The Liaison Committee of Historians came into being in 1982 as a result of an important international symposium that the Commission had organized in Luxembourg to launch historical research on European integration. The committee is composed of historians of the European Union member countries who work on contemporary history.

The Liaison Committee:
- gathers and conveys information about work on European history after the Second World War;
- advises the European Union on research projects concerning contemporary European history. Thus, the Liaison Committee was commissioned to make publicly available the archives of the Community institutions;
- enables researchers to make better use of the archival sources;
- promotes research meetings to get an update of work in progress and to stimulate new research: seven research conferences have been organized and their proceedings published.

The Journal of European Integration History – Revue d’histoire de l’intégration européenne – Zeitschrift für Geschichte der europäischen Integration is in line with the preoccupations of the Liaison Committee. Being the first history journal to deal exclusively with the history of European Integration, the Journal offers the increasing number of young historians devoting their research to contemporary Europe, a permanent forum.

The Liaison Committee is supported by the European Commission, but works completely independently and according to historians’ critical method.

* *

Le Groupe de liaison des professeurs d’histoire contemporaine auprès de la Commission des Communautés européennes s’est constitué en 1982 à la suite d’un grand colloque que la Commission avait organisé à Luxembourg pour lancer la recherche historique sur la construction européenne. Il regroupe des professeurs d’université des pays membres de l’Union européenne, spécialistes d’histoire contemporaine.

Le Groupe de liaison a pour mission:
- de diffuser l’information sur les travaux portant sur l’histoire de l’Europe après la Seconde Guerre mondiale;
- de conseiller l’Union européenne sur les actions scientifiques à entreprendre avec son appui; ainsi le Groupe de liaison a assuré une mission concernant la mise à la disposition du public des archives des institutions communautaires;
- d’aider à une meilleure utilisation par les chercheurs des moyens de recherche mis à leur disposition (archives, sources orales...);
- d’encourager des rencontres scientifiques afin de faire le point sur les connaissances acquises et de susciter de nouvelles recherches: sept grands colloques ont été organisés et leurs actes publiés.


Le Groupe de liaison bénéficie du soutien de la Commission européenne. Ses colloques et publications se font en toute indépendance et conformément à la méthode critique qui est celle des historiens.
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Towards a Supranational History?

Introduction

Johnny Laursen

As these lines are being written the European Convent has for some time been engaged in a debate over what form the future European Union should take. In a sense this discussion also involves a debate over the European past. How should we understand the nature and future of the European nation states? What are the exact nature and dynamics of the European integration process? What relationship between the European community and the Europe beyond? Does there exist – from Reykjavik to Diyarbakîr – a European polity with shared values and concepts?

While politicians are struggling with these questions in an effort to shape the future, historians and social scientists are struggling with much the same questions in an effort to shape the past. Past, present and future European integration is in many ways equally elusive. Just as the present European order is up to discussion also the history of European integration is hard to define.

First, the historians of the EU are studying a subject matter which has not yet found its final shape. Hence, the transient, still changing nature and borders of the EU and of the other European institutions can make it difficult to find a common perspective and a shared set of research questions. This is much more so as the history of European integration is not only pursued by historians, but also by other disciplines such as political science, law etc.

Secondly, the field embraces a variety of methods and approaches in the way researchers work on the history of European integration. The established tradition in the field is that of the empirical, archive-based and severely footnoted ‘histoire événementielle’, closely related to its near cousin the diplomatic history. However, although the subject matter – history of European integration – is obligatory, the methods and the academic backgrounds of the students of the field are far from exclusive. Not only historians (of which there are many kinds already), but also political scientists, sociologists, lawyers and many others apply themselves to this rich field. It is an example of an enriching, interdisciplinary exchange between archive-based, empirical history and more theory-oriented approaches. The variety of methods and approaches is a source of scientific innovation and copiousness, although this admittedly does little to narrow down what the study of the history of European integration is really about.

Third, we are dealing with a subject which is not easy to define in terms of geography and chronology. If we chose the easy and conventional way to define the subject matter, that is to say that the history of European integration is the history about the creation and development of the European Union, many questions remain open. What place does the history of the coming new memberstates of the EU such as the Czech Republic, Estonia or Malta take in such a framework? Is the historical experience of these countries really only relevant from the point of view of mem-
bership, or can the study of European integration embrace wider issues and broader chronological periods of time than that of the existence of the European community? Does there exist, beneath the Iron Curtain of the Cold War, a history of European integration shared by the peoples of both Eastern and Western Europe? Indeed, the boundaries of the subject matter seem to change as the focus shifts between institutions, politics, security issues and identities and perceptions.

Fourth, and most important the field has special features which constitute a challenge. In many ways the study of European integration is and has been – and should to a large extent be – national history. It is on the other hand also a field that highlights the limitations of the national history perspective. We are looking at a process where power and political dynamics are vested into something above the national – something supranational – so if we want to explain this or that negotiation process or this or that set of identity patterns we will have to look at the nation state plus something beyond, a complex pattern of interaction between national governments, Non-state actors and more or less supranational institutions and processes.

Even though this issue of the Journal of European Integration History is an open issue and not a thematic one, the six contributions are nevertheless a fairly representative selection of the established research areas of the history of European integration. Milène Wegmann’s study on the Neo-liberal Conception of a European Federation, 1918-1945 can be considered a study of the intellectual pre-history of the European integration process. The author demonstrates how a group of influential neo-liberal economists such as von Hayek, Röpke, Einaudi and Robbins developed a set of politico-economic doctrines in the interwar period, where a customs union within a liberal economic system was intrinsically linked to a political federation and an international system of states based on international law. During the Second World War these thinkers moved towards a stronger focus on the requirements of social and cultural integration as a necessary foundation for a successful federation. The author is able to trace back the development of a number of key concepts in the federalist thinking to the intellectual origins in the period 1918-1945. Bertrand Vayssière’s work on The Italian Origins of European Federalism during the Second World War investigates the emergence of the Movimento Federalista Europeo and the influences and the circumstances of the Manifesto de Ventotene edited by Altiero Spinelli in collaboration with Ernesto Rossi and Eugenio Colorni in 1943. The militant federalism of these oppositional Italian intellectuals who were convinced of the central role that a federal European solution would play in the future peace system explains the particular strength of European federalism in Italy and throws light on one of the main sources of the emergence of the European federalist movements. Moreover, Bertrand Vayssière carries the analysis beyond intellectual and elitist political history with his analysis of how the Italian federalists failed to adapt to the hard peacetime realities of the primacy of national priorities in the post-war world. Here we move into another important current in the history of European integration.

The pursuit by national elites of European power politics and of national political agendas has with good cause played a central role in the studies of the European integration process in the 1950’s. This holds good for both the abortive ventures
such as the attempt to create a European Defence Community and for the more successful undertakings such as the Schuman plan and the negotiation of the Treaties of Rome. The traditional focus on the 1950’s and on the incentives – and the lack thereof – in the nation states to engage in the integration process is well justified. The time of birth of the European Community undoubtedly is the crux for understanding why nation states have engaged in ceding sovereignty to the supranational community and what was the original ‘contract’ of the integration process. Examining why the Six set sails for the integration process that ended with the EU – and why others did not (at that point of time at least) – is still an important subject for researchers. Two of the contributions to this issue are analyzing these problems in a country where dynamics and reluctance at one and the same time seem to have been most manifest. Seung-Ryeol Kim’s article on France’s Agony between «Vocation Européenne et Mondiale»: The Union Française as an Obstacle in the French Policy of Supranational European Integration, 1952-1954 is a study of France’s attempts to reconcile her priorities in the European policy with her world power status. European considerations – especially in relation to Germany – brought the French political leadership to engage first in the green pool negotiations and later in the attempt to establish a European Army with a European Political Community as a ‘roof organization’. It was, however, difficult to reconcile these policies with the preservation of France’s world power role in which the Union Française was the main pillar. Thus, Seung-Reyol Kim shows how the concern for the endangered system of dependency between France and her earlier colonies contributed to the French rejection of the green pool and to the failure to ratify the EDC treaty. While Seung-Reyol Kim’s article focusses on the overseas aspect of French European policy, Lise Rye Svartvatn’s In Quest of Time, Protection and Approval: France and the Claims for Social Harmonisation in the European Economic Community, 1955-56 turns the attention to the French domestic political considerations during the negotiations on the Treaty of Rome. Lise Rye Svartvatn’s work shows how France’s social policy pursued at European level intended to achieve the domestic aims of securing a continued expansion and modernisation of French industry. In itself a reflection of temporal problems and domestic, political disunity on the question of European integration, the line pursued by France had nevertheless longterm effects on the institutional and policy-oriented compromises in the Treaty of Rome.

Still, however important this original compromise on the Treaty of Rome was, the functions and dynamics of the European Communities met with changes in the face of challenges from outside forces. Even though the integration process initiated by the Six was progressively to become the heart of the development of European institution-building and co-operation, it should be remembered that the Six did not have the monopoly in European integration and co-operation in the 1950’s and 1960’s. Till now the relationship between those inside the union and those outside (or waiting to join) has been one of the most critical factors of the history of the European community. This was so already with the divide between the Anglo-Scandinavian functionalists and the Continental federalists at the time of the foundation of the Council of Europe in 1949, the break-up of the OEEC in 1958-59 and the Euro-
pean market schism between The Six and The Seven throughout the 1960’s. Juhana Aunesluoma’s contribution An Elusive Partnership: Europe, Economic Co-operation and British Policy towards Scandinavia 1945-51 analyses the perceptions and aims in the British Scandinavian policy and in the establishment of the so-called Uniscan co-operation between the UK, Norway, Denmark and Sweden. For a brief moment in 1949 the Uniscan had potential to achieve more than the eventual formless consultations. This study of Uniscan allows a glimpse of the perceptions of many British and Scandinavian decision-makers in the 1950’s. In this sense it is an important contribution to the pre-history of EFTA.

Of course the history of European integration is not limited to the history of the European Communities. On the one hand the integration process exerted an influence that went far beyond the tariff wall of the EEC. The creation of the Schuman Plan and the EEC became important factors for other European states such as Greece, Portugal and Austria. On the other hand, the influence worked also the other way round. Two of the most momentous events for the development of the European Communities was when the British decided first to stay aloof and later on to join the EEC. As today the question of enlargement of the European Communities did not only pose a challenge to the Community in terms of widening, but touched upon the balance of power between states and institutions, upon decision-making procedures and policies. Is it actually possible to explain the development of the EEC without evoking the question of the British EEC-membership hovering over the organisation throughout the 1960’s? The question of enlargement has been one of the most dynamic and conflict-ridden factors in the history of the Community during its existence. But it is also an issue which makes it necessary to redefine the research questions designed for the study of the 1950’s. While the 1950’s might shed light on why nation states join forces and cede sovereignty – or not – creating a supranational community, the rise of the enlargement question from 1961 onwards shifts the question to why nation states should decide to join an already existing supranational co-operation with an established institutional structure and a fixed body of law. Archive-based historical research has in later years begun to till this land. Hopefully the next few years will see the publication of historical studies of the first successful enlargement of the EC in 1972-73 based on primary sources. The implications cannot yet be clearly seen. The many variants of integration theory will also hopefully receive new stimulus from these research results. It is a real challenge to the many more or less theoretical efforts to come to grasp the integration process and the nature of the ever closer union trying to incorporate the changing dynamics and factors as the community grew from six to fifteen nation states. Perhaps it would require two sets of theory: one explaining why nation states should come together and create a supranational community and the other analysing why nation states should join such a community created after the designs of others.

Another challenge to the history of European integration is the progress of the archive-based studies of community policies made into the field former monopolised by policy studies. In recent years researchers have broadened our knowledge
about the structures and policies of the emerging community. Beginning with the 1960’s a number of the early policy areas have been studied and mapped in greater depth than before. Lise Rye Svartvatn’s aforementioned contribution and Erin Delaney’s *The Labour Party’s Changing Relationship to Europe. The Expansion of European Social Policy*, are in fact examples of this trend. While the former looks at the French strategies used in the field of social policy, the latter focuses on the British Labour Party’s views on the social policies implemented by the EC. The first looks at the French position at the time of the Treaty of Rome, while the latter traces the long term patterns of continuity and change in the British Labour Party’s views of the EC using the example of the EC’s development of social policies. Both approaches have their merits. Delaney is thus able to show on the one hand how the Euro-scepticism of the British Labour Party had strong roots in its initial perception of the social nature of the Common Market, and on the other hand how the growth of the community’s social policies had a backlash on the Labour Party’s doctrines in general and on the Labour Party’s European policy in particular. This contribution reminds archival researchers of how useful it can be to take a broader look that underlines the inert nature of political perceptions and ideologies, the importance of long term change and macro-historical patterns.

One of the fascinating aspects of the policy studies analysing the origins of important EEC-policies in the 1960’s is that they throw light on the emerging community institutions and the maze of community decision-making processes. This can be seen in Piers Ludlow’s studies of the European Commission at important turning points in the 1960’s as well as in Ann-Christine Lauring Knudsen’s Ph.D.-thesis on the making of the EEC’s Common Agricultural Policy. Other research results in fields such as the trade policy, the Common Market and the GATT-negotiations and the relationship to the less developed countries of the world could be mentioned. Indeed only in the 1960’s the community archives of the EEC institutions really begin to abound with documents that can offer an alternative or a supplement to the documents in national archives. With an overall view of the integration process of the 1960’s and 1970’s emerging, the discipline will have covered a first, long exhaustive stretch comparable to the political feat marked by the consolidation and expansion of the European Community at the end of that period. With an in-depth overview of the integration history of the 1960’s the history of European integration will furthermore have moved from its origins as either federal history or as a particular aspect of this or that country’s foreign policy to a discipline that is also supranational in the sense that its subject matter is more than the accumulated sum of national policies. The history of European integration is still a quite national business or a special branch of foreign policy studies. We tend to write on ‘Country X and the European Y’ or ‘Country X, Country Y and the European Z’. Sources from the national foreign ministry archives abound in this kind of research. Still, this is important work – also for the history of European integration. However, with the shift in focus from the pioneering years of European integration research – the 1950’s – to the following decades one may hope that the history of European integration will also move even more towards a more supranational focus. The French
historians will hardly claim a veto. British historians will not want to renegotiate their – admittedly momentous – contribution to European integration history, nor will Danish historians vote no. In this respect it is encouraging that many of the contributions to this issue are from younger scholars working on source materials and subjects other than that of their own nationality. However, there remains an enlargement issue confronting students of the European integration history. It is important that EU history should also be seen from the perspective of non-EU countries, from coming member-countries and that non-EU aspects of European integration should also be included.

The 1970’s and 1980’s will bring new questions and an expansion of the subject to new policies, themes and institutions. But empirical, archive-based historical research is moving slowly and will always be lingering at the threshold of the access limits to the archives. It is therefore a strength that the field is broader and more varied than this classical school of historical studies. Other methods and approaches can – and should – be applied to the recent epochs of European integration inaccessible for the archive-grinding historian, to the past already covered by this school of history and to entirely other themes and subject areas of the elusive phenomenon we know as European integration. It appears that the history of European integration is, as Ernest Hemingway called his memoirs about the years in Paris, a moveable feast.

In the 19th century many historians played an important role in laying the foundations for the emerging nation states not to mention for the emerging European nationalisms. After the catastrophes of the 20th century the craft attained new functions as a critical voice that contributed to political and moral reflection in the European democracies. The painful past, war and peace, the workings of the political order and the limits of liberty were scrutinized by many political historians. And rightly so. A functioning democracy needs a critical and inquisitive history writing in order to stimulate discussion on the workings of the democratic and social institutions. As the European Union has grown to a political and social factor of the first rank for many of the European democracies it is now more necessary than ever to subject the making of European policy in the nation states to the searching light of historians and other students of the field. Moreover, as the European Union is becoming a political entity with strong democratic and social institutions also supranational Europe itself will require such a critical history with an interpretative framework broader than that of the single nation state. It might well be difficult to say what conclusions the European Convent will arrive at, but it is a reasonably fair guess that the proceedings will be wordy and that they will focus on the democratic institutions. And democracies – also supranational or federal democracies – need their history.
Les origines italiennes du fédéralisme européen pendant la Seconde Guerre mondiale.

Bertrand Vayssière

La guerre de 1939-1945 tient une place particulière dans le renouvellement de la pensée fédéraliste. Elle est d'abord une manifestation des égoïsmes nationaux qui ne peuvent que déboucher sur des règlements de comptes, faute d'arbitrage juridique. Elle est ensuite une préfiguration du «grand nettoyage», logique espérée par toutes les tendances du fédéralisme de l'entre-deux-guerres. Suivant cette dernière, certains hommes commencent à envisager de nouveaux modes d'action au sein même de la Résistance.

Ce sont les Italiens qui se montrent les plus prompts à formuler une définition ambitieuse du fédéralisme, à tel point qu'ils sont les premiers à mettre sur pied, avant même la fin de la guerre, une organisation susceptible de faire entendre leur voix. L'Italie apparaît donc bien comme un «laboratoire du fédéralisme militant», qui cherche à combiner théorie et impulsion politique. L'opération de «médiation» se fait au sein de la Résistance et dans l'exil, précisément dans cette Suisse neutre qui devient le refuge de nombreux Italiens vers la fin de la guerre. C'est dans le cadre de cet exil que les premiers contacts vont être établis en dehors de la communauté italienne, permettant au fédéralisme de franchir les frontières et ainsi d’acquérir une véritable dimension européenne. Cette dimension européenne est précisément la seule à même de faire comprendre l'originalité de l'idée fédéraliste au sein de la Résistance, et l'importance qu'elle a pu avoir après la guerre. Nous sommes ainsi en désaccord avec l'idée défendue par certains chercheurs, selon laquelle le fédéralisme ne trouve sa force doctrinale qu'à partir de 1945.1 Certes, si l'on se réfère à l'exemple français, il est évident que la Résistance contrôlée peu à peu par de Gaulle a effacé les différences idéologiques d'un bloc que l'on veut monolithique, et opposé par nature à tout ce qui est fédéraliste.2 En revanche, une étude de ce même courant dans le milieu de la résistance italienne y montre une vigueur exceptionnelle,3 alors que l'on peut voir dans l'organisation du Movimento Federalista Europeo (1943) une préfiguration de l'Union Européenne des Fédéralistes, qui sera effectivement créée en 1946.

A trop étudier l'activisme fédéraliste à l'intérieur des frontières nationales, il est difficile de donner les éléments de réflexion susceptibles de faire comprendre le

Bertrand Vayssière

renouveau et la place du fédéralisme européen dans l’après-guerre. On peut même dire, dans le cas français, que l’étude de l’idée fédéraliste sert bien souvent à illustrer sa nocivité et à justifier a posteriori l’apparente désaffection à son égard. Pour nous au contraire, l’idée fédéraliste a une place essentielle dans la Résistance, un «dénominateur commun» selon les mots de Norberto Bobbio, qui ne pouvait qu’éclore dans une période bouleversée. La guerre, combattue par les fédéralistes, sera cependant toujours revendiquée par eux comme étant l’une de leurs matrices, comme moteur de leur engagement à la détruire. A l’image de la plupart des idées politiques qui se font entendre dans l’immédiat après-guerre en Europe, le fédéralisme s’élève sur un champ de ruines, s’insère dans une réalité guerrière et cette origine le marquera pour longtemps, en particulier dans ses difficultés à s’adapter au cadre politique inédit de la Libération, marqué par la Guerre froide. Il est donc intéressant de voir, à travers son élaboration, comment l’Europe devient une alternative politique à part entière, et de quelle manière les fédéralistes se préparent aux enjeux de l’après-guerre. L’étude de l’action des fédéralistes italiens pendant la guerre est donc un bon moyen d’aborder la naissance d’un véritable courant «scientifique» issu d’une pensée jusque-là brouillonne. Nous verrons aussi comment cette pensée, déterminée et modelée selon les circonstances d’une guerre totale, a dû s’adapter au cadre de la Libération.

Les Archives Historiques des Communautés Européennes de Florence contiennent de nombreuses sources qui permettent d’éclairer les premiers balbutiements de la pensée fédéraliste au sein de la Résistance, notamment à travers une volumineuse documentation de diverses origines (fonds Walter Lipgens). Le fonds Altiero Spinelli éclaire les motivations et le parcours du plus bouillant des fédéralistes ainsi que son activité fébrile, dont on peut sentir l’intensité à travers sa correspondance, ses écrits ou ses rapports, ainsi que son rôle dans la rédaction du premier document politique du fédéralisme européen de la Résistance, le Manifeste de Ventotene. Ces travaux permettent également de mesurer l’apport intellectuel et l’impact de cette forte personnalité, dans une action qui se veut avant tout collective. D’autres acteurs italiens ont laissé des souvenirs de leur action, dont certains se limitent à raconter un épisode de leur vie: c’est le cas par exemple du fédéraliste Luciano Bolis qui, dans Mon grain de sable, raconte son arrestation par les fascistes à la fin de la guerre, et nous permet de comprendre l’importance de la Résistance dans son engagement fédéraliste. Concernant plus précisément l’action menée par les fédéralistes italiens en terre helvétique à partir de septembre 1943, de nombreuses

4. «La guerre ne change pas substantiellement les problèmes de vie et de mort qu’il nous faut résoudre. Mais elle précipite, elle accélère furieusement leur évolution, elle transforme en un processus paroxystique ce qui normalement se serait étalé sur un grand espace de temps, et elle change avec une extraordinaire rapidité les conditions de réalisation historique», J. MARITAIN, L’Europe et l’idée fédérale, Mame, Paris, 1993, p.51 (texte écrit en 1940).
recherches ont été menées outre-Alpes, 7 qui continuent actuellement sous la houlette du professeur Luigi V. Majocchi au Département d'Histoire de l'Université de Pavie, grâce à l'ouverture d'archives inédites de certains des acteurs fédéralistes italiens, telles que celles de Guglielmo Usellini.8 Enfin, il faut revenir aux Archives de Florence pour tout ce qui touche à l'organisation du premier mouvement fédéraliste européen dans l'après-guerre, l'Union Européenne des Fédéralistes, dont le fonds est riche de plus de deux cents dossiers.

1) Le Manifeste de Ventotene: 9 genèse et enseignements.

Les Italiens sont-ils les initiateurs du militantisme fédéraliste, tel qu'il va s'imposer à l’issue du conflit? On aurait tendance à le penser en étudiant les textes qu'ils font alors circuler, au premier chef le Manifeste de Ventotene, l'organisation clandestine qu'ils mettent en place dans leur pays, et enfin les liens qu'ils tissent autour d'eux avant même la fin de la guerre. Il est vrai que les réflexions italiennes sur un éventuel État européen s'appuient sur un héritage d'avant-guerre conséquent. L'un des auteurs les plus revendiqués par les fédéralistes italiens dès le début du conflit est l'un de leurs compatriotes, Luigi Einaudi, futur président de la République. Ce dernier avait écrit dès 1918, dans le Corriere della Sera, deux articles virulents contre «l'internationalisme bâtard» que mettait en place la Société des Nations, système incapable de résoudre les problèmes européens et ne pouvant empêcher, par conséquent, l'exaspération de conflits non réglés.10 Il n'est pas anachronique de parler de ces textes, dans la mesure où ils sont connus des fédéralistes italiens de la Résistance, qui iront jusqu'à les faire publier dans la clandestinité, adoptant ainsi les points de vue de l'auteur qui, lui-même, adhère au Movimento Federalista Europeo dès sa création, en 1943. Les critiques de Luigi Einaudi sont d'ailleurs «intemporelles»: elles ne traitent pas précisément de la SDN, mais des problèmes que souève tout type d'organisation internationale. D'après lui, la SDN est une mauvaise réponse à ces problèmes, dans la mesure où elle ne s’attaque pas au fond de la

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question, celui de la souveraineté nationale (premier article). C'est pourquoi Einaudi propose un autre modèle propre à résoudre les problèmes européens (et c'est sur ce chapitre que les fédéralistes italiens l'ont suivi), celui des États-Unis d'Amérique, c'est-à-dire celui de l'intégration institutionnelle. Le deuxième article est dans la continuité du premier, dans la mesure où il donne les raisons qui rendent nécessaire l'unification européenne: il s'agit de l'interdépendance économique croissante des États entre eux, qu'en bon libéral il juge plus forte que les réalités politiques nationales. On peut comprendre l'importance accordée par les fédéralistes à ces textes qu'ils vont en grande partie récupérer, dans la mesure où, pour la première fois, les raisons de l'unité européenne ne ressortissent pas exclusivement d'un point de vue moralisateur ou pacifiste, mais d'une véritable discussion critique permise par les incohérences de la SDN."

Le Manifeste de Ventotene peut faire comprendre les caractéristiques principales du fédéralisme «de guerre». L'une des raisons essentielles en est qu'il a systématiquement été revendiqué par les fédéralistes eux-mêmes comme l'acte de naissance de la vocation politique du fédéralisme, de même que son principal initiateur, Altiero Spinelli, est reconnu comme l'une des personnalités fédéralistes les plus actives de l'après-guerre. L'autre raison en est que le Manifeste de Ventotene, outre les avancées doctrinales qu'il représente dans les domaines politiques et sociaux, marque un changement majeur dans la perception fédéraliste du monde, qui ne peut être séparé des conditions dans lesquelles il a été écrit: œuvre clandestine, rédigée dans les geôles mussoliniennes en 1941, il fait le constat d'un monde qui a sombré à nouveau dans les affres de la guerre, entraîné par la mécanique guerrière du nationalisme.

On ne peut comprendre l'impact de ce document dans les cercles fédéralistes, ni même sa nouveauté, si l'on a pas à l'esprit ce qu'était le fédéralisme avant la guerre, alors représenté par des mouvements hétéroclites repoussant d'eux-mêmes l'appellation de «fédéralistes». Or, le Manifeste de Ventotene, bientôt suivi par divers textes comme la Déclaration des Résistances européennes (juillet 1944), lui aussi d'origine italienne, revendique le cadre européen comme étant nécessaire pour mener une réforme radicale dans les domaines politiques et sociaux. Ce texte, même s'il faut lui reconnaître une certaine confidentialité, marque l'introduction, dans le débat politique, d'un européisme plus militant, constat à la fois d'un sentiment d'échec et d'une volonté d'en sortir, moule multiforme dans lequel se reconnaissent tous ceux qui veulent réformer une société jugée «selérosée».

Le Manifeste de Ventotene est rédigé par Altiero Spinelli en collaboration avec Emesto Rossi, professeur d'économie, et avec le socialiste Eugenio Colorni, rédac-
teur en chef de l'Avanti. Spinelli est un «militant-né»: très jeune, il entre dans l'activité clandestine antifasciste du Parti communiste italien dont il devient secrétaire des Jeunesses pour l'Italie centrale. Le 3 juin 1927, il a seulement 20 ans lorsqu'il est arrêté par la police mussolinienne, et condamné à 16 ans et 8 mois de prison par le Tribunal spécial fasciste (Tribunal de Séreté de l'Etat). Après 10 années de prison, malgré quelques lois d'amnistie, il est maintenu en détention au printemps 1937 à Ponza, avant d'être transféré en juin 1939 sur l'île de Ventotene. Mais en 1935, la rupture est consommée, à l'occasion d'une réunion clandestine du parti à Ponza, où Spinelli se refuse à prendre partie contre Zinoviev, Kamenev et Boukharine, accusés d'être des espions. Cette rupture n'est pas seulement motivée par des raisons conjoncturelles: il y a également à ce moment-là dans la démarche de Spinelli la recherche d'une nouvelle forme de pensée apte à satisfaire sa vision du monde, la quête d'une idéologie plus adaptée à ce qui ne peut manquer de naître de la guerre. Comme il l'explique lui-même dans une lettre à Albert Camus, qu'il espère gagner à son rêve fédéraliste au moment de la Libération:

«J'ai abandonné l'optimisme historique du marxisme qui était sûr que l'humanité était guidée vers des buts toujours plus élevés par la Providence […] Je suis arrivé à me persuader que toute l'activité de l'homme civilisé est une construction audace (sic) et frêle au-dessus d'un gouffre qui menace de l'engloutir continuellement».

Cette vision plus pessimiste mais, selon lui, plus réaliste de l'avenir politique, il la recherche et semble la trouver à la lecture des fédéralistes britanniques des années 30 (Walter Layton, William Beveridge), ainsi que dans les Federalist Papers d'Alexander Hamilton, John Jay et James Madison. Les Britanniques ont cependant eu plus d'importance, puisque Spinelli dit s'être inspiré, dans sa réflexion sur la crise de l'Etat national, des ouvrages de Lord Lothian et Lionel Robbins. Mêmes Motivations chez Ernesto Rossi, qui lui aussi paie très cher son engagement antifasciste. Après avoir adhéré à l'Alleanza Nazionale du député libéral Giovanni Amendola, suite à l'assassinat de Matteotti (10 juin 1924), puis à l'association secrète Italia Libera, il s'exile en France en 1925, puis revient clandestinement en Italie à la fin de l'année, enseigne l'économie à Bergame et collabore à la Riforma Sociale de Luigi Einaudi. Arrêté en 1930 avec le groupe dirigeant de Giustizia e Libertà auquel il a adhéré, il est condamné à neuf ans de prison, qu'il effectuera du 30 octobre 1930 au 12 novembre 1939, avant d'être exilé à Ventotene, où il rencontre Altiero Spinelli.

Le contexte dans lequel a été décidée l'élaboration du Manifeste est important pour comprendre les motivations de ses auteurs: le document est, en effet, diffusé

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14. Lettera a Camus, 18 mars 1945, p.1, AS-7, ASCE.
15. Ensemble des articles que ces trois hommes font paraître entre octobre 1787 et avril 1788 à l'occasion de la campagne de ratification du projet de Constitution des Etats-Unis, d'inspiration fédéraliste.
sous forme polycopiée sur le continent, dès juillet 1941, par l’intermédiaire d’Ursula Hirschmann, épouse de Colorni (et future femme de Spinelli), qui avait obtenu le droit de vivre à Ventotene avec son mari et ses filles,\footnote{17} d’Ada Rossi (femme d’Ernesto) et des sœurs de Spinelli, Fiorella et Gigliola. Il a pour titre «Pour une Europe libre et unie. Projet de manifeste». Il est édité clandestinement à Rome par Eugenio Colorni en janvier 1944, avec deux autres essais d’Altiero Spinelli, \textit{Les États-Unis d’Europe et les différentes tendances politiques}, et \textit{Politique marxiste et politique fédéraliste},\footnote{18} sous le titre général «Problèmes de la fédération européenne». Le \textit{Manifeste} a donc pu être lu et connu par certains milieux résistants pendant la guerre, mais seulement en Italie, à Rome ou à Milan et non à l’extérieur, comme le reconnaît Spinelli lui-même.\footnote{19} 

Le travail de rédaction est partagé entre Spinelli, qui s’est chargé des problèmes de la crise de la civilisation occidentale, de l’unité européenne et du thème du «parti révolutionnaire» européen, et Rossi, aidé de Colorni, qui a rédigé la partie concernant la réforme de la société. Dans sa Préface à la première édition du \textit{Manifeste}, le 22 janvier 1944, Spinelli résume sa pensée concernant la manière de mettre en place la future structure politique européenne: «Partir du préalable que le premier objectif à atteindre, c’est celui d’une organisation unitaire dans le domaine international, jette une nouvelle lumière sur tous les problèmes».\footnote{20} Le texte lui-même, assez court (24 pages), se partage en trois moments forts: dans la première partie, intitulée «la crise de la civilisation moderne», les auteurs critiquent les États-nations devenus États-Moloch, «faiseurs de soldats» et briseurs des libertés individuelles. Face à cette «crise», la seule solution entrevue par les auteurs consiste à créer de toutes pièces «l’unité européenne» qui nécessite le recours à l’«action révolutionnaire». Enfin, cette action politique à grande échelle devrait permettre de mener à bien une tâche plus délicate, «la réforme de la société», qui consiste en un équilibre savant entre socialisme, largement revendiqué, et action individuelle, un peu à l’image du «socio-libéralisme» qui avait été défendu par le groupe antifasciste \textit{Giustizia e Libertà} des frères Rosselli. On voit donc que la revendication fédéraliste s’accompagne d’une critique totale des cadres politiques nationaux ainsi que de la promesse d’une réforme générale des structures sociales.

\footnote{17} Voici comment Spinelli relate les «voyages» de sa future femme: «La chose était au point de vue matériel relativement facile, car vous deviez vous soumettre à une fouille corporelle et de vos valises, qui consistait [pour Ursula] à se faire enfermer par la police dans une pièce avec une vieille femme de ménage qui, au lieu de la fouiller empochoit un gros pot-de-vin, et un quart d’heure après ouvrait la porte en annonçant que tout allait bien». A. \textsc{Spinelli}, op.cit., p.316.


\footnote{19} «Je ne suis pas à même de connaître le degré de pénétration des écrits fédéralistes. Il faut tenir compte du fait qu’un seul papier illégal était lu par plusieurs personnes et que souvent on le copiait à la machine et on le polycopiait çà et là avant de le détruire. Ce qui est certain, c’est que les milieux antifascistes romains, milanais et turinois de 1943 connaissaient directement ou indirectement le \textit{Manifeste}. Je ne sais pas si Silone le connaissait en 1942 en Suisse. Je ne crois pas que Trentin ait pu le connaître en France». \textit{Le Manifeste de Ventotene}, in: \textit{Les Cahiers de Ventotene}, Institut d’Études Fédéralistes Altiero Spinelli, Lyon/Ventotene, 1988, p.59.

\footnote{20} Ibid., p.13.
Les origines italiennes du fédéralisme européen

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Le Manifeste insiste sur deux idées importantes, d'après les auteurs eux-mêmes:
«La première était que la fédération n'était pas présentée comme un bel idéal […] mais comme un objectif dont il fallait hâter la réalisation, dès notre propre génération […] la seconde idée significative consistait à dire que la lutte pour l'unité européenne allait créer une ligne de partage nouvelle entre les divers courants politiques, différent de celui du passé».21

C'est dans ces dispositions volontaristes que l'on s'éloigne le plus de «l'esprit intellectualiste» des européistes de l'entre-deux-guerres, par exemple d'un Julien Benda qui voyait dans l'unité européenne la «victoire de l'abstrait sur le concret».22 Avec ce message clair et ambitieux, les fédéralistes de la Résistance italienne parviennent à une phase plus mature, à une prise en compte plus rationnelle des possibilités de réorganisation politique du Vieux continent, où la notion de «révolution», dans son acception la plus complète, est clairement revendiquée. Créer un nouveau système exige de détruire l'ancien, et d'agir vite car cette issue est envisagée à court terme.

Le Manifeste de Ventotene se termine ainsi par une invitation à l'action militante, une main tendue à ceux qui sont prêts à accepter ces idées, où qu'ils soient:
«Par la propagande et par l'action, en cherchant à nouer, par tous les moyens, des ententes et des liens entre les divers mouvements qui vont très certainement se former dans les différents pays, il faut, dès à présent, jeter les bases d'un mouvement qui sache mobiliser toutes les forces pour donner naissance à la nouvelle organisation qui sera la création la plus grandiose et la plus novatrice établie en Europe depuis des siècles[…]».23

Les auteurs du Manifeste font donc un pari sur l'avenir, mais ils cherchent avant tout, pour des raisons pratiques, à créer un premier mouvement en Italie.

2) Le Movimento Federalista Europeo, première forme d'organisation d'un fédéralisme militant.

Ce mouvement est créé dès la chute du fascisme dans l'ensemble de la péninsule, et la nomination de Pietro Badoglio comme chef de gouvernement le 25 juillet 1943. Le Movimento Federalista Europeo est mis sur pied lors d'une réunion clandestine tenue à Milan les 27 et 28 juillet 1943, dans la maison du physicien Mario Alberto Rollier, que Spinelli avait rencontré en tant que militant du Partito d'Azione et qui avait été membre du parti fasciste jusqu'à ce que celui-ci adopte les premières lois antisémites.24 On peut dire un mot du Partito d'Azione, dans la mesure où cette formation politique nouvelle joue un rôle important dans l'itinéraire d'une grande par-

23. Le Manifeste de Ventotene, op.cit., p.36.
tie des fédéralistes italiens. Celui-ci a été créé par les antifascistes Ferruccio Parri, Ugo La Malfa, Adolfo Tino, anciens de Giustizia e Libertà, qui publient leur premier manifeste en décembre 1941 et établissent un programme en sept points à Rome, le 4 juin 1942. Parmi ces sept points, on note l’abolition de la monarchie, la décentralisation, les nationalisations, la réforme agraire, le syndicalisme, la séparation de l’Eglise et de l’Etat. Le septième point porte sur la nécessité d’une Fédération européenne et c’est celui qui permet les rapprochements entre MFE et Partito d’Azione, qui se vérifie par l’adhésion de Spinelli et Rossi à ce dernier, en 1943.

Parmi les personnalités présentes lors de la réunion de Milan, on peut repérer quelques futurs acteurs notoires du militantisme européen: les trois auteurs du Manifeste de Ventotene (qui ont été libérés au début du mois de juillet), Ursula Hirschmann, Franco Venturi, Guglielmo Jervis, Vindice Cavallera, Leone Ginzburg, Vittorio Foa, Enrico Giussani, etc. (au total 22 personnes). Difficile de trouver une véritable homogénéité politique parmi ces fondateurs, si ce n’est leur engagement dans la Résistance. La composition politique de cette première assemblée montre cependant que les idées défendues par le Manifeste de Ventotene commencent à être connues, suscitant l’adhésion ou, au moins, la sympathie de résistants italiens issus d’horizons politiques différents: en effet, parmi les 22 personnes présentes, 9 viennent, comme Rossi, Cololini et Spinelli, de Ventotene, 14 ont adhéré au Partito d’Azione, 3 sont ou vont devenir socialistes, et deux sont membres du Parti Républicain, alors que Spinelli, sa femme Ursula et sa sœur Fiorella se disent «sans parti». Parmi les «thèses politiques» à la base du MFE, écrites par Spinelli à Ventotene et discutées lors de cette réunion de Milan, on trouve quelques principes directement inspirés du Manifeste: le désir d’aller jusqu’à l’écrasement du nazisme et de fonder par la suite une paix solide (point 1); la volonté de rompre avec les droits régaliens de l’État, présentés comme des moyens d’asservissement des individus au profit d’un Moloch jamais rassasié (point 2); le refus d’adopter une formule confédérale du type SDN ou Confédération germanique (point 3); la volonté de mettre en place une Fédération européenne avec tous les pouvoirs nécessaires (point 4); le désir de fonder cette Fédération en mettant d’emblée de côté les aspirations politiques des uns et des autres, celles-ci ne pouvant être satisfaites qu’une fois que la légitimité du nouvel État européen ne sera plus remise en cause (point 5); la nécessité d’agir vite par un vaste effort de propagande et d’information (point 6).

Il faut bien insister sur le fait que les fédéralistes de la première heure se mettent en retrait de tout militantisme politique classique, ne faisant la différence qu’entre partis «progressistes» (plutôt de gauche à l’heure de la Libération, de toute façon ouverts aux problèmes européens) et «réactionnaires» (les partis qui ont collaboré, ceux qui montrent des réticences à tout type d’organisation du continent, parmi ces derniers les partis communistes). Cette attitude est à retenir dans le combat fédéraliste car elle permet au mouvement une souplesse qui fait passer l’objectif européen avant toute considération partisane. Même le socialiste Eugenio Cololini, qui a participé à la rédaction du Manifeste de Ventotene et à la création du MFE, démythifie la légende d’une Europe faite par le seul socialisme:

25. A. SPINELLI, Come ho tentato …, op.cit., p.34.
«Nous savons par expérience que les sentiments chauvins et les intérêts protectionnistes peuvent facilement conduire au conflit et à la concurrence même entre deux démocraties; et il n'est pas dit qu'un État socialiste riche doive nécessairement accepter de mettre en commun ses propres ressources avec un autre État socialiste bien plus pauvre, par le seul fait que dans ce dernier est en vigueur un régime interne similaire au premier».

