The Liaison Committee of Historians came into being in 1982 as a result of an important international symposium, that the Commission had organized in Luxembourg in order to launch historical research on European integration. It consists of historians of the European Union member countries, who have specialized in contemporary history.

The Liaison Committee:
– gathers and conveys information about works on European history after the Second World War;
– advises the European Union in the matter of scientific projects to be carried through. Thus, the Liaison Committee was commissioned to make publicly available the archives of the Community institutions;
– enables researchers to make better use of the archival sources;
– promotes scientific meetings in order to get an update of the acquired knowledge and to stimulate new research: five research conferences have been organized and their proceedings published; a sixth conference will take place in Oxford in 1996, the seventh conference will be organized in Rome in 1997.

The Journal of European History – Revue d’histoire de l’intégration européenne – Zeitschrift für Geschichte der europäischen Integration is totally in line with the preoccupations of the Liaison Committee. Being the first journal of history to deal exclusively with the history of European Integration, the Journal intends to offer the increasing number of young historians devoting their research to contemporary Europe, a permanent forum.

At the same time, the Liaison Committee publishes the Newsletter of the European Community Liaison Committee of Historians and of the Jean Monnet Chairs in History of European Integration. The Newsletter publishes in particular an important current bibliography of theses and dissertations, books and articles dealing with European integration and presents the syllabuses of research institutes and centres in the field of European history.

The Liaison Committee is supported by the European Commission and works completely independently and according to the historians’ critical method.

Le Groupe de liaison des professeurs d’histoire auprès de la Commission des Communautés européennes s’est constitué en 1982 à la suite d’un grand colloque que la Commission avait organisé à Luxembourg pour lancer la recherche historique sur la construction européenne. Il regroupe des universitaires des pays membres de l’Union européenne, spécialistes d’histoire contemporaine.

Le Groupe de liaison a pour mission:
– de diffuser l’information sur les travaux portant sur l’histoire de l’Europe après la Seconde Guerre mondiale;
– de conseiller l’Union européenne sur les actions scientifiques à entreprendre avec son appui; ainsi le Groupe de liaison a assuré une mission concernant la mise à la disposition du public des archives des institutions communautaires;
– d’aider à une meilleure utilisation par les chercheurs des moyens de recherche mis à leur disposition (archives, sources orales…);


Parallèlement le Groupe de liaison édite la Lettre d’information du Groupe de liaison des professeurs d’histoire auprès de la Commission européenne et du réseau des Chaires Jean Monnet en histoire de l’Intégration. La Lettre d’information publie notamment une importante bibliographie courante des thèses et mémoires, livres et articles consacrés à la construction européenne et présente les programmes des instituts et centres de recherche en matière d’histoire européenne.

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JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION HISTORY
REVUE D'HISTOIRE DE L'INTÉGRATION EUROPÉENNE
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European Integration History: The Cold War and European Integration since 1947
L’impact de la Guerre froide sur le processus d’intégration européenne depuis 1947
Die Auswirkungen des Kalten Krieges auf die Europäische Integration nach 1947

Klaus SCHWABE, coordinator

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Articles for inclusion in this journal may be submitted at any time. The editorial board will then arrange for the article to be refereed. Articles should not be longer than 6000 words, footnotes included. They may be in English, French or German.

Articles submitted to the Journal should be original contributions and not be submitted to any other publication at the same time as to the Journal of European Integration History. Authors should retain a copy of their article. The publisher and editors cannot accept responsibility for loss of or damage to author’s typescripts or disks.

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Introductory Note

Klaus Schwabe

The third issue of this journal is devoted to the impact of the Cold War on the process of European integration, as seen from the perspective of the four major powers – the United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain and France. All shared primary responsibility for the shaping of the destiny of Europe in general and of Germany’s future in particular. In the light of the recent radical shift in international power, the Cold War may appear to have lost most of its contemporary political significance – to have become mere history. But in spite of this appearance a more comprehensive understanding of the Cold War period retains a particular relevance at a time, when substantial decisions on the course of European integration are pending. Maastricht II will have to decide whether or not the expansion of the European Union, widely supported, as it is, will be accompanied by a tightening and deepening of its organizational structure – a process of tightening, in which the introduction of a common European currency will be but one important element.

Whatever direction these developments may take, they will be initiated and implemented in an international setting that differs drastically from the scenario that prevailed for more than four decades from 1945 until the coming down of the Berlin wall. During the Cold War the communist threat provided a stimulus for European integration. As this threat is now a thing of the past, the crucial question as regards the future of our continent is whether European integration will retain its momentum, although one of its incentives, the Cold War and the way it was experienced until 1989, has ceased to be a factor in international relations.

A more detailed and nuanced understanding of the history of European integration during the Cold War era, therefore, may offer some ‘guidance’ for present-day political leaders: One can argue that, if the Cold War, as an oversimplified popular view tends to believe, was indeed the sole motivating force behind the drive for integrating Europe, chances for advancing that process at present are slim. If, on the other hand, historiography can provide evidence for the impact of other forces, unrelated to the Cold War, that encouraged European integration – forces that have preserved their vitality beyond the collapse of the Soviet block –, then the outlook for progress in the construction of genuine European Union is much more solidly rooted, and the ultimate goal of a democratically based political union of Europe may be more than a chimera.

It has become a truism to single out the Cold War as the most potent force that triggered the efforts to achieve a union of those European nations that had not been subjected to Soviet control after the surrender of Nazi Germany. Would there have been an American interest in the stabilization of free Europe, if the West had not clashed with the USSR over the control of the Eastern Mediterranean? Would there have been a Marshall Plan if the victorious powers had not proved unable to agree on the future of Germany at the Moscow Conference in March 1947 and, thereby, had left in the heart of Europe an economic and political vacuum which seemed to
frustrate all attempts at rebuilding Europe’s economy? Would the most ambitious project for European integration, the European Defence Community (EDC) serving as the framework for the armament of West Germany, have been conceivable without the outbreak of the Korean War, which made the West Europeans fear that the attack on South Korea by Communist North Korea was but a prelude to a similar Communist attack in Europe? Was not military integration within NATO an outgrowth of such fears? Finally, did not the Soviet Union, as Vladislav Zubok shows in his contribution to this issue, consider European integration as a capitalist plot designed by the United States for Cold War purposes, i.e. to assist the U.S in its “crusade” to subvert the Soviet Union’s position in Eastern Europe?

On the other hand, did not the apparent waning of the Cold War, the first indications of detente after Stalin’s death, begin to cripple the resolution of the Europeans to integrate? Did Churchill not set a clear priority on efforts at detente as opposed to further steps on the road of European integration, as the article by Klaus Larres amply proves? Did not the relaxation of international tension, as Pierre Guillen suggests in his article, sound the death knell for the EDC as viewed by the majority of the French parliament which rejected it in August 1954? And yet, this setback was followed by a relaunching of integration efforts. Did continued Soviet pressure on Western Europe, the simultaneous Hungarian and Suez crises in particular, not furnish a powerful argument in favor of this revival of the European idea? Did not the second Berlin crisis (1958–1962) stimulate the hard core of the six Western nations that had formed the Common Market – not least the Federal Republic – to pursue this supranational experiment, although it encompassed only a minority of the Western European nations and excluded Great Britain? Above all, did not the Cold War and the ensuing goal of strengthening the West by uniting it provide the overriding justification and primarily military rationale for the United States to support all West European efforts at arriving at an integration that went beyond mere intergovernmental cooperation?

Still, this is not the complete record. There were turning-points in the history of European integration that were not primarily related to the Cold War. The most prominent example was the launching of the Schuman Plan in May 1950. This occurred at a lull in the Cold War, after the two German republics had been founded and a degree of stabilization was reached in Central Europe, and before the Korean War had broken out. The same can be said of the founding of the Common Market, which took place in March 1957, a period of relative tranquillity in East-West relations. In these cases, factors unrelated to the Cold War like Franco-German rapprochement or economic interests can be identified as primary moving forces.