Les motivations des fédéralistes italiens apparaissent à travers les articles de leur organe de presse, L’Unità Europea. Ce journal, dont le premier numéro paraît en mai 1943, est le principal organe de la pensée fédéraliste au sein de la Résistance italienne: les deux premiers tirages sont réalisés clandestinement à Rome sous la direction d’Ursula Hirschmann, Ada Rossi, Cerilo Spinelli et Guglielmo Usellini, puis à Milan (Mario Alberto Rollier), excepté le n°5 édité en Suisse. Tiré à 4.000 exemplaires en juin 1944, il passe en juin 1945 à 7.000 avant de devenir hebdomadaire à partir du 29 avril 1945 et ce jusqu'à la fin des années quarante, époque où il sera relayé par le nouveau titre du MFE, Europa Federata.

Comme pour tout ce qui concerne la presse clandestine, faite dans l'urgence et donc avec un délai de réflexion très court, sans compter le manque de moyens, la valeur des articles de L’Unità Europea est très inégale. Ces articles, bien souvent, se répètent et sont, bien entendu, anonymes (bien que l'on sache que la plupart ont été rédigés par Spinelli ou Rossi). Le message est à la fois simple et ambitieux: la possibilité pour le MFE de devenir un élément de liaison entre les différents partis démocratiques, sans pour autant être annexé par un parti («Movimento o Partito?») et, partant, d’influencer programmes et action («Le Tendenze Federaliste», où l’on insiste sur l’importance d’un «préalable fédéral» avant toute restauration démocratique). Le terme «Révolution» revient le plus souvent, ainsi que la nécessité de s’insérer dans la politique concrète de chaque nation pour ensuite passer à l'échelle supérieure («Governo di Unione Nazionale o Politica Federalista»; «Intransigenza»). En ce qui concerne la méthode, on trouve une première contradiction entre ceux qui se réfèrent au texte de Milan d’août 1943, souhaitant en passer par l’appel aux masses (bien que le mot «Constituante» n’apparaisse jamais dans ces 8 numéros, terme auquel on préfère pacte), ceux qui croient en la seule bonne volonté des pays vainqueurs et ceux qui s'en méfient. Ce qui est clair, en revanche, c’est la nécessité d'abandonner les «mirages» du système confédéral de l’Europe «de Briand». L’ennemi, lui, est omniprésent, ne serait-ce que par les références à son rôle dialectique: c’est l'action destructrice du Nazisme-Fascisme qui va

26. Eugenio Colorni, préface à l'édition clandestine des Problemi della Federazione Europea, janvier 1944.
27. Titre d'un article de Guglielmo Usellini, futur secrétaire général de l’Union Européenne des Fédéralistes, (UEF), paru dans L'Unità Europea, n°2, août 1943.
28. Article paru dans L’Unità Europea, n°1, mai 1943 (Altiero Spinelli).
29. Ernesto Rossi, paru dans L’Unità Europea, n°4, janvier 1944.
32. Ainsi en est-il d'un article de l'Anglaise Edith Monroe, repris dans le n°4 de L'Unità Europea, où le Fédérateur pourrait être l'URSS.
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permettre le renouveau politique et social tant attendu. Ainsi, à propos de la mort d'Eugenio Colorni lors de la libération de Rome (juin 1944) est-il écrit, dans le n°5,

«que parfois [Colorni] était même porté à mettre en avant, paradoxalement, les aspects positifs de la politique hitlérienne, dans la mesure où celle-ci allait renverser toutes ces absurdes souverainetés anachroniques de trente-deux États-nations qui divisaient notre continent».34

Dans le feu de l'action, les fédéralistes se soucient cependant encore peu des réactions des partis classiques, et cherchent d'abord à faire connaître leurs thèses. La dernière résolution prise à Milan concerne l'organisation du MFE, en Italie et à l'étranger: Mario Alberto Rollier est nommé responsable du mouvement à Milan et Eugenio Colorni à Rome, alors que Spinelli et Rossi sont chargés de faire connaître celui-ci hors des frontières italiennes. Les résolutions issues de la rencontre clandestine de Milan sont publiées en italien dans L'Unità Europea (septembre 1943). L'importance de la rencontre de Milan dans l'amorce d'un véritable activisme fédéraliste est résumée par Spinelli: d'après lui, la création du MFE doit donner le départ d'une alliance avec les fédéralistes «d'au-delà des Alpes».

3) Le milieu fédéraliste en Suisse.

Les idées du fédéralisme italien ont beau être ambitieuses, elles ne sont pour l'instant que l'apanage d'une minorité qui vit en vase clos. Dès le départ, les rédacteurs du Manifeste de Ventotene ont compris qu'elles devaient, pour survivre, être diffusées. Ce combat pour la reconnaissance débute dans le chaos d'une Libération incomplète, celle qui est opérée sur le territoire italien après la première chute de Mussolini (25 juillet 1943). Avec l'élargissement des principaux protagonistes fédéralistes, la diffusion de leurs idées hors des frontières devient possible. Le premier pays visé est la Suisse, ce qui s'explique par des raisons pratiques, en même temps qu'idéologiques.

La Suisse est considérée comme un sanctuaire par les premiers fédéralistes. Cette terre est en effet hospitalière à ceux qui, dans l'exil que leur a imposé la guerre, réfléchissent à un nouvel ordre européen, et qui vont jusqu'à voir dans ce pays la préfiguration de ce que pourrait être une Europe fédérale.35 Spinelli, en particulier, veut profiter de son exil pour

rassembler autour de lui ceux qui étaient déjà fédéralistes, ou «convertibles» au fédéralisme, et de réaliser ainsi l’espoir de propagande évoqué à la réunion de Milan.36

L’attraction de la Suisse est particulièrement ressentie par les Italiens, qui vont s’y réfugier en masse vers la fin du conflit. Bien sûr, ce rôle d’asile a déjà joué pour de nombreux antifascistes bien avant la guerre, comme, par exemple, pour Ignazio Silone, fixé à Zurich depuis 1930,37 où il mène une intense activité politique. Mais c’est surtout avec ce que les Italiens appellent le «Grand Exode» que sont réunies les conditions d’une véritable ébullition politique dans le milieu des réfugiés en Suisse. Ce «Grand Exode» s’accélère après la libération de Mussolini, alors détenu dans les Abruzzes, par un détachement de SS (12 septembre 1943). Comme dans tous les moments de panique, se mélangent les fuyards, quelles que soient leurs origines sociales; le 5 septembre, les douaniers suisses enregistrent l’entrée de la belle-fille et de la fille du maréchal Badoglio, les 8 et 9 septembre, c’est au tour de la princesse de Piémont, Maria José de Savoie, accompagnée de ses quatre enfants; au milieu du mois de septembre, on trouve de nombreux fédéralistes, parmi lesquels Ernesto Rossi (le 14 septembre à partir du poste-frontière d’Arogno) et Altiero Spinelli (le 15 septembre à partir de Gandria). L’afflux est alors si important que le Conseil fédéral suisse décide de fermer les frontières le 16 septembre mais, le 17, on enregistre encore 10.000 entrées et d’autres encore après, parmi lesquelles celle de Luigi Einaudi (22 septembre).38 Pour des raisons de commodité, ces réfugiés sont regroupés dans le canton du Tessin, autour de Lugano, ce qui est une manière de les maintenir en dehors de la communauté suisse, puisqu’ils échouent tout près de la frontière.

C’est dans cet îlot, si proche et si loin de la guerre en même temps, que vont s’opérer les premières actions des fédéralistes italiens, notamment en ce qui concerne le recrutement. Ce sont des Italiens de l’exil qui sont les premiers à être engagés dans le tout nouveau mouvement: c’est en Suisse que Spinelli va rechercher et obtenir l’adhésion de Luigi Einaudi, d’Ignazio Silone, du socialiste Leo Valiani et d’autres figures de la Résistance italienne réfugiées de l’autre côté des Alpes, ainsi que d’anciens fascistes ayant tourné le dos au régime alors en pleine radicalisation. Beaucoup des premiers adhérents au fédéralisme sont d’ailleurs concernés par ce rejet, faisant partie d’une génération qui n’a connu que les déceptions du Fascisme.39 Il se crée donc en Suisse, sous la direction de Spinelli et Rossi,

37. Entré au PSI en 1921, il a participé à la fondation du PCI, qu’il a représenté à la conférence internationale de Moscou, où il s’est exilé. Il quitte ce parti en 1930 pour venir s’installer en Suisse, où il rencontre les fédéralistes. Sa première grande œuvre est Fontamara (1930).
39. Pour le fédéraliste néerlandais Henri Brugmans, qui a rencontré ses homologues italiens dès la Libération, Luciano Bolis représente bien en ce sens un symbole: «Tout jeune, il avait été fasciste avec un enthousiasme sincère. Avec ferveur, il crut d’abord à la logomachie chauvine qui exalta le sacrifice comme idéal […] Puis, comme d’autres, il avait été pris par ses premiers doutes et, chemin faisant, finit dans les rangs d’une clandestinité en armes […] Pourrait-on revenir à la situation des années 1920, qui avait vu la décomposition des partis et des syndicats? Non, il fallait un programme novateur». H. BRUGMANS, A travers le siècle, Presses Interuniversitaires Européennes, Bruxelles, 1993, p.245.
une petite communauté italienne active, qui fait découvrir et prospérer dans ce terreau des réfugiés les thèses fédéralistes. Ces dernières figurent dans les Quaderni del Movimento Federalista Europeo, qui publient dans un premier temps sur des feuilles polycopiées, puis sous forme d’opusculs d’environ 50 pages, les contributions de Rossi et Spinelli sous leurs pseudonymes respectifs (Storeno et Pantalone), ainsi que celles de tous ces auteurs britanniques que les deux italiens ont appris à connaître dans leur exil à Ventotene.

En plus de cet exploit éditorial, il faut rappeler qu’en Suisse est publié le n°5 de L’Unità Europea, ainsi que certains opuscules destinés à une large diffusion au sein des exilés italiens. La chance des Italiens, pendant cette période suisse, est également d’avoir rencontré certains intermédiaires d’autres nationalités, qui ont permis aux idées fédéralistes d’emprunter des circuits variés. Cette activité fébrile n’est cependant pas appréciée par tout le monde. Le socialiste italien Piero della Giusta, de passage à Genève, rend ainsi compte du travail de Rossi dans son journal, à la date du 20 décembre 1943:

«Son rendement moyen est de deux opuscules de 40-60 pages par mois […] Les 12 Tables de la Fédération ont la couleur de l’exil et de l’isolement, et même le goût. Elles ont été conçues dans une atmosphère vraiment fébrile, irréelle et liée au confinement, où les rêves d’un avenir meilleur se fondent avec les espérances d’une justice plus proche, où l’action est toujours plus lointaine, où l’inaction allume les cerveaux dans des constructions et des reconstructions idéales, où les proportions et les mesures semblent se perdre dans les idéalisations juridiques les plus pures».40

Cependant, les fédéralistes arrivent à créer à Genève, ce même mois, un Centre d’action pour la Fédération Européenne (pris en charge par Rossi à partir de mars 1944), la ville leur accordant l’accès à la bibliothèque imposante du Palais Wilson. C’est la première fois qu’une occasion est donnée aux fédéralistes de se faire connaître et, au-delà des premières désillusions et de la faiblesse des moyens dont sont conscients les propagateurs de cette idée, la période du «Grand Exode» leur donne une chance d’être entendus. Ainsi, l’historienne italienne Cinzia Rognoni-Vercelli signale quelques meetings importants tenus par les fédéralistes peu avant la fin de la guerre: le 3 février 1945 à Lugano (600 personnes), le 6 février à Lausanne, puis le soir à Vevey, devant une centaine d’étudiants en ingénierie, et le 7 février au camp de Travail de Cassoney (une centaine de personnes).41

On ne peut cependant oublier que cet effort touche essentiellement les Italiens, dont la réflexion sur la question est déjà bien avancée et dont les ressortissants sont les plus nombreux dans la Confédération, les Suisses restant étrangers à ces efforts. L’effet «médiaitique» ne doit donc pas être surestimé, même s’il permet un premier contact. Comme le conclut l’historien Lubor Jilek, on peut dire que

«c’est donc en tant qu’abri, par le biais des débats, des revues, et des bibliothèques que la Suisse permet à l’europanisme italien d’étoffer, en 1944-1945, le raisonne-
ment hamiltonien conçu à Ventotene dans le fragile espoir de pouvoir le faire connaître à l'échelle continentale».42

Nous allons maintenant étudier les actions lancées par les fédéralistes depuis la Suisse, les premières qui méritent véritablement le terme d’«européennes» étant donné qu'elles permettent d'établir des contacts qui vont déboucher sur une première organisation internationale au moment de la Libération.

4) Par-delà les frontières.

En effet, lorsque Rossi et Spinelli entrent clandestinement en Suisse, ils se retrouvent dans un milieu où le flux italien les condamne à l’anonymat et à la méfiance d'autorités qui interdisent toute réunion politique. Il faut donc sortir de ce «ghetto», matérialisé par le parcage des réfugiés dans certains camps dont il est difficile de s'échapper. Malgré quelques tentatives pour se faire connaître au nom de l'antifascisme,43 les premiers mois sont assez décevants bien que se manifestent quelques sympathisants. Parmi ceux-ci, les premiers contacts non-italiens de Rossi et de Spinelli vont être décisifs par la suite: François Bondy, socialiste né en Autriche-Hongrie et qui a acquis la nationalité suisse, les Français Laloi et Jean-Marie Soutou, représentants officiels à Genève du Comité Français de Libération Nationale (devenu le 5 juin 1944 le Gouvernement provisoire de la République française) vont avoir un rôle décisif. C'est par leur intermédiaire que Rossi et Spinelli rencontrent le Secrétaire Général du Conseil œcuménique des Eglises, le néerlandais Willem Vissert'Hooft, et c'est dans la maison de ce dernier que se tiennent diverses réunions entre représentants de certains courants de Résistance intéressés par le thème du fédéralisme européen. Hooft avait déjà fait montrer de son engagement pour dénoncer la barbarie nazie, que la hiérarchie des Eglises catholique et protestante, mis à part certains gestes isolés, s'était bien gardée de condamner, et il avait officiellement demandé que ces Eglises se prononcent en faveur d'une réorganisation de l'ordre international, dans un sens plus respectueux des valeurs chrétiennes fondamentales.44

On note quatre rencontres à l’origine de la Déclaration des Résistances européennes (31 mars, 29 avril, 20 mai et 7 juillet 1944), qui en est le résultat direct.

43. E. ROSSI et A. SPINELLI, Lettre ouverte du Mouvement italien pour la Fédération européenne à tous les antifascistes, novembre 1943, original en français.
L’assistance est un véritable méli-mélo des forces d’opposition au nazisme: outre Rossi et Spinelli représentant le MFE, on compte également Egidio Reale (Partito Repubblicano), les Français Laloi et Soutou, les Allemandes Hanna Bertholet et Hilda Monte (de son vrai nom Hilde Meisel), toutes deux membres de l’Internazionaler Sozialistischer Kampftund (ISK), ainsi que le Yougoslave Lazar Latinovic; Hoof représente symboliquement les Pays-Bas. En plus de ces personnes identifiables, il faut compter un Polonais, un Tchécoslovaque, un Norvégien et un Danois, quatre acteurs dont l’Histoire n’a pas retenu les identités. Nous ne reviendrons pas sur les différentes péripéties des discussions, retenons seulement le fait qu’elles offrent une plate-forme européenne, même modeste (n’oublions pas la marginalisation des idées fédéralistes au sein des mouvements nationaux de Résistance), aux thèses venues d’Italie. Le 29 avril, Rossi et Spinelli obtiennent l’adhésion de principe du Partito Cristiano Sociale, du Partito d’Azione et du Partito Repubblicano à leur travail, ainsi que celle du Liberal Party le 20 mai.

Lors de la rencontre du 20 mai 1944, il est décidé d’envoyer un avant-projet de déclaration, alors en cours de rédaction, à toutes les résistances représentées au cours des réunions, tout en créant un «Comité provisoire pour la Fédération européenne» (avec Rossi et Soutou comme directeurs), chargé de maintenir des liaisons plus serrées avec les différentes résistances et de recevoir les adhésions. Avec l’avant-projet est envoyée une lettre, signée Spinelli, où est signalée l’existence de ce Comité provisoire et l’urgence de répondre aux propositions contenues dans l’avant-projet de Déclaration. Ces réponses sont cependant peu nombreuses, peut-être à cause d’un contexte qui oblige à l’action plus qu’à la réflexion: deux semaines après l’envoi, les Alliés débarquent en Normandie et la phase finale de la Résistance se dessine. Parmi les rares réponses, on peut dénombrer celles qui viennent du Mouvement de Libération Nationale et du Comité Français pour la Fédération Européenne, du Partito d’Azione, du Socialist Vanguard Group (lui aussi affilié à l’ISK), ou de personnalités telles que Lord Layton, ainsi que des réseaux français Libérer et Fédérer et de la Revue libre; en revanche, les Résistances norvégiennes et danoises restent silencieuses. Certaines réponses montrent de la méfiance vis-à-vis du projet et se contentent de promettre l’envoi hypothétique de simples observateurs (qui ne viendront jamais), tel ce message du Partito Socialista Italiano di Unità Proletaria (PSIUP) du 3 juin 1944, qui rappelle que le projet d’Europe fédérale est pour l’instant une utopie. De toute manière, les grands partis traditionnels se démarquent de cette entreprise et l’on ne retrouve, autour de l’idée fédéraliste défendue à Genève, que des groupes minoritaires: ainsi le Socialist Vanguard Group, dont le chef est Allan Flanders, n’est qu’une aile très marginale du

46. Voir L’Unità Europea, n°4 (Milan) et n°5 (Suisse).
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Labour Party, sur lequel il n’a strictement aucune influence, même s’il peut compter sur une tribune de presse de bonne qualité (Socialist Commentary).

Malgré ces contacts limités, une discussion s’est engagée et elle va faire en sorte que les idées fédéralistes italiennes ne meurent prématurément. Doit-on rappeler que ce texte, dont la Déclaration finale est adoptée le 7 juillet, reste fortement symbolique, la Suisse étant un pays neutre, les Allemands et les Italiens étant discrédités par leurs nationalités, alors que les Français représentent un État qui n’est pas encore en place? Il faut bien reconnaître que la Déclaration reste un document très confidentiel, même si l’on peut enregistrer quelques échos à l’étranger, notamment en Grande-Bretagne, où elle est reproduite dans son intégralité dans la revue du groupe Federal Union (créé en 1938) en octobre 1944.48

On peut cependant signaler quelques initiatives réclamant la Fédération comme solution politique d’avenir, encouragées par la diffusion de ce texte. C’est le cas de la Déclaration du Comité français pour la Fédération européenne (CEFE) de juin 1944.49 Le CFFE, créé à Lyon le même mois, émane du Mouvement de Libération Nationale, dirigé par Jacques Baumel (pseudonyme Rossini), Henri Frenay et André Ferrat. Le MLN a été créé le 8 février 1944 avec les réseaux Combat, Défense de la France, Résistance, Lorraine, alors que le Front National communiste et l’Organisation Civile et Militaire s’en sont exclus. En réponse à la Déclaration des Résistances Européennes, parvenue en France fin mai, début juin 1944, le MLN se transforme en CFFE, sous la direction d’Albert Camus (Combat), André Ferrat (Franc-Tireur) et Gilbert Zaksas (Libérer et Fédérer).

Pour bien comprendre le contexte de cette prise de position fédéraliste du CFFE, il faut avoir à l’esprit les particularités de la résistance française basée non loin de la Suisse, à Lyon: dans cette ville existe un «milieu résistant» varié, du fait qu’elle est devenue très tôt le principal refuge de ceux qui ont fui la France occupée. C’est à Lyon qu’Emmanuel Mounier fait reparaître Esprit, avec la plupart des membres de l’ancienne rédaction (mais également avec de nouveaux venus de la ville elle-même, tels que Jean-Marie Domenach), dont l’un des buts est «d’approfondir l’idée fédérative», désolée jusque-là par cette revue;50 c’est à Uriage, non loin de Lyon, que, sous la direction du capitaine de Segonzac, fut créée cette école des cadres qui penche peu à peu vers la Résistance et que fréquenta de temps à autre Henri Frenay, venu s’installer à Lyon avant de fonder le réseau et le journal Combat, où il appelle régulièrement à une «résistance européenne […] ciment des unions de demain»;51 c’est à Lyon, en mars 1944, que Libérer et Fédérer s’associe

au mouvement socialiste L’Insurgé, créé en juillet 1942 par Marceau Pivert, en édi-
tant un manifeste commun où l’on parle d’une «intégration dans les Etats-Unis
da’Europe».

À Lyon, gravitent des européistes en rupture de milieu parisien, tels
qu’André Philip ou François de Menthon, et nombre d’organisations qui jouent un
rôle de relais précieux dans l’information de la Résistance et qui lui permettent
d’être plus forte malgré la répression. Ainsi que l’écrit Michel Winock, «… ces
groupes sont utiles à l’information: on s’échange des ‘tuyaux’, on accueille des visi-
teurs qui reviennent de voyage». L’idée européenne y gagne ainsi tout naturelle-
ment des adeptes.

Les appels à la solidarité européenne des forces de la Résistance par les fédé-
ralistes italiens semblent donc porter leurs fruits en cette période de la fin de la
guerre. Pour Spinelli, le CFFE, auquel il envoie une «lettre ouverte» dès le mois
da’août 1944 pa
craîr être «le parfait équivalent de notre mouvement italien». L’espoir est tellement fort que le même Spinelli voit dans cette création française
l’amorce d’un «mouvement populaire fédéraliste européen», comme il l’écritra dans
un rapport au MFE d’octobre 1944. En outre, Spinelli fait part de considérations
beaucoup plus tactiques, en rapport avec une situation politique en pleine évolution:
les Italiens, discrédités en masse par le régime fasciste, auront peu de chance
d’être écoutés dans l’après-guerre, de même que les Allemands. Le champion, dans
ces conditions, ne peut être que la France, qui «aura sans doute plus d’autorité
vis-à-vis des grandes puissances mondiales que celle de tout autre pays». On
retrouve cette préoccupation chez Rossi qui, dans un mémorandum écrit en décem-
bre 1944, explique qu’

«actuellement le MFE dédie sa principale attention à la France, où il cherche à
susciter un vaste courant d’opinion publique favorable à son programme, car il
estime que c’est la France surtout qui devrait demain prendre l’initiative de l’union
fédérale européenne».

On sent dès 1944 l’enthousiasme des fédéralistes italiens et l’assurance que les
espoirs formulés pendant la guerre sont sur le point de se réaliser. Cet optimisme
n’empêche pas de se poser des questions sur la composition de cette Europe unie et,
déjà, certains perçoivent que l’unification va poser des problèmes d’ordre idéologique.
Maintenant que la fin du conflit approche, les fédéralistes ont donc de plus en plus
tendance à tenir compte du contexte international, un élément inconnu qui peut avoir un
effet perturbateur dans la poursuite de leur idéal. Mais avant cette prise en compte, il

52. Libérer et Fédérer, avril-mai 1944, n°15-16.
54. Déclaration du Comité Français pour la Fédération Européenne et Lettre ouverte du Movimento
Italiano per la Federazione Europea au Comité Français pour la Fédération Européenne, in:
L’Europe Fédéraliste, n°1, septembre-octobre 1944, pp.3 et 6-7.
55. Lettre d’Altiero Spinelli à Ernesto Rossi, 17 août 1944, cité dans E. PAOLINI, Dalla lotta antifasc-
istica alla battaglia per la Federazione europea. 1920-1948: documenti e testimonianze, Il Mulino,
56. Rapport de Spinelli, octobre 1944, WL-27, ASCE.
57. E.ROSSI, Mémorandum du 8 décembre 1944, Genève, WL-27, ASCE.
s'agit pour eux de sonder les forces politiques traditionnelles, dont le Manifeste disait qu'elles pouvaient tout aussi bien être des «alliées» que des «obstacles».

5) Constats des derniers jours de la guerre.

C'est au moment où se termine la Seconde Guerre mondiale que les fédéralistes du MFE tentent de faire connaître leur action au plus grand nombre, particulièrement aux décideurs politiques. Une lettre d'Ernesto Rossi aux militants romains, datée du 7 octobre 1944, raconte le périple commencé la veille par François Bondy et Jean-Marie Soutou, envoyés en France avec des documents fédéralistes. Les contacts à l'étranger ne s'arrêtent pas là; dans la même lettre, Rossi donne à ses correspondants du MFE des nouvelles d'Angleterre, où se trouve un autre envoyé fédéraliste («Robert») qui lui a signalé l'intérêt pour les idées fédéralistes de certains journaux comme le Times et le Tribune, lui demande des informations sur le MFE pour le Socialist Vanguard Group, et parle de l'espoir de ce mouvement que soit élu président du Labour Party Harold Laski, l'un des plus grands théoriciens du fédéralisme en Grande-Bretagne.

La Libération qui s'annonce correspond à cette page blanche attendue par l'ensemble des résistants depuis les premières heures de leur combat. L'attitude des fédéralistes montre cependant que, à côté de l'enthousiasme qui prévaut face au succès annoncé, il y a une grande défiance vis-à-vis des projets de libération de l'Europe par les Alliés. Ernesto Rossi, par exemple, se méfie de ce qu'il appelle la «Sainte Alliance des trois grandes puissances victorieuses», mais par-dessus tout de l'attitude des communistes, qu'il voit comme les plus sérieux ennemis de la paix. Cet anticommunisme va devenir une sorte de lien commun propre aux fédéralistes, certains pour les raisons personnelles que nous avons déjà exposées (Spinelli), la plupart parce que le communisme est à leurs yeux l'ennemi naturel du fédéralisme, depuis que Lénine a explicitement condamné ce dernier en 1915. Et de fait, Rossi dénonce dans sa correspondance un complot soviétique ourdi à l'échelle européenne, et dont il voit le centre en France:

«En France les communistes ont repris les mots d'ordre de L'Action française et se montrent d'accord avec l'extrême droite dans la propagande du plus étroit nationalisme, contre les 'boches', pour la destruction de l'Allemagne, etc.».

58. Il s'agit du suisse Pierre Robert, militant de la Fédération syndicale internationale des Transports.
60. Lettre d'Ernesto Rossi à Luciano Bolis, 24 septembre 1944, p.2, WL-27, ASCE.
Pour Rossi, cette tactique, qui consiste à soulever la haine contre le bouc émissaire allemand, devrait permettre à l’URSS de se présenter comme le seul Sauveur crédible dans le chaos de la Libération.

Le danger étant identifié, il faut agir vite, surtout dans la mesure où les communistes, eux aussi, partent sur une situation révolutionnaire pour faire triompher leurs idéaux. Cependant, c’est au moment où il faut trouver une véritable stratégie politique que les fédéralistes, comme la plupart des résistants, vont se rendre compte que les partis traditionnels, par eux condamnés, restent de sérieux obstacles. Les fédéralistes italiens, qui à Ventotene, à Milan ou en Suisse, parlaient sur la rapidité et la spontanéité pour consolider leur mouvement à l’heure de la Libération, prennent conscience des difficultés à implanter le MFE. Pour Ernesto Rossi, qui est encore en Suisse, ces difficultés proviennent des militants eux-mêmes, qui jouent le jeu des partis traditionnels. Dans une lettre du 2 décembre 1944 aux militants romains (et qui avaient été présents lors de la création du MFE en juillet 1943), il dénonce leur «inactivité» et, plus grave, il déplore «qu’il n’y ait plus personne parmi vous qui croit vraiment à l’absolue prééminence des problèmes internationaux sur les problèmes de politique intérieure».

Dans une lettre envoyée le même jour au seul Vindice Cavallera, il va jusqu’à dire que «[…] à Rome vous avez laissé mourir le MFE, juste quand était venu le bon moment pour commencer un travail sérieusement». En fait, Rossi a peur que la toute nouvelle organisation fédéraliste ne devienne l’exclusivité d’un parti politique, quel qu’il soit. Il avait d’ailleurs déjà exprimé cette hantise dans une lettre antérieure, toujours aux militants romains, en affirmant:

«Nous trahirons nos morts et nous nous trahirons nous-mêmes si nous nous mettons à faire de la petite politique, cherchant à nous attirer les bonnes grâces du Vatican, du gouvernement anglais et américain pour avoir des postes au ministère […] Nous devons sauver notre drapeau, pour constituer un véritable point de rencontre des forces progressistes».

Il faut reconnaître qu’après la mort d’Eugenio Colorni, qui avait été chargé par le MFE de représenter le mouvement à Rome, la tache est difficile pour les fédéralistes dans la capitale; jouant de ses sympathies socialistes, parti que les fédéralistes considèrent comme le premier des «forces progressistes», Colorni avait pu recruter certains jeunes adhérents, tels que Leo Solari, Achille Corona ou Mario

63. Lettre d’Ernesto Rossi à Vindice Cavallera, Manlio Rossidoria, Luisa Usellini et autres amis fédéralistes de Rome, Genève, 2 décembre 1944, WL-27, ASCE. Dans cette même lettre, Rossi exprime la peur que l’européisme ne retombe dans la stérilité de l’avant-guerre, lorsque ses plus ardents défenseurs n’étaient que des «amants de la paix» tels que Dante, Hugo, Cattaneo ou Garibaldi. Le fait que les premiers militants se retirent peu à peu de l’action n’est pas le propre des seuls Italiens, comme le montre cette lettre de Rossi du 4 décembre 1944 (le surlendemain), où il écrit: «le mois dernier nous n’avons plus eu de contacts avec des fédéralistes, sauf avec Pierre [Soutou] qui maintenant a une charge officielle à la légation française et qui donc doit prendre beaucoup plus de précautions que quand il était un simple [privé] comme nous», WL-27, ASCE.
64. Lettre d’Ernesto Rossi à Vindice Cavallera, Genève, 2 décembre 1944, WL-27, ASCE.
65. Lettre d’Ernesto Rossi à Mario Alberto Rollier, Genève, 24 septembre 1944, WL-27, ASCE.
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Zagari; après sa mort, ceux-ci vont prendre du recul par rapport au mouvement et, après la Libération, se consacrer de manière exclusive à leur formation politique.

Du côté de la démocratie chrétienne, l’homme politique en qui les fédéralistes italiens avaient le plus confiance pour mener une action conforme à leurs principes était Carlo Sforza, dans la ligne des idées qu’il avait exprimées en exil dans l’entre-deux-guerres.66 Cette confiance avait été affichée dans une lettre que Rossi et Spinelli lui avaient envoyée de Ventotene à la suite du congrès de Montevideo (août 1942), où s’étaient rassemblés des milliers d’Italiens réfugiés en Amérique. Lors de ce congrès présidé par Sforza, il avait été adopté une déclaration dont le septième point surtout avait attiré l’attention des fédéralistes, puisqu’il proclamait la primauté du droit international.67 L’idylle avec les idées fédéralistes ne durera cependant pas, à partir du moment où Sforza réintègre des fonctions officielles et adopte un discours moins idéaliste, comme dans cette interview accordée par lui au New York Times, le 3 mars 1944: Sforza y déclare que l’Italie ne doit rendre les îles du Dodécanèse à la Grèce que si les populations de ces îles le demandent par référendum, que les Alliés doivent restituer les colonies libyenne, érythréenne et somalienne à l’Italie, et qu’un échange doit se faire avec la Yougoslavie, consistant à conserver l’Istrie contre la ville de Fiume. Ces propos sont dénoncés par Rossi comme ceux qu’aurait pu tenir «n’importe quel homme politique de l’ancien temps qui verrait les problèmes internationaux du strict point de vue des intérêts de son propre pays».68 Il critique les croyances selon lesquelles le principe national et le droit à l’autodétermination des peuples suffiraient à faire cesser le cycle guerrier en Europe: les avertissements d’Einaudi, donnés en 1918, sont bel et bien repris par les fédéralistes pour critiquer l’attitude des hommes politiques italiens.

En ce qui concerne la France, Spinelli s’y rend en septembre 1944, car les fédéralistes parient encore sur la bonne volonté de ses dirigeants pour faire aboutir leurs efforts: ainsi, le point 7 des directives de travail arrêtées par le MFE au Congrès de Milan d’août 1943 parlait de la «convocation dans un pays neutre d’une conférence internationale fédéraliste», en apparence la Suisse; en 1945, parce que la France semble pouvoir devenir le champion de la cause européenne, le lieu d’élection est Paris, où va effectivement se tenir la première conférence fédéraliste, au mois de mars. Les rapports sur la situation française, que Spinelli envoie régulièrement à Rossi, toujours en Suisse, sont intéressants pour saisir l’image d’un pays encore plongé dans le chaos de la Libération et surtout pour comprendre les espérances et les défiances des fédéralistes vis-à-vis de l’Hexagone.

Ces rapports se focalisent sur la personne du général de Gaulle: on peut même percevoir dans les premières analyses faites de ce personnage les futures réticences envers l’homme politique français. C'est bien lui qui restaure les cadres de l'Etat souverain, par l’intermédiaire de la restructuration administrative et des nationalisa-

67. Cette déclaration est reproduite dans l’article de E. ROSSI, La politica estera italiana, in: L’Unità Europea, n°5, juillet-août 1944, pp.4-5.
68. E. ROSSI, La politica estera italiana, op.cit., p.5.
tions, et qui vide la Résistance de tout son sens en marginalisant les Comités de Libération, de plus, il est vu par Spinelli comme l'un de ces «vieux hommes politiques» condamnés par les fédéralistes pendant la guerre, accusés de vouloir restaurer cet ancien régime politique combattu par les idéaux de la Résistance:

«De Gaulle vise haut et grand en voulant que la France soit la quatrième puissance mondiale. Le chauvinisme français se montre très satisfait de toutes ses affirmations de grandeur que de Gaulle fait de manière répétée».

Le combat fédéraliste semble devoir d'ores et déjà choisir son camp, en opposition à un homme qui restaure ce que l'on veut anéantir. Les affirmations de Spinelli à ce sujet se veulent par ailleurs rassurantes, bien que l'on y décelle une certaine gêne: «[...] les meilleures têtes politiques de la gauche française - socialistes, syndicalistes, MLN - sont fédéralistes et participeront à la conférence; cependant, j'ai dû préparer pratiquement tout le matériel nécessaire pour un tel événement».

Ainsi, la première conférence fédéraliste qui doit se tenir à Paris entre les principaux courants fédéralistes de la Résistance, à la fin du mois de mars 1945, semble pouvoir être l'amorce du renouveau politique tant attendu, en même temps qu'un moyen de confronter des idées forgées dans la clandestinité des différentes Résistances.


Si ce rendez-vous international semble marquer une première victoire des fédéralistes italiens, dans la ligne de ce qu'ils réclamaient depuis l'exil de Ventotene, on peut se demander s'ils ont réussi à faire passer leurs idéaux dans leur propre pays et à vaincre les réticences de la classe politique au moment de la Libération. On a vu les liens importants de nombreux fédéralistes italiens avec le Partito d’Azione. Pour certains d'entre eux, ce parti hors normes, issu de la «lave incandescente de 1945» et donc non entaché par les calculs et les combinaisons des partis politiques traditionnels, pouvait devenir une arme importante, ou, au moins, ce relais politique tant attendu pendant la Résistance. Dans ses souvenirs, Spinelli explique l'engagement de nombreux fédéralistes, dont lui, dans ce parti, pour des raisons qui semblent conformes aux objectifs du Manifeste de Ventotene:

69. «Le gouvernement provisoire de de Gaulle a réussi de manière à peu près complète à reconstruire la structure administrative de l’État. Les Comités de Libération départementaux et communaux, n’ayant pas réussi à devenir des organes d’administration, réduits à être de simples organes consultatifs des préfets et des maires nommés par les préfets, perdent chaque jour plus de sens». In: Rapport d’Altiero Spinelli, 15 mars 1945, p.1, WL-27, ASCE.

70. En français dans le texte.

71. Ibid., p.2.

72. Ibid., p.2.

«Il paraissait assez naturel que l'idée d'une nouvelle bataille politique comme la nôtre, riche au point de vue culturel mais sans passé politique, trouve le meilleur écho dans ce parti inédit, grouillant d'intellectuels, dans lequel s'effectuait une recherche fébrile d'horizons nouveaux, et qui ne souffrait pas du frein d'un passé marqué par la seule action politique quotidienne dans un cadre national».74

C'est dire que, lorsque Ferruccio Parri, chef du Partito d’Azione (PDA), parvient à la présidence du Conseil italien en juin 1945, les espoirs sont grands. Il est vrai que le PDA se qualifie lui-même de «parti de la démocratie révolutionnaire», et, dans son programme, revendique la formule politique du fédéralisme. Lors d'un congrès tenu à Rome entre les 4 et 8 février 1944, les azionisti ajoutent à leur programme sur l'élection de l'Assemblée constituante un point 9 intitulé «politique étrangère et fédéralisme», appelant à «la formation des États-Unis d'Europe, le premier pas vers l'abolition des souverainetés nationales qui ont toujours conduit à la guerre».75 La volonté que ce point figure dans la nouvelle Constitution est mise en avant dans le «plan de travail» du PDA rédigé la même année par le juriste Piero Calamandrei (décembre), où il est demandé que soit incluse dans la Constitution italienne une déclaration portant l'acceptation d'une limitation de souveraineté au cas où une fédération européenne serait mise en place.76 La présence d'Altiero Spinelli et d'Ernesto Rossi au secrétariat du PDA à Rome est une garantie pour les fédéralistes que ce gouvernement va dans leur sens: beaucoup des hommes du gouvernement, au premier chef Ferruccio Parri, de même que Piero Calamandrei, sont membres du MFE, alors que Rossi a des liens d'amitié avec certains membres de l'ancien mouvement Giustizia e Libertà, largement représenté dans les rangs du PDA.

C'est pour cette raison que Spinelli et Rossi, pris par leurs nouvelles responsabilités politiques, prennent du recul par rapport au MFE, dont le premier président de l'après-guerre est Umberto Campagnolo. Cet éloignement volontaire a une grande importance à l'heure où se rencontrent les différents mouvements fédéralistes européens dans le but de créer une plate-forme commune. En effet, ce sont les représentants du fédéralisme intégral, inspirés par le personnalisme d'origine française,77 qui sont présents en masse lors des réunions préparatoires dont le but est de réfléchir à la doctrine et à l'organisation d'un mouvement fédéraliste unifié: Spinelli et Rossi n’étaient présents ni à la réunion d’Hertenstein (15 au 22 septembre 1946) ni à celle de Luxembourg (13 au 16 octobre 1946), qui président à la constitution de l’Union Européenne des Fédéralistes, le 15 décembre 1946, à Paris, dans les locaux de La Fédération (mouvement créé le 4 octobre 1944), même si une délégation du MFE était présente. Il y a dans ce déséquilibre un élément de fragilisation, surtout si l'on pense que les liens idéologiques avec la Résistance de cette toute nouvelle

74. A. SPINELLI, Come ho tentato ..., p.34.
75. Ce programme figure dans le journal du PDA, L’Italia Libera, 7 avril 1946.
76. Piano di lavoro del PDA, publié dans Quaderni dell’Italia Libera, 30 décembre 1944.
77. Fédéralisme qui se réclame de l’héritage proudhonien, dont les principaux inspirateurs sont Alexandre Marc et Denis de Rougemont, et dont le principe est que l'individu doit se mouvoir et se réaliser au contact des diverses cellules (familiale, communale, professionnelle) qu'il est amené à connaître et dans lesquelles il s'engage pleinement.
internationale ne sont pas toujours évidents. De plus, la différence entre les tendances fédéralistes réside non seulement dans les origines idéologiques, mais également dans les buts à atteindre, ce que Spinelli résume de manière très radicale:

«Le mouvement italien était anti-idéologique, le mouvement français profondément idéologique. Le mouvement italien voulait créer des institutions européennes dans le but de développer un nouveau cadre politique européen qui révolutionnerait l’ensemble de la vie nationale et politique. Le mouvement français regardait les institutions européennes comme un simple élément de coordination, incapable en lui-même de provoquer le changement, et pour cette raison soutenait un programme d’action multiforme concernant toutes les parties de la société».

Il est vrai que ce point de vue est donné bien après les faits (1953). Il n’en témoigne pas moins du manque crucial d’homogénéité du fédéralisme de l’après-guerre, qui s’est coupé de sa source d’inspiration la plus prolifique.