Recent research has brought to light another such factor, that was of equal importance. It was largely unknown to contemporary public opinion and still played a considerable role in motivating America to throw its support behind European integration: As we know now, it was not only the containment of the Soviet Union and the actual dangers emanating from it, but also the containment of West Germany (or a united Germany) as a potential threat to peace and security in Europe that lead to a continuous American backing of efforts to unite Europe. After all, the Second World War, when the United States had sent its troops to Europe, in
order to avert a permanent Nazi German domination of the European continent, was only a few years past. In that sense it has become customary in recent historiography to speak of the American aim of a dual containment – the containment of the Soviet Union as well as that of Germany – as the motivating force on which America’s advocacy of European integration was based, a motive shared by France and, with some reservation, by Great Britain as well. In fact, the three Western powers were unanimous in believing that an integrated Europe provided the safest and least problematic instrument to “harness” Germany’s potential permanently to the West. European integration thus would make sure that Germany would not drift into neutrality or, worse, into allegiance to the Soviet Union.

To achieve European unity required the assent and the cooperation of all major West European countries. Feelings of revenge between the former adversaries and considerations of national prestige had to be relegated into the background, in order to prepare the European governments and peoples psychologically to accept each other in mutual partnership and to share elements of national sovereignty. In that sense, Ronald W. Pruessen in his article refers to a “triple containment” as the rationale of America’s policy of supporting European integration – the containment of the USSR, of Germany and of European nationalisms that threatened European peace “from within”, as Dulles once put it. Again, the recollection of two World Wars and two American interventions in conflicts between European nations was paramount. Never again did the United States want to become involved in a conflict that had its roots in primarily European rivalries. This was why Franco-German reconciliation became, perhaps, the most important aim of America’s European policy. European integration, initially based on a common economic interest of the Europeans, seemed to provide the most promising approach to achieve that aim – an aim that demanded support in its own right without regard to the so-called Soviet menace.

The Cold War thus was not the only reason why Europeans strove for some sort of union of their countries, even if they did not always agree as to how this union would take shape. The Cold War, at the same time, did not provide the only justification for American support of that process. It is not surprising, therefore, that efforts to expand European integration did not come to a standstill after the fall of the Berlin wall. In fact, the opposite was the case. France in particular strengthened its efforts to assure a further consolidation of European integration, in the hope to perpetuate the “containment” of Germany – or one should rather say: Germany’s commitment to the West – by expanding the close understanding and cooperation that had been achieved between the two countries in the decades following the Schuman Plan. The German government, anxious to Europeanize the process of German unification, committed itself to that priority, and the extension of European integration has become a more urgent topic on the agenda of European politics than had been the case before the peaceful revolution of 1989.

To admit that the Cold War was not the only cause for European integration does not detract from the historical significance of the topic to be dealt with in this issue of our journal. The preceding paragraphs attempted to distinguish between those phases of European integration that were the result of the Cold War and those
that were not. To an extent, this distinction is artificial, as in historical reality motivations usually overlap and are interrelated. This observation certainly applies to our topic: The Schuman Plan, to cite this example once more, had nothing to do with the Cold War in a direct sense, but it was still indirectly related to it, because the desire shared by the Western powers to “Europeanize” West Germany’s key industries and thus to anchor the Federal Republic to the West certainly would not have been so pronounced and not so urgent if it had not been for the rivalry between the Soviet Union and the Western powers over the future of Germany and Europe. Also, Monnet’s fears of an uncontrolled rearmament of Germany, that in part inspired him to conceive the Schuman Plan, resulted from the Soviet-American armaments race that the Cold War had unleashed in 1949. Inversely, the Marshall Plan and the ensuing attempts to integrate the economies of the recipient countries, while primarily reflecting American fears to lose the Cold War against communism in Europe, still was partly conceived to make the reconstruction of Germany acceptable to France. European prosperity and security continued to have two aspects – one related to the shadow cast over Europe by Soviet military power and one related to the role Germany was to play in Europe.

The editor hopes that the articles published in this volume reflect the network of interrelated motivations that at times speeded up, at other times slowed down European integration. At the same time, he is confident that they will help to clarify the rank the Cold War, as a perception of contemporaries and as a historical reality, gained in this network.

Last but not least, he wishes to thank the English speaking members of the Liaison Group of Historians at the European Commission for having advised him in questions of style and expression during the preparation of this issue.
Zur Einführung

Klaus Schwabe


An diesem Wendepunkt bietet sich ein Rückgriff auf die Geschichte an, die – soweit sie überhaupt dazu imstande ist – den gegenwärtigen Politikern eine gewisse Orientierung liefern kann: Man kann argumentieren, daß es um die Aussichten für einen Ausbau der Europäischen Union in der Tat schlecht bestellt wäre, wenn man den Kalten Krieg historisch als die einzige Triebkraft für die europäische Einigung betrachten müßte. Auf der anderen Seite könnte die Geschichte den Beweis erbringen, daß es noch andere Kräfte gegeben hat, die mit dem Kalten Krieg nichts zu tun hatten und die trotzdem die Europäer zu einer Integration ihres Kontinentes inspiriert haben. trifft dies zu und besitzen diese Kräfte und Motive auch gegenwärtig nach dem Fall der Mauer noch Lebenskraft und Einfluß, dann kann man daraus folgern, daß die Aussichten für eine Weiterführung der europäischen Integration bis hin zu einem auf demokratischer Grundlage politisch geeinten Europa so schlecht nicht sein können und daß dieses Ziel am Ende doch keine von der tatsächlichen Geschichte abgehobene Schimäre ist.

Es ist mittlerweile eine Binsenwahrheit geworden, den Kalten Krieg als einen der wichtigsten Väter der westeuropäischen Einigungsbemühungen nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg zu bezeichnen. Hätte es, so kann man fragen, den Marshallplan zum Wiederaufbau des freien Europa gegeben, wenn sich der Westen mit der UdSSR nicht über die Zukunft des östlichen Mittelmeers und das Schicksal
Deutschlands hoffnungslos zerstritten hätte, so daß sich die Gefahr abzeichnete, daß im Südosten und im Herzen Europas ein Vakuum entstand, das alle Versuche eines Wiederaufbaus der europäischen Wirtschaft und einer gesellschaftlich-politischen Stabilisierung infrage stellte? Hätten die Zeitgenossen auf das bis heute ehrgeizigste Projekt einer europäischen Integration – die Europäische Verteidigungsgemeinschaft (EVG) – als Rahmen für eine Bewaffnung Westdeutschlands – verfallen können, wenn nicht der Koreakrieg ausgebrochen wäre, der in der Alten Welt die Furcht vor einem analogen kommunistischen Angriff auf das freie Europa auslöste? Lieferte nicht die militärische Integration innerhalb der NATO die Antwort auf derartige Befürchtungen? Betrachtete, wie V. Zubok in seinem Beitrag zeigt, die UdSSR nicht zuletzt die europäische Integration als kapitalistische Verschwörung, welche die USA im Kalten Krieg als Mittel einsetzte, um die Stellung der UdSSR in Osteuropa zu unterminieren?


Ein weiterer mindestens ebenso wichtiger Faktor gehört in den Zusammenhang nicht vom Kalten Krieg beeinflußter europäischer Integrationsinitiativen: die Unterstützung dieser Impulse durch die USA und deren Motivation. Dies ist ein Zusammenhang gewesen, der der zeitgenössischen Öffentlichkeit noch kaum bekannt gewesen und erst durch die historische Forschungsans Tageslicht gefördert worden ist. Wie wir heute wissen, leitete sich die amerikanische Rückendekung für die europäischen Integrationsbemühungen nicht nur aus dem Willen ab, die gegebene sowjetischen Gefahr einzudämmen, sondern auch aus dem Wunsch, potentielle Gefahren abzuwenden, die das westliche oder ein geeintes Deutschland für Europa heraufbeschworën konnte. Schließlich waren seit dem Ende des Zweiten Weltkrieges, als die USA Truppen nach Europa geschickt hatten, um die Herrschaft Hitlerdeutschlands über den europäischen Kontinent zu brechen, erst wenige Jahre vergangen. Man spricht deshalb in der neueren wissenschaftlichen Literatur von einer „doppelten Eindämmung“ – der Eindämmung der UdSSR und Deutschlands – als Hauptmotiv, auf dem nicht nur die amerikanische, sondern auch die französische und die (freilich mit Vorbehalten versehene) britische Förderung der Integration des westeuropäischen Kontinents beruht; betrachtete der ganze Westen doch ein integriertes Europa als das sicherste Mittel, um Deutschland an den Westen „anzuschirren“ und seine Neutralisierung oder gar seinen Übergang in das sowjetische Lager zu verhindern.