Hélas pour Spinelli et Rossi, l’espoir qui les a fait s’éloigner de l’activisme fédéraliste est très vite déçu. Le PDA ne reprend pas les mots d’ordre du MFE, comme souhaité. Ce refus peut s’expliquer par des raisons internationales mais également internes, le PDA perdant sa ferveur révolutionnaire une fois la guerre terminée: ainsi, les Comités de libération nationale formés dans toute la péninsule en 1945, instruments de démocratie directe qu’appuyaient les azionisti pendant la Résistance, perdent-ils peu à peu le soutien de Parri, pressé par l’aile libérale de son parti. Dans un document de travail rédigé par Ugo La Malfa en juillet 1945, on peut voir les raisons qui poussent les membres du PDA à repousser toute revendication fédéraliste. Les raisons internationales priment et montrent une vision bien différente de celle adoptée pendant la guerre: «La Fédération européenne est une bonne idée, mais il faudrait savoir comment éviter de donner à cette fédération un caractère antirusse ou antibritannique. La Russie et l’Angleterre participeront-elles à la fédération européenne»? La place de l’Allemagne pose aussi des questionsangoissantes: «Sans ces nations [Russie et Angleterre] la fédération finirait par s’acheminer vers une hégémonie allemande […], en gros ce que voulait obtenir le National-Socialisme».

Les raisons internes ne manquent pas également dans le recul du PDA et le titre du document de travail suffit à exprimer les inquiétudes du parti: «Plan de renoncement à la souveraineté: nous pouvons être traités d’ennemis du pays et d’anti-italiens». Toutes ces raisons justifient le rejet de l’alliance avec les fédéralistes et de toute tactique partisane allant dans leur sens: «Tant que ces interrogations ne seront

78. Cette critique vise particulièrement certains membres français de l’UEF, qui avaient été tentés pendant la guerre par l’expérience de Vichy, en premier lieu les membres du groupe La Fédération, dirigé par Jacques Bassot et André Voisin. C’est en pensant à ces derniers que la revue Esprit, dans un numéro spécial consacré au fédéralisme européen (novembre 1948), dénonce «cette pâte très mêlée d’odeurs suspectes» qui lui paraît constituer l’UEF.


80. «Piano con la rinuncia alla sovranità: potremo essere tacciati di nemici del paese e di antiitaliani», 15 juillet 1945, AS-5, ASCE.
pas levées, il n’est pas opportun de faire de la Fédération européenne la base de notre programme de politique extérieure».

Dans ce secteur comme dans d’autres, le PDA a fait preuve de trop d’hésitations. Celui-ci disparaît à l’issue de ce qui sera son dernier congrès, en février 1946, quand une scission intervient entre les tendances socialistes, représentées par Emilio Lussu, et les tendances libérales, dirigées par La Malfa. Le parti n’y survivra pas, et son expérience politique sera des plus courtes: appelé à la présidence du Conseil le 21 juin 1945. Parri quitte ses fonctions en décembre de la même année, remplacé par Alcide de Gasperi, qui n’entretient aucun lien avec le MFE.

Conclusion

Ainsi, la situation politique dans l’Europe de l’immédiat après-guerre ne correspond pas vraiment à ce qu’en espéraient les Italiens, ni du point de vue du fédéralisme militant, ni du point de vue des réformes politiques engagées dans chacun des pays.


On ne peut que constater le parallélisme évident qu’il y a entre le refroidissement des relations Est/Ouest et l’affirmation des idéaux fédéralistes, jusqu’à ce que ces deux correspondent avec le projet d’armée européenne d’octobre 1950. Autant dire que l’année 1948 clôt effectivement ce que Denis de Rougemont a appelé la «campagne des Congrès européens»: l’UEF inaugure une nouvelle stratégie, qui repose sur les contacts personnels au plus haut niveau (Spaak, Schuman, de Gasperi) et qui utilise le relais de la presse et de l’édition: inutile de dire que ce nou-

81. Ibid., p.1.
82. On doit souligner les difficultés des fédéralistes à faire connaître leurs idées en passant par les maisons d’édition traditionnelles: c’est par exemple le cas du livre de L. EINAUDI, La guerre et l’unité européenne, refusé successivement par Plon et Gallimard. Voir lettre de Michel Berveiller à Guglielmo Usellini, 22 décembre 1948, UEF-5, ainsi que par Calmann-Lévy. Lettre de refus de Raymond Aron à Michel Berveiller, 18 décembre 1948, UEF-2, ASCE.
Bertrand Vayssière

veau combat correspond de plus en plus aux attentes de Spinelli, très à l’aise dans ces nouveaux chantiers politiques qui s’ouvrent dans la foulée du Plan Schuman.\textsuperscript{83} Nous sommes bien au cœur du combat pour la supranationalité, que les fédéralistes engagent en s’appuyant sur un militantisme qui semble préservé de toute polémique: l’objectif commun est de faire céder les États européens occidentaux, notamment avec le projet de Communauté Politique européenne qui, s’il venait à aboutir, permettrait l’aboutissement de cette «société fédérale», suivant les prédictions que Spinelli avait formulées pendant la Seconde Guerre mondiale. Cependant, ce retour mérité et efficace des fédéralistes italiens au premier plan ne doit pas faire oublier que ceux-ci ont dû renoncer, pour ce faire, à une partie de leurs idéaux: le projet européen pour lequel ils vont alors se battre tourne le dos aux espoirs de la Résistance, vérification supplémentaire que le Vieux Continent, partagé en deux, n’est plus vraiment maître de son destin, et que le Fédéralisme n’a pas su s’imposer en idéologie autonome …

\textsuperscript{83. On peut signaler que deux dirigeants «intégraux» de l’UEF, respectivement Denis de Rougemont et Henri Brugmans, seront appelés à diriger des instances culturelles européennes créées en 1950, le Centre européen de la Culture à Genève et le Collège de Bruges: ces grandes figures prennent donc de la distance avec l’action militante fédéraliste, au profit du seul Spinelli.}
France’s Agony between «Vocation Européenne et Mondiale»
The Union Française as an Obstacle in the French Policy of Supranational European Integration, 1952-1954

Seung-Ryeol Kim

Supranational European integration, beginning with the Schuman Plan in 1950, was sought by the first “Six-countries” in order to reconstruct their economies. But the hidden goal of the most important member state in this European community, France, was to control West Germany by means of supranational European integration. It was much supported by the United States, which intended to draw upon German economic and military capacities in view of the escalation of the Cold War. It therefore had both a European and a global perspective.¹ To the latter belonged also problems that were related with the colonies of European powers, above all Great Britain and France. Although the problems regarding colonies did not originally concern supranational integration, they always influenced the process of the latter.

In the 1950s Great Britain did not take part in supranational European integration. One of the reasons for British non-participation was that Great Britain thought the consolidation of the Commonwealth would not be compatible with the supranational integration in which Great Britain should transfer some parts of its sovereignty to a European community. The British stance on supranational European integration began to change in 1956, when the British government estimated that in the long term the Commonwealth would not have the same impact on the British economy than the Common Market of the “Six-countries”. After a long internal discussion, Whitehall decided to participate in supranational European integration in 1961. Which role did the Union Française play in early supranational European integration? Contrary to Great Britain, when drawing up the Schuman Plan, France thought that the Union Française-policy and supranational European integration might be compatible.² The Territoires d’Outre-Mer (TOM) were excluded from the European communities during the negotiations on the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the European Defence Community (EDC) and the common agricultural projects in the early 1950s. The questions of the relationship between the Union Française and the supranational European community played a role, but were not an obstacle for the success of these projects. It was not until 1955-1957 that France suddenly wanted to include its overseas territories in the supranational integration.

². These differences between the policies of two European powers towards supranational European integration, according to Clemens Wurm, lie in the degree of importance of their Empires to their national economies and in their policies over West Germany. France felt a future security threat more seriously than Great Britain. Therefore, France took supranational integration for an inevitable measure to control an ever stronger West Germany. See C. WURM, Two Paths to Europe: Great Britain and France from a Comparative Perspective, in: C. WURM (ed.), op.cit., pp.175-200.
European integration process, hoping that it could solve colonial financial problems with the help of the other partner states, which was a great burden on them.

Did not, however, the “vocation mondiale” make it difficult for France to lead early supranational integration, just as in the case of Great Britain? Gérard Bossuat deals with the subtle questions arising from the relationship between the French overseas areas and the European Political Community (EPC) in 1953. In 1953 France could not control the process of European integration and no longer wanted to play the role of leader of integrated Europe. As the subtitle, “from criticism to repudiation [of the projected EPC]; France’s vocation mondiale” alludes to, according to Bossuat,

“the European construction failed in 1953, because of the French governments’ dilemma, having to choose between Europe, whose destiny they might not be able to control and the perpetuation of France’s world power”.

Bossuat’s outstanding contribution still needs to be completed in some points. He only analyses the problem of the Union Française in the negotiations of the EPC. (Even this aspect he treated too briefly). But problems of the TOM in European integration in these years were not only related to the EPC, but also to the process of ratification of the EDC treaty and the negotiations of a European agricultural community. This article investigates the questions arising from the relationship between the Union Française and all the projects of supranational European integration between 1952 and 1954.

3. Quotations marked with an * have been translated by the author.

4. The points that Bossuat overlooked derive from the fact that he did not consult file 42 of the private archive of Georges Bidault in the Archives Nationales (AN) entitled “Europe et Union Française” (AN Papiers Bidault 42). In 1953, the French government was confronted with problems which supranational European integration would bring about in the Union Française. Conscious of this problem, foreign minister Georges Bidault collected appropriate documents in one special file. This is file 42. This article is based on the analysis of this special file. This defect is found in expert studies to the “pool vert”, too. See G. NOËL, France, Allemagne et «Europe verte», Berne, 1995; G. THIEMEYER, Vom «Pool Vert» zur Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft. Europäische Integration, Kalter Krieg und die Anfänge der Gemeinsamen Europäischen Agrarpolitik 1950-1957, München, 1999.
The Union Française, the ECSC and the EDC, 1950-1952

During the negotiations for the ECSC, Italy demanded that the French overseas areas should be included in the ECSC because it wanted to import the iron ore mined at Quenza in eastern Algeria at a low price. Jean Monnet argued that the inclusion of the TOM in the ECSC might raise a difficult problem because of the complexity of the customs systems of the French overseas territories, which would require modifications of the system of the Union Française. Monnet proposed a compromise solution: ensuring Italy a regular iron supply without incorporating Algeria into the Schuman Plan. France accepted this proposition. The TOM were not included in the ECSC, but France was obliged to grant the other member states, above all Italy, “the same preferential measures” which it enjoyed.5

The Pleven Plan for the creation of a supranational European Army took into account France’s special responsibilities in its overseas areas. Those participating states that had national armed forces would keep their own command of the part of their existing army that would not be integrated into the European army.6 France could have under its command the part of army stationed in its overseas areas as well as the great part of army on the continent. However, during the negotiations France had to give way to the demands of the other partner states which were based on the principle of equality, so that it agreed that direct national command would remain only in overseas areas. That meant that all troops in Europe should be subordinated to a supranational EDC.7

That was a point on which the EDC treaty of May 1952 suffered harsh criticism from EDC opponents. On the one hand, many Frenchmen feared that West Germany would soon take the supremacy on the continent, because the great part of the French army would have to remain stationed further in the overseas areas, particularly in Indochina. France might thus drop back to third rank within the EDC, after Germany and Italy. On the other hand, it was feared that a two-fold division of French armed forces - between Europe and the TOM - would leave France too weak to defend the TOM.8

The Union Française played a role in the period between 1950-52, but was not an obstacle to the success of these projects. The ECSC was ratified in December 1951. And the EDC treaty was signed in May 1952. The French government could

exclude its overseas areas from supranational European integration, without fearing that this would bring about problems for France maintaining the Union Française and, therefore, its world power position alongside the U.S. and Great Britain.

The French Initiative for a Political Integration in 1952 and the Draft EPC Treaty of Ad Hoc Assembly

The Assemblée Nationale, especially the parliamentary delegation of the principal socialist party, the Section Française de l’Internationale Ouvrière (SFIO), had demanded certain prerequisites for the EDC ratification in February 1952, one of which was the establishment of a supranational political authority for the European Army. That was why the French government proposed a European Political Community (EPC) to the other EDC member states in July 1952, not quite two months after the signature of the EDC treaty of May 1952. The EPC aimed at facilitating the ratification of the EDC treaty by the Assemblée Nationale. Up to the end, Guy Mollet, leader of the SFIO, still considered the EPC project as valuable for securing the agreement of the SFIO to the EDC treaty. He therefore demanded that the French government fulfill this prerequisite. But French governments proved unable to negotiate an acceptable treaty. During the almost two years of EPC negotiations, France was strongly opposed to the Dutch plan (Beyen Plan) for a customs union, which the Netherlands took for conditio sine qua non for their accepting the EPC. The SFIO itself rejected the Beyen Plan as well. Therefore, it seemed that the Beyen Plan was a principal reason why the EPC project did not serve its original purpose, i.e. the relief of the ratification of the EDC treaty. Most accounts on the EPC proceed from this assumption. As will be demonstrated in the following pages, however, documents on the EPC show us a more decisive reason for its failure than the Beyen Plan - namely, the Union Française.

The supranational military integration first required the answer to one question: Whom should the European Army obey and serve? Without solving this question, a merger of the national armies would remain possible only on a confederal basis, as with NATO. Therefore, the demand of the Assemblée Nationale was logical and

10. For the position of Guy Mollet, see Archives Jean Monnet. Fondation Jean Monnet pour l’Europe, Lausanne. La Communauté Politique Européenne (AMJ), file 11.
reasonable. Which form the political authority for the European army should take, however, was not clear from the Assemblée Nationale’s demands. On the one hand, an integration of the EDC member states’ foreign politics (“pool diplomatique”) could be intended; on the other hand, civil and parliamentary control over the military could also be intended. In addition, the creation of functional sectoral communities demanded an authority which could coordinate them. This involved the ECSC and the EDC directly. For Schuman, however, a “pool diplomatique” was not acceptable, since this carried too many federal characteristics. The important thing for him was to reinforce the democratic control over the two technocratic communities (ECSC, EDC) in a political community. Schuman’s concept for political integration was mainly motivated by the wish to facilitate the parliamentary agreement to the EDC treaty.13

At the ECSC conference of member states in Luxembourg on 10 September 1952, the six foreign ministers gave the Common Assembly of the ECSC the mandate to draft a treaty constituting an EPC. The results were then to be submitted within six months. The new aspect of this resolution, in comparison to the French-Italian suggestion of July, was the Dutch initiative for economic integration.

The Assembly of the ECSC accepted the invitation of the six foreign ministers to draft an EPC treaty and constituted itself for that purpose as an “ad hoc Assembly” in September 1952. After six months of collaboration, the draft treaty was adopted by the ad hoc Assembly on 10 March 1953. One day earlier the president of the ad hoc Assembly, Paul-Henri Spaak, had handed over the draft treaty to the acting president of the ECSC Council of Ministers, the French foreign minister Georges Bidault.

The cornerstone of the draft EPC treaty was a directly elected Peoples’ Chamber, which served as an instrument for effective parliamentary control. It also functioned as an organic combination of the ECSC and the EDC in the EPC, without bringing about a significant expansion of jurisdictions. Perhaps eventually, the EPC would lead to the creation of a common market. But the EPC only had the right to prepare for the progressive creation of a common market. As far as a common foreign policy was concerned, the draft treaty only proposed that the member states should coordinate their foreign and security policies within the framework of the EPC. As far as the territories were affected, two articles only referred to France. Before dealing with them, it is worthwhile to look at the structure of the Union Française.

According to the French constitution of 13 October 1946 the overseas areas were divided into the following four categories:

1) the Départements d’Outre-Mer (DOM), which included the Algerian departments and, by reason of a law from 19 March 1947, the Martinique, the isles of Réunion, Guadeloupe and French Guyana, each forming a department (altogether approximately 10 million inhabitants);

2) the Territoires d'Outre-Mer (TOM), which referred to all overseas areas which had formerly been colonies (about 25 million inhabitants);

3) the Territoires associés, which meant the mandates Cameroon and Togo, administered under the supervision of the trustee council of the UN (altogether about 4 million inhabitants);

4) the États associés, which consisted of the protectorates Morocco, Tunisia and Indochina (altogether 35.5 million inhabitants).

Together with the metropolitan France the DOM and the TOM overseas regions and territories formed the constitutional association of the French Republic, which was under the sovereignty of France (article 60 of the French 1946’s constitution). The Union Française consisted of the French Republic and the “Territoires et États associés”.

On 24 October 1952 the leader of the Mouvement Républicain Populaire (MRP), Pierre Henri Teitgen, demonstrated how complex and sensitive the problem of the relations of the Union Française with the supranational EPC was. He assumed first that

"France was not only a European power but also a world power, whose interests went beyond the framework of the European continent”*

and that the connection between the homeland and its overseas areas was “indivisible”. He found the suggestion of the Council of Europe unacceptable that non-European territories and states, which were in a constitutional relation with European states, could not become full members, but only be associated. According to him this mere association would loosen the connection of France with its overseas areas. Teitgen strove to find a solution which made it possible to drive supranational integration further without endangering the Union Française. Just as Teitgen, the Gaullist Michel Debré rejected the suggestions of the Council of Europe. Debré maintained that the French African areas were to be included as full members into the EPC, that the EPC should not have decision-making powers over member states’ foreign policies, and that it should be constructed in a loose form. As a matter of fact, if the EPC were vested with greater powers, it could intervene in the affairs of the French overseas areas.

In the plenary session of the ad hoc Assembly on 7 January 1953, the French Senegalese Léopold Sédar Senghor argued that the French overseas areas should be included into the EPC. For Senghor, a convinced supporter of the idea “Eurafrika”, it was incomprehensible that the TOM, which were an integrated constituent of the French Republic, should be excluded from the EPC. Their exclusion risked alternative developments, namely independence from France. These areas were ready to

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15. AN Papiers Bidault 42, Déclaration faite par Teitgen à la commission préconstituante, 24.10.1952.

open their markets for Europe, however, only on the condition that they should become members of the European communities. Senghor demanded an increase in the number of French seats in the People’s Chamber, from 63 to 83. Twenty seats were intended for the overseas areas. In the ensuing debate, almost all French delegates including Debré treated the inclusion of the TOM into the EPC as already decided or natural. Although they had not completely the same opinion as Senghor, they supported Senghor’s suggestions out of fear of the separation of the TOM from the metropolitan France. These suggestions met the rejection of parliamentarians from other member states, above all from Germany, so that the debate ended without result.\footnote{Abänderungsvorschlag zum Bericht des Verfassungsausschusses Nr.40 (Senghor), in: Sonderversammlung für die Gründung einer Europäischen Politischen Gemeinschaft, Straßburg, 1953, Kurzbericht der Beratungen der dritten Sitzung vom 9. Januar 1953, pp.15-23; Sonderversammlung für die Gründung einer Europäischen Politischen Gemeinschaft, Straßburg, 1953, Aussprache. Wörtlicher Bericht über den Verlauf der Sitzungen, pp.199 ff.; AMAE DE-CE, CECA, Vol.521, pp.187-197, DGAP/Europe/S/Direction du Conseil de l’Europe, note, 15.1.1953, a.s. Réunion des travaux de l’Assemblée ad hoc. This document marked the speech of Senghor as “une intervention très remarquée”.
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In February 1953 the French parliamentarians strove again to include the French overseas areas into the EPC. Teitgen maintained that these areas should be represented at least “symbolically” in the People’s Chamber. For this reason, the number of French seats should be increased.\footnote{PAAA II, Bd.855, AZ 240-10 Bd.2, von Brentano an Hallstein am 7. Februar 1953; PAAA II, Bd.855, AZ 240-10 Bd.2, Schwarz-Liebemann an Ophüls vom 11.2.1953; PAAA Materialsammlung MD Dr. Herbert Blankenhorn, Auswärtiges Amt, Satzung der Europäischen Gemeinschaft. Materialien, 31. März 1953, pp.45-47 and 174-176.} Teitgen’s suggestions were laid down in article 15 and 101 of the draft EPC treaty.

According to article 101, the parts of the Union Française that were under the sovereignty of France should be included through the signing of this accord into the valid area of the EPC treaty, if France raised no objections to the signature of this accord. France could list them in a subsequent protocol, if it were first to exclude them from the valid areas of the EPC. In addition, France could at its discretion revise the application of the treaty and the community’s laws in the Union Française. This referred to the DOM and the TOM. Indirectly included were the Territoires associés and the États associés which were not under the sovereignty of France but which France represented in international affairs. These could also be included through a special protocol.\footnote{PAAA II Bd.889, AZ 224-41-03, pp.158 ff., Ophüls, Einbeziehung der überseeischen Gebiete (Union Française), 30. Mai 1953.} According to article 15, France would hold in addition seven extra seats in the People’s Chamber to account for its overseas areas, for a total of 70 seats, if these colonies would be included in the EPC. However, Germany and Italy would each have 63 seats.
French Criticism of the Draft EPC Treaty of the ad hoc Assembly: France’s “Vocation Mondiale”

After the signature of the Bonn and Paris treaties in May 1952, the government Pinay/Schuman was exposed to increasing criticism in the Assemblée Nationale. It was alleged that the government promoted the sale of France’s national sovereignty and its historical great power status through European integration. The attack on Schuman’s policies referred concretely to the EDC and the politics of the Union Francaise. During the EPC negotiations of the ad hoc Assembly, Paris experienced a governmental crisis that led to Bidault replacing Foreign Minister Schuman at the end of the year. This followed demands by the Gaullist opposition, which supported the formation of the government of the new Prime Minister René Mayer on the condition that Schuman should be replaced by Bidault.

Although it was officially explained that the previous European policy would continue unchanged under the new government, modifications soon became clear, in particular in France’s concept of the European Army. High-level civil servants at the Quai d’Orsay defended the opinion that France should carry out a reversal in policy by giving up the EDC and simultaneously developing NATO in order to prevent the Germans from an unaligned military build-up. The top officials’ argumentation was based to a large extent on problems regarding the Union Française. According to them, by retaining the Union Française, France could continue its role of world power alongside Great Britain and the USA, and maintain a continental balance against Germany, which might regain strength. The administrative elite understood that the British did not accept the supranational elements in European integration because of their responsibility in relation to the Commonwealth. Now, however, the EDC threatened to develop into a supranational political community that would particularly impair the world power position of France to the extent that it split the French army into two sections - one for the homeland and a second for the overseas territories - and thus weaken the French army as a whole. This would lead to France possibly losing its overseas territories, although the right to withdraw the French soldiers from the European army was planned for France in the case of a crisis in the Union Française.

Alarmed by his colleagues, Hervé Alphand (president of the Interim Committee of the EDC), a convinced proponent of the EDC, criticized this view of the EDC.

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22. AN Papiers Bidault 34, A. Gros, Résumé de la conversation du samedi 24 janv. 1953, written on 27 January 1953; AN Papiers Bidault 34, De la Tournelle (directeur politique) et al., Note sur la CED, 28.1.1953. This document was signed by De la Tournelle as well as by Gros (chef du service juridique), Seydoux (directeur d’Europe), de Leusse (chef du service des pactes) and De la Tournelle; AN Papiers Bidault 34, Lettre De la Tournelle à Pierre Louis Falaise (directeur du Cabinet de Bidault), 29.1.1953.
23. AN Papiers Bidault 34, De la Tournelle (directeur politique) et al., Note sur la CED, 28.1.1953.
particularly the notion that the EDC would impair French responsibility in relation to the Union Française and endanger the French world power status. He argued that the EDC would not endanger France’s legal, economical and moral connection with the Union Française by any means. The overseas navy was not the object of integration. For a time, about 50 percent of the French army would remain under national authority. Furthermore, the additional protocols, which were negotiated at that time, would ascertain France’s privilege to be able to withdraw its army relatively quickly and without restriction in the case of a crisis in the overseas territories. The only restriction that would limit French foreign policy was policy regarding defence in Europe. This limitation could be balanced on the one hand by the reserved rights of France in Germany, which had been guaranteed by the Bonn treaties, on the other hand by the responsibilities in the world. Thus France could remain in the “permanent Group” of NATO alongside the USA and Great Britain.

“France belongs to two systems”, so Alphand, “one at European level, which will materialize under the form of the Community, the other at world level, the Union Française; France while becoming European, will continue to remain a world power”.

The alternative discussed by the opponents of the EDC at the Quai d’Orsay was out of question. The idea of an extension of NATO had already proved futile because of American objections. For Alphand it was under any circumstances unacceptable to give up the EDC.

As for the EPC, the director of the European department of the Quai d’Orsay, F. Seydoux, elucidated French intentions: the danger that the creation of the EPC would lead to a new renouncement of sovereignty had to be avoided. From the beginning France should resist a complete institutional structure of a federalist type. Seydoux therefore only was prepared to accept the creation of a directly elected European Parliament, but its functioning was not necessary in the initial stages of the project. The creation of a new executive which should replace the High Authority of the ECSC and the Board of Commissioners of the EDC seemed unnecessary, even dangerous, because

“Its mere creation risked to bring about, by that very fact, new extensions of competence, thus new cessions of sovereignty”.

The department Afrique-Levant at the Quai d’Orsay warned that even the direct election for a People’s Chamber would seriously weaken, or dissolve in foreseeable time, the connection between France and its overseas territories. Therefore, the directly elected parliament should be replaced by an indirectly elected one, with deputies drawn from the national parliaments.

24. AN Papiers Bidault 34, Alphand, Note pour le Président, 10. févr. 1953, secret.
25. Ibid.
With regard to the integration of foreign policy, the Quai d’Orsay seriously criticized the modest result of elaboration of the ad hoc Assembly, and thus the coordination of the foreign policy under the member states. The legal advisor at the Quai d’Orsay, Gros, posed the question of how a state which surrendered its powers of decision in foreign policy matters to the EPC could carry out its world-wide responsibility.  

From the beginning the Beyen Plan for the creation of a customs union did not find approval in France. One of its most ardent critics was the director of the Service de Coopération Economique at the Quai d’Orsay, Olivier Wormser. The question of the Union Française was one of the reasons why Wormser was opposed to the Beyen Plan. Wormser asserted that if the Beyen Plan was accepted and carried out, France would be forced to open its overseas markets to other European member states. He argued that France could not simultaneously invest in both the metropolitan territory and in the unproductive economic areas of its overseas territories without letting other countries participate. Wormser foresaw the danger that the markets of the overseas territories would be opened for the other five states without economic benefit for France, although these countries participated under prerequisites favourable to France. Thus, France would be forced to grant them its privileges in the Union Française, and economic gains would be lost - almost 40 percent of all exports of France were sold at this time within the Union Française. This would entail enormous political problems, and France would lose its world power position.

The French European agricultural policy was likewise adapted to the Quai d’Orsay’s general change of course in European politics, away from pro-community tendencies. In the meantime, the dissenting opinion of the Pfimlin Plan became influential. A majority of administrative elites in the ministry of Agriculture carried out the change from a pro-European agricultural policy to a national protectionist concept, as supported by the majority of the professional associations. In addition, the question of the relation of the French overseas areas to a planned agricultural commodities market also induced the French government to a reserved position vis-à-vis the supranational community of the Six. The previous negotiations for agricultural integration showed that this question could not be avoided any longer. In order to consider the situation of the overseas territories in agricultural integration, an interdepartmental conference took place under the leadership of the conseiller technique of Bidault’s staff, du Vignaux, on 2 and 5 February 1953, including the top officials from the Quai d’Orsay, the Ministère d’Etat, the ministry of

28. Ibid.; AN Papiers Bidault 38, le jurisconsulte (Gros), Note pour le secrétaire général (Parodi), 18 fév. 1953, a/s. Projet de Fédération politique européenne.
30. Ibid.
the Interior, the ministry de la France d'Outre-mer, the ministry of Economic affairs and the ministry of Agriculture.\textsuperscript{32}

At this conference Wormser and du Vignaux presented documents which represented the position of the Quai d'Orsay.\textsuperscript{33} According to them, contrary to the ECSC, the agricultural community was of great importance for relations between France and its overseas areas, since the agricultural sector dominated these economic relations. There were five possible solutions: 1) total exclusion of the overseas areas from the European agricultural community, 2) the system of the ECSC, 3) partial inclusion, 4) total inclusion in the European agricultural community and 5) modification of the structure of the agricultural community. Solutions 1 and 2 would separate the homeland from its overseas areas. Solution 4, which most seriously considered the relationship between metropolitan France and the Union Française, encountered an insurmountable obstacle, if the agricultural community intended to create a supranational agricultural commodities market. France itself was an important sales market for its overseas areas, just as the overseas areas were important customers for France's agricultural (above all, sugars, wheat and preserved food) and industrial products. These were currently sold under the preference system on a higher price level than world prices. If the agricultural sales markets of the other five European states were opened to the French overseas areas by virtue of their being integrated into the European community, it would be favourable to the French overseas areas. The European states would accept this only on the condition of reciprocity for their industrial products. This meant a great sacrifice for France, because it would no longer enjoy exclusive access to the preference system. The substantial problem was whether the European partners were ready to carry the responsibility for social development together with France, although this, from an economic point of view, would be very unproductive. All the arguments concerning solutions 1, 2 and 4 applied to solution 3. Wormser recommended solution 5: if France did not intend to sacrifice itself, it was necessary,

"to give up the idea that the objective of this Community has to be the creation of a Common Market and to think of organizing trade in certain basic products taking into due consideration trade with our overseas territories in the negotiations with our European partners".\textsuperscript{34}


\textsuperscript{33} AN Papiers Bidault 42, Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, Service de Coopération Economique, Communication au conseil des ministres, 27.1.1953. a.s./ l’organisation européenne des marchés agricoles et les TOM; AN Papiers Bidault 38, Note pour le président, Wormser, 14.2.1953 a.s. pool agricole; AN Papiers Bidault 38, Note pour le président, Wormser, 14.2.1953 a.s. pool agricole.

\textsuperscript{34} AN Papiers Bidault 42, Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, Service de Coopération Economique, Communication au conseil des ministres, 27.1.1953. a.s./ l’organisation européenne des marchés agricoles et les TOM.
An organization of this type would by no means be a European community, but a bilateral and intergovernmental organization. It would ultimately be better to negotiate the question of the agricultural community within the framework of the OEEC. All participants in the interdepartmental conference shared the basic idea of this document.\textsuperscript{35}

In France question of the EDC, the EPC, the customs union and the agricultural community depended closely on the kind of future relations between the Union Française and European community to be created. Awareness of this problem arose indirectly through the Strasbourg recommendation of the Assembly of the Council of Europe in September 1952 for common investments in all overseas areas of European countries, but such awareness was also directly caused by the EDC treaty and the EPC negotiations of the ad hoc Assembly.\textsuperscript{36} In the Conseil de la République and the Assemblée de l’Union Française the problem had been discussed in the context of the EDC several times in 1952. In the discussion many feared that supranational European integration would separate France from its overseas areas.\textsuperscript{37}

In view of this procedure the Quai d’Orsay began to intervene. It should be noted that the department Afrique-Levant had warned Schuman several times since October 1952 of arising problems for the Union Française from European integration. At that time Schuman did not take the warning seriously.\textsuperscript{38} Nor did Monnet think it wise to tackle this problem at this stage. He asked Schuman,

“to prevent representatives of the overseas territories from being designated at the Common Assembly and consequently to prevent also the question of the European Community’s relationship with the overseas territories belonging to the Union Française from being brought up for discussion at that moment”\textsuperscript{39}

The Territoires d’Outre-Mer should only be included when Germany would be reunified, in order to retain the balance in European communities.\textsuperscript{39} The department Afrique-Levant considered a provisional solution: The representatives from the overseas territories would participate in the parliament of the EPC, but the EPC

\textsuperscript{35. AN Papiers Bidault 42, Note relative aux réunions tenues au Quai d’Orsay les 2 et 5 févr. 1953 entre les cabinets ministériels en vue de la préparation d’un comité interministériel, 7.2.1953.}
\textsuperscript{36. AN Papiers Bidault 42, Direction des Affaires politiques 3ème Bureau, Pour M. le Ministre (à l’attention du professeur Luchaire), 6.2.1953, le Directeur-adjoint, Delteil, objet: Proposition de résolution tendant à inviter le Gouvernement à constituer une Commission chargée d’étudier les rapports entre l’Union Française et l’Organisation Politique de l’Europe présentée par Debré, au Conseil de la République; AMAE DE-CE 45-60, Vol.577, pp.420-424, L’entrée des TOM dans la Communauté Européenne, 26.11.1952, G. Peter, Office du Niger (organisme publique autonome) à Wormser ou Brunet; AN 457 34, RL/SB, les objections faites à la CED au cours des débats de l’Assemblée nationale, du Conseil de la République et de diverses manifestations politiques, confidentiel, undated.}
\textsuperscript{37. AN Papiers Bidault 34, Direction d’Afrique-Levant, S/D d’Afrique, Note a.s: Chambrun, Question n°4, 17.2.1953.}
\textsuperscript{38. AN Papiers Bidault 42, DGAP, Direction d’Afrique-Levant, sous-direction d’Afrique, Note, 12.1.1953, a.s./Europe et Union Française.}
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should not be endowed with powers over the French overseas territories from the start, and the jurisdiction of the EPC should be extended only later and gradually by France to non-European areas.

These were the contents of article 101 of the draft EPC treaty of the ad hoc Assembly. Problems nevertheless remained:

“1) If we reject the de facto extension, the consequence will be a break between metropolitan France and the overseas territories and a discriminatory treatment”**.

In view of the American anti-colonial policy and the intensifying drive towards independence within the states of the Union Française (Indochina, Morocco and Tunisia), the weakening of the French sovereignty by the supranational European community would very probably lead to a “coupure” (split) of the French Empire.

“2) two disadvantages at least will necessarily appear: a) a break this time between the Republic and the rest of the Union Française b) French sovereignty in the considered field will have to be shared with Germany and Italy in particular”**.

In addition, there was no guarantee that the French delegates from Africa would act loyally towards France. Altogether it was to be expected that the relationship between the European community and the Union Française would supersede the existing connections between France and its overseas areas. This dilemma was to be taken “extremely serious”**. Amongst the problems caused by supranational European integration it was the most fundamental problem that France was confronted with at the turn of 1952-1953. All the difficulty

“is indeed due to the fact that France can’t belong to the same extent to a European Community and to the Union Française, unless the two of them are completely merged”**.40

It was a question of priorities. According to some, such as Monnet and Schuman, Europe was right of way, whereas others gave the Union Française first priority. The convinced Gaullist Michel Debré pleaded for the second option. He defined Monnet’s supranational European communities as “an immense adventure”** for all and “some kind of nightmare” for many. According to him, these communities should be changed to the extent that the power of decision rested with the council of the heads of government. The Assembly however should by no means be endowed with “governmental and legislative power” and the Executive Council should function only administratively. Thus Debré’s Europe was called “a coalition of national authorities” or “an association of sovereignties”**. Debré represented the prevailing opinion of the Conseil de la République, the Assemblée de l’Union Française and the Comité d’études et de liaison du patronat de l’Union Française (CELPUF), which was close to the Conseil national du patronat français

41. AN Papiers Bidault 34, Debré, Note à l’attention de M. Bidault, 30.1.1953.
The minister responsible for the French Territoires d’Outre-Mer, Jacquinot, shared Debré’s opinion:

“The realization of the Union Française precedes and prevails for us over the realization of the European entity. One should not forget that the French grandeur is made up of metropolitan France as well as of all its overseas territories.”  

The majority of the French government was inclined to master this dilemma not by modifying the old French colonial system but by restructuring European integration, so as to develop from

“a federal or merged system into a confederate or associative system, taking the Union Française as an indissociable whole, that will only enter into a sufficiently flexible relationship with Europe.”

With this solution France could benefit from the additional advantage of being able to co-operate with Great Britain in such a confederate Europe in European and overseas affairs.

Contrary to this train of thought, the leaders of the MRP and the SFIO took a positive position on the question of the inclusion of the French overseas territories into the European communities. Guy Mollet, the leader of the French socialist party, was surprised at the negative opinion of the Assemblée de l’Union Française in Versailles. He held the view that the specialized communities should be limited to Europe only, but that in the long run France was not in the position to solve the problems of its underdeveloped overseas territories alone. In full agreement with Mollet, Rose and Alduy emphasized the necessity to tackle the question of the creation of a European investment bank in the French overseas areas as soon as possible. Moreover, in a note which is to be found in Mollet’s private archives
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Nr.106 (Articles et interventions de Mollet sur l’Europe, 1948-1955) he completely agreed with article 101 of the draft EPC treaty suggested by Teitgen. For Mollet, the question of the Union Française was not a reason to modify the supranationality of European integration. The special issue of the party newspaper of the MRP (Forces Nouvelles) on 20 December 1952 announced the result of the internal discussions of the MRP regarding these problems. According to the expert on the Union Française, G. Le Brun Keris, these problems were used as a tactical instrument by opponents of the European integration. However,

“we cannot give up either the European Union, the answer to German pressure, among other advantages, or our overseas territories to which so many moral ties are linking us and without which we would only be a very small power”.

Le Brun Keris, therefore, advocated that the French Republic as a whole should be integrated into the EPC and so the jurisdiction of the EPC should be extended to the French overseas territories. However, one should find a balance between driving European integration forward and retaining the Union Française.

“Just as France judged it necessary for its own legislation and regulations, the European Community’s legislation and regulations as well will have to be adapted to the situation of the different overseas countries by means of application rules determined by the relevant bodies within the French Republic”.

Teitgen, the leader of the MRP, who was engaged in the negotiations of the ad hoc Assembly, was of exactly the same opinion. For Le Brun Keris as well as for Teitgen, the question of the Union Française was not a reason to modify the supranationality of European integration.

What was Bidault’s position, as the new foreign minister, on European integration as a whole? Bidault alluded to making certain modifications to the European policies of his predecessor in favour of those who most strongly represented national feelings. He did not, however, go so far as to abolish the existing achievements. The experienced French diplomat Chauvel recommended to Bidault on 25 January 1953, to implement the EDC in the light of the negotiations compromising the positions of “the pole MRP and the pole RPF”, a recommendation which Bidault accepted. On 21 April 1953, Bidault rejected the demand of the French military to modify the determined EDC transition period to an indefinite period of time and also the demand of the high-level civil servants of the Quai d’Orsay to renounce the EDC. Bidault took account of the strong

47. AN MRP 350 AP 128, Forces Nouvelles N°28 Samedi 20 décembre 1952, «C’est toute la République qui doit rentrer dans la Communauté européenne, par G. Le Brun Keris»; AN Papiers Bidault 42, G. le Brun Keris, Note sur les rapports à établir entre les pays d’outre-mer membres de la République Française et la Communauté politique européenne, undated. Le Brun Keris suggested as a measure for this balance that direct elections should not be introduced at the beginning. In this point he dissociated himself from Teitgen (AN Papiers Bidault 39, Lettre de G. Le Brun Keris (Conseiller de l’Union Française) à Bidault, 24.2.1953).
national feelings in France, but he was not prepared to jeopardize the supranational European army.48 Bidault was thus closer to Alphand’s position than to that of the opponents of the EDC at the Quai d’Orsay. His attitude towards the EDC laid the foundation for his position on the EPC.

In order to define the French position in view of the conference of the six foreign ministers in Rome on 24-25 February 1953, Bidault called a meeting on 11 February, at which all the Quai d’Osay’s top civil servants were present.49 Teitgen was invited to report on the work of the ad hoc Assembly. The top civil servants criticized many points in Teitgen’s report. The theme of this debate dealt with the question of whether the Germans could be sufficiently controlled in the supranational European community or, conversely, whether the community might finally be controlled by the Germans in the foreseeable future. The participants also discussed whether promoting supranational European integration would be compatible with France’s world power position, based on the Union Française.

On the one hand, there were Teitgen, Alphand and Maurice Schumann who defended the continuation of Schuman’s European policies and the compatibility of these policies with retaining the Union Française. On the other hand, Parodi, de la Tournelle, de Maroerie, Gros, Seydoux, Wormser, Sauvagnargues and du Vignaux argued for the modification of Schuman’s European policies and for a French foreign policy which put more emphasis on the Union Française than on Europe. Their position was typically represented by the secretary general at the Quai d’Orsay, Alexander Parodi and the head of the European department, F. Seydoux. Parodi linked the EPC project to French foreign policy as a whole. With the Schuman Plan, France had taken the initiative and determined the speed and direction of European integration. However, France had gradually been deprived of its initiative and was driven to the point that it now was confronted with the so-called ‘Luxembourg resolution’.

“What is the meaning of all this? That France has to disappear as an independent state (…)? On the other hand, this European Community will not be controlled by France. When the projects of the ECSC and the EDC were put forward, we could legitimately assume that the European Community, as it was conceived, would operate under French leadership. It is obvious that Germany will be the leader of this community”*.


If the French overseas areas were opened to Europe, he emphasized, France would lose its rank as a world power. Bidault replied to Parodi that France, Great Britain and the U.S. would have to lead the Western world. Seydoux held the view that it was impossible for France to belong to the Six and at the same time to remain one of the three great powers. Bidault replied again that both should remain compatible. Bidault seemed to be torn, but was nearer to Teitgen’s thinking than to Parodi’s. Bidault insisted on a minimum amount of integration:

“It is not a question of giving Europe the possibility to extend its authority to unlimited fields. It is only a matter of uniting the ECSC and the EDC in order to have few and centralized organizations”.

The only new element, which Bidault sought to introduce through the EPC project, was “suffrage universel”. He therefore finally said that the EPC should “open its windows by means of universal suffrage”. However, he did not take a clear position on the question of the Union Française, which he called “our great concern”, with the exception of the principle quoted above.

Bidault however was not convinced of the necessity of direct elections. At the meeting of the board of MRP directors on 4 March 1953, Bidault said: “It seems most uncertain to me that universal suffrage should be adopted”. A. Colin replied: “Universal suffrage is essential in order to create a certain dynamism”. Bidault did not think that direct elections were a measure to speed up the European integration as Colin thought, but for him it was only a tactical instrument in order to make the ratification of the EDC treaty easier.

While visiting Paris on 20 February 1953, Beyen asked Bidault whether the French government intended to submit the EDC treaty together with the EPC treaty to Parliament for ratification or whether the government would be content with “favourable perspectives” regarding the creation of a political community. Beyen said that the first hypothesis would cause difficulties between both states, because the French Parliament did not want economic integration, whilst the Dutch Parliament was opposed to the EPC, if it were not combined with economic integration. Bidault replied:

“The French Parliament stated, among other necessities, the need to create a political community. It isn’t sure whether today it would do the same again as one year ago”.

He therefore did not demand that the EPC treaty should be ready to be signed before the ratification of the EDC treaty. So it seemed that both politicians agreed upon the second hypothesis.

Bidault expressed his basic position regarding the European policy in a speech at the Assemblée Nationale on 9 March 1953. The aim was, according to Bidault, to build Europe without breaking France down, to create Europe, but not to dis-
solve France therein, to raise and maintain France’s leadership of the European community. The French spoke in the name of 120 million people. In their name they would strengthen the Union Française and create Europe.54

Bidault’s main positions regarding the EPC can be summarized as follows: balancing Europe and the Union Française (“vocation européenne et mondiale” – European calling and world calling); resuming integration within the framework of the six states; making the jurisdiction of the EPC correspond, from the beginning, to that of the ECSC and the EDC; refusal of the Beyen Plan; entrusting the EPC only with the right to make suggestions regarding a Common Market. Besides the question of direct elections, the questions of the concrete structure of the EPC’s executive, and the relationship between the EPC and the Union Française were also remaining open.55

The Governmental Conference in Rome in September-October 1953 and the Failure of the EPC Project

The conferences for the additional protocols of the EDC treaty and for agricultural integration in 1953 ended without results. The four foreign minister conferences of the ECSC states dealing with the draft of the ad hoc Assembly56 also brought no results. It is remarkable that Bidault referred each time to the difficulties regarding the Union Française without taking a clear position on this. The diplomatic conference which was intended to discuss the draft EPC treaty of the ad hoc Assembly, according to article 38 of the EDC treaty, took place in Rome in September-October 1953. In the following section the internal debates of France for the preparation of the Rome conference are discussed with special consideration given to the question of the Union Française.57

The high-level civil servants of the Quai d’Orsay made every effort to convert the supranational character of the draft treaty of the ad hoc Assembly into a confederal form. They criticized the draft treaty of the ad hoc Assembly on the points of economic integration, of coordination with regard to foreign policy, of its supranational structure (above all the executive council) and, not least, the relationship be-

55. AN Papiers Bidault 38, Note du Gouvernement français relative au projet de marché commun, 21.2.1953; AN Papiers Bidault 38, Conception française pour l’organisation et le fonctionnement de l’organisation exécutive, undated - author unknown (it is nevertheless sure that this note before the conference of ministers of foreign affairs in Rome was drawn up in February).
56. The conferences were held in Rome in February, in Strasbourg in March, in Paris in May and in Baden-Baden in August 1953.
57. In May, the Mayer government was brought down. The cabinet crisis lasted until July, when the new Laniel government was formed. Bidault remained minister of foreign affairs. The European policies of the new government continued essentially unchanged.
between the Union Française and the community. The last point of criticism will be brought under further analysis in the next paragraph.

On 27 April 1953, an interdepartmental conference took place in the office of the secretary general of the French Foreign Office, Parodi, in order to consider the consequences of the draft EPC treaty for the Union Française. Bourgeot took the view that direct elections were unfavourable, since they would set the overseas territories in direct contact with the five other states. It would be desirable that the European Parliament would consist of the delegates selected from the national parliaments. Ratineau drew attention to the fact that the draft EPC treaty would offer to the overseas territories a “itinéraire de fuite” [escape route] from France. Roux feared that the draft treaty would cause the separation of Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia from France. Bardet was worried that, on the one hand, if the Etats associés should participate in the EPC, irregardless of form, their direct contacts with the five other states could break off the close connection between them and France. On the other hand, he was concerned that, if they remained outside of the EPC, France would lose its guiding role over them. Burin des Roziers pointed out that a studying committee, which had been set up on Mayer’s suggestion within the framework of the Centre d’Etudes de Politique Étrangère, had recently submitted its research results. It was agreed that the interested ministries should make their views clear and a conference among them should take place one day between 4 and 9 May. On the basis of the documents that the author examined, it can not be ascertained whether this conference actually took place. However, it is clear that the views that had been expressed by the top civil servants from the interested ministries were not modified at a later stage. For example, the minister in charge of France d’Outre-mer, L. Jacquinot, endorsed Bourgeot’s fears regarding direct elections. Moreover, he pointed out that the supranational Executive Council should be replaced by an office whose head was to be appointed by the Council of national ministers. He rejected the extension of jurisdiction of the EPC on foreign policy and on economic integration.

The top civil servants of the Quai d’Orsay shared these fears. Jurgensen regarded the guarantee of article 101 of the draft treaty as insufficient. He proposed that the EPC should become “supple” in order to let the Union Française as a whole

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58. AMAE Europe 44-60, Vol.78, p.140, Bidault au Ministère de la France d’Outre-mer, de l’Intérieur et des Etats associés, 10 avril 1953; AN Papiers Bidault 42, Compte-rendu de la réunion du 27 avril concernant le problème des rapports entre l’Union Française et la Communauté Européenne, 28 avril 1953. In this meeting participated the ministry of Foreign affairs [Parodi, De la Tournelle, Marchal (directeur d’Afrique-Levant), Jurgensen (Sous-directeur d’Afrique-Levant), Salade (Direction d’Asie), Argod (Direction d’Europe), Valery (Direction Economique)], the cabinet of the president of the Conseil des ministres [Burin des Roziers, (Conseiller diplomatique au cabinet du président du conseil)], the Ministère de la France d’Outre-mer [Ratineau (Cabinet du Ministre), Bourgeot (Sous-Directeur aux Affaires politiques), Servoise (Direction des Affaires politiques)], the Ministère des Etats associés [Aurillac (directeur des Services politiques), Bardet (directeur-adjoint)] and the Ministère de l’Intérieur [Roux, (sous-directeur d’Algérie)].

59. AN Papiers Bidault 42, Compte-rendu de la réunion du 27 avril concernant le problème des rapports entre l’Union Française et la Communauté Européenne, 28 avril 1953.

60. AN Papiers Bidault 42, Ministère de la France d’Outre-mer, Direction des Affaires politiques, JB/CJ, Note, 5.5.1953, a.s. du projet de traité portant statut de la Communauté Européenne (en ce qui concerne les TOM).
take part in it, without jeopardizing the close connection between those areas and France. He argued for indirect elections for the European Parliament. He spoke against the establishment of a supranational Executive Council, whose function the Council of national ministers could assume, and he also rejected each extension of jurisdiction of the EPC on foreign policy and economic integration.61

The research results of the above mentioned studying committee (which was chaired by general Catroux) consisted of two parts: 1) the institutional and political aspects, 2) the economic aspects. The author of the first part was Jurgensen, the second part was written by René Servoise from the ministry de la France d'Outre-mer. The first part was identical with the draft that Jurgensen had developed internally at the Quai d’Orsay. Servoise regarded the Community of the Six as an insufficient framework for the development of the economy of the French overseas areas. These two parts, which were used as one of the important main documents for laying down the French attitude, were published in the magazine “Politique Étrangère” of the Centre d’Études de politique étrangère in 1953. Jurgensen did not want to be revealed as the author of the first part. Therefore, the author of the first part - “L’Union Française et les institutions européennes”, was called “XXX”.62

Seydoux summarized the internally developed thoughts of the Quai d’Orsay, in contact with Bidault. As for the Peoples’ Chamber, its members should be directly elected by the national parliaments in the first period, and afterwards by the people. He spoke decidedly against the establishment of a supranational Executive Council. In his opinion, the Council of the National Ministers or the Council of the Foreign Ministers should assume this role. Deviating from the suggestions made by Jurgensen, Seydoux recommended that at first only metropolitan France should take part in the EPC, because the French government, above all Bidault, had not yet taken any clear position on this subject. Accordingly, France did not need to be given additional seats in the People’s Chamber. Along these lines Seydoux prepared instructions for the French delegation of the diplomatic conference in Rome.63

On 16 September 1953, a stormy council of ministers meeting took place, in which Bidault was forced by the pro-European wing of Laniel’s government (Reynaud and Teitgen) to withdraw his confederal instructions and to replace them with new, more concrete and supranational directives. Thereupon Bidault had to issue revised instructions, according to which direct elections should take place from the beginning, but no substantial powers should be awarded to Parliament. An executive of the community could be created, but it should consist of the Council of national ministers and the Executive Council of the EPC. The Council of national ministers should take “all essential decisions”. The Executive Council should consist of a president to be appointed by the Council of national ministers, the president of the ECSC’s High Authority, the president of the Board of Commissioners of the EDC and two members appointed by the Council of national ministers.64 These new instructions precipitated a dramatic debate between proponents of supranational integration and their opponents. Because of this extreme discord within the French government, the new instructions could no longer be submitted to the Council of Ministers for approval. Instead, Bidault passed the new instructions to the de facto director of the delegation, Seydoux,65 after obtaining assent from Laniel. In addition, Bidault indicated that the French delegation should not bind itself to anything final as long as the Assemblée Nationale had not concerned itself in detail with the entire question. The question of the Union Française should be excluded from the agenda.66

The governmental conference went into session in Rome on 22 September 1953. From the beginning, the question of the Union Française was excluded from the discussion, after the French as well as the Belgian delegation had made a statement about it before the opening of the conference.67 The conference in Rome ended again without result, just like the earlier conferences of the foreign ministers. It was decided to discuss the draft EPC treaty again at a next conference of the foreign ministers in The Hague. The unresolved position of France on the EPC project became clearer.

65. The official, de jure, director of the French delegation was the French ambassador in Rome, Fouques Duparc.
In a letter at Laniel on 22 October 1953, the minister in charge of France d’Outre-mer, Jacquinot, criticized the instructions prepared by Seydoux concerning the relationship between the European community and the Union Française, i.e., the provisional elimination of the representation of the French overseas territories in the European Parliament. Jurgensen supported Jacquinot and expressed that the EPC structurally should become even looser, so as to include the overseas areas as a whole into the European integration without jeopardizing the links between France and its overseas areas. However, the SFIO and the MRP officially supported the regulation of the draft EPC treaty as a result of Teitgen’s initiative.68

Bidault gave an important speech on the government’s European policies in the Assemblée Nationale on 20 November 1953: “The real dilemma” was the situation in which France had to choose between Europe and the Union Française, in other words, between the “vocation européene” and the “vocation mondiale”. In order to find a solution to this dilemma, one had to start out from political reality, Bidault argued. The ECSC had come into force. The EDC treaty was already signed. However, it was not a question to “federate” the nations and the states which possessed a long history, but to “make them share” a common function. One had to consider the different political situation, for example the division of Germany and the overseas responsibility of France. If one started from this reality, both the concept of a “a federal system consisting of a government or an embryo of government of the six countries”*, and the confederation model of the Gaullists could not meet this reality, because the concept of a confederation would run against the ECSC and the EDC. The true Europeans were “des constructeurs patients” [patient builders].69

Bidault intended to balance the European policy of his predecessor with strong nationalistic thoughts and emotions. He saw the solution not in destroying the previous accomplishments, but in correcting their contents and reducing the speed of European integration in favour of France.

Still, the kind of relationship that would link the Union Française to European union was not yet clearly defined. In France, this resulted not taking a clear position on the institutional questions of the EPC. So the conference in The Hague again brought no re-

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69. Speech of Undersecretary of State M. Schumann as Bidault’s representative in the Assemblée Nationale. Compte-rendu analytique officiel. 2ème séance du vendredi 20 nov. 1953, pp. 19-27 (These minutes are found in PAAA Büro Staatssekretäre 1949-1967, Bd. 59, pp. 16-46); AN Papiers Bidault 38, Note, author and date unknown. The content indicates that the document for the preparation of this speech was written in November 1953. The document is situated, however, in the document series which was collected and kept for the conference of Rome in February 1952. Therefore, this classification is false.
sults, just like the earlier conferences. The six foreign ministers only set up an expert committee. This committee went on working until the summer of 1954, when the EPC project disappeared at the demise of the EDC in August 1954.

Conclusion

The French government was reserved and careful in its approach to political integration in 1952. After the replacement of the Pinay-Schuman government with that of Mayer-Bidault, this caution became more obvious. The underlying cause was the difficult problem of the Union Française: How could France harmonize the advancing European integration, which was mainly directed toward the monitoring of Germany, with its world power position mainly based on retaining the colonial system? Furthermore, this problem involved also the question of whether and how France should appear as one of the world powers or whether it should act instead as leader of the united Europe on the stage of world politics. France began to split over these questions.

For Monnet and Schuman, a supranational status was necessary for the protection of a framework in which France and Germany would be reconciled and West Germany could be sufficiently controlled. They did not lose sight of the risk that the dominating role could be transferred to the Germans in a supranational community, against which an equilibrium had to be maintained. This equilibrium was to be constructed in the broader framework of an Atlantic community. According to Monnet, France’s world power status could be ensured on the basis of a leading role in the supranational European community. This conviction was derived from the fact that, without a close co-operation with the U.S., France’s world power status could not be secured. The United States pursued a world-wide anticommunist strategy at that time, by co-operating closely with Great Britain mainly in the non-European areas, and with France primarily in Europe. Schuman and Monnet were ready to delegate a still larger part of sovereignty to the European communities than the Gaullists and the high-ranking civil servants at the Quai d’Orsay who shared strong national feelings.

The opponents of Monnet-Schuman’s European policy regarded supranational European integration as an insufficient framework to control the Germans. Rather, they saw therein the possibility that France would eventually lose the dominant position in the European community to the advantage of the Germans. The Gaullists, the majority of the top civil servants at the Quai d’Orsay and the EDC opponents generally believed that the French world power position depended more on the Union Française than on Europe. In view of the crisis of the Union Française, and the contrary attitude of America in colonial questions, they viewed Monnet’s supranational communities as a sellout of France’s national sovereignty and of its historical world power status. Therefore, they demanded to give up the supranational construction of the community in favour of a confederal construction. These opinions
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With his realistic European policy, Bidault intended to meet all French positions on the question of European integration. He could not decide however which orientation to give to French foreign policy, whether to give priority to the Union Française or to European integration. He simply postponed taking a clear position on this question for later.

Despite the careful attitude of the French government, it seemed that the EPC would lead in the near future to a federation, a framework within which France’s world power status could be dissolved. France was against the final stage of European supranational integration, which it expected in the EPC negotiations. In view of this terrible prospect a number of people in France among those who had advocated the ECSC and the EDC as monitoring control bodies over West Germany recoiled from European supranational integration. The original opponents of this functional integration, like the Gaullists, affirmed this regression.

In conclusion, the fear that supranational European integration would break down the Union Française played a great role in France’s rejection of the supranational construction of the EDC and the EPC. Thus the EPC project did not serve its original purpose, the relief of the ratification of the EDC treaty, but proved only to be a cumbersome burden for the ratification. France changed its attitude towards the problem of the relationship between the Union Française and a supranational European union two years later, during the EEC negotiations. At this time France wanted to include its overseas territories in the community. This change in attitude is of great importance for the success of the EEC negotiations.  

70. It is very interesting to study why France changed its position in such a short period. But this article will not tackle this question.
In Quest of Time, Protection and Approval:
France and the Claims for Social Harmonization in
the European Economic Community, 1955-56

Lise Rye Svartvatn

The development of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) in the 1960s illustrates how France solved a national problem by means of a European solution. By making France’s participation in the European Economic Community (EEC) conditional on the setting up of a common agricultural market and a common agricultural policy in accordance with French preferences, the country succeeded in giving French surplus production new outlets. The French position during the negotiations that led to the Treaty of Rome indicates that there were similar ambitions behind the country’s claims for social harmonization. France was not the only country calling for social harmonization. However, while the Benelux countries demanded a harmonization of the social policies of the participating countries, France called for a harmonization of working regulations, claiming that the diversity in existing national regulations caused unequal terms of competition. More precisely, France demanded that all members of the future common market signed and ensured the effective application of the International Labour Organization’s (ILO) convention on equal pay for men and women. She also demanded the introduction of uniform overtime pay for hours exceeding an agreed number and the harmonization of paid holiday schemes.

This article argues that the French claims for social harmonization were launched in order to secure time, protection and approval. When first presented at the Messina conference in early June 1955, the claims formed part of a scheme that aimed to gain time for a government unable to take a stand on the proposed common market. They were sustained in order to secure continued protection for French industry. Continued protection was in turn instrumental in securing the National Assembly’s approval of the government’s pro-EEC policy. Maintenance of protection simultaneously formed part of a superior agenda aiming at the modernization of the French industrial structure. France raised the stakes in order to get her own way. In October 1956 this led to a deadlock in the negotiations. Due to Germany’s will and ability to accommodate the French claims, France finally obtained an agreement that rendered a completion of the negotiations possible.

A central question in studies of French European policy in this period has been why France took an interest in the new proposals for further integration that ap-

1. This article originated as a paper presented at the workshop “The Nordic Countries and West European Economic Integration up to the EFTA period” in Turku (Åbo), September 1999. I thank the participants, the anonymous reviewers, Frances M. B. Lynch, Hans Otto Frøland and Siri Rye Salvesen for helpful suggestions.

2. Centre des Archives Contemporaines (CAC), Secrétariat général du Comité interministériel pour les questions de coopération économique européenne (SGCI) 771468, Art.89, Note sur les objectifs de la France dans la politique agricole commune, 03.11.61.
peared in spring 1955. Hanns Jürgen Küsters argues that it was the Suez crisis that “… tipped the balance for the French government’s decision to join the EEC …”.

Wilfried Loth stresses that Guy Mollet’s pro-European policy aimed to tie the Federal Republic of Germany to the West and to further Europe’s independence from the USA. Pierre Guillen sees France’s participation in the common market as a result of her wish for co-operation on research into the use of nuclear energy. Thus, there has been a tendency to emphasize the impact of geopolitical factors. Others attach more weight to economic considerations. Frances Lynch argues that the decision to sign the Treaty of Rome resulted from the need to find a framework that would enable a continued modernization of the French economy through the exposure to increased, but limited, competition. Lynch downgrades the impact of the Cold War. So does Andrew Moravcsik, who claims that commercial considerations were decisive for the French government’s decision to sign the Treaty of Rome.

Explanations of the claims for social harmonization have emphasized domestic political imperatives. Alan Milward retraces the claims for social harmonization to demands from French industry, arguing that the claims were necessary for parliamentary reasons. Likewise, Hanns Jürgen Küsters writes that „In Wirklichkeit waren die Diskussionen um die soziale Harmonisierung ein reines Politikum zur Befriedigung französischer Verbandsinteressen. Die Regierung hatte sich die Forderung teils notgedrungen, teils willkommen zu eigen gemacht, um zusätzliche Garantien und Schutzklauseln einzuhandeln“.

Another view, presented by Paul M. Pitman and in line with the contemporary justification used by the French government, is that the claims were made in order to compensate for the country’s advanced social legislation, the costs of which put

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8. A. S. MILWARD, The European Rescue of the Nation-State, 2nd Edition, London 2000, p 212. Milward traces the demand for harmonized overtime pay back to complaints from the French manufacturing industry that the working week in France was only forty hours whereas it was forty-eight in Germany and Belgium. See also A. MORAVCSIK, The Choice for Europe ..., op.cit., pp.109 and 114. According to Moravcsik, French industry considered these claims the second best solution to devaluation.
the country at a disadvantage in export markets.\textsuperscript{10} While this article does not dispute that French industry claimed social harmonization, it aims to show that the French government had reasons of her own that were more far-reaching for claiming social harmonization among the Six.\textsuperscript{11}

\textbf{In Quest of Time}

In spring 1955 France was governed by a centre-right coalition headed by Edgar Faure of the Radical party. Less than a year had passed since the National Assembly had voted down the European Defence Community (EDC) with a majority of 319 to 264 votes. The dispute over the EDC had disunited the French people. In his memoirs, Robert Marjolin depicts dinner parties in Paris where guests broke up and left in fury, and compares the atmosphere to the one prevailing during the Dreyfus affair which began 60 years earlier.\textsuperscript{12} National unity, restored at the time of the liberation, seemed once again to be broken. When the Benelux-countries launched their memorandum in April the following year, there was still considerable division over the question of European integration both within the French government and in the National Assembly. Several of the ministers were convinced Europeans. Among those were Antoine Pinay at the Quai d’Orsay, Robert Schuman at the Ministry of Justice and Pierre Pflimlin at the Ministry of Finance. It was Pinay’s government that had signed the Treaty of Paris on the setting up of a European defence community in 1952, and Pinay had himself defended the treaty in the debate in the National Assembly two years later. However, the Faure government also included Gaullist ministers opposed to supra-nationality, opposed to the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and opposed to the very person of Jean Monnet.\textsuperscript{13} The situation within the political leadership mirrored the one prevailing elsewhere in French society. The Foreign Ministry was aware of the danger of presenting the National Assembly with another insufficiently prepared proposal. The opinion was that the EDC incident had made French opinion extremely sensitive to economic risks in international politics.\textsuperscript{14}

The Benelux memorandum consisted of two parts. One stemmed from a proposal launched by the Dutch foreign minister Jan Willem Beyen for a common market among the members of the ECSC. The other part consisted of a suggestion presented by his Belgian colleague, Paul Henri Spaak, for an extension of Europe-
an sectoral integration into the fields of energy, transport and atomic energy. In France even pro-Europeans were sceptical of the part of the memorandum concerning a common market. Pinay, for instance, feared the consequences of a more liberal policy for French enterprises. He was, again according to Robert Marjolin,

«profondément gêné par ce qu’il savait des sentiments français, ceux des élites industrielles ou administratives, comme ceux du peuple lui-même, à l’égard des problèmes discutés».

The prevailing attitude within Pinay’s own ministry was in accordance with this, that acceptance of the proposal for a common market was very unlikely. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs argued that such a solution would demand the surmounting of very serious technical and social problems. The fact that European agriculture was not ready to confront free trade was one of these. The French Union, Benelux’s insistence on a low common external tariff, regional imbalances and disparities in prices and productivity constituted the rest of the problems. Additionally, one would have to deal with the social problems resulting from the above listed problems. The Ministry also had political objections to entering a European common market. If Germany regained her sovereignty and the right of disposing an army, the fear was that integration would further German economic and political hegemony on the continent and that this in turn would imply the loss of all freedom of action and diplomatic independence for France. Another concern of political character was that any development that could be interpreted as federal would frighten away large segments of the French public opinion.

While there were plenty of objections to the proposal for the common market, France was simultaneously unable to reject it. Already twice in two years time the country had prevented the process of European integration from progressing. First in August 1954 with the National Assembly’s rejection of the EDC proposal, and secondly in 1953, when the government had turned down an earlier version of the proposal for a common market. Since the new proposal included concessions to the objections raised by France in 1953, another rejection would raise serious doubts about the country’s will to integrate. The fact that the principle of a common market also figured in the agreement on the Saar recently entered into with Germany, made a re-

21. In September 1953 the Dutch foreign minister Jan Willem Beyen proposed that tariff reductions were to take place within the six ECSC countries, and were to lead to a full customs union. On the 1953 proposal, see R. T. Griffiths and A. S. Milward, *The Beyen Plan and the European Political Community*, in: W. Maihofer (ed.), *Noi si mura*, Selected Working Papers of the European University Institute, Florence, 1986, pp.596-623.
22. The new proposal emphasized that the speed of the process of integration was to be determined by intergovernmental agreement. It also posed the principle of harmonization of social charges and production costs. DDF, 1955, I, no.308, Note du Département, May 1955.
jection even more difficult. The Ministry therefore concluded that, as matters stood, the best (and probably only) solution was to play for more time. This was to be done by demanding an examination of the problems that would result from the setting up of a common market. At the Messina conference, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Antoine Pinay, acted in accordance with this conclusion. It has been argued that positive conclusions at Messina were due to concessions made by France’s partners. The countries agreed to undertake a study of the measures necessary in order to harmonize the general policy of the participating states in the financial, economic and social fields. Furthermore, they declared it essential to study the progressive harmonization of regulations now in force in the different states, particularly those relating to the length of the workday and the payment of additional benefits.

In the time that followed, France made every effort to change the economic terms of the Benelux proposal. As it had already been established that the proposal could not be turned down, this was the only logical thing to do. If the economic terms within a common market could be improved for France, scepticism within public opinion would decrease at the same time as the outlooks on a dominating German position. Earlier research into French European policy has shown that French tactics before the Messina conference were to disrupt the link between the acceptable proposal for sectoral integration and the unacceptable proposal for a common market. This was to be done by focusing on topics most likely to divide the other countries. Social harmonization was considered to be one such issue.

While there is no reason to doubt that disruption was what the Quai d’Orsay hoped for before the conference, several circumstances indicate the existence of additional motives. One of these is that the claims were sustained after the Messina conference was over and the disrupting tactic had failed.

In Quest of Protection and Approval

Scholars commenting on the French claims have contested their economic importance. Robert Marjolin considered them an absurd demand. However, Marjolin also gave the following description of what it would take to bring France into the common market.

23. Ibid.
24. Ibid.: “il s’agirait d’étudier à loisir les conditions de réalisation du marché commun”.
27. The Messina Declaration: (http://www.let.leidenuniv.nl/history/rtg/res1/messina.htm).
La difficulté essentielle qu’il fallait surmonter était l’hostilité de la quasi-totalité de l’opinion française à l’abolition, même progressive, de la protection dont jouissait, je dirai plutôt souffrait, l’industrie française.  

The argument presented here is that the demand for social harmonization was vital in overcoming the French opinion’s hostility to the removal of protection that membership of the common market seemed to imply. This did not come as a result of the direct economic significance of the French claims, which seems to have been minor. The indirect significance of the claims was on the contrary considerable, both politically and economically. Through these claims, France was able to secure continued protection for French industry within the common market. The claims were furthermore instrumental in justifying regulations for France within the OEEC that had resulted in considerable advantages for French trade. Finally they enabled French governments to avoid undertaking an otherwise necessary but politically undesirable devaluation of the French franc.

Opposition to membership of a common market in the French National Assembly reflected prevailing sentiments in French public opinion in general, and within French industry in particular. The industrial sector feared foreign competition and was reluctant to the removal of the protection which French industry enjoyed. This protection consisted of a tax reduction on exports and a corresponding surcharge on imports into the Franc Area. The claims for social harmonization were conducive to overcoming opposition to economic integration by being instrumental in maintaining these special regulations for French trade. It turned out as follows. In Brussels France justified her resort to export-aid and special import-taxes with the importance of social charges weighing upon French cost prices. The claims for social harmonization were in turn justified by the argument that they were made in order to harmonize social charges: to prevent countries with less developed social legislation from outclassing other countries. Accordingly, as long as the French claims for social harmonization were not accommodated, special protection of French industry was justified. At the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, continuance of this protection was considered a necessity if a treaty on a common market was to be ratified by the French National Assembly.

31. Ibid., p.281.
33. R. MARJOLIN, Le travail d’une vie … op.cit., p.284. See also Ph. MIOCHE, Le patronat français et les projets d’intégration économique européenne dans les années cinquante, in: G. TRAUSCH (ed.), The European Integration from the Schuman-Plan to the Treaties of Rome, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft and Bruylant, Baden-Baden and Brussels, 1993, p.247. Mioche explains that the employer’s organization, the Conseil National du Patronat Français (CNPF), was divided in the question of membership of the common market and why this was the case.
34. MAE, DE-CE 1945-60, 711, Note, 15.09.56.
35. MAE, DE-CE 1945-60, 711, Note pour Monsieur le Président de la Délégation française, 12.07.56.
The maintenance of the claim for social harmonization in Brussels also contributed to the keeping up of advantages within the OEEC. Within both the OEEC and GATT, the French system of tax reductions on exports had been heavily criticized, and France had already obliged herself to announce when she would be ready to diminish or eliminate these reductions. The additional tax on imports was likewise contested. In order to explain her modest liberalizing performance within the OEEC, France had invoked the disparity between French and foreign prices. She had argued that it was this disparity that necessitated both tax reductions on exports and the additional tax on imports. Thus, if France engaged in a common market without harmonization of social legislation at the same time as she had not fulfilled her obligations versus the OEEC, she would put herself in an awkward position.

Table 1: Trade liberalization in OEEC countries, 1952-56
(% of imports freed from quota restrictions; end years)\textsuperscript{38}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Intra-OEEC trade</th>
<th>1952</th>
<th>1954</th>
<th>1956</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OEEC average</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The opinion within the Foreign Ministry was that France during the last few years had considerably benefited from the process of quota liberalization. In addition to the general advantages of liberated trade and payments following the decisions taken within the OEEC, exceptions had permitted her to profit from the ongoing process without having to commit herself to the same degree as the other countries. \textsuperscript{39} In early 1952, France had suspended all import-liberalizing measures for a period of twenty months due to balance of payments troubles. While doing so she had been allowed to continue to benefit from the liberalization undertaken by the other countries. In the same period the other countries had accepted a 50% reduction in quota-regulated imports into France without introducing similar measures versus French exports. Furthermore, the OEEC had accepted the introduction of the special tax on imports that appeared in April 1954. And finally, while the OEEC had decided in January 1955 to remove a certain number of export subventions, the organization had admitted that this obligation would not automatically apply to France. This decision was due to take effect from December

\textsuperscript{37} MAE, Papiers Wormser (PW), Vol.31, Note pour le Président, 10.10.55.


\textsuperscript{39} Between 1952 and 1955 the French economy remained one of the most protected economies in OEEC. F.M.B. LYNCH, Restoring France ..., op.cit., p.65.
31st 1955 and would as a consequence favour even more French trade. The French Foreign Ministry was well aware that these advantages had allowed French exports to expand. Exports had expanded more rapidly than imports, and exports toward the OEEC countries had expanded faster than exports to the rest of the world. To give up a privileged position within the OEEC while simultaneously having to face increased competition within a European common market, can not have been a tempting prospect.

Finally, the system of export-aid and import-taxes enabled French governments to avoid undertaking the otherwise necessary, but from a political point of view undesirable, devaluation of the French franc. The overvaluation was estimated in November 1955 to reach approximately 12%. Within the Faure administration it was considered the sole guarantee for continued economic and hence political cohesion of the Franc Area. It was regarded as the means that allowed the transformation of the French political union into the Franc Area as an economic unit constituted by a customs union. The internal price level corresponding to the overvaluation was considered advantageous in several respects. It allowed the industrialization of technically underdeveloped areas and made otherwise marginal agricultural areas profitable. A common level of prices restricted possible markets to the Franc Area only and led to a common level of protection against the rest of the world. The overvaluation also obliged the under-developed areas to renounce customs toward France. It obliged all territories in the Area to constitute a customs union and to engage in a common policy and a common investment-program ensuring a very advanced degree of political cohesion. The fear was that devaluation quickly would lead to an economic and political break-up of the French union. The exchange rate was considered a necessary, perhaps also sufficient, condition for the continued existence of the Franc Area. Thus, an artificial maintenance of an overvalued currency appeared as an economic and political imperative.

In January 1956, as a result of legislative elections, a new government took office with Guy Mollet, the leader of the Section Française de l’Internationale Ouvrière (SFIO), as head of government. With the exception of a small number of Mendès-France radicals, Mollet’s centre-left coalition, the Republican Front, has been described as more pro-European than the Faure government. The composition of the new National Assembly has been interpreted somewhat differently. While some argue that it indicated an increased opposition, others claim the opposite.

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40. MAE, PW, Vol.80. Avantages que la France a tirés de sa participation à l’OECE dans le domaine des échanges et des paiements, 17.01.56.
42. MAE, PW, Vol.77, Note pour Monsieur Clappier, 28.11.55.
43. Frances Lynch shows that on balance the number of deputies strongly opposed to European integration increased. Chapsal and Lancelot claim that the elections made away with a good number of representatives opposed to European integration. F. M. B. LYNCH, *France and the International Economy …*, op.cit., p.173. J. CHAPSAL and A. LANCELOT, *La vie politique en France depuis 1940*, PUF, Paris, 1979, (5th edition), p.296. I believe the disagreement is due to the fact that Chapsal and Lancelot only seem to take account of the decline of the Gaullists, ignoring changes in the number of communists and the emergence of the Poujadists.
What seems sure is that support for a pro-EEC policy still could not be, and was not, taken for granted. Improvements in France’s economic position may have made it easier for the new government to lead a more pronounced policy in favour of a common market.

Shortly after the Mollet take-over, the director of the economic and financial division at the Quai d’Orsay, Olivier Wormser, wrote a note in which he discussed the situation faced by the new government. Wormser emphasized that exports to the OEEC area had expanded considerably, that gold and currency reserves had increased and that the country had been able to repay an appreciable part of her debts. However, he simultaneously established that the situation was far from satisfactory, and also marked by the precarious methods that had been used to obtain the above mentioned results. Exports of finished products were still low, and France had not yet seen all consequences of the loss of market shares in Indochina, of the situation in North Africa and of the statute for the Saar. As for the methods used by France, several countries were about to lose their patience with the French system of export subventions and import taxes.

As Wormser put it, the government was faced with two options. One possibility was to devalue and eliminate the export subventions and import taxes. The other alternative consisted in making the other countries accept that the existing system was a temporary but inevitable solution made necessary by the disparity between French and international prices. He did not envisage that the new government would be willing to devalue. Nor could the disparity in prices be rapidly eliminated. It would take time before any policy of increased productivity and/or investments could produce results. The international picture, the situation in North Africa and the need to maintain full employment rendered a severe policy impossible. Consequently, he concluded that the government would have to make the other countries accept the French system of export subventions and a temporary tax on imports. Wormser emphasized the emergency character and importance of the task in question. Yet he was also aware that the French government seemed unable to reach a clear and definite solution to the problem. The only way out seemed to be «… de chercher à gagner du temps en érigeant des pratiques en vérité contestables, en système doctrinal, tout en demeurant conscient qu’il s’agit là d’un expédient provisoire».

Material produced under the new government indicates that it ended up in adopting Wormser’s recommendations. France’s reason to engage actively in the ongoing work in the Spaak-committee was “l’intérêt politique qui s’attache à faire un nouveau pas vers la construction de l’Europe”. However, the common market was simultaneously considered an economic opportunity, where increased but limited competition would enhance a reform of the French economy. Due to prevailing

45. MAE, PW, Vol.80, Note, 30.01.56.
46. Ibid.
sentiments in French economic circles, the Foreign Ministry remained convinced of the need to take account of social and fiscal differences among the Six. The outlook for the ratification of a treaty that did not include clear arrangements in these fields was considered poor. What mattered was therefore to set up a system taking sufficient care of realities in order to gain the National Assembly’s approval and necessary support in public opinion. After the elections, instructions to the French delegation in Brussels continued to insist on the need to harmonize social, as well as fiscal, policies.

Hanns Jürgen Küsters writes that after the elections “a more open-minded approach to European policy was expected of France. The political personalities did in fact change, but the administration – and with it – its extremely anti-European stance remained”. It is not my impression that the Foreign Ministry was opposed to a common market membership. Rather, it appears realistic with regard to the internal situation in France and what it would take to overcome opposition to the government’s choice of policy. After January 1956 the Ministry no longer advocated the need for an alignment of the social charges belonging to France’s partners only. Just as consistently, it called for the need to undertake structural economic and social domestic reforms. Thus, structural problems were no longer swept under the carpet, and self-examination was more pronounced. As soon as the decision to establish a common market was taken, France would have no choice but to surmount the problems that membership presented.

Other questions, including the harmonization of charges, only constituted a means to that end. It was made clear that membership would not be compatible with the maintenance of the present economic and social equilibrium in France. The safeguard clauses were temporary and would not spare France the necessary social and economic changes, the importance of which could not be underestimated. The common market would also constitute a step toward a merger of the economic policies of the countries involved, and a certain integration of the countries’ foreign policies. Finally, it would both legally and practically be impossible to realize simultaneously the merger of the European markets and the markets of the French union. Acceptance or refusal of these implications would have to take place. Before doing so, France would have to ascertain that there was no other way to ensure in a comparable manner a durable reinforcement of European co-operation and suitable conditions for the modernization and expansion of the French economy.

The Ministry knew at an early point that the forthcoming Spaak report was unlikely to take account of the French claims in a precise manner. Nor was the Cont-
The employ-ers’ organization made it clear that it considered a harmonization of the production conditions an indispensable counterpart to the planned liberalization of trade. It in-sisted that France demand precise obligations on this point, which in turn would exclude a fixed schedule for the passage from one stage of the transitional period to another. In other words, the CNPF demanded the ratification and application of the convention for equal pay for men and women. It demanded the fixing of a com-mon basis for overtime pay and the harmonization of paid holidays. The employ-ers emphasized the need to ensure the maintenance of import-taxes and export-aid. According to the organisation itself, this system ought to exist as long as the causes for the general price disparity between French and other international prices were not eliminated.

It has been argued that the narrower commercial concern of export promotion was central to the preferences of the French, German and British governments’ choice for Europe. There is reason to believe that French policy-makers were out for more than that. Material from the Foreign Ministry says clearly that while, in January 1956, the expansion of exports is well on its way, the need for moderniza-tion is still considered urgent. French leaders were undoubtedly sensitive to, and forced to take account of, the position of French industry. But that is not to say that French governments claimed social harmonization only to accommodate French industry. French politicians had reasons of their own to maintain the claim for social harmonization that had little or nothing to do with the French patronat. The CNPF claimed social harmonization in order to maintain protection while simulta-neously getting access to a larger market. French political leaders shared this ambition. In contrast to the CNPF however, the political leadership was also out to avoid undertaking a devaluation, and to obtain support for a policy whose overriding con-cern was more far-reaching than export-promotion, namely a much needed mod-ernization of the French economy.