Der Kalte Krieg ist mithin nicht der einzige Grund für die europäischen Einigungsbemühungen gewesen, gleichgültig welches Verfahren von Fall zu Fall und


Der Herausgeber hofft, daß die an dieser Stelle veröffentlichten Beiträge diese Verwobenheit der Motive, die den europäischen Einigungsprozeß bald beschleunigten, bald verlangsamen, authentisch wiedergeben und daß sie der Bedeutung, welche der Kalte Krieg und seine Perzeption durch die Zeitgenossen in diesem
Introductory note – Introduction – Einführung

Integrating Europe or Ending the Cold War?
Churchill’s post-war foreign policy

Klaus Larres

“We see nothing but good and hope in a richer, freer, more contented European communality. But we have our own dream and our own task. We are with Europe, but not of it. We are linked but not compromised. We are interested and associated but not absorbed” (Winston S. Churchill, February 1930).¹

This view of Great Britain’s relationship with continental Europe well summarizes Winston Churchill’s attitude towards European integration throughout his political career. Various speeches and comments as leader of His Majesty’s opposition in the years after 1945 confirmed this view. However, in a climate of increasingly widespread enthusiasm for European unity as the main instrument to overcome the continent’s numerous post-war problems, Churchill carefully differentiated between a policy of ever-increasing unity, which was right for the continental countries, and a very different policy of full independence for Britain. The latter was almost entirely ignored by continental politicians. Instead, his early post-war speeches in Zurich, The Hague, Strasbourg and elsewhere were enthusiastically greeted and widely misunderstood. It was, therefore, almost inevitable that soon after the formation of Churchill’s peacetime government in October 1951, some of the so-called pro-European members of his government as well as a considerable number of continental political leaders became deeply disappointed by his new administration’s European policy.² Contrary to all expectations, Churchill’s post-war administration did not embark upon a more flexible and open-minded policy towards the European continent. In fact, it was extremely difficult to discern any difference between the European policies of Clement Attlee’s Labour party and the new Conservative government.³ This led the former French Prime Minister, Paul Reynaud, to express the view in March 1952 that “the trouble is (...) that in England the statesmen are pro-European when they belong to the Opposition, and anti-European when they are in power”.⁴

⁴. Quoted in H. J. HEISER, British Policy with regard to the unification efforts on the European continent, Leyden 1959, p.84.
However, this view was misguided, at least as far as Churchill was concerned. As will be demonstrated in the following pages, he was quite consistent in his views on European integration and he did not change them substantially either during his period in opposition (1945-1951) or in his final years in power (1951-1955). European integration per se was not foremost in his mind but rather Britain’s survival as a world power and an early end to the Cold War including the resolution of the German question. Although these two policy concerns were closely linked to some form of loose association with Britain’s European neighbours, Churchill regarded the revival of the ‘special relationship’ with the United States and his repeated attempts to overcome the East-West conflict and prevent the outbreak of a nuclear Third World War as much more important. Both as leader of the opposition, and as Prime Minister from October 1951, he showed great consistency in the pursuit of those goals, goals he had first tentatively formulated as head of government during the war.  

War Leader (1940-45)

During the Second World War, Churchill exhibited no particular interest in post-war planning. He left that task largely to the Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden and the civil servants in the Foreign Office (FO). Churchill was completely absorbed by his commitment to the defeat of Nazi Germany. His offer of an Anglo-French union in June 1940 should be evaluated in that context. It envisaged that both France and Britain would cease to be two separate states, merge their respective parliaments and embark upon a common defence, foreign and economic policy. Although this proposal might be viewed as “a prototype of total integration”, never again suggested in the history of European integration, it merely constituted a desperate remedy for a seemingly hopeless situation. Churchill did not have “any wider perspective” than keeping the struggle against Hitler going. The offer was certainly not part of a comprehensive plan for the future of Europe as Churchill had never developed any such precise formula.

Between May 1940, when he became Prime Minister, and the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour in December 1941, Churchill was much more concerned with establishing a special relationship with President Roosevelt and persuading the

7. HEISER, British Policy, p.21.
9. It therefore cannot be given credit as the “event which gave birth to the post-war development of European integration” and led to the establishment of the Council of Europe in 1949. For this misguided view see HEISER, British Policy, p.21.
Integrating Europe or Ending the Cold War?

USA to enter the war than with any plans for a future European order.\(^{10}\) Nevertheless, from 1942 Churchill occasionally voiced his opinion about the post-war order in Europe. His ideas were usually rather vague and often uttered on the spur of the moment. They showed no sign of having been given much careful consideration or planning. The Prime Minister’s considerations consisted merely of some tentative ideas which he would never fully develop. Thus his ideas about the post-war European order remained rather vague and ambiguous, both throughout the war as well as afterwards.

There were, however, some elements which always dominated his thinking in regard to plans about the future of Europe. Usually, his conceptions centered around a Europe on an intergovernmental basis and, as he told the British cabinet in November 1942, this would be “run by a Grand Council of the Great Powers including Prussia, Italy, Spain and the Scandinavian Confederacy”.\(^{11}\) By May 1943, when he was visiting the United States, Churchill spoke of the establishment of a World Council incorporating three regional councils (Europe, American hemisphere, Pacific). The European Council would consist of up to twelve states or confederations led by a strong France.\(^{12}\) These, however, were ideas he had developed as early as 1940. Suddenly, after dinner with friends on December 13, 1940, he began talking about his “noble and lofty” “grand design” for the post-war era.\(^{13}\) He would proclaim similar ideas in a speech and broadcast on 23 March 1943 outlining his concept for a post-war European confederation.\(^{14}\)

According to this design Churchill believed that once Britain had won the war, five great European nations (England, France, Italy, Spain and Prussia) as well as four confederations would regularly discuss the main directions of European policy within a Council of Europe. Such a Council was to be established at the end of the war and would consist of a Northern, a middle European, a Danubian, and a Balkan confederation. The Council of Europe “would have a supreme judiciary and a Supreme Economic Council to settle currency questions, etc.” While “all air forces, military and civil, would be internationalized”, every state would continue to have its own army (except Prussia which had to be demilitarized for a hundred years apart from an air contingent). “The Council would be unrestricted in its methods of dealing with a Power condemned by the remainder in Council.” Although this plan seemed to hint at the inclusion of some supranational elements, Churchill was

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largely thinking of a Council of Europe organized along intergovernmental lines. Moreover, it was clear to him that Great Britain could not be expected to participate in such a scheme. He declared, “the English speaking world would be apart from this, but closely connected with it, and it alone would control the seas, as the reward of victory”.

In a note to Eden in October 1942, Churchill expressed the hope that after the war “the European family may act unitedly as one, under a Council of Europe in which the barriers between nations will be greatly minimized and unrestricted travel will be possible. I hope to see the economy of Europe studied as a whole. Of course we shall have to work with the Americans in many ways (...) but Europe is our prime care”. When he visited Turkey in January 1943, after the Casablanca Conference, the Prime Minister dictated his “morning thoughts”. He again spoke out in favour of the creation of a Council of Europe as an “instrument of European government” which would “embody the spirit” of the League of Nations. By means of a memorandum called “early morning thoughts”, Eden and the Foreign Office dismissed Churchill’s ideas as “romantic” and impractical. They deplored Churchill’s “rapid approach and equally rapid conclusions” as “irrational” and overtly adventurous. The Foreign Office believed that in case Europe organized itself along Churchill’s lines the Americans would withdraw into isolation while the Soviets would be very annoyed and might end all post-war co-operation.