The Problems Faced by the French Economy

By pointing social legislation out as a trade distortion, France managed to keep more fundamental reasons for the country’s lack of competitive power out of the

53. MAE, DE-CE 1945-60, 628, Le marché commun européen, 09.08.1956.
54. Ibid.
55. MAE, DE-CE 1945-60, 628, Le marché commun, 10.08.1956.
57. MAE, PW, Vol.80, Note, 30.01.56.
searchlight. France’s problem was that the country’s industrial sector was relatively small and unproductive. This has been explained by the fact that no net investments had taken place in the period from 1930 to 1945. Low productivity and lack of competitive power has also been traced back to the 1931 sterling devaluation and the introduction of a preferential tariff within the British Empire. These steps augmented France’s trade with its own empire. Since the French Empire was undeveloped and not able to compete in a free market, this trade had been highly protected. Due to the protection, structural changes that competition otherwise would have provoked, such as the merger of small firms into larger units, had not taken place. France in the mid-fifties was still protectionist. According to the Foreign Ministry, economic circles took little interest in exports. Quotas were kept up not only for balance of payment-reasons, but also due to the will, justified or not, to protect. The fact that France managed to keep its trade on the present level of liberalization was attributed to the system of import taxes and export aid.

In 1956 the ILO published an investigation into the cost of labour that showed that wage costs and obligatory social charges in France were higher than in Germany.

<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Average hourly earnings, 1954</th>
<th>Obligatory social charges expressed as percentage of asseable wages at 01.01.1956</th>
<th>Cost to employers of days off with pay as percentage of wages, 1952-53</th>
<th>Wages + obl. social charges + cost of days off with pay. Indices: Switzerland = 100</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>In Swiss francs</td>
<td>Indices: Switzerland = 100</td>
<td>Wages + obl. social charges + cost of days off with pay. Indices: Switzerland = 100</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>1.88</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>29.8</td>
<td>7.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>1.74</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>9.8</td>
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However, the ILO investigation did not take account of private agreements between undertakings and trade unions that, unlike in France, constituted a considera-

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59. In the constitution of 1946 the term “empire” was replaced by the term “union”.
62. DDF 1956, I, no.67, Note de la Direction générale des Affaires économiques et financières, 02.02.1956.
63. Source: International Labour Office: *Social Aspects of European Economic Co-operation*. Report by a Group of Experts, Geneva 1956, p.33. Since the three sets of data related to different dates, the ILO emphasized that the aggregates were approximations. It was considered unlikely that this affected the relative magnitude in any substantial degree.
ble part of total social charges weighing upon German employers. Nor did it take account of the overvaluation of the French franc and the undervaluation of the German mark. Thus, the disparity in the cost of labour in the two countries was, according to officials in the Interministerial Committee for Questions of European Integration (SGCI), less than indicated in the table above. The SGCI concluded that in the course of two years the difference in the cost of labour between France and Germany had decreased from 22.6% in 1954 to only 7% in 1956.64

The Quai d’Orsay was well aware that a harmonization of social charges would not compensate for the disparity between French and foreign prices. The Ministry was of the opinion that this disparity was mainly due to the structure of the French costs and to the sum of production costs. After the Second World War, subsequent French governments had, in contrast to the previous period, led a policy focused on investments. Simultaneously, a policy of increased wages had been pursued. At the national level the increase in income had balanced the increase in prices. At the international level these policies had created a gap between French and foreign prices.65 Consequently, harmonization of social legislation would only very slightly improve the situation for those branches of French industry where prices were higher than in other countries. Nor was such harmonization likely to be accepted by France’s partners. Not only would it contradict objectives with regard to competition pursued notably among the Six, social harmonization would also worsen the European countries’ competitive position on the international market without improving France’s position versus third countries.66

The Quai d’Orsay was concerned with the danger involved in describing the gap in prices as a general disparity. Export-aid and import-taxes did not concern all products. This could be interpreted as if disparities did not exist within sectors outside the scope of these arrangements, which would mean that the disparity was not general. It could also be interpreted as if disparities within these branches were compensated for by specific distortions to the detriment of other countries.67 An investigation into general price disparities would highlight the need for reform of the structure of French costs.68 Alternatively it could lead France’s partners to recommend with reinforced insistence a devaluation of the French franc. The Ministry was well aware that a permanent elimination of price disparities would take both devaluation and reform. Yet while the Mollet government did not share the preceding government’s reasons against devaluation, it was all the same against it.69 The system of export aid and import taxes was conducive to avoiding devaluation. The argument presented by the French government was that the price disparities were

64. CAC, 910004/2, Note sur l’incidence des charges sociales et de la charge salariale globale, undated.
66. Ibid.
67. Ibid. One is left with the impression that this was the case, since the Ministry advised against a sector-wise study of price disparities since this could reveal specific distortions harmful to certain countries.
68. Ibid.
not only of a general character, liable to be corrected by an adjustment of exchange rates, they also corresponded to certain differences in social and fiscal legislation. That was why France had demanded the harmonization of social charges as a precondition to the common market. The hope was that France’s partners, at least for a while, would accept the soundness of this.\footnote{Ibid.}

So far, little indicated that this would be the case. Outsiders had long argued against harmonization and in favour of a French devaluation. Harmonization, whether social or fiscal, was not considered a necessary precondition for a common market. It would, the argument went, be identical with demanding that the other countries would augment their production costs, which was considered a solution without any chances of succeeding.\footnote{MAE, DE-CE 1945-60, 612, Bertrand (OEEC) to Valéry (MAE), 11.08.55.} The Secretariat of the Intergovernmental Committee had also produced a note on distortions in the Common Market with the intention of proving that prior harmonization of charges was unnecessary, and that it would be possible to correct the distortions of which France suffered through a devaluation.\footnote{MAE, DE-CE 1945-60, 612, Note pour le Cabinet du Ministre, 19.09.55.} From a technical point of view the French were not foreign to this kind of argument. While their reasons for not wanting to devalue were of political and psychological nature, they still found this way of arguing maladroit.\footnote{Ibid.}

**Saved by the Germans**

In October the question of social harmonization brought the negotiations for a common market to a standstill. A few weeks later France and Germany hammered out a compromise that enabled a successful completion of the negotiations. This compromise simultaneously eliminated opposition to the common market within French industrial circles.

Germany never believed that France’s ability to compete was hampered by social costs constituting a larger part of production costs than in other countries. The German Foreign Ministry based itself on experience from the ECSC as well as recent investigations undertaken by the OEEC, which rejected that the burden of social and fiscal costs in France would distort competition in a common market. The German view was that indirect pay constituted a larger part of total hourly labour costs in France than in most ECSC countries, but that total hourly labour costs were not higher in France than in the other countries.\footnote{Bundesarchiv (BA), B 146/594a, Soziallasten, Lohn- und Steuerbelastung und der Wettbewerb auf dem Gemeinsamen Markt, 27.06.56.} Accordingly, the German Foreign Ministry was sceptical when the French delegation in July 1956 called for an investigation into the expenditures made up of social costs in the different countries. In its opinion, the scope demanded by the French was too narrow and could only pro-
duce a result that would be used to justify a French demand for a levelling up of the costs in other countries to French standards.75 The Germans were convinced that a more comprehensive investigation would prove that the importance of social harmonization was over-estimated. This was probably why the Ministry referred to the question of social harmonization as a false problem. Nevertheless, it was considered a problem and one that, on account of negotiating tactics, would have to be solved as soon as possible.76

Months went by before a solution was reached. In the time that passed, the discussion centred around which matters ought to be investigated in order to decide whether social costs did constitute a trade distortion or not. France demanded an investigation into the significance of equal pay, overtime pay and paid holidays. Germany pressed for a more comprehensive investigation into the part constituted by direct and indirect wages on net production value of industrial production in the Six states.77

The Bundeswirtschaftsministerium considered rightly that the problem of social harmonization was political. The Ministry was on the other hand wrong when assuming that the French government made use of this question in order to prevent the setting up of a common market that they were opposed to. Still, that was what they believed, and from that point of view Germany was now confronted with two possible options. On the one hand, they could by means of an appropriate investigation do away with the problem and simultaneously provide the French supporters of the Common Market with arguments against their opponents. On the other hand, it could be that the French were out to bring the negotiations to an end over this question. In that case the matter would have to be treated in a way that ensured that France was left with the blame, and in a way that guaranteed that Germany could not be accused of being socially reactionary. In Ludwig Erhard’s opinion the French claims were impossible, but in first instance they would still have to be met. He was convinced of the need to bring the topic up to the highest political level.78 This was also what finally happened.

Prior to this, the French upped the stakes in order to get their way. When the delegations met in Brussels on July 26 Faure urged quick action, emphasizing the positive climate created by the recent debate over Euratom in the National Assembly. He stressed the fact that a governmental crisis could provoke a situation that would give the opponents of a common market time to organize. However, his efforts were fruitless. A decision was taken to postpone the question of social harmonization until the beginning of September when the heads of delegations were to present their objections to the system for social harmonization envisaged in the Spaak-report.79 When the delegations met again on September 13 Faure proceeded in a more decisive manner. This time he stressed the special difficulties faced by

75. BA, B146/594a, Kurzprotokoll über die Ressortbesprechung vom 3. Juli 1956 im Auswärtigen Amt.
76. Ibid.
77. BA, B146/594a, Harmonisierung der Soziallasten im Gemeinsamen Markt, 10.07.56.
78. BA, B146/594a, Ressortbesprechung über Angleichung der Soziallasten im Gemeinsamen Markt bei Herrn Minister Erhard am 25.07.1956.
79. BA, B146/593, Kurzprotokoll über die Ressortbesprechung vom 27.07.56 im Auswärtigen Amt.
France where the demands of war had created price-disparities. He also stressed the strong political will to see a common market come true that included France. In order to obtain this he suggested a special agreement for France allowing the maintenance of her system of import duties and export support as long as price disparities existed.\textsuperscript{80} When a few days later the French delegation presented the terms on which it would be possible for France to participate in the common market, the demands were even more extensive. The decision to pass from the first to the second stage of the transitional period was to be unanimous, and only to be taken when the objectives decided upon had been reached. In the field of social harmonization, France demanded the realization of equal pay within a period of two years. Within this period, measures also had to be taken to ensure the harmonization of the length of the working week and corresponding overtime pay at the end of the first stage, as well as the harmonization of paid holidays. During the following stages, measures were to be taken in order to harmonize total wage charges.\textsuperscript{81}

The French terms met vivid opposition. This was particularly the case with the claim for the harmonization of total wage charges. As far as the question of equal pay was concerned, the countries agreed that this seemed to constitute a specific distortion that could find its solution through the system of safeguard clauses as proposed in the Spaak-report. In the matter of paid holidays, the countries agreed that this was unproblematic. To the question of harmonized overtime pay, a solution was still to be found. The heads of delegation seemed ready to accord France a regime of export-subsidies and import-taxes on special conditions. The French delegation argued on its side for the additional possibility of introducing safeguard clauses in case of a deficit in the balance of payments. This did not please the other delegations. It appeared, however, as if some solution was to be reached.\textsuperscript{82}

On October 20 and 21 the six states met to deal with the questions on which agreement had not yet been reached. At this meeting the question of social harmonization brought the negotiations to a point that threatened to break them off in their entirety. This was not due to the other five, since they showed considerable will to reach a solution, but to the French who constantly came up with new demands. The five agreed that France could maintain export-subsidies and import-taxes in the transitional period under certain conditions. Safeguard-clauses were furthermore to be invoked in case of problems with the balance of payments. It was when discussing the terms for passing from the first to the second stage of the transitional period that a critical point was reached. France insisted that the decision had to be unanimous. The other delegations favoured qualified majority. After a long break and the intervention of the French Prime Minister a compromise was reached. This said that the first stage was to last for four years. If a country found that the targets set for the first stage were not reached, it would be able to

\textsuperscript{80} BA, B 146593, Brüsseler Integrationskonferenz; Delegationsleiterausschuss, Sitzung vom 13. September.

\textsuperscript{81} MAE, DE-CE 1945-60, 610, Mémorandum du Président de la Conférence Intergouvernementale pour le Marché Commun et l’Euratom, 12.10.56.

\textsuperscript{82} Ibid.
prevent the passing to stage two. Stage one was then to be prolonged by two years, after which the decision to move to stage two was to be taken by a qualified majority. However, France then made it clear that in making her decision on whether to move from stage one or not she would not only consider the question of social harmonization, but also the economic situation in its entirety. This provoked the German delegation, who refused to continue the negotiations if France did not accept the qualified majority voting, nor would the Germans continue the Euratom negotiations. They also declared themselves unable to accept the proposition concerning the length of the working week and corresponding overtime pay.83

On the surface a resolution appeared impossible. Unofficial discussions revealed however, that a solution that did not include France was considered impossible.84 A solution was reached when the German chancellor Adenauer met with Prime Minister Mollet in Paris on November 6.

As far as equal pay and paid holidays were concerned, the two heads of state sustained the formula from the conference in Paris in October. They further agreed on a general formula on social harmonization saying that this would come as a consequence of the common market. On the question of special regulations for France, France accepted an annual investigation into the conditions for maintaining such regulations. The Council of Ministers would also be empowered to demand a lowering of the French level of taxes and subsidies if other countries were to be unfairly treated by this system. If this turned out to be the case, countries negatively affected by the French regulations could also be allowed to invoke safeguard clauses. France agreed to abolish the system when her balance of payments had been in equilibrium for a year. On the difficult question concerning the length of the work-week and corresponding overtime pay, the countries agreed not to make the introduction of the forty hour week obligatory.85 In spite of this decision, the German view was that they had made a considerable concession. This because one knew for certain that the forty hour week would not be a reality within the first stage. France would as a consequence be entitled to safeguard clauses working to the advantage of French industry.86 France renounced, on her side, the claim for veto in connection with the passing from the first to the second stage of the transitional period.

The Franco-German agreement has been described as a “… recul sensible des positions françaises; sur tous les points jusque là posés en préalables, les engagements précis font place à des déclarations d’intention ou à des formules de compromis assez vagues”.87

83. BA, B146/594, Aussenministerkonferenz der Länder der Montanunion über den Gemeinsamen Markt und Euratom am 20 u. 21 Oktober in Paris.
84. Ibid.
While France undoubtedly obtained less than she had asked for, what she obtained was what she needed. French policy-makers had considered acceptance of the common market proposal unlikely. They had done so because of the hostility that existed within France to the removal of protection that membership of the common market seemed to imply. Continued protection was as a consequence considered a necessity if the treaty on the common market was to get through Parliament. Through the November agreement with Germany, France obtained an agreement that secured continued protection of French industry. The fact that France gave up her claim for veto in order to obtain this agreement, supports the affirmation that this agreement was of importance.

Concluding Remarks

The story of the French claims for social harmonization illustrates how France aimed to use the process of European integration as a means to ensure a continued expansion and modernization of the French economy. The claims for social harmonization were in turn instrumental in realizing France’s entry into the common market. In the beginning, these claims bought time for a government divided over the question of European integration. In the end, they ensured continued protection for French industry. In the final discussions over this question, France profited from the fact that other countries considered French membership of the common market a necessity. In the November 6 agreement with Germany, this enabled her to trade their wish for qualified majority voting in return for continued protection of French industry. At national level the maintenance of this protection was conducive to securing the support of French industry, and consequently the support of the National Assembly for the government’s pro-European policy.

88. Philippe Mioche shows that head of the CNPF, Georges Villiers, set great store by the concessions obtained and that the agreement was instrumental in turning hesitant industrialists in favour of the common market. Ph. MIOCHE, Le patronat français …, op.cit., p.253.
An Elusive Partnership: Europe, Economic Co-operation and British Policy towards Scandinavia 1949-1951

Juhaana Aunelasuoma

Throughout the past half-century of European economic and political integration, Britain and Scandinavia have formed a stronghold for “Euro-scepticism”, where reluctance and outright opposition to new ideas about co-operation amongst the European nation-states has been widespread. Britain, Denmark and Sweden have been latecomers in the present day European Union (EU), whereas in Norway the question of European Economic Community (EEC) or EU membership has been rejected twice in national referenda. Whether in- or outside these organisations their relationship with more ardent Europeans has been problematic over a long period.

Not least because their paths joined in the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) in 1959-60, the British and the Scandinavians have often been seen to have drawn a sense of unity from the fact that they all were in the 1950s, for various reasons, unable to participate in such integrative experiments as the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) or later in the EEC. The similarities in their behaviour have led to assumptions that even more wide-ranging convergence of interests between the British and the Scandinavians has existed since Europe's economic reconstruction began in the 1940s.

British and Scandinavian scepticism towards new forms of economic and political co-operation in Europe in the 1950s was embedded in national circumstances and preferences, but was coupled with their shared feeling of the feasibility of an intergovernmental alternative towards economic co-operation in Europe in the 1950s. Further, instead of withdrawing into complete isolation, it has been argued that they sought “meaningful association” with the new institutions, and as can be seen in the following, with each other.¹ What is argued in the following is, that this basic convergence of interests in the early phase of European integration brought the British, Danish, Swedish and Norwegian governments together into regular consultations within a specifically established body, Uniscan, which sought to facilitate a degree of co-ordination of policies and eventually paved the way for the speedy establishment of EFTA in 1959, when the alternative to create a wider free trade area had been exhausted.

None the less, before EFTA realised the original vision outlined in 1949, attempts towards deeper Anglo-Scandinavian economic co-operation beyond the consultative remit of Uniscan proved unsuccessful. In spite of similar thinking about the most fruitful approach to integration policies in Europe, co-ordinated policy-making and the definition of collective bargaining positions within and towards

different international organisations was found difficult. The following article dis-
cusses the potential and the ramifications of Anglo-Scandinavian co-operation in
the post-Second World War international economy and in the early years of Euro-
pean integration, with particular attention to British policy-making.

Reconstruction and Restoration: Attempts to Re-establish Britain’s
Economic Positions in Scandinavia after 1945

British economic thinking towards Scandinavia after the Second World War was
characterised by the persistence of traditional views, which posited Scandinavia
apart from the rest of Western Europe. Scandinavia was in many ways a special
case, culturally and politically different from the continent, and what was most
important, an enclave – in European standards – of unexceptionally high economic
interdependence with Britain.

Although neither the continental European economies nor Scandinavia could chal-
lenge the primacy of the Dominions, the Commonwealth and the Sterling area in Brit-
in's overseas trade in the 1940s and 1950s, the three Scandinavian countries, Norway,
Denmark and Sweden, figured prominently in the economic geography of Europe as it
was interpreted at the time in London. In 1946-53, the three Scandinavian countries had
an average share of 7.4 per cent of Britain's overseas trade, while the area that would
later become the EEC amounted to no more than 11.1 per cent.²

The close relationship between the Scandinavian economies with Britain and
the network of bilateral trade agreements and financial arrangements that were es-
tablished between the Sterling bloc and Scandinavia in the 1930s, made its position
in British eyes to resemble more that of the Commonwealth than of Europe. Scan-
dinavia could be seen in the vague terms of the “informal empire”, as was des-
cribed by Ashton Gwatkin of the Foreign Office when he interpreted it before the
war to have formed “a kind of unacknowledged economic empire of which London
is the metropolis”.³ Intense competition with Adolf Hitler’s economically expa-
sive Germany in the 1930s merely heightened long-held views that Britain’s con-
cerns in the region were primarily economic, and that the essence of foreign policy,
when it came to Scandinavia, was about trade, finance and the maintenance of eco-
nomic spheres of influence.⁴

³ Quoted in P. LUDLOW, Britain and Northern Europe, 1940-1945, in: Scandinavian Journal of
History (SJH), 4/2(1979), pp.123-62. Ashton Gwatkin was an economic specialist in the Foreign
Office (FO).
⁴ A comprehensive account of economic and strategic competition between Britain and Germany in
Scandinavia before 1940 is found in P. SALMON, Scandinavia and the Great Powers 1890-1940,
As soon as wartime conditions permitted it in 1944-45, Britain reasserted its economic positions in the region, including Finland where substantial amounts of timber and pulp were exported to Britain. Alongside Danish foodstuffs Sweden in particular became a trade partner of prime importance. With its strong balance of payments position it afforded Britain exports of vital raw materials effectively on credit in 1945-47, as the Swedish government and central bank hoped that the transitory period would not last for too long. New financial ties that persisted long into the 1950s were thus established between Britain and the Scandinavians in the name of economic stabilisation, reconstruction and the hope for gradual normalisation of relations.

The other side of the British economic strategy towards Scandinavia was an attempt to seize a commanding share of the northern markets for industrial goods as long as German exporters were absent from the markets. However, due to shortages of exportable goods such as coal and steel and declining competitiveness of British manufacturers, this strategy eventually failed to win such a preponderant position for British traders as had been envisaged. A good example of Britain’s economic decline in the region was how its shipbuilding industry lost its most important export market – Norway – in 1945-67 when the world market for ships was most vibrant. None the less, still until the first half of the 1950s when German competition was being fully felt again, the British managed to hold an unexceptionally strong economic position in the region, if not much longer.

The Scandinavians, for their part, saw their post-war relationship with Great Britain with certain ambivalence. An important characteristic of their economic relationship with Britain was that it was more important for them than it was for the British. The direct economic benefits from normal trade relations with Britain were clear enough, as the ongoing processes of modernisation of the Scandinavian economies and societies depended on their access to world markets of industrial goods and raw materials in scarce supply within the region itself, and on their ability to sell their own produce as freely as possible to the world. Foreign trade in general and trade with Britain in particular was vital for all the Scandinavian economies, which even in times of heavy protectionism remained open economies in the sense of their high dependence on international in- and outputs of factors of production.

6. Memorandum for M. L. John Edwards, MP (Parliamentary private secretary to the president of the Board of Trade), undated (1945), FO 371/56223; Memorandum for Mr. Marquand (Secretary for the Department of Overseas Trade, Board of Trade), 27 December 1945, FO 371/56223, Public Record Office (PRO), London.
7. L. JOHNMAN and H. MURPHY, The Norwegian Market for British Shipbuilding, 1945-1967, in: Scandinavian Economic History Review, 2/XLVI(1998), pp.55-78. Issues such as price, failure to meet delivery dates and to offer competitive credit terms are listed as explanatory factors for the decline. Britain’s market share was taken over by Norwegian, West German, Japanese and Swedish shipyards.
Politically most sensitive issues about Britain's post-war economic reconstruction emerged from the attempts by the British government to restore pre-war arrangements that were based on bilateralism and the implicit assertion that Scandinavia should be held as a special preserve for British traders. In the absence of Germany as an economic counterweight, the situation could be seen as an attempt to include Scandinavia within Britain's economic sphere of influence.

A key element in the future of the Anglo-Scandinavian economic relationship when reconstruction reached its final phase in the early 1950s was to what direction the traditional, in trade theoretical terms classical, complementary pattern of the national economies would develop. Eventually, the failure of the British economy to create a surplus of strategic raw materials such as coal and steel in the 1950s and the simultaneous process of diversification of Scandinavian exports away from the dependence on basic raw materials (iron ore, pulp, paper, timber, agricultural produce) and semi-finished industrial goods towards more highly refined goods, decreased the complementary nature of the British and Scandinavian economies. But even with such structural changes and the relatively slow development of intra-industrial trade within the region, the volume of Anglo-Scandinavian trade in the traditional sectors remained high, and was eventually enhanced by EFTA, albeit its growth potential was limited compared to emerging economic contacts and intra-industrial trade between Britain and Western Europe.

Scandinavia as a Lead in Britain's European Policy 1949-50

The idea of a special institutional arrangement between Britain and Scandinavia was a recurrent theme in British thinking of its European policy and external economic relations. It was seen in various occasions in Anglo-Scandinavian economic diplomacy from the end of the Second World War in 1945 to the British Free Trade Area proposals in 1957. But until full restoration of currency convertibility and multilateral trade was realised towards the end of the 1950s, not much of tangible economic significance was achieved within the Anglo-Scandinavian framework. Likewise, the plans for a Scandinavian Customs Union, which were discussed intermittently between 1947-50 and in 1954-57 between Norway, Denmark and Sweden, ended in failure and were eventually overtaken by the establishment of EEC and EFTA, although other aspects of Nordic co-operation, such as the creation of the Nordic Council in 1952 and a common labour market in 1954 proved to be more successful aspects of regional economic integration.⁹

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Despite political goodwill behind the plans and numerous studies, Anglo-Scandinavian economic co-operation never took off the ground before EFTA. None the less, from the viewpoint of British European policy in the 1950s, the plans for deepening its economic and political relations with the Scandinavians are not wholly insignificant, even if they lacked the final push success would have required. Similarly, the talks the Scandinavian governments held with the British, first on European economic reconstruction and later on integration policy were a substantial part of their general policy towards Europe as well.

The period in 1949-51, when most pressing needs of reconstruction began to give way to long-term schemes of Europe's politico-economic order, is particularly illuminating in highlighting both the potential and the problems Anglo-Scandinavian economic co-operation contained. The British government's so called Uniscan-initiative from late 1949 is a good example of the ways in which Scandinavia was seen to fit in Britain's overall European policy at the time. The internal discussions in London and the subsequent negotiations that were held in December 1949 and January 1950 with the Scandinavian governments, showed what political benefits the British government sought from its closer association with them. The following years showed how severe the economic ramifications proved to be. However, despite the inherent problems of Anglo-Scandinavian economic co-operation that were soon realised, the continuing work of the Anglo-Scandinavian Economic Committee, Uniscan (1950-60), was valued as an informal consultative group where it was ascertained to which extent these countries could or could not agree upon a common line towards various problems of international economic policy and integration.\(^\text{10}\)

The idea of re-establishing the pre-war relationship between Scandinavia and the sterling area surfaced soon after the war. Nevertheless, before 1949 neither specific plans nor written documents were presented. Schemes for closer co-operation in the economic field between Britain and the three Scandinavian countries were first put forward at an official level in the Treasury in January 1949, after a suggestion from the Bank of England.\(^\text{11}\) As had been done privately before, officials then

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played with an idea of some kind of Anglo-Scandinavian economic association, or of Scandinavian membership of the Sterling area. But it was not until October 1949 before the question of Scandinavia's relationship to the Sterling area and closer co-operation with Britain was put forward to the Cabinet and subsequently adopted as official policy.12

There were several reasons why different departments in Whitehall opened the issue of Anglo-Scandinavian economic co-operation in the autumn of 1949. The immediate reason for calling up the representatives of the countries to discuss further economic co-operation was provided by the US economic aid administration (ECA), when it increased pressure for the establishment of regional economic groups in Europe. In October 1949, the ECA chief, Paul Hoffman, delivered a strongly worded speech for the Ministerial Council of the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC), in which he said that the US Congress would not accept continuance of the recovery program without clear determination by the Europeans to move towards economic integration.13 On 2 November, the Ministerial Council of the OEEC adopted a resolution, in which “the desirability was recognised of promoting regional economic groupings”.14 From the US viewpoint, this seemed on the short term to open the best prospects for further integration of the European economies. At the same time as American thinking was veering in favour of regional arrangements in Europe, the French finally changed sides in the long-standing Anglo-American dispute over the character and ultimate goals of the OEEC, and joined the Benelux-countries and Italy in exploring further economic co-operation outlined in the Finebel/Fritalux proposals.15 This meant that the British were left alone with the Scandinavians in opposing the increasingly influential and better-consolidated Franco-American axis within OEEC.

12. Playfair to A. P. Graffey-Smith (Bank of England), 11 October 1949, T 236/5370; Closer Economic Association between Scandinavia and the Sterling Area, Report by the Official Committee on Economic Development, 28 November 1949, ER(L)(49)321, CAB 134/245, PRO. Once the plan was announced British journalists christened it as Uniscan. Other names given by journalists included Ukiscan, Uniskan, Scandanglia, Scanuk, Brisk (in Norway) or L'uniscan and Uniscan (in France). These names compared well with such contemporaries as Franebel, Finebel, Fritaluxal, Fraswitaluxal, Benefrit or Benefit. Cripps said that it was a 'scandangle' that such names should be allowed at all. Cripps' speech to the Treasury staff, 11.1.1950, Sir Stafford Cripps Papers, Nuffield College, Oxford. Cripps' own favourite would have been 'Skanuk', as it reminded him of 'a viking war cry'. G. HÄGGLÖF, *Fredens Vägar*, P.A. Norstedt & Söners Förlag, Stockholm, 1973, p.179.


The potential emergence of regional economic arrangements in Europe highlighted Britain’s problematic position. As the supranational alternative was dismissed in Britain and its conditional “contract out of Europe” prepared, relations with the Scandinavians were discussed too. A wide consensus existed in Whitehall that in the new situation it was important to maintain Britain’s close relations with Scandinavia, whatever the future relationship between the continental countries and Britain should be. A contract out of the so-called “Little Europe” of the Six, which had only a limited bearing for the British economy, should not be a similar contract out of Scandinavia. To maintain Britain’s links with the Scandinavians, which were not presumed to participate in such schemes as the Finebel negotiations or later in 1950 in the Schuman and the Pleven plans, was a policy objective that was in British eyes both politically feasible and economically necessary. However, as discussions in late 1949 and early 1950 revealed, British policy-makers had more far-reaching goals too about the political utility of an opening towards Scandinavia.

The development of Britain’s political and economic relations with Scandinavia seemed to offer Britain a unique opportunity. As E. W. Playfair presented the Treasury view in October 1949, the development of closer relations with Scandinavia may have been “the only means of avoiding being faced by a United Europe which we either have to keep out or get into”. According to this reasoning, Scandinavia could offer an alternative route to formulate Britain’s Europeanness in political and economic terms. From the political point of view, a step ahead on the Scandinavian front seemed to bring certain advantages both as to allay US suspicions of British procrastination in further economic integration in Europe, and to bring the Scandinavians closer to Britain by economic means. The economic motivations of Britain’s Scandinavian opening arose from the perceived need to achieve a wider degree of liberalisation in the unflexible current trading situation, especially in the field of finance and payments. The bilateral, annual trade negotiations framework was politically troublesome and any steps towards increased flexibility were welcomed in Britain and in Scandinavia. The Norwegians in particular were keen to gain access to the capital markets of Britain, and to a lesser extent, in Sweden, which could only be achieved through special arrangements. Furthermore, in the OEEC-wide liberalisation process and in the talks leading to the European Payments Union (EPU), the British were keen to enlist the Scandinavians on their side.

The general approach of the British and the Scandinavian governments towards questions dealt with in the OEEC had been very similar in 1948–49, but in 1950 a rift opened between low-tariff countries such as Sweden and Denmark and the British, who sought further trade liberalisation through curtailing import restrictions which the low-tariff countries relied upon. However, in organisational questions, they had all been firmly against the idea of a strong independent supranational bureaucracy or the suggestion of a “super-
man” as a head of the permanent organisation in 1947-49. Their approach towards internal financial problems was remarkably similar too, save perhaps Denmarks lesser preoccupation with full employment policies. Otherwise the domestic economic policy of maintaining price stability in a full employment economy by Keynesian demand management using budgetary means was common to these countries. Despite disagreements from 1950 onwards on the most suitable instruments of trade liberalisation, in numerous cases, the British could find the Scandinavians on their side in OEEC discussions on economic policy. This convergence of the basic economic outlook of the British and the Scandinavians was compounded with a more deliberate policy of co-operation among the OEEC delegations in Paris. At the same time when the Treasury and the Foreign Office considered the Uniscan-scheme in October 1949, the British representative to the OEEC, Edmund Hall-Patch, suggested that their co-operation should be deepened by some special arrangement within the Paris organisation too.

When the Uniscan-plan was introduced in Whitehall in the autumn of 1949 enthusiasm was most pronounced at the Treasury and the Bank of England. Foreign Office officials saw the merits of the plan too, and when Uniscan was established in January 1950, the Foreign Office support for it was based on calculations of the political usefulness of a special channel to the Scandinavians in policy-making, and when economic benefits failed to materialise from its work, the Foreign Office interest proved to be decisive to its continuance.

Above the official level perhaps the most consistent proponent for closer Anglo-Scandinavian economic association in Britain during the Labour government was the Chancellor of Exchequer, Sir Stafford Cripps. Whereas Hall-Patch in the OEEC was an ardent supporter of closer Anglo-Scandinavian co-operation in organisational and practical questions of European economic co-operation, Cripps took a somewhat broader view. His assessment was based on what he saw to be the fundamental unity of interest Britain and Scandinavia shared towards the “general problem, which was included in the talk of “economic integration” or “unification of Europe”. It seemed “that England and the Scandinavian countries had to a large degree a common conception of the question of economic policy and that we often distanced ourselves from the Latin peoples in these questions”.

Cripps’s rather optimistic views of the fundamental similarity of outlook between the British and the Scandinavians in economic and social thinking reflected views that

22. The Bank of England held that Treasury and FO enthusiasm behind the scheme was entirely based on political considerations. Lithiby minute, 8 November1949, OV 29/31, BEA.
23. Cripps minute, 2 November 1949, T 236/5370, PRO; Östen Undén promemoria, 3 November 1949, HP 64 Å, vol.HP 2216, RA.
24. Ibid.
were widely held amongst British socialists in particular: “On the side of the British Labour Party, illusions were rife about Scandinavia in general”, Alan Milward described the socialists’ “special relationship” over the North Sea in The Reconstruction of Western Europe 1945-51. When the gap between the continent and Britain seemed to widen in 1949-51, both ministers and officials in London sought consolation from the presumed unity between Britain and the “like-minded” people of the North, the “champions of the Welfare state”, or “our staunchest friends and allies in Europe”, as Roger Makins of the Foreign Office put it in the summer of 1951, witnessing that such notions were not confined to socialist circles only.

Besides such a heightened sense of similarities between the British and Scandinavian “mentalités”, and whatever political implications these – undoubtedly sincerely held – views may have had, the plan Cripps put forward in November 1949 was based on political and economic arguments. For Cripps, as was the case with officials in Whitehall as well, Anglo-Scandinavian co-operation was not just a tactical ploy to manoeuvre into better positions in the Ministerial Council of the OEEC or an act of solidarity among the brotherhood of socialists around the North Sea. An opening towards Scandinavia was initially hoped to be at least a partial solution to Britain’s numerous problems in its economic and political position in Europe, along lines that would build up Britain's economic strength in a way not inimical to current British – or socialist – economic thinking and political traditions.

The establishment of Uniscan

One of the most useful political arguments in favour of further Anglo-Scandinavian economic co-operation was that Britain needed to show that it had kept to its word about its commitment to regional economic groups as a fundamentally desirable objective. The British government had confirmed this to both domestic and international audiences, but words needed to be supplemented with actions. And if actions fell short of words, something was needed to sugar the pill in Washington at least. Desperately looking for a way out, Foreign Office officials agreed that it could hardly be argued on the basis of a closer economic association between Britain and Scandinavia

“that we should be acting as rather bad Europeans if we associated ourselves with a regional group which would after all be based in that similarity of outlook and economic structure which is the only logical foundation for any regional groups”.

In this view, there was no other serious alternative for Britain, because participation in the regional group including Belgium and Italy would be more difficult.

27. Burrett minute, 8 November 1949, FO 371/78136, PRO.
for Britain “for obvious reasons”. Hence, if Britain was not to contract out of Europe completely, Scandinavia was their only chance.

Irrespective whether this reasoning made much sense as a long-term strategy for Britain's European policy, the economic implications of a closer association between Britain and Scandinavia could not be overlooked. The original British studies over the pros and cons of an Anglo-Scandinavian economic association were remarkably optimistic both in terms of the extent of the projected association and the timetable of its establishment. What the British originally suggested was Scandinavia's association with the sterling area as “non scheduled territories”, without participation in the gold or dollar pools. In effect, this would have meant full freedom of currency convertibility and capital movements, which would in turn have led to a situation where both the sterling area and the Scandinavian countries would have agreed to hold each other's currencies without limit, i.e. would give each other unlimited short term credit. Otherwise the British did not suggest any far-reaching concessions in the most important and difficult fields of tariffs and the allocation for export of scarce raw materials such as coal, but such an extensive financial liberalisation within the group would undoubtedly have had implications on trade in due course.

The initial Whitehall view, that there did not appear to be any serious objections for closer economic association, was subsequently revised when the plans were first discussed with the Scandinavians in December 1949 and January 1950. The Swedes in particular were concerned lest they would end up financing the whole scheme, as they already held substantial sterling balances as a result of the imbalance of Britain's imports and exports with Sweden. As the Swedes saw it, the deepening of economic relations between Britain and the Scandinavian countries was ultimately dependent on the degree of equilibrium in the trade between the countries as long as multilateral trade was not re-established elsewhere.

What proved most damaging to the British proposals was how further studies revealed that they would actually increase the existing disequilibria and probably lead to further increases of sterling balances in Sweden and Denmark in the short term at least: in plain words, a further increase of the credit they were already giving to Britain. Not surprisingly, this made the Swedes especially apprehensive that they were to finance the whole scheme, a concern that was already familiar from studies conducted on the feasibility of further Scandinavian economic integration. Hence the Swedes were keen to find out what the British could give them in return in trade matters. As was soon found out, there was nothing to be expected on that side. Most important for Swedes and Danes were British exports of coal, which had not been touched upon in the preliminary discussions. Indeed, trade was scarcely mentioned in the discussions, which centred around financial and payments problems.

28. Ibid.
30. Berthoud memorandum, 'Ukiscan', 20 December 1949, FO 371/78139, PRO.
31. Playfair to Christelow, 20 December 1949, FO 371/78139, PRO.
When the reluctance of in particular the Swedes and the Danes to embrace Britain's proposals of deepening their economic relations dawned in early 1950, Cripps still tried to instill more life into the Uniscan concept and continued to stress the importance of developing such co-operation further. But the momentum was hard to maintain not only because of the wider economic processes which undercut Uniscan's potential. The Labour Government was heading towards a general election and this was not the best of moments to break new ground in such a controversial issue as policy towards Europe. But more ominously for the long term, Cripps himself, his health ailing, had passed his peak as chancellor. Although he can be considered as the “primus motor” behind the Scandinavian orientation of Britain's European policy, his power was not enough to keep it running after the initial push. A stronger political will was lacking and nobody, either in Britain nor in Scandinavia, was ready to take on the initiative Cripps himself failed to take further.

Besides bilateral trade and financial issues between the British and the Scandinavians, the feasibility of their economic co-operation depended on wider issues as well. From the British point of view, there were three main themes running alongside its attempts to deepen its economic and economic-political relationship with the Scandinavians. First, on the liberalisation of trade, the main progress was being made in Paris at the OEEC, and to a lesser extent under the auspices of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Measures agreed in these organisations influenced the participating states' positions in bilateral trade negotiations as they limited the scope for granting exclusive concessions. In other words, falling short of creating a discriminatory Anglo-Scandinavian trade bloc, Britain could offer relatively little to the Scandinavian countries that they did not already have. Second, talks about ending financial restrictions between Britain and Scandinavia took place at the same time as proposals for a European Payments Union were being launched in Paris. It was realised that any concessions made within Uniscan might have less value if there was an effective arrangement covering Western Europe as a whole, backed by Marshall aid dollars. Later during 1950, this process completely overtook the incremental and rather modest payments liberalisation process attempted within Uniscan in early 1950.