Churchill was generally adamant during the war that Britain, like the Soviet Union and the United States, could not be part of any future European organization. He assumed instead that the Big Three would oversee things as the leaders of the United Nations. It never seriously occurred to him that Britain might be expected to integrate with the continental powers. Churchill always believed that the ‘Big Three’s’ responsibility lay in directing and guiding developments from outside. Max Beloff came to the conclusion that Churchill’s thinking was entirely uninfluenced by the evergrowing movement for a federal Europe, which had such an impressive number of supporters among the members of exiled governments and resistance fighters living in London during the war.

20. Ibid., p.448. In the following the terms “federal Europe”, “federalists”, “federalism”, etc. are employed in the way they were usually applied by Churchill, Attlee and their contemporaries. They took these terms to refer to a Europe organized on a more or less supranational basis with decisions made by majority rule. It implied a considerable decrease in the importance and relevance of the individual nation state. It also represented the exact opposite to traditional intergovernmental co-operation among fully sovereign and independent states. The relationship between supranationalism and intergovernmentalism is analyzed in Alan MILWARD (with G. BRENAN and F. ROMERO), The European Rescue of the Nation State, London 1992.
In the last years of the war, however, Churchill could not avoid being drawn into lengthy discussions within the Foreign Office regarding a Western European bloc. Such a scheme had played a prominent role in post-war planning discussions in London since 1942. Discussions came to a head in mid 1944. In response to an initiative by the Belgian Foreign Minister Paul-Henri Spaak, Foreign Office official Gladwyn Jebb was asked to draw up internal memoranda on Britain’s policy towards Europe. The “combined memorandum” entitled “Western Europe” was submitted to the Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden on 20 June 1944. The paper was in favour of working toward some form of a regional European system which would include security matters to prevent renewed German aggression. However, such a grouping was not meant to divide Europe into a Russian bloc and a British one but to be part of the envisaged world organization apparently favoured by both Roosevelt and Churchill. The paper expressed the opinion that within a “United Nations Commission for Europe” Britain ought to be prepared to work for the organization of a scheme of mutual defence agreements between London and Paris which would eventually be extended to include other western European countries.

Churchill was openly hostile towards the discussions regarding the formation of a British led Western European bloc. He hoped that Washington would remain interested in European affairs to make the establishment of a western European bloc superfluous. He even believed that the very formation of such an organization would convince the USA that its aid was not needed anymore; consequently Washington might well lose interest in Europe. Only the establishment of a world organization would prevent the United States from withdrawing into isolation. Furthermore, Churchill feared that instead of strengthening his country by providing a defence in depth, a western European bloc might well weaken Britain by making London responsible for the defence of the war-ravished European nations at the expense of Britain’s responsibilities and commitments for the Empire and Commonwealth. In mid July 1944, Churchill and Eden decided that Britain was not prepared at this stage to enter into any detailed considerations of a Western European pact. On 25 July 1944, during a meeting of the War Cabinet, Churchill and Eden also rejected the idea of a military alliance of the western democracies as a precautionary measure against the domination of the continent by Moscow. Such a proposal had been advocated by Duff Cooper, the representative to De Gaulle’s government in Algiers. They feared that any leakage of the considerations regarding the division of the world into blocs would antagonize Stalin. This in turn would

23. Ibid.; see also note 21 above.
endanger the chance of Anglo-Soviet collaboration and European recovery in the post-war world.\textsuperscript{24}

Short shrift was also given to a memorandum produced in November by the interdepartmental Post-Hostilities Planning Staff (PHPS). It stated that due to Britain’s changing strategic situation it was vital for her security to obtain “powerful allies” by forming a West European security group consisting of France, the Benelux and the Scandinavian countries and one day maybe even Germany. It also recommended that this organization should co-operate closely with both the Commonwealth and the United States in order to eventually create something like a North Atlantic organization which seemed to be necessary to avoid a Soviet domination of Western Europe.\textsuperscript{25} Churchill and to some extent Eden, however, were still very sceptical as to whether the European nations would have the necessary resources to participate in such an alliance. Both were still worried about antagonizing the Soviet Union. The best policy to them seemed to be to build up the European nations ‘one by one’ starting with France and continuing with the smaller European nations. These countries and Britain could then attempt to draw up a common plan for their mutual defence. Eden and some other members of the British Government, though not Churchill, were gradually becoming interested in the idea of some kind of defensive agreement with Western Europe which, in the long run, would make some British military commitment to the continent obligatory.\textsuperscript{26}

Despite the various wartime analyses, no long-term strategy decisions in regard to Britain’s western European policy had been taken by mid 1945. This was due to no small degree to Churchill’s outright opposition to a western European bloc which would include Britain but not the United States.\textsuperscript{27} Neither had Churchill taken any initiative to make progress with his idea of an intergovernmental European Council “of lesser powers”.\textsuperscript{28} As he was of course aware that Roosevelt intended to avoid any new ‘sphere of influence’ solution for the post-war world, he assumed that the President would undoubtedly reject the creation of regional units. Roosevelt remained much more interested in pursuing the realization of his “one world” concept.\textsuperscript{29} The Allied negotiations regarding the establishment of the


\textsuperscript{26} See BARKER, \textit{Britain in a divided Europe}, pp.20-21.


\textsuperscript{28} Quoted in BELLOFF, “Churchill and Europe”, p.447.

United Nations in 1945 were consequently dominated by a concentration on the more global powers of the General Assembly and the Security Council with its five permanent great power members. Although initially it had been planned to emphasize the regional aspects of the world organization, this did not happen.30

By the end of the war Churchill had clearly lost interest in his earlier cursory preoccupation with European Councils. His major concern consisted of the post-war continuation of the “fraternal association” between Britain and the USA which, as he hoped somewhat over-enthusiastically in mid-1943, might even result in a common citizenship.31 After all, since the 1943 Teheran conference Churchill had increasingly realized Britain’s financial and military weakness; he was aware that the Big Three were in reality merely the Big Two and a Half.32 Moreover, he increasingly distrusted Stalin’s post-war ambitions. Although he continued hoping that it would be possible to co-operate with Moscow in the post-war world and arrive at a quick settlement of all the many outstanding problems among the Big Three,33 he had become ever more anxious to persuade Roosevelt and, from April 1945, his successor Harry Truman, to remain involved in European affairs. As early as October 1942, in a secret minute to Eden, and again in November 1943, in conversation with Macmillan, Churchill had explained that “Germany is finished (...) the real problem now is Russia. I can’t get the Americans to see it”.34 By July 1944 the British Chiefs of Staff supported him in this view. They had also come round to the opinion that amicable Anglo-Soviet relations and not renewed German aggression would be crucial for the post-war period.35

Churchill further realized that he needed the support, or at least the acquiescence, of the USA to prop up the Empire until Britain had recovered its pre-war strength.36 Despite Washington’s well-known advocacy of anti-colonialism and self-determination, Churchill never became tired of explaining that he was not will-

ing “to preside over the liquidation of the British Empire”. In this respect, even the Anglo-American “special relationship” had to take a backseat. Undoubtedly Churchill possessed “a pugnacious determination to maintain the greatness of the British Empire”. While he did not intend to claim any territorial or other advantages from the war, he made it clear that he would do everything in his power to prevent his country from being “deprived of anything which rightly belongs to her after having given her best services to the good cause”.

Moreover, Churchill had become much more concerned towards the close of the war with practical policy concerning Germany and the prevention of yet another situation which would entail the roots of a major war, than with working out general plans for the future of Europe. Like a number of other political personalities in France, Germany and the United States, Churchill had realized that the future peace of Europe depended above all on a rapprochement between France and Germany.