But perhaps the main limiting factor allowing Uniscan to become a more wide reaching economic arrangement during the 1950s was the question of the West German economy. The re-emergence of West Germany in international markets challenged Britain's position as a large-scale supplier of industrial goods throughout Europe from the early 1950s onwards. The Swedes and the Danes were keen to use their accumulated sterling balances for West German goods, and were therefore very hesitant about joining any discriminatory bloc in which West Germany was not a member. The West Ger-

32. 'Trade with Europe', The Financial Times, 23 January 1950.
man markets were also becoming more and more lucrative in particular for Danish agricultural products that had previously flowed to Britain, often on prices that irritated Danish producers. As West Germany's participation in any Uniscan arrangements was considered early on politically impossible in London, this proved to be a difficult stumbling bloc for the Danes and the Swedes.35

Changes took place on the Atlantic front too as it became evident that US insistence on Britain's participation in regional trade groups was relaxing already in 1950. Further, as the European ground shifted in the spring of 1950 with the announcement of the Schuman plan, such a limited approach as was typified by Uniscan had far less sales value as an example of British steps towards integration from a Congressional or ECA point of view than was anticipated in 1949. In trade liberalisation and payments questions the most important arena was the OEEC, where both the British and the Scandinavians had been ever less enthusiastic to follow the Franco-American lead. The American views had at first been rather positive towards Cripps's more ambitious plans about co-operation with the Scandinavians, but the realisation of the economic difficulties that were ahead quickly distinguished much of the flair of enthusiasm in Washington.36

The negotiations between the British and the Scandinavian governments ended in an agreement in January 1950 that the present economic circumstances did not allow the complete removal of all restrictions on payments between the four countries, but that there was scope for more limited action, which should be studied further. The practical meaning of this was that tourist allowances were increased without limit, with certain restrictions with Norway – the Scandinavian country, ironically enough, that had been most eager to develop its economic and political relations with Britain in the first place.37 The declaration setting up the Anglo-Scandinavian Economic Committee was signed in Paris on 30 January 1950, four months before the Schuman Plan, when Cripps and the Scandinavian foreign ministers approved the officials' report.38 On 31 January the Council of the OEEC was formally informed about its establishment and about the first steps towards payments relaxation within the group.39

35. British officials had at first aired a wider plan covering the Uniscan countries, Netherlands and West Germany in November 1949, but this was shelved in December for its potential to bring about unwelcomed political consequences, such as appearing to sabotage the Benelux or the Fritalux negotiations. Berthoud to Hitchman (T), 9 November 1949, FO 371/78136; J. B. Richards minute (German political dept.), 2 December 1949, FO 371/78136; Duke minute, 15 December 1949, FO 371/78136, PRO.
36. Sir Oliver Franks telegram no.5739 to FO, 9 December 1949, FO 371/78138; Christelow to Playfair, 13 December 1949, FO 371/78139, PRO.
38. Report by Officials, 21 January 1950, FO 371/87087; Agreed Minute, 30 January 1950, FO 371/87088, PRO.
What was the most significant conclusion reached in the negotiations was that possibilities for further openings should be subjected to continuing study. This in fact became the rationale for setting up and maintaining Uniscan. Its main function was

“to keep under review the carrying out of the financial recommendations and to explore further possibilities for economic co-operation”

although later it functioned as an expert body discussing developments in Europe and in the international economy. The body began to work on a permanent basis, meeting on an official level normally twice a year in each capital. Informal ministerial meetings were organised occasionally, normally in conjunction with the OEEC Council in Paris.

The first Uniscan meeting was held at the Danish Embassy in Paris in April 1950. The delegations, consisting of senior officials from the four countries, discussed organisational questions, actions taken in each country to implement the January declaration, and problems of economic disequilibria. The only tangible move forward on the financial side was the UK delegation’s statement about steps for further relaxations of controls over possession of Scandinavian currencies in Britain.40 On the economic policy front, Swedish proposals for studies on disequilibria were linked up with the work, which was being done within the OEEC “harmonisation” resolutions.41

The first meeting set a pattern for the future Uniscan discussions: instead of spectacular advances towards Uniscan free trade, the agenda came to be dominated by “European” and other wider international questions. In the first meeting there was only one “European” question on the agenda, the forthcoming OEEC payments scheme. Characteristically, it was agreed that

“it was desirable that representatives of the four Governments in Paris should keep in close touch and discuss the various proposals for a European Payments Union with a view of ensuring that discussions in the OEEC of such proposals take due account of the objectives of Anglo-Scandinavian economic co-operation”42

In practice this meant an agreement that “these and other points should be followed continuously in an Anglo-Scandinavian group in Paris in which the U.K. Delegation will have the initiative”.43 This meant, that the previously informal co-operation of the British and Scandinavian delegations in Paris became institutionalised. The OEEC offshoot of Uniscan adopted a more active role in Anglo-Scandinavian economic talks from autumn 1950 onwards. The FO instructed Hall-Patch along these lines in October 1950, but was nevertheless reluctant to reduce Uniscan just as part of the “Paris machinery”.44 Indeed, the *leitmotif* behind continuing this co-operation in the EPU era seems to have been a need for a more comprehensive exchange of views and co-ordination of policies in the OEEC, but

40. UK OEEC delegation telegram no.214 to FO, 4 April 1950, FO 371/87089, PRO.
41. Makins to Berthoud, 3 April 1950, FO 371/87089, PRO.
42. Hall-Patch telegram no.214 to FO, 3 April 1950, FO 371/87089, PRO.
43. Makins to Berthoud, 3 April 1950, FO 371/87089, PRO.
44. FO telegram no.1017 to OEEC Delegation, 3 October 1950, FO 371/87091, PRO.
also to be able to respond to any new developments such as the Schuman plan. To be effective, this also required co-ordination outside the daily work of the OEEC.\(^{45}\)

**Co-operation with Limits**

With Conservatives back in power in Britain in late 1951, Uniscan meetings continued along the lines established in 1950 and wide-ranging discussions of international economic policy and European questions were continued. However, it is difficult to establish the ultimate significance of these consultations from the point of view of national policy-making in Britain or in Scandinavia. The British, who sensed how keenly the Scandinavians wanted to integrate British responses to such questions as sectoral integration schemes in Europe to their own, had by the end of 1950 grown somewhat uneasy lest the regular consultations with their Uniscan partners forced them to tie their hands in advance of important policy-decisions in the OEEC or elsewhere. In November 1950, during Labour's reign, a decision was made in London, “that the United Kingdom could not admit that there should always be a common Uniscan approach to O.E.E.C. problems”. The decision applied to other topics discussed in the forum as well.\(^{46}\) However, even if Uniscan was therefore not let to develop de facto decision-making functions, it was appreciated that even in cases when British and Scandinavian views diverged, a preliminary exchange of views within the group was useful.

Despite fears in Scandinavia, that the new British government would not be as interested as the Labour government had been in the Scandinavian dimension, various developments spoke for the continuance of close Anglo-Scandinavian economic consultations. First of all, the Scandinavians themselves seemed to want this, even if the British sought to restrict the extent Uniscan may have been able to force their hand.\(^{47}\) Second, the British delegation in the OEEC favoured further openings on the Uniscan front and set great value to its co-operation with the Scandinavians. Third, until at least 1954-55 the Treasury did not abandon its original idea of closer financial association between the United Kingdom and Scandinavia. And last but not least, developments in Europe with the establishment of the ECSC and other attempts towards further integration in the military and economic spheres increased the Foreign Office's interest to use the Uniscan framework in keeping a special channel open to the Scandinavians in European issues. Therefore, from early 1951 onwards there existed a wide interdepartmental consensus about the usefulness of a distinctive Anglo-Scandinavian economic forum, a consensus at which the different Whitehall departments arrived despite their own particular interests.

\(^{45}\) Hall-Patch telegram no.849 to FO, 8 October 1950, FO 371/87091, PRO.
\(^{46}\) Note of a UK Uniscan delegation meeting held in the Treasury, 17 November 1950, FO 371/87092, PRO. Emphasis in the original.
\(^{47}\) An example of the value Swedish officials in charge of European policy set on Uniscan is found in the memoirs of Ingemar Hägglöf. I. HÄGGLOF, Drömmen om Europa, op.cit., p.56.
However, even if the Conservative government accepted the basic line Labour had had towards Scandinavia and Uniscan, new developments emerged in Anglo-Scandinavian relations that were partly due to the new government's foreign political preferences, and partly due to economic developments with which the Conservatives had to react soon after assuming office in 1951. The first problem arose with the difficulties the new government encountered with Britain's balance of payments in 1951-52. While disputes over coal exports or fish landings had been a longstanding problem with the Scandinavians, there was now trouble on a wider front.\(^{48}\) In 1951 serious problems over Britain's balance of payments led to drastic cuts in imports, and this affected all the three Scandinavian economies in their vital export sectors. On top of this, there were problems in meeting previously agreed levels of coal and steel exports to Scandinavia. After much hard bargaining, larger quantities of coal and steel were secured in late 1951, after an intervention by the Foreign Office, but the continuing import restrictions led to further problems and strong protests from the Scandinavian governments.

In early 1952, just as tension on the trade sphere was gradually reduced, the Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden introduced the idea of linking the planned European Defence Community (EDC) with existing European institutions.\(^ {49}\) This created a serious problem for Sweden and for them it was additional proof that the Conservative government had a different set of priorities towards Scandinavia than Labour had had. Membership in European institutions with a military role was considered incompatible with Sweden's neutrality policy.\(^ {50}\) The prospect of Sweden's forced withdrawal from the Council of Europe if the Eden plan succeeded, posed a grave threat to the Anglo-Scandinavian axis in other questions concerning Europe too. Arguments highlighting the need to maintain Britain's 'special relationship' with Scandinavia, however, were not enough for Eden to modify his European policy. Overriding concerns over the future of West Germany in particular, placed Sweden further down on the list of Britain's political priorities.\(^ {51}\) Further, Eden was in general less interested in the different new multilateral forums of economic diplomacy that had emerged after the war, and his general disregard for the OEEC was witnessed by the Swedish ambassador who in their first encounter had to explain to the embarrassed secretary of state what those four letters stood for.\(^ {52}\) In the end, the fact that the Eden plan never seriously endangered Sweden's already restrained attachment to European institutions was thanks to the French National Assembly, which rejected the EDC in 1954, and not to concerns over Britain's relations with Sweden.


\(^{50}\) M. AF MALMBÖRG, *Den ståndaktiga nationalstaten…*, op.cit., pp.268-284.

\(^{51}\) Dennis Allen minute, 23 April 1952, FO 371/100931, PRO.

The trade disputes of 1952 and the abortive Eden plan were both signs that the Anglo-Scandinavian relationship had after all become more strained when compared to the Labour government's period in office in 1945-51. Thus in summer 1952, while acute disagreements between Britain and Scandinavia in trade issues were patched up, posts in Scandinavia were increasingly apprehensive about the future prospects of Anglo-Scandinavian economic co-operation, as this time problems seemed to originate from London and not from Stockholm or Copenhagen.53

While on the trade side the British were steadily losing ground to West Germany, on the economic-political front even the Norwegians had become more reserved towards Britain than they had been in the beginning of Uniscan co-operation in late 1949. There was a growing realisation of economic changes, which were working against, not for, further Anglo-Scandinavian economic co-operation. The last occasion when plans for deepening economic relations between these countries were discussed was in 1953-55, when under the initiative of the Treasury and the Bank of England, feasibility of Scandinavia's full Sterling area membership, and even participation in the British Commonwealth, was studied and abandoned in face of Swedish and Danish opposition. This time these ideas met with even less enthusiasm on the behalf of the Swedes and Danes than the Uniscan proposals had in 1949, although the Norwegian response was at first positive.54 Again in 1957-58, when the British government's Free Trade Area proposal was discussed, the prospects for any special Anglo-Scandinavian economic arrangements alongside the wider schemes were very low. After the shelving of the Sterling area proposals in 1955, no substantial openings for further co-operation within this group were introduced until 1959.

**Conclusion**

While officials at the Board of Trade and the Foreign Office tried to counter the overall trend of growing distance between the governments on international economic policy in the early 1950s, Uniscan's meetings nonetheless continued apace and remained a part of the official machinery of managing Britain's relations with the Scandinavians and vice versa. The biannual meetings of Uniscan lasted until 1959, when the Swedish government initiated – during what proved to be Uniscan's last meeting – the negotiations that led to the signature of the Stockholm Convention in November 1959 and the formation of EFTA. The arrangement was formally ended in 1960.

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53. Wright to Eden, 18 June 1952, FO 371/99082, PRO.
In Uniscan policy-makers found a useful forum to discuss long-term strategies and negotiation positions. Being a multilateral forum it brought the policy-making machineries together in a manner that would not have been possible using normal diplomatic channels. This, and the numerous studies conducted over the years for the use of Uniscan meetings on the national economies and Anglo-Scandinavian economic interaction, eventually paved the way for EFTA – when external conditions so permitted – and provided that loose association with an institutional memory concerning expectations the core members had over the potential and ramifications of co-operation amongst them, and the behaviour and policy-making processes typical on both sides of the North Sea.

Despite considerable political goodwill behind the scheme, the economic achievements of Uniscan fell far short of the original British proposals of November-December 1949, when a more comprehensive financial liberalisation had been envisaged. Had this approach been successful, the pound sterling would have become convertible within this group which would have directly strengthened the economic influence of Britain in Scandinavia, whose situation would then have resembled that of the sterling area countries.

The utility of Anglo-Scandinavian discussions in Uniscan, were therefore of technical and to a lesser extent, of political nature. While the ultimate ramifications Uniscan co-operation was subjected to was acknowledged early on, it was nevertheless kept alive. Within its limits, it provided a forum for consultations, discussions and exchanges of view, and occasionally, a place where disagreements could be dealt with “on the domestic plane”, as the British described it. More than anything else, the history of its establishment in 1949-51, illuminates the complex set of perceptions and misperceptions, hopes, fears and different national policy goals the British and Scandinavian governments had during a key period in European integration history.
The Labour Party's Changing Relationship to Europe.
The Expansion of European Social Policy

Erin Delaney

In 1950, the National Executive Committee (NEC) of the Labour Party clearly stated its attitude towards European integration involving Britain.1 “The Executive argue that no Socialist party could accept a system by which important fields of national policy were surrendered to a European authority, since such an authority would have a permanent anti-Socialist majority”.2 Over the following forty years, Labour’s ideological opposition to an integrated European community fundamentally changed, so that by 1994, a Labour spokeswoman was able to claim that “Europe is now part and parcel of our domestic policy in Britain”.3

Traditional analysis has cited the reasons for this change as a combination of numerous factors, including intraparty factionalism, economic pressure, tension between the leadership and rank-and-file members and the role of the two-party system.4 The European Community itself is one factor that has been relatively ignored in the explanations for this policy change, as has its potential to exert discreet and discernible influence on policy in general.5 Without disregarding the importance of the domestic mechanisms, the aim of this article is to demonstrate that the changing focus of the European Community - from an economically liberal organisation to one concerned with social welfare - also influenced Labour’s evolving decision to embrace the EC. As European policies began to merge with Labour’s domestic agenda, ideological opposition decreased, and Labour saw an opportunity to affect change on the European level, especially when barred from action in the UK.

As the European Community developed its social conscience, Labour began to embrace it. The social democrats first saw the possibilities for socialism through Europe in the 1960s, but the Labour Left was determined to achieve its aims through national planning and traditional nation-state socialism. After the economic hardships of the 1970s, and the political wasteland of the 1980s, the Labour Left

1. The National Executive Committee (NEC or Executive) of the Labour Party conducts the Labour Party Conferences, and produces the Labour Party Manifesto which is ratified at the Conference. The Parliamentary Labour Party, the leaders of regional Labour Parties, as well as representatives from the Trade Unions make up the voting population of the Conference - and are the elected members of the NEC.
4. See H. YOUNG, This Blessed Plot, Macmillan, London, 1998 for a detailed analysis of how these factors influenced both the Conservative and Labour Parties' relationships to Europe.
was prepared to review its position. It saw significant changes at the European level which contributed to its change of policy, and the Labour Party emerged reunified in the late 1980s as the party for Europe.

The first section will provide an historical outline of the Labour Party’s opposition to European integration, through the 1950s until the mid 1960s. I then analyse the changes on the European level during 1965-1967 and demonstrate how a faction of the Labour Party noted the shift, leading to division and internal breakdown of the Party during 1967-1987. The 1980s and early 1990s marked the final transformation of the Labour Party; in this section, I draw the links between this move to Europe and the expanding possibility for Labour to implement social change on the European level.5

**Labour Unified in Opposition to European Integration**

During the 1950s and early 1960s, the Labour Party remained, by and large, united against the integration movements on the continent. Part of their antipathy to European integration stemmed from the dangers they believed European integration posed to the Commonwealth countries, as well as to the sovereignty of Parliament. The other major concern of the Labour Party was that the proposed organisations would not further socialist ideals in Britain, or in Europe.7 In addition, there was a perception that those same organisations and their institutions might go so far as to hinder or undo successes that the Labour Party had had in implementing a socialist agenda within Britain.

Faced with the Schuman Plan, the first proposal for integration in the nascent European movement in the early 1950s, the NEC issued a statement on international affairs entitled, *European Unity*.8 The document clarified the Labour Party’s attitude toward Europe: “In every respect except distance we in Britain are closer to our kinsmen in Australia and New Zealand on the far side of the world, than we are to Europe”.9 Specifically, the statement outlined Labour’s stance, which had been established at the 1950 Labour Party Conference, on the fledgling European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC).

Delegates had spoken out strongly against the ECSC, using socialist rhetoric. Mr. R. Edwards, a delegate representing the National Union of Vehicle Builders,

6. The author would like to thank Julie Smith and Anne Deighton for their help and advice on earlier drafts of this article.

7. The Party may have had reason to believe this, as the governments of the states pushing for integration were all led by centre right or Christian-Democrat governments.

8. An earlier attempt at European integration was the agreement in 1950 between the governments of Denmark, Norway, Sweden and Britain to hold consultation in economic matters. This union was called the UNISCAN. Its success was short-lived, however, as by 1953 the impetus driving Northern economic harmonization was the Nordic Council, minus Britain.

asked: “Is the Schuman Plan a development of workers’ control of the basic industries of Europe, or is it a development of capitalist control and cartel agreements which have always been detrimental to the working class”? A representative from a regional Labour party declared that “without public ownership and a policy of full employment, the unification of European heavy industry will inevitably lead to a restrictive monopoly, the destruction of full employment and of the workers’ standards of living.”

Members of Parliament also spoke out against joining the ECSC, focusing on the dangers of the supranational aspect and the fears of a European body usurping the Government's right to plan and direct the British economy. In 1952, while in Opposition, Labour remained faithful to the values it had espoused when in office. The Rt. Hon. Hugh Dalton clarified:

“There are some who propagate the notion of a federal Europe of which Britain should be a member. The Labour Party, almost unanimously, has rejected that view. We are not prepared to join a European federation because we are not prepared to hand over to a supra-national authority decisions on matters which we judge vital to our national life; such matters as the scope of socialisation, the means of maintaining full employment or the distribution of wealth through the policy of fair shares”.

In 1955, the Conservative Government was invited to participate in the furthering of European integration at the Messina Conference. The negotiations led to the Treaty of Rome, which served as the founding document for the European Economic Community (EEC). The preamble resolved to ensure the economic and social progress of signatory countries, though the articles mainly focused on the complex details needed for economic integration. The countries that elected to accept the Treaty became known as the ‘Six’—France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. Britain, under the Conservatives, sent a delegation to observe, but as in the case of the ECSC, decided to remain aloof. In response, Britain rallied the other European nations who were not involved in the Treaty of Rome, to join a European Free Trade Area (EFTA). EFTA would not push for deeper integration but would allow member countries to benefit from reduced or eliminated tariff and non-tariff trade barriers.

The Labourite Shirley Williams advocated in 1958 that EFTA countries should agree on certain measures of ‘social harmonisation’ that were already in place within the EEC – in order to bring the two organisations closer together. Although the majority

10. Ibid., p.84. It is interesting to note that at this time, because of the strong unity of the Party, the Labour Government is thought to clearly represent the views of the Party – this attitude and assurance did not continue into the 1960s.
11. Ibid., p.164.
12. The Conservatives, led by Winston Churchill, won the 1951 campaign, with 321 seats to 295. Party positions on the Schuman Plan did not figure into the election, as both parties were against joining.
14. A section on Social Policy was included, as was the creation of a European Social Fund; however, concrete action was mainly restricted to ‘making studies, delivering opinions and arranging consultations.’ (Part 3, Title III, Article 118, Treaty of Rome) At this time, Labour was still convinced it could achieve its social aims through national planning.
of the Labour Party was firmly against the EEC, certain members, such as Williams, were beginning to see possibilities of socialism on the European stage, and a British connection with the EEC, in this case through EFTA. She claimed that it was necessary to start planning on the European level because “in ten or twenty years we will be trying to win the control of Europe as a whole for socialism”.  

By 1960, it was the Conservative Party who was warming to the idea of the EEC, and broached the subject of accession to Europe. In debate, the Parliamentary Labour Party criticised the federalist nature of the community. The most crucial point they stressed was whether or not socialist ideals could be implemented within the EEC. During the October 1961 Conference, the debate on Europe, which in July had seemed to be a main party focus, was overshadowed by Labour’s economic and social proposal, ‘Signposts for the Sixties’. The relationship between Labour’s proposals and the Treaty of Rome structured the arguments against the EEC. Only two speakers gave unconditional support to the idea on entry, and the overwhelming majority voiced concerns similar to those of MP Harold Wilson’s: “As I read the Treaty of Rome, and the intentions of those who at present operate it, 'Signposts for the Sixties' cannot be implemented without substantial amendment to the relevant articles of the Treaty”.  

The MP Mr. Tudor Watkins explained further, and synthesised the ideological argument for socialism with his concern about the EEC: “I wonder if Macmillan would have come to us and begged of us in some way or the other to go to the Common Market if they were all Socialist countries. Not on your life! [...] Ideals can make institutions, but institutions can kill ideas, the ideas and ideals we want as a Socialist Movement”.  

Although sentiment within the Conference turned against entry into the EEC, the Labour Party did not articulate a clear position on the issue until the following year. In fact, some scholars have identified an abatement in the hostility towards the EEC in the early 1960s. Labour revisionists, such as Roy Jenkins and Shirley Williams, were pushing for more involvement with Europe, and even some of the trade unions began to point out advantages to joining Europe based on improved social welfare. At the General and Municipal Workers’ Union (GMWU) Conference, A.M. Donnet declared: “Joining the EEC will commit Britain to implementing the principle of equal pay. It could also give added impetus towards longer holidays and shorter hours, and may lead to an improvement of training methods and facilities. The harmonization of social policies could lead to an improvement in family allowances”.  

16. It is important to remember that throughout the early sixties, Labour was sending delegations to the Congress of Socialist International and held its socialist responsibilities as a top priority.  
A memorandum from the Trades Union Conference (TUC) articulated the over-riding question facing the Party: “Would going into the Community help this country and the six already in the EEC to work together for their own economic expansion and rising living standards”?21 The answer to that question was not clear.

Barbara Castle, on the Left of the Labour Party and a member of the anti-EEC Britain and the Common Market Committee, was certain that entering the Community would not help Britain. In a 1962 article entitled, ‘Planning and the Common Market: The Anti-Socialist Community’, she wrote:

“In the context of the economic philosophy which inspired the Community this means, in effect, that [Britain] would be debarred from pursuing even the cautious and experimental Socialist policy to which the whole of the Labour Party is committed”.22

Richard Clements, the editor of the Left-wing paper, Tribune, outlined the paper’s opinion of the EEC in 1961:

“The Common Market […] is a baited trap. If Macmillan and the Conservatives had got Britain pinned down and immobilized into the capitalist-oriented EEC, then their task in Britain would have been easier”.23

Hugh Gaitskell, the leader of the Party, had indicated some lukewarm support for Europe, caught as he was, between the anti-European left and the pro-European revisionist right. However, he shied away from openly endorsing the idea, and at the 1962 Party Conference, to the surprise of his revisionist friends, he effectively came down against Europe.24 In an effort to unify the party, Gaitskell presented Five Conditions for entry but in 1962, it was already clear that the Conservative negotiators would not succeed in attaining them.25 Because Labour and the Six could not be reconciled, general opinion, and even opinion within the Labour Party, recognised that Labour was thus ‘against’ entry to the EEC.26

24. Gaitskell was seen as something of a revisionist, as he had become a central figure in Friends of Socialist Commentary, which promoted links between revisionist groups. (See T. JONES, Remaking the Labour Party, Routledge, London, 1996, p.26.) One theory for his more negative stance towards Europe at the 1962 Conference is his experience meeting European and Commonwealth socialists in 1962. His meeting with the Europeans at the Socialist International was marked by clashes and disagreements; in contrast, when he met with the Commonwealth Socialist leaders in September 1962, the conference was pleasant, harmonious and productive. L.J. Robins credits these experiences with reinforcing Gaitskell’s and the Labour Party’s commitment to the Commonwealth, at the expense of European integration. (See L.J. ROBINS, The Reluctant Party, op.cit., p.28.)
25. Gaitskell outlined his major points of concern: 1) safeguarding the interests of the EFTA countries, 2) retaining the freedom to plan the British economy, 3) retaining the system of planned production in agriculture (that Labour created after the war), 4) retaining the right to maintain an independent foreign policy, and 5) providing for the interests of the Commonwealth countries.
26. George Brown, the Labour Foreign Secretary in the Wilson Government, wrote in his memoirs, “In the years of opposition, when Mr. Macmillan was trying to negotiate British entry, Labour feeling, on the whole, was hostile […] the bulk of the Party was Anti-Common Market”. G. BROWN, In My Way, St. Martin’s Press, New York, 1971, p.216.
Gaitskell had managed to unify the Party behind a stance advocating conditional entry and promoting nationalism.\(^{27}\) His sudden death robbed the Party of an able leader, and perhaps of the promise of future Party unity. Nonetheless, initially, under the new leader Harold Wilson, the Labour Party appeared to maintain a general unanimity on the subject of the Five Conditions. The 1964 Labour Election Manifesto did not mention the EEC. It outlined Labour's approach to Europe in one sentence:

> “Though we shall seek to achieve closer links with our European neighbours, the Labour Party is convinced that the first responsibility of a British Government is still to the Commonwealth”.\(^{28}\)

The Labour Left saw the EEC as “a Conservative exercise in economic escapism”; they believed that economic recovery would be through national planning.

The 1964 Manifesto presented Labour's economic plans, including a reintroduction of a planned economy, the re-establishment of public ownership of the iron and steel industries, as well as an extensive regional policy designed to help the less developed or declining areas within the UK. At the first Labour Conference following the election,\(^{29}\) there was little mention of entry to the EEC and the Common Market - the subject was confined to the speech of George Brown, the Foreign Secretary: “In view of the difficulties now within the Common Market we cannot talk airily of 'going into Europe' without defining what that means”.\(^{30}\)

In the journal, *Common Market*, an article appeared in 1965 that, after describing the Labour Government's attitude toward the EEC, declared: “any direct Labour initiative to join the Common Market can therefore be dismissed as overwhelmingly unlikely.”\(^{31}\) And in fact, the Prime Minister, Labour leader Harold Wilson, emphatically stated in April 1965 that

> “there is no question whatever of Britain either seeking or being asked to seek entry into the Common Market in the immediately foreseeable future. So far as this Government are concerned, the conditions we laid down still apply”.\(^{32}\)

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27. He could not, at this point, seem to unify the Party around one vision of socialism. He was unable to convince the Party that the much vaunted Clause IV of the Labour Party Constitution had outlived its usefulness, and the right-left split over that issue foreshadowed the factionalism of the 1970s and 1980s. See T. NAIRN, *The Left Against Europe?*, op.cit.; and T. JONES, *Remaking the Labour Party*, op.cit.


29. A comment at this Conference foreshadows a future split between the leaders of the Government and the rank and file of the Labour Party. No longer were Party and Government viewed as a unified entity. The split would occur five years later over the EEC. The Rt. Hon. R. J. Gunter, M.P. and Chairman of the Conference remarked: "You know, the Labour Government is not the Labour Party, and the Labour Party is not the Labour Government. We all know this is so. The Government no more dictates to the Party than the Party dictates to the Government. The Labour Party exists as a party so that we may progress towards a Socialist society, and for that we must have Labour governments". 64th Annual Conference, …, op.cit., p.112.

30. Ibid., p.181. George Brown was personally pro-Europe, as were some other ministers; however, he was not at this point able to push for integration against a strong anti-Europe majority.


However, by 1967, Wilson was prepared to support an application for entry that overlooked most of the original Labour conditions. What occurred between 1965-1967 to change Harold Wilson’s mind, and split the Party on Europe?

A Faction of the Party Turns to Europe – 1965-1967

Harold Wilson, elected to lead a government with a four-seat majority in 1964, was neither pro- nor anti-Europe. There have been suggestions that the application for entry in 1967 was done to appease the pro-Europeans in the knowledge that de Gaulle would veto the effort. However, there are indications that a legitimate shift towards Europe was occurring in a faction of the Labour Party. Traditional analysis points to the economy as the overwhelming rationale for the change in attitude towards the EC. The benefits outlined in the Manifesto did not materialise, and the economy entered a downward spiral. In addition, EFTA was not as successful as its creators had hoped and efforts to create a linkage between the EFTA countries and the EEC were rejected by the Six. Thus, this failure of the Labour Party to achieve its aims through national planning, coupled with the perceived inefficacy of EFTA, is thought to have led to the renewed interest in the EEC. In addition to the economic reasons, however, there is evidence of changes on the European level which also influenced members of the Labour Party to turn towards Europe. Specifically, the work of the new Commission pointed to an emerging promise of something more compatible with the socialist goals of the Labour Party.

The leader of this first Commission was Walter Hallstein, who was a dedicated 'European' and expanded the role and power of the Commission within the Community. Initially, it appeared that the Commission was only interested in achieving liberal economic aims – an agenda that did not include full employment or other Labour priorities. The immense challenge of beginning deregulation and the harmonisation of industry necessary for the Common Market demanded tough action from the Hallstein Commission in its first few years. The expansion of the institutions' jurisdiction over certain social policies could have created more opposition from the Labour Party; however, the increased focus and the 'left of centre' thinking on social issues (complementary to the Labour ideology) were essential new elements of the institutions in the late 1960s.

34. Wilson himself led the British delegation to the Vienna Conference where it was hoped EEC-EFTA ‘bridge-building’ would be successful. However, it was not only the rejection of the Six that weakened EFTA. “In 1962 part of Labour’s attack on the Conservative Government had been based upon support for EFTA as an alternative European grouping which had no supranational or restrictive political aspects. However, in October 1964 the Labour Government, which had inherited a massive balance of payments deficit, itself weakened the organisation by imposing a 15 per cent surcharge on EFTA imports in clear contravention of the EFTA treaty”. M. NEWMAN, Socialism and European Unity, op.cit., p.204.
The Commission introduced ‘new ideas’ into the European debate, beginning with the Medium-Term Policy Programme, drawn up to cover the years 1966-1974, which was described as “an exercise in *dirigisme*”\(^{35}\). In fact, as early as 1964, the Commission Reports show a marked increase in their discussions of social policy and social harmonisation – a turn from the capitalist enterprise to which Labour objected. In that same year, the Commission attempted to create a measure of social harmonisation in the area of wages and trade unions. ‘Initiative 1964’ was devised to call “the member States’ attention to the need for increasing the close collaboration in order to promote the levelling upwards of living and working conditions”.\(^{36}\)

A law on collective bargaining was in its second reading stage, and business and trade unions were to participate in a task force to make changes in a wages policy. In addition, a social policy for agriculture was announced, and advisory committees were formed on the social problems of farmers, and paid farm-workers.\(^{37}\)

The most important change, vis-à-vis the Labour Party’s attitude, was the introduction of the concept of ‘Regional Policy’, mentioned for the first time in the June 1965 Report. The Commission stated that “social policy and regional policy are closely linked. A balance must be sought between mobility of labour between sectors or regions, which is essential for a dynamic economy, and the social and economic disadvantages which could arise from excessive inter-regional migration”.\(^{38}\)

This section of the Report and the work the Commission had been doing directly addressed one of Labour’s fears about the EEC, incorporated under the condition of retaining the freedom to plan the economy. The social policy of the Commission in the area of employment had consisted of an extensive retraining and relocation programme. Funds were pooled by the Six, and the Commission directed them to specific areas within individual countries for unemployment relief. However, prior to the change in the Commission’s priorities, most of the money went to relocating workers - almost twice as much for relocation than for retraining. This new Community regional policy was a closer articulation of Labour’s policy preference, outlined in its 1964 and 1966 election manifestos: that money was better spent encouraging industry in the poorer regions, rather than relocating those workers.

Another new policy introduced in 1965, in line with existing Labour policies, was the formation of a committee designed to distribute the money of the European Development Fund to projects originating in the less-developed EEC Associated Countries. Funds were provided for infrastructure, as well as public institutions, such as schools and hospitals. This programme provided on a Community level much of what the Labour Government was interested in providing to its Commonwealth. In the 1964 Labour manifesto, the Government promised to create a Ministry of Overseas Development in order to provide funding and aid to the developing countries of the world. In 1966, Labour claimed that it had “increased the flow of

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\(^{38}\) *Eighth General Report …. op.cit.*, p.164.
external aid to developing nations both inside and outside the Commonwealth” and proposed to “make our aid more effective by helping recipient countries to plan their development and to select worthwhile projects on which to spend our aid”. 39

During 1967 a faction of the Labour Party, including Prime Minister Wilson, began to see opportunities for social policies within the European framework. Harold Wilson believed Europe could advance his domestic agenda: “The question is whether any proposed surrender of sovereignty will advance or retard our progress to the kind of world we all want to see”. 40 The TUC also saw benefits on the European level, and when invited to join the trade union centre of the Six (ECTUS), the TUC sent two representatives to their Executive Committee. 41

In retrospect, the political shift of the Community is apparent; that it was noted by Labour leaders and contemporary journals at the time reaffirms its importance:

“It is evident that EEC members like France remain free to practise a high degree of economic planning. In the Common Market's own practice, the trend is toward more central control of national economic life along lines attractive or at least acceptable to Socialism. Many young Labour MPs and Ministers have 'discovered' the European institutions, and have found them less dangerous than they imagined”. 42

The Labour leadership officially recognised the leeway allowed by the European institutions after Wilson's trip to meet with the Heads of Government of the Six. The meetings were arranged to assess the possibility of safeguarding British interests in an application for EEC membership, and were conducted from January to March 1967. During the series of meetings, which also included a February visit to the EEC Commission itself, Wilson began to understand the difference between the Treaty of Rome and its practical application within the Community. 43 In his memoirs, Wilson described his discussion with the Italian Ministers about an important Labour issue, regional policy:

“We then turned to regional policies. The answers we received, both on the freedom we require for existing regional policies and on our plans to extend them, were reassuring. It was important to us that we should be able to report that in the matter of regional policies, Community practice allowed a great deal of latitude”. 44

In other countries as well, Wilson was told that the laws of the Community in practice could allow for many of Labour's requirements.

43. Upon returning from Europe, George Brown, the Foreign Secretary, said of himself and Wilson: “Td long ago discovered that the Treaty of Rome, like the Bible, takes account of any possible sin, provides the antidote and thereby offers ways and means of obtaining sanctity afterwards. On our tour of Europe the Prime Minister also learned this. We found that other people bound by the Treaty of Rome had managed to provide for all their private troubles, and it was pretty obvious that we could provide for ours, even within the terms of the Treaty”. G. BROWN, op.cit., p.221.
In the ensuing Parliamentary debate over application to the EEC, Wilson articulated many of these examples and arguments to support his case for entry. No less than three times in his speech on 2 May 1967 did he refer to the “practical working of the Community”, and on 8 May he reiterated the importance of the nature of the institutions rather than the articles of the Treaty. “My experience with the working of the Community, the actual practical working, and what we have learned in our discussions about its working, render unfounded the fears and anxieties which I certainly had and very fully expressed, based on a literal reading of the Treaty of Rome and regulations made under it”.\(^45\) Wilson’s comments attest to the fact that it was not Labour’s (or his) ideology that was changing, but rather that Labour’s ideological convictions could be accommodated within the EEC.

Other Members of Parliament also embraced this new view of the EEC allowing them ideological constancy. Labour MP Eric Heffer encapsulated the vision of the Community:

“We have the opportunity within our grasp as a Labour and Socialist movement to influence the future of Europe for all time. […] I believe that we can get a Socialist United States of Europe”.\(^46\)

He elaborated at the 1967 Labour Party Conference:

“We must fight for a Socialist United States of Europe […] I believe that the way to get there is first to get into the EEC, to fight for its expansion and to fight to turn it into a Socialist economic community”.\(^47\)

Unfortunately for the future of the Labour Party, there never existed a consensus position on Europe within the Party. Compounded by economic and political concerns, the split within the party ran deep. At the 1967 Labour Party Conference, votes in all areas under discussion were very close, as the effects of joining or not joining the Common Market overshadowed all policies. One motion demonstrates both the split within the Party and some of the factors influencing the move towards Europe. The motion in question was carried by 3,350,000 for, and 2,697,000 against; it read:

“This Conference welcomes the Government’s decision to apply for membership of the European Economic Community and to negotiate satisfactory terms for British entry. Conference is encouraged by the support of our Socialist and Trades Union colleagues in the Six for the entry of Britain and other E.F.T.A. countries and is convinced that British membership would be a vital step towards European unity”.\(^48\)

The Labour Party entered the 1970s divided on the question of Europe, with rising left-right tension approaching a dangerous precipice. Wilson as party leader was confronted with the task of unifying the party - one that he could not accomplish.

During the 1970s and early 1980s, the Labour Party was weak and riddled with infighting on the issue of entry, and later, of remaining in the EEC. The Conservatives orchestrated the successful entry of 1 January 1973, and Labour remained opposed to entry, refusing to participate in Community institutions until after the 1975 referendum on remaining in the EEC. Renegotiations and the referendum failed to unify the party as was hoped, and the anti-Europe faction continued to voice concerns similar to those of the party in the 1950s and 1960s. Finally, in 1983, after a bitter Conference debate, Labour advocated in its election manifesto complete withdrawal from the Community.

The division within the Labour Party, forged during the 1967 application under Wilson, critically impaired the Party’s ability to get elected. In fact, Party membership was in decline, and within the last two years of the Wilson government, the party lost over ten by-elections.49 Even after losing the 1970 election to the Conservatives by a large margin, Labour remained unable to unite on the subject of Europe. Tom Nairn, on the Labour Left, rearticulated the question asked in 1962 by the TUC in his 1972 essay ‘The Left against Europe?’.

“We know, indeed, that the Common Market is intended to strengthen the sinews and the world-position of European capitalism and its various ruling classes. What we do not know – and on the basis of this analysis, cannot ever know – is whether, or in what ways, it may also strengthen the position and enlarge the real possibilities of the European working classes and European social revolutionaries”.50

He also framed the European discussion in relation to the deeper debate within the Labour Party – that of the nature of socialism. The revisionists in the Labour Party identified themselves with the social democratic movements of the Continent and were in favour of entering the EEC, based on arguments of promoting socialism through the Community.51 Those on the Left of the Party did not accept the type of socialism promoted by the revisionists, and thus refused to accept their related views on the positive social aspects of European integration.52 This debate of ideas and ideologies would continue throughout the 1970s and the 1980s and cause a severe split within the Party.

The Conservative Prime Minister Edward Heath brought Britain into the Common Market in 1973. In the vote, 69 Labour MPs, led by the pro-European revisionist Roy Jenkins, voted for membership, flouting the demands of the Labour leadership who im-

51. Alan Day credited the European social democrats with becoming “the pace-setters of European integration”. He also claimed that Continental, and by extension, British social democrats believed that there was time and opportunity to mould Europe into a socialist concept. See A. DAY, Socialists and European Unity, in: Socialist Commentary, August 1971.
52. Byron Criddle commented in Socialists and European Integration that “the socialists’ espousal of the European cause has gone hand in hand with retreat from traditional socialist ideology into social democratic revisionism”. As quoted in A. DAY, op.cit., p.7.
posed a three-line whip against membership. Even though the terms of entry were negotiated by the Conservatives, these Labour MPs believed that it did not “automatically make them into ‘Tory Terms’; that is, terms which in their nature must be opposed by members of the Labour Party. The Labour Committee for Europe says these are terms that can honourably be supported by Socialists”.

Notwithstanding the rhetoric of the pro-Europeans, the majority of the Parliamentary Labour Party voted no, and animosities deepened.

Many members of the Labour Party remained ideologically opposed to the idea of the Common Market, even though Britain had joined. To the “guardians of the Party’s ‘ultimate purpose’”, in other words, the Left-wing traditionalist socialists, “there was still little to choose between the collaborationist Social Democratic Europe of the revisionists and the capitalist-dominated Europe of the Conservative Party.” One Labour MP, Eric Deakins, declared: “I am not merely against Britain’s membership of the Common Market. Even if we were not in, I should be against the Common Market’s very existence”.

In the more moderate press, however, the benefits of the EEC, as noted in the 1965-1967 period, were still being reported. In a 1973 issue of Political Quarterly, for example, an article discusses the increased attention paid to social policy within the Community. It reviews the 1971 progress report on the actions taken by Community institutions, Report on the Development of the Social Situation in the Community. A key element of the actions taken in 1971 by the Community included the reform of the European Social Fund “to allow the Community to promote schemes itself directly instead of through national governments.” This and other achievements were touted as successes for socialism on the European stage.

Harold Wilson, still the leader of the party, attempted to create and maintain cohesiveness in the party by throwing the European issue into the hands of the British public. The major elements of the 1974 Labour campaign strategy were the commitments to renegotiating the terms of entry and to a referendum on joining. The renegotiation process was a balancing act between the leadership, which, while not enthusiastic, was nonetheless committed to Europe, those on the pro-European Right, and the Party’s Left, which was strongly against any involvement.

The outlined renegotiation objectives in the Labour manifesto included the traditional concerns for the Commonwealth and developing countries, as well as a demand for changes in the Common Agricultural Policy and the Community Budget. After Labour won the 1974 election, in an opening statement to the Council of Ministers, the Foreign Secretary, James Callaghan, reiterated that Britain “reserved the right to withdraw from the Community if satisfactory terms could not be

agreed.”57 The renegotiated terms passed Parliament on 9 April 1975, though not because of Labour support. The Government had to rely on Opposition support, which it received: its own members were split - 137 Labour MPs voting for, 145 against, with 33 abstentions.

The renegotiated terms were almost immaterial at the start of the referendum campaign, as most of “the opponents of membership were opposed whatever the terms”.58 The referendum itself was also a question of intraparty factionalism, as the Left hoped to use the issue of EC membership in order to secure control of the leadership positions, by gaining support from the many members of the party who were against entry but not necessarily in favour of radical leftist economic policy.59 The Left called for a national referendum on the issue of membership, expecting that with a withdrawal vote it could consolidate its position within the party. The mainstream element of the party, represented by Prime Minister Wilson,60 also thought that the EC debate would provide it with a chance to strengthen its power – by “outmanoeuvring the left”.61 Thus Wilson co-opted the Left’s strategy of holding a referendum.62

Wilson, in an attempt to hold the party together, waived Cabinet responsibility during the referendum campaign, paradoxically allowing the Left and the Right of the Party to criticise each other with impunity. Neil Kinnock, writing in the leftist Tribune, scoffed at the idea that socialism could be better achieved by going into Europe and attacked Roy Jenkins and other revisionists:

“Somehow the vocabulary of radical – even revolutionary – socialism has a hollow ring when it comes from such conventionally Right-wing, or to use current terminology, ‘moderate’ mouths”.63

In response the Right-wing attacked the ‘Labourism’ of the Left-wing, which was not ‘socialism’ and was blocking “the way to the establishment of social democracy on the European model”.64 Labour leadership hoped that the referendum decision in favour of entry, on the high turnout of about 65%, would help to put the membership issue to rest. However, to the Labour Left, the issue was far from settled.

After the referendum, the Labour Party sent representatives to the European Parliament (EP), which the Conservative Party had done from the time of British accession in 1973. Some pro-European Labour Members of the European Parlia-

59. G. BROWN, op.cit., p.76.
60. Although Wilson was initially the Left’s candidate in the early 1960s, by his third term as PM in 1974, he had become much more centrist, and a supporter, though now lukewarm, of entry to the EC.
61. G. BROWN, op.cit., p.77.
ment (MEPs) took advantage of the opportunities presented, and began to pursue socialist aims. Michael Stewart became a vice-chairman of the Socialist Group, the largest political grouping in the EP, and John Evans pushed to expand the Regional Fund. These efforts, and some successes, notwithstanding, the Labour Left refused to see the European Community as a route to broader socialism.

Only the implementation of radical reforms (outlined in the 1979 general election manifesto) could reconcile the Labour Left to the EC. Even a newly-elected MEP, Alf Lomas, spoke at the Conference in negative overtones on the subject:

“If we do not achieve these fundamental changes within a reasonable period of time, then we should reconsider the whole issue. A reasonable period of time, in my opinion, is no longer than one term of the Assembly, and if we do not get these changes then we should recommend withdrawal.”

Labour's goodwill and effort towards achieving these demanded reforms were limited, as only one year later the Conference decided that the demands were incapable of being fulfilled. The Conference “urged the Labour Party to include the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the EEC as a priority in the next general election manifesto.” Ideological opposition still ran deep within the party: John Shelmerdine stated at the 1980 Conference:

“Let us face it, the Common Market is a club for capitalism. The only way we need to trade is through an international socialism. Our fight is not just with one country or another; it is with capitalism.”

Labour did indeed continue to fight against capitalism, as expressed through the EEC, until ideology compatible with the Labour ideals of socialism became a viable option within the EEC institutions.

In 1981, the National Executive Committee (NEC) of the Labour Party agreed to a policy, Withdrawal from the EEC, which was passed with 6,213,000 votes for, and only 782,000 against. The statement clearly articulated the view held by most on the Labour Left, and echoed the earliest criticisms of the EEC of the 1950s:

“[EEC membership] has seriously hindered, and could prevent altogether, Britain adopting a coherent socialist strategy for industrial and economic regeneration. Withdrawal is thus not a substitute for Labour’s alternative economic, industrial and social strategy. It is a necessary condition for its success.”

The hard-line approach to European affairs drove the pragmatists and the pro-Marketeers from the party.

In 1981, Roy Jenkins, and other MPs, mostly revisionists and pro-Europeans, formed the Social Democratic Party (SDP) which entered into an ‘Alliance’ with

67. 79th Annual Conference of the Labour Party (Blackpool: 1980), p.126. This quotation is an excerpt of Composite 15 at that Conference, which was carried by a vote of 2 to 1.
68. 79th Annual Conference ..., op.cit., p.127.
The Labour Party's Changing Relationship to Europe

The Alliance attracted membership away from the Labour Party, and showed itself in by-elections to be capable of contesting both Conservative and Labour 'safe seats'. Ignoring the Alliance threat, and with the most articulate pro-Europeans out of the Party, the Labour Party held fast to its strong anti-European rhetoric for the 1983 campaign. In 1982 there was not a single discussion concerning Europe at the Labour Annual Conference, except a casual remark by Michael Foot reaffirming the Party's commitment to withdrawal. On election day, 9 June 1983, Labour lost further 31 seats on top of its 1979 loss, leaving the Party with 209 seats, and the Conservatives with 397. Labour was decimated.

Confronted with such failure, and faced with a round of elections for the European Parliament, the Labour Party decided to accept the Community and Britain's membership for the duration of the upcoming European Parliamentary session, 1984-1989, and retain merely the 'option' to withdraw. However, during the 1986 and 1987 Labour Party Conferences there was no debate or even comment on the state of European affairs. After the third straight loss to the Conservatives in 1987, the Labour Party was officially unelectable.


Labour's failures in the 1983 and 1987 elections demanded a radical change in policy – and in the late 1980s the Party launched a thorough Policy Review. Not only a result of electoral failure, the Policy Review was also designed to confront the perceived inefficacy of traditional Labour economic policies. The President of France, François Mitterrand had attempted to create a socialist state in France during the years 1981-1984. His experiment failed badly and forced a reversal of policy. "From this experience, European socialists generally drew the conclusion that a new strategy had to be devised which would operate on a European scale." As these events overtook them, anti-Marketeers began to re-evaluate their positions; the Policy Review was not, however, as some claim, merely a response to Thatcherism. It also coincided with changes on the European stage which promoted European policies that more closely mirrored Labour’s traditional domestic aims.

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70. Although the Liberal Party had been consistently pro-Europe since the 1950's, until the SDP-Liberal Alliance, they had never provided enough of electoral threat to force the major parties to consider seriously their impact in a campaign.

71. In November 1981, Shirley Williams won a by-election victory for the SDP in the Conservative seat of Crosby. In February of 1983 the Liberals won the traditional Labour seat of Bermondsey.


Jacques Delors, the President of the Commission, began to widen the mandate of the EC as early as 1986, in the Commission’s programme for that year. He stated that “The Commission can only welcome incorporation of the social dimension in the Luxembourg Treaty. Beginning this year it promises to translate these aims into proposals to demonstrate to the people of Europe that the creation of a vast economic area, based on the market and business co-operation, is inconceivable - I would say unattainable - without some harmonisation of social legislation”.74

After Labour’s 1987 general election defeat, this new European social dimension provided Labour with the only means of achieving its social aims against the backdrop of Thatcherite Britain.

While the Thatcher Government was attempting to undermine the trade unions in the UK, Jacques Delors was visiting the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) to garner support for his proposals for “l’espace social” and a “social charter”. In Britain during these years, the Conservatives were privatising British Telecom and British Gas, and cutting back on pensions and benefits and other elements of the welfare state. With an overall majority in the House of Commons of 144 seats, the Conservatives left Labour without much recourse at the national level in the area of social policy. The Policy Review recognised the constraints to Labour on a national level, and Europe, and the EC, is portrayed as an opportunity, rather than an obstacle.76

The increased opportunities in Europe and the plurality position within the European Parliament of the Socialist Group provided the 32 Labour MEPs with more of a chance of defeating the Conservatives than the 209 MPs had in London. This fact was noted at the time as demonstrated in an article in Political Quarterly: “It is clear that the aims and interests of European Labour movements have more influence over EC decisions than the British movement can bring to bear on the Thatcher administration”.77 A Labour MEP, Barry Seal, elaborated:

“Comrades, decisions are being made in the Common market every day […] the decisions that affect Britain cannot be changed by Westminster. This is where the Labour members of the European Parliament come in”.78

A key example was in the 1987 debate in the European Parliament on the Baron Crespo von Wogau report, which considered the Commission’s Paper: ‘The Single Act: A New Frontier for Europe’. The report generally supported the Commission’s plans, and highlighted the importance of the creation of the espace social, as well as the efforts to create economic cohesion between countries or within a country by supplementing the Structural Funds with other programmes. In Westminster, such an effort would have been

75. L’espace social, conceptualised by Delors, is a vague term for a new area of integration which would focus on workers’ rights and social issues. It is the idea behind what would become the Social Charter, or a charter of basic social rights introduced by Delors in 1989.
78. 79th Annual Conference …. op.cit., p.152.
immediately quashed; however, in the European Parliament, the report was passed by 255 to 38, with the 63 abstentions including the British Conservative MEPs.\textsuperscript{79}

It is apparent that the EP presented a broad opportunity for political and policy achievement for the Labour Party, and after a time serving in the EP, Labour MEPs and Party members realised its potential.\textsuperscript{80} Speaking for the NEC, Tony Clarke encapsulated the new Labour attitude: “Each vote for a Labour Euro candidate is a vote for Labour and is a vote against Thatcher and her divisive policies for Britain and Europe”.\textsuperscript{81} By 1988, a vocal portion of the Conference was drawing attention to the possibilities in Europe, perhaps partially spurred on by the visit of Jacques Delors to the Trades Union Conference earlier in the year.

In 1988, Jacques Delors addressed the annual conference of the TUC. He spoke of issues directly affecting the unions and their members: a social Community that would benefit workers, not merely employers; a voice in policy-making; protection for the rights of the members.\textsuperscript{82} This last concept, of workers’ rights, resonated with many in the trade union movement; the related idea of social citizenship had been discussed in the Labour press since the mid-1980s. Michael Mann wrote that “policy should be built on top of a simple, more universal, more radical understanding of citizen rights, to enhance the power of the ordinary person and family against the power of big capital”.\textsuperscript{83}

At the 1988 Party Conference, Neil Kinnock picked up this theme of European workers’ rights. The \textit{Financial Times} reported:

“[The] social dimension is anathema to Mrs. Margaret Thatcher, Labour argues […] in sharp contrast, Labour’s ‘social Europe’ as defined by Mr. Kinnock, means ensuring the highest standards of working conditions and workers’ rights”.\textsuperscript{84}

The Party was primed for the emergence of the Social Charter.

The concept of a ‘social charter’ suited the Party, as in the 1970s Labour had advocated its own ‘Social Contract’ as an essential tenet of its Manifesto, \textit{Let Us Work Together}.\textsuperscript{85} However, the European Social Charter, drafted in 1980 and an element of the

\textsuperscript{79} EUROPEAN COMMISSION (Brussels), \textit{Bulletin of the European Communities} vol.20, no.5(1987), p.118. It is worthwhile to mention that often the divisions came down on national lines, rather than the broader political alliances; therefore, examples of clear Labour versus Conservative voting are difficult to pinpoint.

\textsuperscript{80} Ben Rosamond highlights the importance of the links built between the Labour Party and the Confederation of Socialist Parties. See B. ROSAMOND, \textit{Labour and the European Community: Learning to be European?}, in: \textit{Politics}, vol.10, no.2(1990), pp.41-48.

\textsuperscript{81} 79th Annual Conference ……, op.cit., p.140.

\textsuperscript{82} S. GEORGE and B. ROSAMOND, \textit{The European Community}, op.cit., p.179.


\textsuperscript{84} Another critical element of this Conference debate was the remission of a resolution demanding change to the 1972 European Communities Act. The Act, passed under the 1970 Conservative Government in tandem with the Treaty of Accession to the Communities, accepted the primacy of European Council Directives in Britain. The Labour Party had, since the law’s inception, been fighting to change it and return power to the British Parliament. By 1988, most of the controversial laws being passed on the European level and ‘forced’ on the British Parliament were social measures that Thatcher and the Conservative MPs did not like. Labour capitalised on this unintended consequence and thus no longer advocated repeal or amendment to the European Communities Act.
‘1992’ Programme which would later be added as a protocol to the Maastricht Treaty, was a much wider and far-reaching document, allowing for greater reform within Britain. Margaret Thatcher called it ‘socialism through the back door’. Labour was quick to see the potential benefits of such a charter, and prepared a policy document in support entitled, The Social Charter: How Britain Benefits. This document highlighted the similarities between Labour’s aims and those of the Commission.

There was great excitement about the Charter, Delors and Europe in general. Ken Coates, a Labour MEP, wrote of Delors: “Suddenly, a new prophet had arisen in Brussels. Was it possible that all those causes which had been lost during the Great Waste since 1979, all those social Goods, could now, after ten corrosive years, be recovered in the European Community”? All of the Policy Review documents had a European dimension, “suggesting that the EC [was seen] not only as a separate policy area, but also as a factor in the formulation of all other policy.”

Even on the local level, Europe was having a direct impact, changing the attitudes of Labour councils and councillors. Authorities could apply directly to Community structural funds, such as the Social and Regional Funds, to support local projects. In fact, the links with the Commission and the Community were shown in several surveys to have a direct effect on the attitudes towards Europe of Labour councillors. Labour leaders with local government backgrounds were among those pushing for Labour to take a bigger role in Europe.

By the time that the Maastricht Treaty came into force in November 1993, the extension of European Community responsibility to include workers’ rights, as well as public health policies and education, had created a social awareness in the community which resonated with the left of centre governments in Europe, and with the entire Labour Party. The Major Government refused to participate in the dialogue on the Social Charter, and did not agree to adopt the finished product. Tony Blair’s campaign promised that Britain would sign this Charter, and many of New Labour’s reforms within Britain have been direct results of implementing European directives. Thus, Europe has finally become “part and parcel” of Labour’s British domestic policy. Moreover, as Prime Minister, Blair has taken a lead in setting the agenda for the European Council meetings that discuss employment and social policy. Nonetheless, though social policy may have helped convert the Labour Party to Europe, it has not yet converted the European Union to socialism.


This book, written by Andrea Ciampani (University of Padua) for the fiftieth birthday of the CISL, the Italian trade union set up by Giulio Pastore in May 1950 two years after the CGIL's break up, is an example of European scholars' recent but growing interest in the role played by pressure groups and non-institutional actors in the international system and the European integration process.

The analysis of the CISL's international profile appears particularly difficult, not only because it is not supported by a selected bibliography, but mainly because it looks like a hybrid where European Integration History coexists with other subjects like Economic History and Industrial Relations.

Via a careful analysis of the documents collected at the International Institute of Social History in Amsterdam, the author efficaciously investigates the different levels at which the CISL operates: national, European, and international, in an intricate labyrinth where the three identities often appear to be overlapping. This complex articulation is not only the result of the CISL's own history, but also of the Italian post-war history, which has been strongly influenced by international development as well as by the Cold War.

In the first part of his book Ciampani deals with the CISL's origins, focussing on the historical debate developed with regard to the various splits which completely changed the history of the labour movement in Italy and France, ousting the united antifascist trade unions established after World War II. The author stresses that even though the Marshall Plan was the catalyst of the Italian CGIL's break up due to its implications with organised labour, internal factors also played an important role, as did the disputes among the various labour wings with regard to adopting different programs for Italian reconstruction. Since its birth, the CISL, through Giulio Pastore, its first Secretary, and Mario Romani, Director of the Ufficio Studi, has developed a pronounced international profile. It took part in the establishment of the new international labour organisation, the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), formed by all the Western «free» labour organisations which had left the Communist oriented World Federation of Trade Unions in 1949, and it has played an active role in Europe since the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1952.

In the 1950's the links with the American labour organisations, in particular the American Federation of Labour (AFL), as well as its efforts to become a reliable interlocutor for the US programs in Italy, have influenced the identity of the CISL. It tried to establish a «new» form of trade unionism, free from both the political parties and the State along the lines of the American model, something that was completely new to the Italian tradition of labour organisations, strongly tied as they were to political parties.

During the 1960's, in spite of the strong repercussions caused by internal political factors like the question of the opening to the left, the CISL consolidated its international approach. In 1965 Bruno Storti, the CISL's Secretary, was appointed President of the ICFTU, a symbol for the overwhelming role played by European trade unions on the international scene. As a consequence the CISL promoted a series of international initiatives with the intention of radically changing its image and becoming a trade union seriously engaged in supporting the establishment of new democratic organisations all over the world, like in Somalia and the Middle East.
On the European scene, the 1960's were characterised by the CISL's change of attitude, passing from its enthusiastic support of the European Community to a more critical approach. This was partly the result of the condition of inferiority which the Rome Treaties assigned to the labour movement. The Treaties were worked mainly out by governments, political leaders and the management, with little possibility of participation for trade unions and, more seriously, paying little attention to the development of an integrated policy in the social field. This condition became more than evident in the absence of trade union representatives sitting in European institutions. No labour representative took part in the Messina negotiations and in spite of the continuous requests for being represented in the Commission, only the Economic and Social Committee, a consultative body with no decision-making power, allotted one third of its seats to trade union representatives. In spite of this limited success, the CISL believed that the creation of a Common Market could provide the solution to Italian unemployment and for this reason it started a propaganda campaign among its members, asking for the setting up of a European Social Fund, seen as an instrument for financing professional training. The author stresses how during the 1960's the CISL consolidated its European identity through the debate with other European trade unions, taking part in Jean Monnet's Committee for the United States of Europe and starting a dialogue with the Commissioner Lionello Levi Sandri with the aim of promoting a European social policy and supporting Italian workers who travelled abroad. The real turning point in the question of labour movement representation in Europe came about with the establishment of the European Trade Union Confederation in 1973, which also comprised the European Christian unions and, since 1974, the Communist CGIL, marking a leap forward in the new role played by the European labour movements in Brussels.

During the 1970's internal political factors became preponderant: Ciampani points out how the Italian labour movement tried to loosen its ties with the political parties. After the violent protests which took place in 1968, the question of promoting the unification of the three Italian labour organisations became the focus of their activity, and in 1971 the CGIL-CISL and UIL agreed on a common program. Even though real unity of action met with many obstacles and actually was never achieved, the three organisations tried to find a "gentlemen's agreement" signing a pact for unity of action in 1972 and working towards common goals during that period.

The last part of the book, focussing on the 1980's and 1990's, is particularly interesting as the links between internal and international factors become more complex with the radical changes that occurred in the international system forcing the CISL, as well as all the European labour movements, to start an internal debate regarding the new role played by the trade unions in a globalised system. The fall of the Berlin Wall, the German unification, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War had obvious consequences in the social field, as the role played by the labour movement changed radically.

On the European scene, the '80s and '90s appear more successful for the labour movement's goals. Ciampani points out the role played by the new President of the European Commission, Jacques Delors, in promoting a new dialogue with the social actors, with the aim of setting up a social space in Europe. For the first time the European Community acknowledged the right of the social parties to negotiate among themselves. This acceleration was to lead to the Social Charter approved by the Strasbourg European Council in 1989, which, despite lacking any real binding value, reinforced labour's participation in the European decision-making process. The election of Emilio Gabaglio, as the European Trade Union Confederation Secretary during the Maastricht Treaty negotiations was particularly significant as it gave the CISL an extraordinary opportunity to play a role in working out the Maastricht Treaty articles on the establishment of a European social policy.

In general, Ciampani's book is a pioneering work which opens the way to a new series of European studies, focussing on the role played by non-governmental actors in shaping the European Union’s history. In this context the CISL's case appears particularly interesting not
only for the pronounced international profile developed by the Italian trade union since its origins, but also because it casts light on a series of initiatives which clearly demonstrate how since the 1970's Italy has tried to find a space among its European partners, in particular France and Germany, by promoting the development of a social policy. In this context the role played by the CISL in close cooperation with the Italian government appears particularly significant.

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In his book Theorizing European Integration, Dimitris Chryssochoou aims at nothing less than a reformulation of what European integration research should be aiming at: In place of the dominance of the “microcosm of sector-specific analyses” (p.2), future scholarship on the European Union should be more open and geared towards a re-thinking of the epistemology of EU studies by asking “what constitutes legitimate questions and answers for integration scholarship” (p.2)?

Chryssochoou’s major contention is that existing theories of integration are too narrowly focused and conceptually confined to “grasp the distinctive nature of the European polity and its complex … governance structures” (p.1). He claims that this insufficiency in extant European integration theorizing is mainly the result of the “raw positivism of self-styled ‘social scientists’ confining the art of theorizing to a narrow set of verifiable or falsifiable hypotheses” (p.6). Yet, what should integration theory do or seek to achieve instead? Chryssochoou has an answer ready at hand. In order to gain a deeper understanding of the emerging Euro-polity, its constitutive ‘civic spheres’ and ‘political spaces’, researchers have to free themselves from the cages of ‘“strict” science’ advocated by ‘KKV’-type scholars (p.8).1 Although much of Chryssochoou’s book is about existing theories of integration which he presents at length – half of the volume is dedicated to a review of theories from the functionalism and federalism of the Community’s ‘formative’ years to the present new-institutionalism debate – he is critical and sceptical about the contributions these theories are capable of making in order to meet two key challenges of the evolving European polity, the ‘democratic deficit’ and the lack of a transnational civic sphere. In the final chapters of the book he proposes to remedy this situation.

First, Chryssochoou advances an alternative characterization of the EU polity, based on Lijphart’s theory of consociationalism, illuminating key features of European governance which other characterizations, such as the federal or confederal state analogy, do not grasp. According to him, the EU can best be depicted as a ‘confederal consociation’ possessing key elements of a consociational polity: a power-sharing ‘governing’ coalition of member states, some form of proportional representation in the decision-making institutions, a (qualified) right of mutual veto, and segmental autonomy of the constituent (national) parts. He justifies the attribute of a ‘confederal’ polity through the existence of “equally sovereign demoi, each with its own distinctive national identity, political tradition, social structure and civic culture” (p.141). Especially in the more recent treaty amending bargains, the confederal nature of the polity poses an increasing challenge to EU governance. Given the increasing asymmetry between and politicization of an elite-controlled process of further policy integration and a concomitant compromising of the principles of “ruler accountability and

responsible government” resulting in a democratic deficit, the EU’s legitimacy deficit is exacerbated in the absence of European ‘civic sphere’ or ‘demos’ (p.164).

Chryssochoou’s analysis of the inadequacies of extant integration theories to ask (and answer) the question about how these pressing legitimacy concerns can be solved, leads him, in a second step, to issue a plea for more engagement in ‘metatheorizing’. He claims that existing integration theories are “trapped in the legacy of functionalist-driven, task-oriented and problem-solving modes of collective action” and are hence inapt to ask and answer the ‘right’ questions “of polity, democracy, identity and legitimate governance within the evolving ‘EU order’” (p.172). What Chryssochoou calls for is a ‘normative turn’ in European integration theorizing, which denotes the elaboration of a “‘system of ideas’ that attaches a priori importance to questions of bringing the Union closer to its citizens” (p.173). Hence, presently dominant questions in EU scholarship, such as how to explain outcomes and processes, should cease to be a main concern for future research. What is important, claims Chryssochoou, is to improve the EU’s grass-root support, i.e. to find and to construct the EU’s “civic core” and, in order to achieve this goal, reflect about “in whose name are publicly binding decisions taken in Brussels, or what really makes for the polity’s ‘constituting authority’?” (p.174)

Although Chryssochoou’s book addresses interesting and pressing problems of EU governance, i.e. the often alleged lop-sidedness between ‘output’- and ‘input-legitimacy’² and the lack of a European transnational civic sphere, his reflections on how these twin-problems should be tackled and solved are, unfortunately, delegated to no more than a quarter of his book. Furthermore, his thoughts on these problems are neither convincing nor do they lead to the advancement of a coherent research agenda. Two main deficiencies that underscore this seemingly harsh statement spring readily to mind.

First, Chryssochoou’s ‘jump’ from the alleged inadequacy of existing theories of integration to the conclusion that more ‘metatheorizing’ should be done, lacks the foundation upon which an enterprise of this type could be justified. At no place in the book does he advance a coherent set of criteria according to which he intends to compare, contrast and criticize existing theories of integration. Half of the volume provides a good literature review; however, it is not evident how this review adds to the general argument of the book. The author explores at the outset the somewhat trivial point that theories help us order and understand the world in manifold ways, i.e. through deduction, induction, normative claims etc. But, for various reasons, no social scientist would probably disagree with the assertion that theories are important. Chryssochoou’s presentation of integration theories illuminates how historical context and theory formation continue to fuel one another, although, one may ask, for what purpose? If the fundamental objective of the presentation of these different ‘theories’ is to demonstrate their inadequacy to ask and answer questions that relate to the problem of the Community’s democratic credentials, then Chryssochoou has undoubtedly succeeded in beheading ‘theory strawmen’. Yet, he failed to explicitly recognize that some of the approaches reviewed are explanatory theories (that can be tested), some normative and prescriptive, others – by social science standards – rather ideologies than theories. Hence, it is about as fair to accuse explanatory theory of being blind to providing answers to allegedly normative questions, as it is to accuse a football team to do badly in basketball. If we accept that theory has different purposes, as the author made more or less explicit in the first chapter, why should so much space be dedicated to integration theories which Chryssochoou belittles for their ‘too narrow focus’? The main criticism here is that Chryssochoou does not deliver on what he seemingly sets out to do when he tells the reader about the value of theorizing in general: Theory evaluation has to follow certain rules and standards of comparison – where are they?

Secondly, Chryssochoou’s plea for the use of metatheory in redefining the European integration research agenda is equally grounded on weak foundations. Based on his characterization of the European polity as a ‘confederal consociation’, he shows that one of the key problems that troubles the present and future EU, the problem of democratic legitimacy, has to be put at center-stage. Yet, why should this problem be approached through ‘metatheorizing’? Chryssochoou’s claim for metatheory is based on two assumptions. First, the problem of transnational democracy-building to overcome the challenges to democratic legitimacy can only be addressed in the context of constructing a European civic sphere or demos; and second, theories of integration are too narrowly confined as to be capable of dealing with these questions. The first assumption is based on an ideal-typical characterization of the EU as a ‘confederal consociation’ and forms part of a larger debate about a ‘demos-requirement’ for the workings of democracy, a debate which he does not even hint at in the book. However, why should the reader be convinced about the ‘civic sphere’ or ‘demos-requirement’ for the construction of a legitimate and viable European polity when Chryssochoou does not provide compelling arguments why we should follow this assumption? He definitely has a case when he claims that the ‘input’-side of democratic legitimacy is heavily burdened, but he fails to deliver on the implications – he simply assumes that European democracy has to be European demos-cracy. Consequently, the second assumption – that extant theories of integration neither ask the right questions nor provide any answers to the demos-cracy-problem – is a corollary of the first. However, only if we accept the ill-founded first assumption does the second make sense.

Theorizing and metatheorizing/‘self-reflection’ on the European polity should follow criteria which are clearly defined and transparent. Chryssochoou’s book has made a valid and important point when affirming that democratic legitimacy in the EU is under stress – but he has provided a nonconvincing argument as to why explanatory theory and positivist science should not be able to address and deal with the question of democratic legitimacy. Furthermore, even if we were to accept that we need more metatheorizing, Chryssochoou’s book ends merely on a plea to do just that with little in the way of suggestions as to how to metatheorize, and which rules to follow.

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When Wolfram Kaiser’s Using Europe, Abusing the Europeans. Britain and European Integration, 1945-63 was originally published in 1996 it was lauded on its dust jacket as ‘indispensable’, ‘outstanding’ and ‘an important contribution to British history’. At that time, the book deserved such commendations as it was the first archive-based study of Britain’s reaction to the formation of the European Economic Community (EEC). It has since held a notable position in what has become a rich and dominant area of research and teaching, enough for it to be reprinted with a new preface in 1999. Kaiser’s subject – essentially British policy from the Messina Conference of June 1955 to de Gaulle’s veto of Britain’s first application in January 1963 – gained him a place in the historiography, but it was his argumentative style and uncompromising judgements which motivated other historians to engage with his work. To determine whether the dust jacket endorsements of Using Europe remain valid, Kaiser’s arguments have to be analysed, particularly in light of subsequent research. These may be divided into those specific to 1955-63 and those concerning the wider history of Britain and European integration.
Kaiser offers numerous contentions about 1955-63 but there are four which are most significant. The first is that in 1955 the British were complacent, arrogant and underestimated the Six but did not 'miss a bus' at Messina (pp.27, 54-60). The criticisms ranged by Kaiser about Britain's decision making and diplomacy in 1955 were not entirely original although they were based on a more detailed analysis than that of preceding accounts. Kaiser has no sympathy for Foreign Office attitudes, especially for the then Foreign Secretary, Harold Macmillan, to whom he attributes personal responsibility for Britain's disastrous diplomacy (pp.48-49). Although the failed diplomacy cannot be gainsaid, Kaiser's views on Macmillan may be disputed; if Macmillan is to be criticised then it ought to be for his non-involvement rather than his involvement. As to Kaiser's rejection of Miriam Camps' view that Britain missed a bus in 1955 – questioning whether there was a bus to catch and adding that Britain was heading along a different road (pp.54-60) – whilst these are germane points to raise, they are speculative and suggest little more than the unpredictability of events for Britain and the Six in 1955. Kaiser is on stronger ground in his second major argument which explains how British attitudes towards European integration evolved over 1956-57 to produce Plan G, Britain's proposal for a European industrial Free Trade Area (FTA) (pp.60-87). Nevertheless, Kaiser's treatment of the FTA is ultimately negative and others, such as Ellison, Moravcsik and Schaad, have offered more positive interpretations.

Kaiser's third and most significant argument is that Britain's first application for EEC membership in 1961 was 'the result of a dual "appeasement" strategy' to maintain strong Anglo-American relations, particularly the nuclear link, and to hold the Conservative Party together whilst splitting the Labour Party (pp.XXXII and pp.108-173). Without doubt this is an interesting explanation, if a rather contrived one. Yet that US pressure was dominant in Macmillan's mind, and that an EEC application was seen as a diplomatic counter to secure the deal eventually agreed at Nassau, underplays the other motives for the first application and overlays its potential by-products. Furthermore, it could be argued that the domestic political context of the application was not as straightforward as Using Europe suggests although extensive research on this subject has yet to be produced. Nevertheless, the work of Bange, Deighton, Ellison, Griffiths and Ward, Ludlow, Tratt, Hugo Young and John Young, amongst others, offer contrary interpretations to Kaiser's on the motives for the first application.

Kaiser's fourth main argument considers the fate of Britain's first application. Here, he focuses on high politics, particularly the relations between de Gaulle and Macmillan, and the issue of nuclear diplomacy (pp.174-203). Although his account is far less developed in terms of evidence than his treatment of the motives for the application, it nevertheless has merit. Yet Ludlow's research on the conditional nature of the application and on the Brussels negotiations themselves, along with the work of others, demonstrates that Kaiser tells only one version of this story. Ludlow's concentration on the ebb and flow of the negotiations and their technicalities and the attitudes of the Community and the Six suggests that Britain failed to exploit opportunities for success prior to the strengthening of de Gaulle's power after 1962. The first application's demise, according to Ludlow, was thus a significant failure for the British, contrary to Kaiser's view that on the 'diplomatic level' it was 'a full success' (p.203). Whatever view is taken of de Gaulle's veto in January 1963 it cannot be denied that it left the British government in the position which it had worked to avoid since the Messina Conference of June 1955.

Clearly, Using Europe is important in that Kaiser's arguments about 1955-63, despite the criticisms that may be made of them, are significant and have generated historical debate. Can the same be said of Kaiser's assertions about 'Britain and Europe' when he ventures outside of 1955-63, especially as his epilogue covers 1963-1996 and the 1999 reprint's preface comments on 1997-98? Using Europe does not make enough of its own historiographical criticisms of the 'awkward partner' school and the British Sonderweg thesis as depicted in the introduction (see pp.XXIX-XXXI). That Kaiser himself ultimately succumbs to 'round-
ing up the usual suspects' (p.XXX), criticising the British for their arrogance and underestimation of the Six and not offering a thorough-going comparative perspective leaves him to a degree hoist by his own petard. Neither does Using Europe distinguish itself by engaging significantly with the research of the noteworthy historians of the field, primarily Alan Milward and John Young. The 1999 preface might have been employed by Kaiser to comment on the literature since 1996 and to place his book amongst it but instead he focuses on party politics and Britain's relationship with the EU from 1996 to 1998. Perhaps his decision to do so reflects his own belief that it is here that his work is of greater effect?

Despite being for the most part a diplomatic history, Using Europe also develops arguments about the domestic political context, particularly party political, of British foreign policy. This is the strength of the epilogue and of the 1999 preface where Kaiser comments on how Britain's European policy has consistently been driven by, and undermined by, party politics, especially of the Conservative kind. In this Kaiser returns briefly to the points raised in his introduction and states that 'Unintentionally, the Sonderweg thesis of British postwar history adopts the myth, created by the British political elite, of British exceptionalism' (p.211). Dismissing the premise that Britain's choices can be explained by its difference from other Western European countries, a view restated recently by John Young, Kaiser argues that British diplomacy set it apart from the early EEC. Moreover, he believes that this had, and has, party political motivation: 'What is arguably even more relevant to understanding Britain's relationship with its European partners was – and is more than ever in the 1990s – the enormous influence of party political controversies and tactics' (p.218). Whilst this draws Kaiser's thesis together, and explains why he chose the title he did for his book, perhaps it does not offer the revision of the awkward partner school that he suggests as he is forced to admit that 'Seen over the entire postwar period, [party political controversies and tactics] have been far more divisive [in Britain] than in any other member state' (p.218). Thus, Kaiser's main contribution to the historiographical debate, apart from his arguments about 1955-63, is that he adds domestic politics to the list of factors which explain why Britain has found it so difficult to integrate with Europe.

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Ce livre n’a rien d’un recueil d’articles. Les douze auteurs se sont livrés sous la direction de George Petrosakos et Stoyan Totev à une réflexion approfondie sur les limites et l’avenir du développement économique dans la région des Balkans. La période de transition depuis dix ans en Europe a soulevé beaucoup de questions, restées sans une réponse claire et convaincante. Par exemple, pourquoi les pays balkaniques sont-ils tellement différents en termes d’efficacité économique par rapport aux pays de l’Europe Centrale? Pourquoi ces pays là semblent-ils échouer dans leurs efforts de transition vers l’économie du marché? Est-ce que l’échec des politiques intérieures ou les conditions initiales désavantageuses et l’environnement géographique défavorable sont-ils responsables de cette médiocre efficacité? En plus, quelle réponse politique a été donnée par l’Union européenne aux questions susmentionnées et qu’est-ce qu’on peut faire actuellement? Voilà quelques questions cruciales qui se posent dans ce livre pour l’ensemble des pays balkaniques.

Dans ce volume, les auteurs essayent de faire une analyse comparative des problèmes d’efficacité économique et d’adaptation structurelle dans les pays des Balkans. Ce livre, composé de seize articles au total, est divisé en deux parties. La première partie est constituée d’un travail de recherche comparative sur des questions politiques et analytiques. Dans cette partie du volume
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on fait l’analyse de la performance économique et des structures de l’industrie et du commerce dans les pays balkaniques, des relations commerciales inter-balkaniques et de la coopération économique, de l’évolution et de la distribution des investissements directs étrangers, de la réforme structurelle en ce qui concerne les privatisations, de l’efficacité de l’industrie balkanique, de la désintégration ou intégration dans les Balkans et des politiques de l’Union européenne pour la reconstruction et le développement de la région.

La deuxième partie du volume est composée des études de cas et des recherches sur les différents pays de la région. Après avoir démontré la problématique générale du développement économique de la région, les auteurs se lancent dans l’analyse des facteurs spécifiques qui influencent les divers pays des Balkans. Le cas de la Bulgarie, de l’Albanie et de la Roumanie, pays en phase d’une longue et difficile transition économique, montre bien les contradictions de ce processus: les possibilités et les conditions pour une coopération et une intégration régionale et leurs limites en termes d’adaptation structurelle. L’expérience de la Grèce, pays membre de l’Union européenne, indique clairement le rôle important de la géographie dans les relations commerciales et le développement économique. Dans le cas grecque, la proximité géographique est un des facteurs importants qui conditionnent fortement l’orientation des investissements directs étrangers, comme p.ex. en direction de Bulgarie, d’Albanie, de Roumanie ou de la FYROM.

Au début du nouveau millénaire les pays balkaniques, à l’exception de la Grèce, qui a honoré les critères de convergence pour faire partie de l’Union Economique et Monétaire, ont eu moins de chance que les autres ex-pays démocratie populaires de l’Est européen. Pour certains pays balkaniques, toute la période des années 90 a été, dans le meilleur des cas, une ère de crise prolongée ou, dans le pire des cas, un cauchemar. Si les indications présentées à travers les différents articles devaient persister dans le futur, les pays balkaniques seraient décrochés davantage encore par les pays développés de l’Union européenne, en constituant un noyau périphérique européen encore plus faible. Voilà quelques observations pessimistes des auteurs de ce livre.

Dans le livre présenté ici la perspective s’approfondit et s’élargit au terme de recherches basées sur de nombreuses sources comme en témoignent les notes abondantes qui accompagnent chaque article. A n’en pas douter, cet ouvrage intéressant et riche incite à la réflexion. Il constitue un apport important à la recherche et nourrit un débat sur l’avenir des Balkans.

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Cette étude évalue les conséquences qu’entraînera l’adhésion des pays de l’Europe centrale et orientale (PECO) à l’Union européenne dans le domaine de l’agriculture. Elle relève quelques-unes des incertitudes et des contraintes fondamentales, les effets économiques et les coûts d’adaptation qu’engendrera l’intégration de ces pays dans l’Union. Le premier chapitre donne une vue d’ensemble thématique de la région en général et arrive à la conclusion que l’adoption de la politique agricole commune par les pays PECO aboutira à une augmentation substantielle de la production agricole, entraînant des conséquences macro-économiques considérables dans tous les pays candidats à l’adhésion.

Après cette analyse générale, l’étude offre un examen plus détaillé et plus précis pour sept des pays candidats. Les perspectives qui s’ouvrent aux États baltes sont plutôt partagées: la région possède une grande abondance de terres et vient d’entamer le processus du
rétablissement de la propriété privée. Cependant, à un accroissement de la production dans certains secteurs (par exemple le secteur laitier), correspond une situation moins encourageante dans secteur céréalier où la compétitivité souffre des conditions défavorables du climat et du sol. Les Etats baltes devraient améliorer tout aussi bien la qualité des produits que l’efficacité des méthodes de production.

La politique agricole tchèque par contre s’écarte de façon frappante des objectifs de la Politique Agricole Commune (PAC) de l’Union européenne. Ainsi, la République tchèque ne se soucie guère du maintien de la parité des revenus entre le secteur agricole et le secteur industriel – une priorité dans l’Union européenne –, tout comme elle ne prévoit pas de ressources destinées à compenser le secteur agricole pour des désavantages comparés. La République tchèque dispose néanmoins de ressources à meilleur marché que l’Union européenne, pratique un système d’agriculture efficace et jouit de certains avantages en termes de plus grande mobilité de facteurs comme la main-d’œuvre et le capital en l’occurrence. L’Union européenne est le principal partenaire commercial de la République en ce qui concerne les produits agricoles: elle fournit quelques 50% des importations dont le pays a besoin et acquiert 40% de ses exportations agricoles.