Already in 1923, in the first volume of his *The World Crisis*, he had wondered whether prior to 1914 the British “by some effort, some compulsive gesture, at once of friendship and command [could] have reconciled France and Germany in time and forced that grand association on which alone the peace and glory of Europe would be safe?” In general Churchill was quite well-disposed towards the German nation. He admired its cultural achievements, economic success and military leaders like Hindenburg and Ludendorff. In May 1912, in the midst of the naval race between the British and German empires, he wrote to a friend: “I have never had any but friendly feelings towards that great nation (...) and I regard the antagonism which has developed as insensate. Anything in my power to terminate it, I would gladly do (...)”. Even during the Second World War, as early as December 1940, he voiced his opinion that one had to differentiate between the Nazi regime and the German people. He very much hoped that the victorious powers would succeed in ensuring that “Germany was going to remain in the European family (...) there should be no Pariahs.”

"revenge is, of all satisfactions, the most costly and long drawn out [one]." Above all, he announced that the German nation had to be re-integrated into the "world system of free and civilized democracy".

Thus, by the end of the war and the beginning of the post-war period Churchill regarded a solution to the following political issues as particularly urgent for the development of a peaceful world: Franco-German reconciliation and the re-integration of Germany into the European family of nations; the settlement of conflicts and peaceful co-operation with Stalin in the post-war world; and last but not least, the development of the Anglo-American 'special relationship'. Ultimately, Churchill hoped that the successful pursuit of all these closely interlinked aims would serve to rebuild and maintain Britain's role as a world power. He did not hesitate to announce that the "main aim" of his policy was "to restore the greatness of Britain". Churchill had not worked out any concrete plans for building a united Europe. He was much more obsessed with ensuring Britain's survival as a great power in the post-war world. To him Britain's elevated international status as well as its many global commitments ruled out any British participation in an integrated Europe, which would have meant joining the weak and devastated European states who, unlike the UK, had not been able to withstand Hitler's onslaught. He merely hoped that Britain would be able to develop its "new association with Europe without in the slightest degree weakening the sacred ties which unite Britain with her daughter States across the oceans". Churchill held the widely shared illusion that the Empire and Commonwealth and not some kind of western European bloc would serve as a power base for Britain's influence in the post-war world. After all, Britain needed, in Denis Healey's words, "new sources of power, not new sources of responsibility".

**Leader of the Opposition (1945-51)**

Defeated in the general election of July 1945, Churchill began the post-war era by concentrating on writing his memoirs and enjoying his enormous reputation as the world's most famous person. Churchill's political importance in the years 1945-51

The new leader of the opposition concentrated instead on addressing matters of global concern. Those he found much more interesting and stimulating. Above all, his references to the East-West conflict and to the unity of Europe received great attention. As far as the latter issue was concerned, Churchill largely followed the ideas which he had developed during the Second World War.

Churchill’s original contribution to addressing the many problems of the post-war world, therefore, did not consist of his vague and ambiguous calls for European unity. His unique contribution can be found in his repeated calls for negotiations with the Soviet Union to overcome the post-war differences among the Big Three. Although he observed that an “iron curtain” had descended across the European continent and that Moscow could only be impressed by a show of force, he did not believe that Stalin sought to provoke the outbreak of yet another war. Therefore, he made it his business to call upon the nations of the world to arrive at a peaceful settlement of the conflicts which had led to the East-West divide. He explained his ambition in full during a speech in the House of Commons in late January 1948 by pointing out that he wanted “to arrive at a lasting settlement” with the help of “formal diplomatic processes”. Otherwise there seemed to be a “very real danger in going on drifting too long”.\footnote{H.C. Deb., 5th series, vol.446, 23 Jan. 1948, cols.560, 561.}

However, Churchill had not suddenly ‘gone soft’ on Communism. He pursued a twin-track approach.\footnote{S. J. LAMBAKIS speaks of a “carrot and stick approach”. See his Winston Churchill: Architect of Peace: A Study of Statesmanship and the Cold War, Westport, Ct. 1993, p.111.} He argued that the Soviet Union first had to be impressed by western unity of purpose, military preparedness and political, economic and military strength. Only then would negotiations with Moscow be viable in order to settle the Cold War amicably and without either side losing face. He had already expressed the view in August 1945, with reference to the atomic bomb, that there were “three and perhaps four years before the concrete progress made in the United States can be overtaken”. During this period it was all-important to re-organize international relations in a peaceful way and establish an international atomic control agency, if a nuclear war between East and West was to be avoided.\footnote{“There is not an hour to be wasted; there is not a day to be lost”}.\footnote{Churchill, “Debate on the Address”, H.C. Deb., 5th series, vol.413, 16 Aug. 1945, col.80.}

However, by 1948 that “breathing space” had almost been exhausted. Churchill became increasingly unhappy with the approach the American administration was taking to the Cold War. Both President Truman and his Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, seemed to believe that the west was inferior to the Soviet Union as far as
conventional weapons were concerned. That gap had to be bridged by means of western rearmament before “negotiations from strength” were deemed possible. Churchill doubted this. Because of Washington’s atomic bomb monopoly, he believed the West was still in a superior position. As the Soviet Union would, however, soon catch up, negotiations had to be entered into in the very near future. A more favourable outcome of any East-West talks could certainly not be expected once Moscow had also obtained the atomic secret. Soon he would add that “it is said we are getting stronger, but to get stronger does not necessarily mean that we are getting safer”.

Despite his urgent calls for negotiations with Moscow, it took Churchill until early 1950 to clarify his views on how to achieve this result. During an election campaign speech in Edinburgh in February, Churchill realized that general “diplomatic processes” were hardly sufficient to make progress in the matter. Instead, for the first time he expressed himself in favour of a dramatic Big Three summit meeting; if elected Prime Minister he wished to have “another talk with Soviet Russia on the highest level”. Churchill was convinced that “a supreme effort” was necessary “to bridge the gulfs between the two worlds, so that each can live their life if not in friendship, at least without the hatreds and manoeuvres of the cold war”. He concluded that “it is not easy to see how things could be worsened by a parley at the summit if such a thing were possible”. He was certainly convinced that because of his global reputation and well-known charisma he was the only one who could attempt such a task. Even after the Soviet Union’s explosion of an atomic bomb in August 1949 and the outbreak of the Korean War in late June 1950, Churchill had not given up hope. He declared: “I do not mean that war [in Europe] is imminent. But I must not lead you to suppose that time is on our side.” In July 1950 he told the House of Commons that “we must never abandon the hope that a peaceful settlement may be reached with the Soviet Government if a resolute effort is made (...).”

This was, however, not the opinion of the Labour government. Prime Minister Attlee let it be known that “it would be presumptuous to suppose that personal contact (...) would do anything but raise hopes unduly”. In March 1950 – well before the outbreak of the Korean War – Minister of State Kenneth Younger explained in unambiguous terms that in view of Moscow’s “withdrawal from co-operation” and “scarcely veiled hostility to everything we are trying to do”, the British cabinet saw

59. Quoted in NICHOLAS, British General Election, p.102.
no possibility of entering into negotiations with the Kremlin. Such talks required a more pleasant atmosphere and above all “adequate preparations”. 60 Even Anthony Eden was highly sceptical of Churchill’s ideas. Eden and US Secretary of State Acheson agreed that, at some time in the future, negotiations with the Soviet Union would be necessary. However, contrary to Churchill’s opinion, they did not believe that time was working against the West – quite the contrary. 61 However, to Churchill his twin-track strategy of western unity and rearmament and the more or less simultaneous pursuit of genuine negotiations was still the only feasible policy which would prevent another world war.

Churchill’s repeated calls for European unity, and even for the creation of a United States of Europe between 1945 and 1951 as leader of the opposition, must be seen as part of his strategy to impress upon Stalin the coherence, strength and resolution of the western world led by the Anglo-American “fraternal association”. 62 Other factors like a Franco-German rapprochement, German re-integration into the civilized world, the development of economic stability in Europe, and a certain willingness to bow to American pressure in the European question were also important considerations which led to his calls for a united Europe. 63 However, Churchill’s grand design for the post-war world consisted of arriving at an amicable settlement with the Soviet Union by means of “negotiations from strength”. His calls for European unity were part and parcel of that scenario; they ought not to be regarded as separate from that design. It is clear that European integration for its own sake was not one of his prime objectives. His “ultimate aim” was the end of the Cold War and with it “the unity and freedom of the whole of Europe”. 64

The issues which appeared to be most pressing to him (good relations with Moscow; Anglo-American relations; European unity without full British participation), all made an appearance in one of his most famous speeches ever – his address at Westminster College in Fulton, Missouri, on 5 March 1946. The Fulton speech in fact outlined Churchill’s grand strategy for the post-war world by calling for both an international settlement and a policy of strength while emphasizing the enduring importance of the British Empire and Commonwealth.

This speech attracted particular attention because of its at first sight violent anti-Russian tone, which elevated Churchill almost overnight to the Cold Warrior par excellence. Churchill used the address to warn the world with his forceful rhetoric of Stalin’s aggressive intentions and the ever encroaching expansionist ambitions.

63. See for example Churchill’s speech to the Congress of Europe in The Hague, 7 May 1948, in R. S. CHURCHILL (ed.), ibid., pp.310-17.
of the Soviet Empire. According to British Ambassador Lord Halifax, the persuasive language of the speech gave “the sharpest jolt to American thinking of any utterance since the end of the war”.65 Above all, it convinced President Truman that American public opinion was gradually accepting the seemingly unbridgeable post-war differences with Stalin’s Soviet Union and was warming up to fighting the Cold War.66

However, it can be seen clearly that Churchill did not just employ the Fulton speech, officially entitled “The Sinews of Peace”, to address the threat from the East. He also pointed to the possibilities for a peaceful settlement with Moscow. Churchill declared that he did not believe that a new war was “inevitable” or “imminent” or that “Soviet Russia desires war”. Instead of “closing our eyes” to Stalin’s expansionist policy or embarking on “a policy of appeasement”, he recommended a different strategy by emphasizing that “what is needed is a settlement [with Stalin], and the longer this is delayed, the more difficult it will be and the greater our dangers will be”67. At Fulton Churchill first publicly proposed his twin-track approach of how to deal with the Soviet Union without provoking a war.

As far as Europe was concerned, he declared that “the world requires a new unity in Europe from which no nation should be permanently outcast”. Thus, he hinted at the necessity of integrating Germany into such a scheme. He resurrected his Second World War ideas on the future of Europe by emphasizing that “we should work with conscious purpose for a grand pacification of Europe, within the structure of the United Nations (...) one cannot imagine a regenerated Europe without a strong France.” It was, however, obvious to Churchill that a united Europe led by France would hardly be able to deal with the world’s post-war problems. Therefore, he emphasized the importance of the Anglo-American special relationship. After all, he believed that “a good understanding with Russia” and its maintenance “through many peaceful years” could only be reached with the help of “the general authority of the United Nations Organization” and above all with the support of “the whole strength of the English-speaking world and all its connections”. In particular, he emphasized that nobody should “underrate the abiding power of the British Empire and Commonwealth”.

“If the population of the English-speaking Commonwealth be added to that of the United States with all that such co-operation implies in the air, on the sea, all over the globe and in science and in industry, and in moral force, there will be no quiver-

ing, precarious balance of power to offer its temptation to ambition or adventure. On the contrary, there will be an overwhelming assurance of security.”

It was obvious that Churchill was not thinking of Britain as part of a united Europe. Instead, together the USA and the UK would safeguard the security as well as the democratic spirit of the world. Churchill’s speech at the University of Zurich on 19 September 1946 elaborated on his vision for a united Europe. He called for building “a kind of United States of Europe” to restore the material and spiritual wealth and happiness of the people on the continent. He did not think that a “regional organization of Europe” would conflict with the United Nations. Quite the opposite. He was convinced that “the larger synthesis will only survive if it is founded upon coherent natural groupings”: After all, there was already such a “natural grouping”. “We British have our own Commonwealth of Nations. These do not weaken, on the contrary, they strengthen, the world organization. They are in fact its main support”. Above all, Churchill believed that in order to save Europe from “infinite misery” and “final doom”, an “act of faith in the European family and an act of oblivion against all the crimes and follies of the past” were required. He then outlined his vision of a strong and energetic Europe by calling for Franco-German co-operation. “France and Germany must take the lead together”:

“The first step in the re-creation of the European family must be a partnership between France and Germany. In this way only can France recover the moral leadership of Europe. There can be no revival of Europe without a spiritually great France and a spiritually great Germany. The structure of the United States of Europe, if well and truly built, will be such as to make the material strength of a single state less important. Small nations will count as much as large ones and gain their honour by their contribution to the common cause.”

A few months prior to this speech Churchill had outlined in the House of Commons that the main threat to post-war European stability did not rest in the devastated Germany but would result from “the confusion and degeneration into which all Europe (...) is rapidly sinking”. This situation, he feared, could easily be exploited by the forces of international communism. Despite his ambition to achieve a settlement with Stalin, Churchill was realistic enough to come to the conclusion, as early as June 1946, that the long-term division of both Germany and the European continent had to be expected:

“We have to face the fact that, as we are going on at present, two Germanys are coming into being (...) I say it with much regret, but without any hesitancy – that, when all has been tried and tried in vain (...) it is better to have a world united than a world divided; but it is also better to have a world divided than a world destroyed.”

Churchill’s approach for dealing with the defeated German nation consisted of his hope that the western world would succeed “over a period of years to redeem and

68. Ibid., pp.98-104.
69. See also Churchill’s similar but much briefer speech at the reception of the Lord Mayor and civic authorities of New York at the Waldorf Astoria, New York, on 15 March 1946, in ibid., pp.115-20.
70. Ibid., pp.198-202.
Integrating Europe or Ending the Cold War?

“reincorporate” the Germans into the free world. Above all, the Germans had to be fully integrated into a united western Europe. In his Zurich speech he even mentioned that he envisaged the United States of Europe as a “federal system” and the formation of a “Council of Europe” – even if not all European states were prepared to immediately join this system. Moreover, in the course of the speech he seemed to hint at the possibility that Britain might be part of this scheme when saying that time was running out as the protective shield of the atomic bomb would in a few years also have been acquired by the enemy. “If we are to form the United States of Europe or whatever name or form it may take, we must begin now.” But then, at the very end of the speech, Churchill made it clear that Britain would remain outside:

“Great Britain, the British Commonwealth of Nations, mighty America, and I trust Soviet Russia – for then indeed all would be well – must be the friends and sponsors of the new Europe and must champion its right to live and shine.”

Thus, Churchill had not entirely given up his idealistic vision of a united Europe closely associated with the Big Three: As the leaders of the United Nations, they would guide and oversee European developments in a peaceful and co-operative way from the outside. To Churchill Britain was still “with” Europe but not “of” it. Since his speech at Zurich University, Churchill’s strong support for the European unity movement was taken for granted. His audiences either entirely misunderstood his words which distanced Britain from participation, preferred not to listen too carefully to such statements or they hoped that Churchill did not really mean what he said. Some of his speeches were indeed quite ambiguous. Churchill often employed his high profile statements on European unity to embarrass the Labour government, enhance his own profile and score political points for the Conservatives. Moreover, the leader of the opposition seemed to display more pro-European activities than the Labour government with its very cautious and reserved attitude to the increasingly popular European unity movements. Churchill, for example, presided at the first Congress of Europe in The Hague in May 1948 while the Labour government and the Labour party had initially called for a boycott of the event. He used the opportunity to call upon the participants to “resolve that in one form or another a European Assembly shall be constituted”. He was also in