L’importance du secteur agricole en Pologne avait suscité la crainte que l’adhésion de ce pays à l’Union européenne, n’entraine un accroissement substantiel de la production et ne rende plus préoccupantes encore les distorsions du marché communautaire. Mais les conditions climatiques et pédologiques sont moins favorables en Pologne qu’en Union européenne. En outre, le pays continue à importer des produits agricoles en grandes quantités. La peur que l’adhésion polonaise ne provoque une surproduction substantielle s’est avérée injustifiée. Il y a même des signes indiquant que les prix entre la Pologne et l’Union européenne ont convergé depuis le début des années 1990, bien qu’il subsiste des écarts pour certains produits (sucré, bœuf, lait, beurre).

Seule la Slovénie ne pose pas de problèmes. Alors que la situation géographique de ce pays vallonné et montagneux entrave la production agricole, la Slovénie est le plus proche de l’Union européenne en termes de politique agricole: une prédominance d’exploitations familiales, un fort lobby et des prix élevés. Le processus d’adaptation à la PAC est en cours. Le secteur agricole de la Slovénie n’est pas libéralisé comme en Pologne ou en Estonie, et il y a des craintes que les prix chutent. Mais en fait, on ne s’attend point à des difficultés d’adaptation majeures.

Ce qui n’est pas vrai pour la Bulgarie, dont la politique agricole, tout comme le niveau des prix, diffèrent sensiblement des réalités agricoles de l’Union européenne. Tandis qu’en Union européenne les agriculteurs sont subventionnés, et même fortement, les agriculteurs bulgares sont effectivement taxés. De plus, les relations commerciales entre les deux régions restent faibles: Le commerce agro-alimentaire entre la Bulgarie et l’Union européenne est encore instable, en partie à cause de fortes fluctuations de l’économie bulgare.

Dans les quatre derniers chapitres (7 à 10), les auteurs tirent quelques conclusions prudentes. Il y a eu un mouvement de migration considérable des pays de l’Europe de l’Est vers l’Union européenne. Il s’en est suivi un accroissement de l’offre de la main-d’œuvre agricole en Europe de l’Ouest, tandis qu’en Europe orientale, la production agricole a baissé. Certes, les politiques agricoles de l’Union européenne et des PECO ont convergé dans une certaine mesure, mais il subsiste des différences notables entre ces deux régions en ce qui concerne le choix des instruments et le niveau de protection. A l’exception de la Slovénie (et sauf certains produits comme le lait dans d’autres pays candidats) le niveau de protection est toujours beaucoup plus bas dans les pays de l’Europe centrale et orientale. «Une ré-nationalisation» de la politique agricole commune, au moins en partie, pourrait constituer une solution possible pour affronter quelques-uns des futurs défis. Étant donné que les PECO jouiront du statut de bénéficiaires nets alors que les pays membres actuels de l’Union européenne deviendront dans une plus large mesure des contributeurs nets à la PAC, l’évolution en cours
encouragera le transfert de revenus entre pays, voir même entre régions, de l’Ouest vers
l’Est. La préférence actuelle en Union européenne pour une politique agricole hautement
protectionniste pourrait par conséquent diminuer.

Les réflexions développées dans *Agriculture and East-West European Integration* reposent sur des données antérieures à l’adoption de l’«Agenda 2000» par le sommet de Berlin en mars 1999. Puisque lesdites réformes décidées par le sommet de Berlin en mars sont néan-
moins tout, sauf radicales, les conclusions de l’ouvrage restent toujours pertinentes. Par
ailleurs, un des attraits majeurs de l’étude consiste en le double fait de donner au lecteur,
primo, des informations de base ainsi qu’un aperçu de l’état actuel du secteur agricole dans
les États candidats et, secundo, d’ouvrir une perspective intéressante grâce à une analyse
comparative qui, il est vrai ne concerne pas tous les pays candidats à l’adhésion. Le livre
offre par-dessus le marché une multitude de données statistiques et servira autant l’étudiant
en agroéconomie que les passionnés de la PAC. Sans parler, bien entendu, de tous ceux,
directement ou indirectement, concernés par le processus de l’élargissement.

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Il est des livres dont la publication marque presque instantanément l’historiographie, pour le
moins variée et désormais abondante, de l’intégration européenne. L’ouvrage volumineux de
Massimiliano Guderzo, professeur associé d’histoire des relations internationales à l’univer-
sité d’Urbino, figure assurément au nombre de ceux-là. En effet, alors que les relations entre
l’Europe en construction et les États-Unis ont déjà donné lieu à des recherches fécondes
pour la période qui court de l’immédiat après-guerre jusqu’aux années de la présidence Ken-
dedy, rares encore sont les travaux consacrés à la politique européenne de l’administration
Johnson trop souvent occultée dans la littérature par la guerre du Viêtnam et par ses
répercussions immédiates sur la politique intérieure américaine. Voilà une lacune magistra-
lement comblée. Les sources exploitées sont nombreuses (papiers Lyndon Johnson, docu-
ments diplomatiques américains et européens, archives communautaires et militaires,
Mémoires et sources orales, ...) et la bibliographie se révèle très solide.

A défaut de l’analyse détaillée qu’interdisent les dimensions forcément limitées imparti-
tes à cette recension, on se limitera à survoler les principaux thèmes abordés au fil de l’ouvrage.
Prêtant une attention toute particulière au processus décisionnel et à la policy-making dans
la conduite des relations étrangères des États-Unis (Maison-Blanche, Secrétariat d’État, Pen-
tagone, Trésor) l’auteur passe au crible la politique atlantique américaine au cours des
années soixante et pointe la concordance répétée entre la recherche de l’intérêt national et la
conscience, au titre de superpuissance occidentale, d’une responsabilité globale dans le con-
texte de la Guerre froide. Il montre aussi combien cette duplicité ne pouvait inévitablement
qu’entraîner des malentendus avec un partenaire européen de plus en plus désireux d’affir-
mer sa position économique, politique et militaire mondiale et, en ce faisant, tenté de traiter
d’égal à égal avec les États-Unis malgré les soubresauts répétés du processus d’intégration.

Dans un premier temps, le Prof. Guderzo se penche sur l’année 1963, endeuillée par
l’assassinat de John F. Kennedy, pour examiner la portée du «grand dessein» atlantique du
président démocrate en faveur d’un partnership américain-européen et décrypter les réac-
tions de Washington face au projet gaullien d’Europe européenne et indépendante, au renfor-
cement de l’axe Paris-Bonn et à l’opposition française à l’entrée du Royaume-Uni dans la
Communauté économique européenne (CEE). Accordant une attention soutenue aux ques-
tions de défense, l'auteur analyse ensuite l'origine et la portée stratégique du projet américain de force multilatérale nucléaire (MLF) et s'attarde sur l'attitude adoptée par les stratégies de la Maison-Blanche à l'égard des velléités françaises de développer unilatéralement une force de frappe nucléaire nationale. Il précise ensuite les raisons qui ont conduit les États-Unis à développer une nouvelle doctrine stratégique de riposte graduée mieux adaptée à la menace soviétique en cas d'escalade nucléaire. Mais les Européens, qui réclament un nouveau partage des responsabilités atomiques au sein de l'Alliance, ne parviennent pas à s'entendre sur les moyens de la réformer. Dès lors, toujours plus isolée compte tenu de ses ambitions d'indépendance nationale, la France s'engage dans ce qui apparaît bien comme une logique de rupture et décide, en 1966, de retirer ses forces du commandement militaire intégré de l'Alliance atlantique. A cet égard, le livre fourmille d'éléments qui mettent en lumière, parfois au jour le jour, la complexité des relations, y compris personnelles, entre Johnson et De Gaulle. «Débarrassés» de l'épine française, les États-Unis réactivent alors leurs relations privilégiées avec la Grande-Bretagne et avec l'Allemagne fédérale qui, de facto, dominent les débats au sein du Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) immédiatement créé. La RFA, qui a fini par renoncer à la MLF et par accepter le principe d'un accord de non-prolifération atomique, se trouve alors enfin associée aux décisions occidentales en matière d'armement nucléaire. Un an plus tard, le rapport Harmel saura lui aussi consacrer le leadership américain, présent et futur, au sein de la coalition atlantique.

Au total, sur fond de crise de l'Otan, de la transformation des relations Est-Ouest et des péripéties qui secouent les relations franco-américaines, le livre met particulièrement bien en lumière les difficultés de l'administration Johnson à composer avec les solidarités et les antagonismes intra-européens et, dès lors, à conduire une politique à la fois collective et différenciée à l'égard des Six malgré une approche de consultation multilatérale entre les Occidentaux. Il décrit aussi avec nuance les efforts menés par la Commission Hallstein (tandem J. Rey-R. Marjolin) pour personnaliser l'Europe des Six et pour participer aux négociations commerciales multilatérales au sein du GATT (Kennedy Round) en qualité d'interlocuteur unique. Le Marché commun apparaît alors comme un rival commercial. Mais la diplomatie américaine sait aussi tirer habilement profit de l'évolution des relations de force franco-allemands, qu'il s'agisse du dossier de l'adhésion du Royaume-Uni aux Communautés européennes, de l'accès des produits agricoles américains au marché européen ou de la restructuration monétaire de novembre 1968.

Particulièrement dense, l'ouvrage de Massimiliano Guderzo offre un panorama détaillé des relations USA-Europe analysées surtout du point de vue américain et stratégique. L'auteur démontre que la guerre du Viêt-nam n'a pas empêché la Maison-Blanche de s'impliquer activement dans les affaires du monde et de l'Europe qui, au cours des années soixante, est elle-même en butte à des luttes internes qui ne facilitent pas le dialogue qu'elle veut nouer avec les États-Unis, notamment sur le terrain militaire et commercial. L'unité européenne et atlantique sont au cœur du propos. Mais Guderzo retrace aussi l'action personnelle du président Johnson en matière de politique internationale examinée notamment sous l'angle conceptuel de la peacekeeping et de la peacemaking. Enfin, il passe au crible les efforts poursuivis par l'administration démocrate en faveur de l'unité européenne bien perçue par les Américains comme un gage essentiel de leurs propres sécurité et prospérité. Et de s'interroger, pour conclure, sur la capacité, passée et à venir, des Européens à se doter eux-mêmes des moyens nécessaires pour assurer leur défense et ainsi contre-balancer la suprématie américaine.

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In the early 1950s West German foreign policy had to face a serious dilemma: on the one hand, Chancellor Adenauer, who since March 1951 was acting as foreign minister, too, tried to reduce West Germany’s dependency on the Western Allies; on the other hand, he desperately needed – and asked for – Allied support, especially after the Stalin proposals of spring 1952 concerning the unification of Germany. Thus Adenauer, at the same time, had to avoid the impression on the part of the Western powers that West Germany might again turn to traditional power politics, and on the part of the German people that he was some sort of a puppet on Allied strings. How successful he and his government in Bonn were in managing this problem is, amongst many other topics, documented in the two volumes.

These volumes – a first one, dealing with the years 1949/1950, was published in 1997 – are the first steps towards filling the gap between 1949 and 1963, the starting point of the “official” edition project concerning the foreign policy of the Federal Republic of Germany. They, too, may be read in addition to the documentation on the talks between Adenauer and the Allied High Commission, published in two volumes in 1989 and 1990. As was the case with the former volumes, a summary of their content is not provided, but abstracts for each document and a detailed index are valuable tools for searching certain topics. The annotations by the editors concentrate on more or less “technical” aspects like the references of a certain document to others or to other record groups, the importance of documents within the decision making process or its political and organisational background. The main source of documentation in these two volumes have been the archives of the German foreign ministry; furthermore, they contain some records of the papers of Herbert Blankenhorn, head of the political department of the Auswärtiges Amt, and the Federal Chancellery kept by the Bundesarchiv Koblenz, of the Bundesarchiv/Militärarchiv in Freiburg and of the Adenauer papers, kept by the Stiftung Bundeskanzler-Adenauer-Haus in Rhöndorf near Bonn.

The altogether 469 documents, including memoranda, notes, minutes and correspondence, cover a wide range of topics: the West German contribution to the common Western defence against the “communist threat”, the European Defence Community (EDC), the ratification of the treaty on the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the “contractual agreements” between the Three Powers and the Federal Republic and the termination of the occupation statute, the establishment of diplomatic relations with other countries, the negotiations on the settlement of Germany’s foreign debts, the restitution negotiations with Israel, the problem of German reunification, the Saar question, and arms production, to mention only the most important. Surprisingly, there are only a few entries concerning the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation and the European Payments Union, which were without doubt of high importance for the integration of West Germany into the West European economic and political setting. One may wonder whether this fact reflects the attitude towards the OEEC of Adenauer and his administration or of those who selected the documents.

Among the most interesting topics rank the Soviet Union’s proposals regarding a unified, but neutralised Germany and the reactions of the Western powers, as well as of the Federal Republic and the German Democratic Republic (GDR). It becomes clear that not only the Federal Chancellor and his supporters were afraid of the potential consequences, but also the GDR government. Ulbricht and other leading politicians of the Socialist Unity Party (SED) feared that they might be “sacrificed cold-hearted”, if the Soviet Union succeeded in keeping West Germany out of the “aggressive block” dominated by the United States. So Adenauer’s rigid refusal to explore the Soviet offer was received with great relief by the East
German government. Amongst Adenauer’s motives for the rejection of the Soviet proposals the non-recognition of the Oder-Neiße as Germany’s final Eastern border ranked very high. One may speculate about the chances to unify at least the Federal Republic and the GDR at that time, if Adenauer would have been willing to renounce the Eastern parts of the former German Reich.

As far as European integration is concerned, the formation of a defence community is the problem most frequently dealt with in the documents. The West Germans stressed the necessity to be treated on equal terms and to establish some sort of political framework for the EDC and the ECSC as well. Although there can be no doubt regarding the Federal government’s willingness to integrate West Germany into the emerging European community, French anxiety seemed not to have disappeared until the signing of the ECSC treaty. To control the Germans counted, after all, amongst the predominant causes of European integration – a fact that Adenauer had already “forgotten” in spring 1952, when he only mentioned the aggressive politics of the Soviet Union as an impetus to unify Europe.

The two volumes are a valuable and indispensable source for anyone who is interested in the beginnings of West German foreign policy. The documents demonstrate in detail what kind of obstacles had to be cleared and how “Bonn” step by step got used to a new style of foreign policy and to its new role in European and international politics.

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On the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the declaration of 9 May 1950, the Institute of high European studies of the Strasbourg University III – Robert Schuman, organized, from 25 to 27 May 2000, a scientific symposium with the purpose of studying the posterity of this founding proclamation of the European Community. Following the tradition established by Raymond Poidevin who has set up and run for long years the Research Centre for the history of international relations of the Institute, this symposium gathered French and German historians specialists in the history of Europe and connected the subjects of Franco-German relations and European construction.

Without recounting the genesis and the immediate results of the Schuman plan, already known by the works of Raymond Poidevin¹ and Pierre Gerbet² or by the symposium organized on that subject by Klaus Schwabe,³ the 25 contributions collected by Marie-Thérèse Bitsch look back, over a period of 50 years, on the evolution of the Franco-German relations with regard to the Community construction. The contributions are divided into five large parts that successively take up the “first options” leading from the Schuman plan to the treaties of Rome (with in particular an assessment of the ideas of Walter Hallstein), the “pros-

pects of institutional evolution in the sixties”, “the standpoint of the dynamic forces” made up of political parties, the trade unions and business circles, the “position of the leaders of the seventies”, finally the “relaunch of the eighties and nineties”. The great variety of themes that recall the political aspects as well as social and monetary questions, and the particular importance attached to the personal contributions of the French and German political leaders, who were increasingly embodying the relation between the two countries, answer the general question on the adaptation of the “Franco-German couple” to the evolution of the European project. This often hackneyed expression finds here its true justification, each of the actors taking a constant interest in the European policy of the other and each of them conceiving his own European policy according to the interests and concern of his neighbour.

This study of the Franco-German relations with regard to the European construction reveals a certain number of permanent features, beyond the evolutions and transformations that give a certain rhythm to the history of the two partners.

The European construction is in the first place a matter of pragmatism and realism, rather than of lyricism or vision. The Schuman declaration and Chancellor Adenauer’s response to it at that time were only partly attributable to the power of a visionary project or to the necessity of reconciliation, but embraced also France’s and Germany’s immediate interests at the beginning of the fifties. The contributions devoted to the politicians, considered the most European political leaders (Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, Helmut Schmidt, François Mitterrand and Helmut Kohl) emphasize the pragmatism of their European proposals. To each of them could apply Willy Brandt’s affirmation in 1971 quoted by Andreas Wilkens, according to which the German chancellor refused “institutional perfectionism” and “integrationist abstractions” preferring a step-by-step policy, “the possible and practical steps that we can take right now”. Michèle Weinachter, in her study on Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, recalls that the ancient president of the Republic affirmed his support of federalism only after 1981. The election of the European Parliament by universal suffrage, often presented together with the creation of the EMS as one of France’s important contributions to the European construction, is described by people around the President as the “least evil” in the face of the feared reinforcement of the prerogatives of the European Parliament. But this pragmatism also picked out by Georges Saunier for the years 1981-1985 during which the relaunch projects were being prepared, doesn’t work just one-way. It doesn’t alone put a damper on the most daring advances of the Community construction; it also protects its achievements in the name of well understood national interests, particularly at the economic level. Pierre Gerbet thus shows the importance of President Pompidou’s action in favour of economic integration, even if he basically remained loyal to the de Gaullian conception of the Europe of States, despite some astonishing references to prospective transfers of sovereignty in favour of a European government.

Pragmatism at work in the European policy pursued by France and Germany neither rules out difficulties nor the will to go ahead. Differences of opinion between François Mitterrand and Helmut Kohl, whether about the part of the WEU analyzed by Elisabeth du Réau or concerning the institutional reform of Europe, studied by Hanns-Jürgen Küsters at the time of reunification, prove that the Franco-German relations are not self-evident according to François Mitterrand’s own words in 1994, that they evolve continuously and that crises or friction cannot always be avoided. Even then, it still must be stressed, that oppositions are not fixed and could never be reduced to the simple contrast between centralizing France, desperately defending national sovereignty, and federal Germany whose constitutional tradition might make it more accessible to the process of Community integration. If basically the idea of supranationality meets with less resistance in Germany than in France, Wolf Gruner nevertheless shows that from the beginning of the debates on the ratification of the ECSC treaty within the Bundesrat there is to be found a certain distrust of Community integration on the part of the German Länder. These reservations have known an important development
in 1992 with the insertion of a new article 23 in the Constitution that aims at protecting the rights of the Länder and at giving them a share in working out Germany’s Community policy. The reservations are still tangible today in the recent European proposals made by the Christian Democrat Union (CDU) and the Christian Social Union (CSU), originating from Bavaria that advocates reducing and clarifying the powers of the European Union. Thus, in the continuation of the work of Georges-Henri Soutou on the “uncertain alliance”\(^4\), the proceedings of the symposium contribute to demythifying the idealized, almost pious image of the Franco-German couple. At the same time, France’s and Germany’s European commitment seems like the main point of contact between both countries, their most solid anchorage in 50 years of basic transformations.

The necessity of cooperating that drives on the political leaders of the two countries also urges on part of the civil society. One of the interests of the symposium was to make room for economic, social and unionist actors often missing in the historical works on the Community construction. The studies of Sylvie Lefèvre and Werner Bührer on the business circles and the French and German federations of employers (the CNPF= French National Employers’ union) and the BDI, the confederation of German industrialists, emphasize that despite divergent economic traditions, marked either by the mercantile system after Colbert or by liberalism, they were in agreement on European integration in the name of economic modernization. The interest of German and French trade unions, except for the communist CGT (Confédération Générale du Travail = French Trade Union, close to the French communist party), is well brought out in the contributions of Cédric Guinand and Sylvain Schirman. For the powerful German DGB (Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund = Federation of German Trade Unions), as well as for the French organizations CFTC (Confédération Française des Travailleurs Chrétiens, Christian trade union) and FO (Force ouvrière), it is a question of bringing an influence to bear on the Community institutions with a view to give the workers’ interests more weight. These organizations rapidly support the Community construction, in which they see a means to improve the protection of their members, even if at the beginning they expressed reservations towards the European Economic Community that was less willing to lend an ear to trade unions than the ECSC. Nevertheless, the structuring of European trade unionism doesn’t turn out to be less laborious as the national means of expressing claims remain predominant.

The panorama outlined by the contributions of the symposium on 50 years of a vivid Franco-German cooperation on European level bring definitively out the present lifelessness of the relations between the two states, the lack of confidence prevailing between their leaders, the diverging evolution of their policies. The lessons learned in these 50 years induce to be optimistic, but the theme of the symposium, that refers to the posterity of the declaration of May 1950, doesn’t spare the question: a temporary crisis before the nth relaunch or the end of an adventure initiated by the Schuman plan?

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Cet ouvrage arrive à point nommé, et non seulement en raison de la création récente de la «Convention pour la réforme de l’Union européenne». Si la discussion urgente et nécessaire sur l’avenir de l’Europe, entamée là et ailleurs, doit être menée à son terme avec succès, la politique et la science ont en effet besoin d’un «forum de discussion commun» réclamé par les éditeurs (p.7). Wilfried Loth et Wolfgang Wessels ne se contentent pourtant pas «de mettre en ordre ces éléments et de les examiner en vue de détecter leurs points forts et faibles» (p.13). Ils veulent en outre créer une base pour les recherches interdisciplinaires.


D’une façon impressionnante, les contributions des experts montrent comment les hypothèses de départ, les questions et les méthodes divergent non seulement entre elles, mais également au sein même des différentes disciplines. Malgré certains points de départ, le chemin vers une théorie d’intégration commune semble être encore très laborieux.

Priv.-Doz. Dr. Ulrich Lappenküper
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From 1918 to 1945 neo-liberal federalists advocated an institutionally founded "liberal federation" of states as the "logical consummation of the liberal programme" (von Hayek) and the desirable alternative to the socialist international planning. They maintained the thesis that economic systems and political structures were strongly interdependent. Customs unions being introduced as measures of liberal trade policy could be accepted (Röpke) and even understood as a synonym of "federation" (Einaudi, von Hayek, Robbins). Freedom and order ought to be secured by means of a framework of legal regulation within the federation and by an international system of law in the worldwide inter-state relations. After the neo-liberal federalists had analyzed the economic aspects of federal unions from 1918-1939, they turned during the Second World War to the extra-economic conditions of a federation of states and recognized social and cultural integration as of primordial importance. They considered the social and cultural integration as a prerequisite for an economic integration and emphasized the necessity of an institutional framework. The essential features common to the different conceptions of a neo-liberal federation resulted from the discourse of the neo-liberal economists: the relation of correspondence between the political and the economic structure of society, the cosmopolitan and liberal-internationalist orientation of the conceptions of federation, the primacy of social and cultural integration over economic integration and the rejection of laissez-faire in international relations.

Les conceptions néo-libérales d'une fédération européenne (1918-1945)

Entre 1918 et 1945 les fédéralistes néo-libéraux défendent la conception d'une «fédération libérale» institutionnalisée en laquelle ils repèrent à la fois «l'aboutissement du programme économique libéral» (von Hayek) et l'alternative préférable à la planification internationale socialiste. Ils défendent la thèse de l'interdépendence des structures économiques et politiques. Pour autant qu'elles soient conçues comme mesures d'une politique économique libérale, les unions douanières peuvent être acceptées (Röpke); elles deviendraient même synonyme du terme «fédération» (Einaudi, von Hayek, Robbins). La liberté et l'ordre devraient être assurés au sein de la fédération par un cadre de règles légales et, au niveau mondial, dans les relations entre États, moyennant un système de droit international. Après avoir analysé entre 1918 et 1939 les aspects économiques des unions fédérales, les fédéralistes néo-libéraux consacrent leurs études pendant la Seconde Guerre mondiale à l'examen des conditions autres qu'économiques, en l'occurrence sociales et culturelles, dont ils reconnaissent l'importance primordiale, voire leur indispensable à l'intégration économique et à la formation d'une fédération entre États. Aussi insistent-ils sur la nécessité d'introduire un cadre institutionnel. Les caractéristiques essentielles unissant les visions néo-libérales d'une fédération d'États plongent leurs racines dans les débats des économistes néo-libéraux: interdépendance des structures économiques et politiques, orientation cosmopolite et libérale-internationaliste des conceptions de fédération d'États, subordination de l'intégration économique à l'intégration sociale et culturelle ainsi que renonciation au «laissez faire» en matière de relations internationales.

Neoliberale Europa-Föderationskonzepte. 1918–1945


Bertrand Vayssière

**The Italian Origins of European Federalism during the Second World War.**

The study of the especially strong federalist current within the Resistance in Italy, enables to understand the very particular conditions of the emergence as well as the specificities of this ideological movement, that broke with the political traditions of the pre-war years and laid down as a prerequisite the setting up of a European political framework. Actually, the first activists in the literal sense of a current until then without militants gathered in Italy. They could very quickly refer to a real programme of action, a structured political training and they were willing to carry the "good news" beyond the borders, i.e. to Switzerland, where first contacts were established during the war and from where the diffusion of this idea, that used to be confined to certain resistance circles of the peninsula, set off. Certainly, this first diffusion, accelerated by the effects of liberation, induced a great optimism within the ranks of these militants of a new kind who saw in the political, economic and social conditions emerging in the post-war years, the opportunity to rebuild a more just and coherent whole at European scale. But liberation was also the occasion to recognize the gap, that may exist between utopia and reality: the Italian federalism, battle-tried and well-disciplined, then had to take into account the existence of other currents from different countries, until then undreamt-of, as well as the opposition of political parties condemned a bit quickly and finally an international situation that questioned the prerequisite to all hopes expressed in the Resistance movement: the possibility of establishing a unique and independent European framework.

Les origines italiennes du fédéralisme européen pendant la Seconde Guerre mondiale.

L'étude du courant fédéraliste au sein de la Résistance en Italie, particulièrement fort dans ce pays, permet de comprendre les conditions très particulières de son émergence, ainsi que les spécificités de ce mouvement idéologique, qui rompt avec les traditions politiques d’avant-guerre et pose comme préalable l’institution d’un cadre politique européen. L’Italie est en effet un pays où se sont regroupés les premiers activistes, au sens propre du terme, d’un courant jusqu’ici sans militants, qui peuvent très tôt se réclamer d’un véritable programme d’action, d’une formation politique structurée, et désireux de porter «la bonne parole» par-delà les frontières. En l’occurrence, c’est en Suisse, en pleine période de guerre, qu’ont été établis les premiers contacts et lancée la diffusion d’une idée qui restait cantonnée à certains milieux résistants de la péninsule. Certes, cette première diffusion, accélérée par les effets de la Libération, prédépose à un grand optimisme dans les rangs de ce militantisme d’un nouveau genre qui voit, dans les conditions politiques, économiques et sociales qui se dessinent dans l’après-guerre, l’occasion de rebâtir un ensemble plus juste et plus cohérent, à l’échelle européenne. Mais la Libération est également l’occasion de vérifier le hiatus qui peut exister entre l’utopie et la réalité: le fédéralisme italien, aguerri et discipliné, doit alors tenir compte de l’existence d’autres courants, jusque-là insoupçonnés, issus de pays divers, ainsi que de la résistance de partis politiques un peu vite condamnés, et enfin d’une situation internationale qui remet en cause le préalable à tous les espoirs exprimés dans la Résistance: la possibilité d’instaurer un cadre européen unique et indépendant.

Der italienische Ursprung des europäischen Föderalismus während dem Zweiten Weltkrieg

Das Studium des in der italienischen Resistenz ganz besonders stark ausgeprägten Föderalismus erlaubt ein besseres Verständnis, sowohl der besonderen Rahmenbedingungen seines Aufschwungs, als auch der

Seung-Ryeol Kim

France’s Agony between “Vocation Européenne et Mondiale” : The Union Française as an Obstacle in the French Policy of Supranational European Integration, 1952-1954

In contrast to the Atlantic and European dimension of European integration, historians have neglected problems that were related with the colonies of European powers. Although the problems regarding colonies did not originally concern supranational integration, they always affected the unification process. In contrast to Great Britain, France planned and stimulated two supranational functional Communities (ECSC and EDC) in spite of its world power status. France thought that it could harmonize the construction of supranational European integration, mainly directed towards the monitoring of Germany, with the world power status mainly based on retaining the colonial system. However, during the negotiations for the European political Community (EPC), the Pool Vert and the process of the ratification of the EDC treaty (1952-1954), France was confronted with a serious problem. It seemed that the EPC which was to be a "roof organization" for the ECSC and the EDC would lead in the near future to a federation, a framework in which France’s world power status could be dissolved. In view of this terrible prospect, a number of people in France who had advocated the ECSC and the EDC as control bodies over West Germany recoiled from the EPC project. This issue played a great role in France’s rejection of the Pool Vert and the ratification of the EDC treaty. The study shows that supranational European integration and the retaining of world power status based on the colonial system was very difficult to be harmonized and that, in this sense, the breakdown of the French colonial system contributed to the success of the EEC negotiations (1955-1957).

La France entre “vocation européenne et vocation mondiale”: l’Union Française, un obstacle au principe de la supranationalité européenne (1952-1954)

Les dimensions européenne et atlantique du processus d'intégration de l'Europe sont bien connues. En revanche, les historiens ont négligé les problèmes en rapport avec les colonies des puissances européennes. Quoiqu'initiallement ces problèmes ne concernaient point l'intégration supranationale, il n'en reste pas moins qu'ils ont toujours affecté la marche vers l'unification. A l'opposé de la Grande-Bretagne, la France, malgré son statut de puissance mondiale, fait figure de moteur de deux communautés fonctionnelles à caractère supranational: la CECA et la CED. Paris croyait pouvoir harmoniser la construction d’une Europe supranationale essentiellement destinée à contrôler de près l’Allemagne d’une part avec ses préoccupations de grande puissance visant au maintien de l’empire colonial d’autre part. Hélas, au cours des négociations pour la communauté politique européenne (CPE) et le Pool Vert, ainsi qu’au fil des procédures de ratification de la CED (1952-1954), le Quai d’Orsay se heurta à une sérieuse difficulté: appelée à coiffer la CECA et la CED, la communauté politique pouvait facilement aboutir dans un avenir rapproché à une fédération européenne qui menacerait de remettre en question la position française de grande puissance. Cette perspective inquiétante amena finalement la plupart des Français qui jadis avaient initié la CECA et la CED comme instruments de surveillance de la RFA à abandonner le projet de la communauté politique. Ce revirement joua également un grand rôle dans le rejet français du Pool Vert et le refus de ratifier le traité CED. La présente étude montre qu’il était en effet très difficile de concilier

**Zwischen europäischer Berufung und Berufung zur Weltmacht: die Union Française, und Frankreichs supranationale Europapolitik, 1952-1954**


**Lise Rye Svartvatn**  
In Quest of Time, Protection and Approval:  
France and the Claims for Social Harmonization in the European Economic Community, 1955-56

During the negotiations that led to the Treaty of Rome, France called for a harmonization of working regulations, claiming that the diversity in existing national regulations caused unequal terms of competition. This article aims to explain why social harmonization was a persistent French demand. It argues that the claims were launched in order to gain time for a government that was unable to take a stand on the proposed common market. Furthermore, it suggests that the claims were sustained in order to secure continued protection for French industry, which was necessary if sufficient support for French membership of the common market was to be obtained.

**En quête pour gagner du temps, une meilleure protection et un appui suffisant:**  
la France, la CEE et l’harmonisation européenne dans le domaine social (1955-1956)

Tout au long des négociations aboutissant au Traité de Rome, Paris n'a cessé de revendiquer une harmonisation des conditions de travail en prétextant que la diversité des réglementations nationales faussait la compétition européenne. La présente contribution tente d'expliquer la persistance de cette demande française par trois considérations majeures. D'une part, la France cherchait à gagner du temps parce que son gouvernement ne voulait pas se prononcer sur le marché commun proposé par les partenaires européens. D'autre part, l'harmonisation sociale est revendiquée pour assurer à l'industrie française l'indispensable protection, et au gouvernement, un appui suffisant pour rallier l'opinion publique à une adhésion au marché commun.
Die EWG-Verhandlungen und Frankreichs Forderung nach Harmonisierung im sozialen Bereich: ein Spiel um Zeit, Schutz und die nötige Unterstützung zu gewinnen. 1955-1956


Juhana Aunesluoma

An Elusive Partnership: Europe, Economic Co-operation and British Policy towards Scandinavia, 1949-1951

The British and the Scandinavians have often been seen to have drawn a sense of unity from the fact that they, all of them, were in the 1950s, for various reasons, unable to participate in such integrative experiments as the ECSC or later in the EEC. The similarities in their behaviour have led to assumptions that even more wide-ranging convergence of interests between the British and the Scandinavians has existed since Europe's economic reconstruction began in the 1940s.

British and Scandinavian scepticism towards new forms of economic and political co-operation in Europe in the 1950s was embedded in national circumstances and preferences, but was coupled with their shared feeling of the feasibility of an intergovernmental alternative towards economic co-operation in Europe. What is argued in the article is, that this basic convergence of interests in the early phase of European integration brought the British, Danish, Swedish and Norwegian governments together into regular consultations within a specifically established body, Uniscan, which sought to facilitate a degree of co-ordination of policies and eventually paved the way for the speedy establishment of EFTA in 1959, when the alternative to create a wider free trade area had been exhausted.

None the less, before EFTA realised the original vision outlined in 1949, attempts towards deeper Anglo-Scandinavian economic co-operation beyond the consultative remit of Uniscan proved unsuccessful. In spite of similar thinking about the most fruitful approach to integration policies in Europe, co-ordinated policy-making and the definition of collective bargaining positions within and towards different international organisations was found difficult.

The article discusses the potential and the ramifications of Anglo-Scandinavian co-operation in the post-Second World War international economy and in the early years of European integration, with particular attention to British policy-making. What emerges is the preference of the Labour government in particular to develop economic, political and institutional ties with the Scandinavians, but that these fell short of the earlier plans of widespread liberalisation and co-ordination among the group.

Un partenariat difficile à saisir: l’Europe, la coopération économique et la politique britannique face à la Scandinavie. 1949-1951

A cause de leur refus, pour diverses raisons, de participer aux expériences intégratives de la CECA, respectivement de la plus tardive CEE, les Britanniques et les Scandinaves sont souvent considérés comme ayant développé durant les années 1950 une espèce de sens commun. Les similitudes au niveau de leur comportement ont même fait supposer une très large convergence d'intérêts, et ce, depuis les débuts de la reconstruction dans la seconde moitié des années quarante.

La méfiance britannique et scandinave envers les nouvelles formes de la coopération économique et politique développées dans l'Europe des années 1950 est certes conditionnée par des circonstances et des préférences nationales, mais, d'un autre côté, elle est aussi l'expression du sentiment commun qu'il existe, en-dehors de la coopération économique pratiquée par les Six, une alternative intergouvernementale faisable. Ce point commun élémentaire amena les gouvernements britannique, danois, suédois et norvégien à se consulter régulièrement pendant la phase précoce de l'intégration européenne au sein d'un organisme spécifique, l'Uniscan, qui aspirait à faciliter la coordination des politiques et qui, finalement, prépara la voie à la rapide constitution de l'AELE en 1959, lorsque l'alternative de créer une vaste aire de libre échange avait été abandonnée.
Pourtant, avant même que l'AELE ne concrétise enfin la vision originale déjà esquissée en 1949, d'autres efforts briguant un approfondissement de la coopération anglo-scandinave au-delà des attributions purement consultatives d'Uniscan avaient échoué. En dépit de l'unicité des vues en ce qui concerne l'approche la plus bénéfique en matière d'intégration européenne, une coordination des politiques ainsi qu'une définition commune des positions à adopter face aux différentes organisations internationales s'avérait difficile.

Le présent article discute les potentialités et les ramifications de la coopération anglo-scandinave dans le système économique international de l'après-Deuxième Guerre mondiale et des débuts de la construction européenne. Ce faisant, il voue une attention particulière à la politique britannique. Il apparaît ainsi que, surtout le cabinet travailliste, accorda la préférence au développement des liens économiques, politiques et institutionnels avec les Scandinaves, ce qui cependant ne répondait guère aux plans initiaux d'une vaste libéralisation et coordination au sein du groupe.

Eine schwer definierbare Partnerschaft: Europa, die wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und die britische Skandinavienpolitik (1949-1951)


Allerdings, noch bevor die EFTA das ursprüngliche, bereits 1949 ins Auge gefasste Ziel verwirklichen konnte, waren Versuche die wirtschaftliche Kooperation über die beratende Rolle der Uniscan hinaus zu vertiefen gescheitert. Trotz aller Gemeinsamkeit, insbesondere mit Rücksicht auf die in ihren Augen wohl bessere europäische Integrationspolitik, gelang es den Briten und den Skandinaviern nur schwer eine einheitliche Haltung gegenüber den internationalen Organisationen einzunehmen.


Erin Delaney
The Labour Party's Changing Relationship to Europe.
The Expansion of European Social Policy

In 1950, the National Executive of the Labour Party stated that European integration could not be reconciled with a socialist agenda; however, by 1994, the Labour Party declared that Europe, and the European Community, were an integral part of its ‘socialist’ domestic policy. Traditional analysis has cited the reasons for this change as a combination of numerous factors, including: intraparty factionalism; economic pressure; tension between the leadership and rank-and-file members; and the role of the two-party system. The EC is one factor that has been relatively ignored in the explanations for this policy change, as has its potential to exert discreet and discernible influence on policy in general.

The aim of this article is to demonstrate that developments within the Community, specifically in the area of social policy, affected the Labour Party’s policy towards the EC. Beginning in 1950, this article
traces the changes in Labour’s policy, and relates them to the concurrent changes in the Community, using a variety of primary resources, including Party documents, academic and political debate in journals and newspapers and personal memoirs.

Les développements de la politique sociale européenne et l’attitude changeante du Labour Party britannique face à l’Europe

En 1950 encore, le comité exécutif national du Labour Party britannique déclarait qu’une intégration européenne s’avérerait incompatible avec son agenda; en 1994 pourtant, le même parti proclamait que l’Europe et la Communauté européenne font partie intégrante de son propre programme politique ‘socialiste’. Les analyses classiques attribuent ce revirement à une combinaison de différentes raisons parmi lesquelles on distingue notamment la lutte des factions au sein du parti, les pressions économiques, les tensions entre les leaders et la base des militants ainsi que le poids du système bipartite anglais. La CE par contre est un facteur d’explication relativement ignoré, en l’occurrence son potentiel d’exercer une influence judicieuse et visible sur la politique en général.

Le but de la présente contribution est de démontrer que les développements de la politique communautaire, notamment dans le domaine social, ont affecté l’approche du Labour Party face à la CE. En se servant de diverses sources primaires – des documents du parti, les débats académiques et politiques reproduits dans les journaux, revues ou mémoires – l’article retrace à partir du début des années 1950 le changement d’attitude des travaillistes en le mettant en relation avec les évolutions au sein de la Communauté.

Die Entwicklung der europäischen Sozialpolitik und die veränderte Haltung der Labour Party gegenüber Europa


Conference on "Actors and Policies in the European Integration from the implementation of the Rome Treaties to the creation of the ‘snake’ (1958-1972)"

Florence, 28, 29 and 30 November 2002

Historical research on the European integration has mainly focussed its attention on the period between the 1940s and the 1960s, but from the 1960s, with the creation and strengthening of the European institutions, the historical analyses dealing only with the policies pursued by the national governments, diplomacies, etc. seem no longer completely satisfactory in order to fully understand the European integration process. Not only the European Commission or the European Parliament tried to assert themselves as autonomous actors, which could work out ‘European’ policies independently from the governments of the "six", but also interest groups and political forces began to organise themselves as European entities. Such an important development seems to offer to the historians an opportunity to further a new approach to the History of the European integration. To that end the next conference organised by the Liaison Committee of Historians will focus its attention on those topic.

The conference, which will held in Florence in November 2002, will be organised into five sections:

1. Institutional actors, national governments and EC decision-making process
2. The Birth and Consolidation of a European political world
3. Interest and pressure groups
4. The EC ‘internal’ policies
5. The EC ‘external’ policies

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