75. See for example his speech at the Albert Hall, London, 14 May 1947, when he attended a ‘United Europe Meeting’, in R. S. CHURCHILL (ed.), Europe Unite, p.84; his “United Europe Exhibition” speech, Dorland Hall, London, 17 November 1948, in ibid., p.466; and above all his speech on the Schuman Plan to the House of Commons, 27 June 1950, in idem., In the Balance, pp.287 ff. G. WARNER, “Labour Governments”, is convinced that Churchill’s and the Conservatives’ strategy “was not only irresponsible but also hypocritical, since they were no more willing than their Labour opponents to surrender British sovereignty to the kind of federalist authority advocated at The Hague” (pp.67-68). For a similar view see M. CAMPS, Britain and the European Community, 1955-63, London 1964, pp.11-12.
favour of admitting the Germans to this Assembly.\textsuperscript{77} Ultimately, Churchill’s strong support led to the establishment of the Council of Europe in May 1949. In the House of Commons on 27 June 1950 Churchill strongly criticized the Labour government for not participating in the talks about a European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the Schuman Plan. He even declared that “the whole movement of the world is towards an inter-dependence of nations” and “national sovereignty is not inviolable” and may be “resolutely diminished” for the sake of the nations concerned.\textsuperscript{78} A few months later, on 11 August 1950, during a speech to the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe in Strasbourg, it was again Churchill who made the very controversial proposal to begin with the “immediate creation of a unified European Army”, including a German contingent.\textsuperscript{79} This encouraged Jean Monnet and the French Defence Minister René Pleven to work out a scheme for a supranational European Defence Community (EDC), in late 1950, based on the ECSC model. In the wake of the outbreak of the Korean War, the European Army proposal allowed France to give in to strong American pressure for German rearmament while avoiding the creation of an independent German army and a German general staff. Despite strong American and French pressure, the British did not feel that they could join such a European defence organization.\textsuperscript{80}

Yet, despite all the activities on behalf of a united Europe, Churchill continued to remain convinced that Britain was a special case. The United Kingdom was at the center of three concentric circles consisting of the British Empire and Commonwealth, the English speaking world, and a united Europe. Politicians of all major parties in Britain and also the vast majority of the general public genuinely believed that as a respected and highly influential member in all of Churchill’s three circles, Britain had a unique and ultimately beneficial global role to perform. It could, therefore, not simply join the continental European nations in a federation. Together with the United States, Britain was the leader of the free world with the additional task of guiding Washington towards a responsible policy.\textsuperscript{81} In fact, as far as Europe was concerned and despite all party political rhetoric, Churchill’s views hardly differed from the perspective of Prime Minister Attlee and Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin. “Cooperation with Europe was desirable; integration with Europe was not”.\textsuperscript{82}

Post-war British leaders were “prepared to work for a united Europe, seeing that as the only way in which Western Europe could survive in the long run as a

narrow fringe on the west of the great Communist empire of Eurasia” – but did not intend to participate in that venture themselves. Politicians from all major parties had a “nasty feeling” that if Britain “went off into Europe and left the Americans outside, they would reduce their own commitment”. And committing the Americans to Western Europe was the “prime concern” which united the vast majority of politicians in Westminster. Thus, Churchill’s war-time objections to the creation of a purely western European bloc under British leadership were still widely shared.

The Labour government’s early interest in close co-operation with the European continental states in the years between 1945 and 1948 ought to be regarded as mere contingency planning. Part of this policy were the creation of an Anglo-French military alliance (the Dunkirk Treaty) in March 1946, Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin’s initial enthusiasm for a customs union with some of the continental states, and the formation of a Western European Union, as expressed in Bevin’s speech to parliament in January 1948 and realized by means of the Brussels Treaty Organization three months later. Although almost all of these schemes avoided any supranational elements and concentrated on intergovernmental co-operation, they largely represented attempts to develop a British led third force in world affairs based on cooperation with the European continent. After all, until the beginning of the successful implementation of the Marshall Plan with the help of the OEEC in early 1948 and the negotiations from mid-1948 which led to the creation of NATO, Britain could not be sure whether or not there would be an active and benevolent American involvement in Western Europe. However, this policy of co-operation which included quite naturally a certain dependence on and involvement with Western Europe had always been regarded as a compromise solution, as a mere alternative to an American commitment to Europe. For both Attlee’s Labour government and Churchill’s Conservative opposition, American involvement in European affairs was their ultimate aim. Thus Britain’s bipartisan European policy strategy after the

81. On 9 October 1948 Churchill declared with reference to the three circles: “(...) we have the opportunity of joining them all together. If we rise to the occasion in the years that are to come it may be found that once again we hold the key to opening a safe and happy future to humanity, and will gain for ourselves gratitude and fame”. “Perils Abroad and At Home”, speech to the Annual Conservative Party Conference, Llandudno, Wales, in R. R. JAMES (ed.), Winston S. Churchill: His Complete Speeches, 1897-1963, vol.7: 1940-49, London 1974, p.7712. See also for similar remarks in 1949, ibid., pp.7870-71; also Keesing's Contemporary Archive, vol.7, 1948-50, p.10288.
83. Quotes: HEALEY, When Shrimps Learn to Whistle, p.76.
war largely consisted of attempting merely to oversee developments on the continent, in close consultation and co-operation with the United States.86

This chasm between the attitude prevalent in London and the view of the ‘federalists’ on the continent only became clear to the French and others in the course of 1948-49 when the government in Paris began supporting supranational solutions by proposing the creation of a genuine ‘European parliament’. While Bevin was merely thinking in terms of a pragmatic and evolutionary ‘step-by-step’ approach to European co-operation, France, Italy, the Benelux countries and soon also the newly created West German state favoured a speedy formal federation to further the continent’s economic reconstruction. European unity was also seen partially as a way to neutralize Europe in the Cold War; some talked of the development of a European third force between the two superpowers, though this idea soon petered out.87

Moreover, by 1948-49 (beginning in 1947 with the announcement of Marshall Plan aid) the United States strongly favoured the creation of a supranational Europe where majority decision-making would apply.88 Several reasons existed for American pressure for the speedy creation of such an integrated Europe: the perception of an ever increasing threat from the Soviet Union; an American Congress which seemed to be inclined to make further Marshall aid dependent on progress with European integration; a worsening of the general psychological atmosphere in Europe; and last, but not least, a lack of identity and a feeling of inferiority within the new Federal Republic of Germany. It was hoped in Washington that a return to nationalism and international unreliability could be prevented by integrating the West Germans firmly and irreversibly into Western Europe.89

Churchill and above all Prime Minister Attlee, however, were highly suspicious of Washington’s increasingly impatient demands that Britain should shoulder the responsibility for leading Western Europe into a supranational federation and, much to their mutual dislike, even participate in such a union. General Eisenhower’s declaration at the end of the war that the United States would withdraw from Europe within two to three years was still fresh in the minds of politicians. The differences in approach between Britain and the continental Europeans as well as the Americans became clear, for example, over disputes regarding the form the OEEC should take for the administration of Marshall Plan aid.90 It also led to the fact that the Council of Europe set up in May 1949 soon proved to be a bad compromise as

86. As YOUNG has persuasively shown, this also applied to the ‘pro-Europeans’ within the Conservative party like Macmillan, Maxwell Fyfe, Eccles, etc. who were somewhat more prepared than Churchill and Eden to associate Britain with the European continent. However they did not think in terms of integration with a federal supranational Europe either. See “Churchill’s ‘No’”, pp.923 ff.
it represented the combination of a ‘federal’ with a ‘functional’ solution. Although the Council included a Consultative Parliamentary Assembly, it was not a proper European parliament with legislative powers. Instead, it represented merely a debating chamber (“an irresponsible talking-shop”) which was largely controlled by the Committee of Ministers – an organ based on traditional intergovernmental co-operation. Indeed, Churchill found himself in full agreement with the Labour government and traditional British policy when he came out strongly in favour of not attempting to turn the Council into a supranational body by changing “the powers which belong to the duly constituted national parliaments”. He believed that “such a course would be premature (...) [and] detrimental to our long-term interests”. The most positive feature of the Council of Europe was perhaps its very existence as a symbol of some kind of western European co-operation and West Germany’s membership which, it was hoped, would be useful in facilitating a Franco-German rapprochement.

When Churchill returned to No. 10 Downing Street in late 1951, he was widely associated with his calls for a “united Europe” in Zurich, the Hague and elsewhere, and that despite his anti-supranational statement quoted above. That clear misperception of Churchill’s views led to some unfounded expectation among continental politicians that Britain’s European policy was about to change. That was mere wishful thinking. As Churchill no longer needed European matters as a tool with which to embarrass the Labour party or as an instrument to obtain global attention, he lost almost all his remaining interest in the question of European unity. Most of his last years as Prime Minister were characterized by intensive advocacy of ‘summit diplomacy’ to end the Cold War rather than by an European integration policy. In his final speech during the election campaign of 1951 Churchill made it unambiguously clear what he intended to achieve. He hoped that Stalin would be willing to participate in “a friendly talk with the leaders of the free world [to] see if something could not be arranged which enabled us all to live together quietly.”

“If I remain in public life at this juncture it is because, rightly or wrongly, but sincerely, I believe that I may be able to make an important contribution to the prevention of a third world war and to bring nearer that lasting peace settlement which the masses of the people (...) fervently desire. I pray indeed that I may have this opportunity. It is the last prize I seek to win.”


92. See Churchill’s speech before the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe, Strasbourg, 17 Aug. 1949, in R.S. CHURCHILL, ibid., pp.81-82 (quotes: p.80); also his speech to the same forum on 11 Aug. 1950, in ibid., pp.347 ff.

Churchill received the opportunity to convince the world of his summit diplomacy when the British people gave him a majority of 17 seats on 25 October 1951 to form his last government. The new Prime Minister was already 77 years old and his health had been in a precarious state for some years. His government was “too much characterized by its chief’s stubborn battle for [political and physical] survival to be a splendid affair”. Churchill’s peacetime premiership largely was a very consensual affair aiming at consolidation rather than radical change. Indeed, he reversed only very few of the Labour government’s legislation (e.g. the nationalization of iron and steel).

Churchill also continued Attlee’s policy towards European integration. Despite occasional hints to the contrary while in opposition, he left the Labour government’s decision not to participate in the Schuman Plan unaltered. By means of the Eden Plan of 1952 his government merely attempted to re-design the High Authority of the ECSC as well as the supranational EDC organs yet to be established into a non-supranational body by proposing that both the ESCS and the EDC would be closely linked to the Council of Europe. This was, however, eventually rejected by most European states. Churchill had taken no active interest in the ill-fated Eden Plan. His age no longer allowed him to give equal consideration to all the many different areas of government. With the exception of Egypt and the attempt to maintain Britain’s imperial position in the Near East, Churchill concentrated entirely on his summit diplomacy and related issues. He neglected almost all other external (and domestic) matters.

European issues would only attract his attention when they were directly connected to his policy as a global peacemaker. In late November 1951, when referring to his Zurich speech of 1946 in a cabinet paper entitled “United Europe”, Churchill made it unambiguously clear that he had “never thought that Britain (...) should become an integral part of a European Federation”.

His government’s attitude towards the European Defence Community, signed in 1952, was therefore never more than lukewarm though the EDC was the dominating issue during his peace-time government as far as European integration was concerned. The EDC was not only the instrument to achieve western European rearma-
ment on a supranational basis but also the means to integrate West Germany irreversibly into the West while giving the Federal Republic its sovereignty in return. Thus, the linkage between West German sovereignty (the so-called contractual agreements were also signed in May 1952) and the ratification of the EDC meant in fact that the further development of the western alliance as well as the attachment of the Bonn Republic to the West were at stake. Everything seemed to depend on the ratification of the EDC by its six member states (France, West Germany, Italy, Benelux). However, these ratification problems did not impress Churchill too much. European matters were largely left to the competent though not very sympathetic Anthony Eden. Churchill was not so much concerned with the successful integration of the Federal Republic with the West by means of the EDC as with the creation of an international détente and an end to the Cold War thus rendering the EDC unnecessary and terminating the division of Germany. It was Churchill’s main goal to end the Cold War by means of an informal Anglo-American summit conference with the Soviet Union. He hoped to be able to negotiate away the division of Germany. As will be outlined below in detail, throughout 1953 and to some extent also in 1954 the British Prime Minister was quite prepared to sacrifice the Federal Republic’s integration with the West. He believed that the creation of a neutral and united Germany (in the Yalta and Potsdam borders) would be the expedient to overcome the Cold War and to ensure a more peaceful and – as was generally assumed – infinitely more stable world.

However, during Stalin’s lifetime he was always torn between his wish to negotiate a compromise peace with the Kremlin and the terrible realities of Soviet power politics in Eastern Europe which seemed to make any rapprochement with Moscow impossible. Thus, when Stalin proposed in his Note of March 10, 1952 the reunification of Germany on a neutral basis, Churchill hardly became involved in the heated debate in the western world over the question of whether or not Stalin’s suggestion was meant seriously. In 1951-52 Churchill was rather pessimistic. He was deeply shocked by the purges and show trials in the CSSR and soon concluded that “the chances of achieving anything with Stalin were almost nil”. Moreover, Eden’s strategy of arriving at a rapprochement with Moscow by initiating secret and informal talks between November 1951 and January 1952 with

103. See note 101.
Soviet Foreign Minister Vyshinsky had come to nothing. During Churchill’s visit to the USA in early 1952, President Truman told the Prime Minister that “the time was not ripe” for East-West negotiations. Churchill was forced to admit “that in present circumstances he would not be in favour of proposing a meeting with the leaders of the Soviet Union”. However, by June 1952 Churchill had regained some of his old optimism. He was confident that if Eisenhower were elected President, the USA might be interested in a “joint approach” to Moscow. This would eventually lead “perhaps to a congress in Vienna where the Potsdam Conference would be reopened and concluded”. With the death of Stalin on 5 March 1953, Churchill energetically began with the realization of this policy in spite of the strong doubts of most of his closest advisers. After all, in the immediate aftermath of the dictator’s death the new Soviet leadership consisting of Malenkov, Beria and Molotov had begun to embark on a peace campaign. It included proposals designed to limit the escalation of the Cold War. It appeared that the new leaders in Moscow needed a calmer international atmosphere in order to settle in internally and solve the serious economic problems of their country if they wished to remain in power for any length of time. Moreover, a fierce struggle for power seemed to have erupted in Moscow. There were even rumours that the new leadership (particularly Beria) was considering to sacrifice the GDR and give its agreement to German unification on the basis of its neutrality. However, this information frightened most western politicians and diplomats, including West German Chancellor Adenauer and the British Foreign

105. PRO: CAB 21/3057, Folder 9/102, 8 Feb. 1952; also FRUS 1952-54, vol.6, pp.693 ff.; SHUCKBURGH, Descent to Suez, p.32.
109. Up to the present day it is very controversial whether or not Moscow would have been prepared to enter into negotiations regarding German unification between March and June 1953 (after Stalin’s death and before the uprising in the GDR), if the West had indicated that genuine prospects for an agreement existed. For a brief overview of the relevant literature see K. LARRES, “Preserving Law and Order: Britain, the United States and the East German Uprising of 1953”, Twentieth Century British History, vol.5 (1995), pp.333-34; also Ch.F. OSTERMANN, “The United States, the East German Uprising of 1953 and the Limits of Rollback”, Cold War International History Project, Working Paper No.11 (1994).
Office. They feared Moscow might be about to repeat and perhaps improve upon Stalin’s reunification offer of March 1952. Any such suggestion could well endanger German rearmament and the establishment of the increasingly unpopular EDC. Therefore, none of the western statesmen involved, except Churchill, wished to believe that the Soviet Union was seriously considering giving up the GDR in order to obtain the unification and neutralization of Germany. Above all, it was generally thought that a neutral Germany would in the long run be a country dominated by the Soviet Union. Western statesmen, including Adenauer, agreed that they only would consider German unification if it meant unity on western terms – a united and democratic Germany fully integrated with the West. As long as this was not possible, at least the western part of the country had to be irreversibly anchored in the western alliance. Before this had happened, most western politicians did not entertain any notion of entering into negotiations with the Soviet Union.

Accordingly, the new American President Eisenhower was not very keen on Churchill’s letters containing his summit proposals, which reached him in March and April 1953. He replied in a rather vague and hesitant way. This, however, encouraged the Prime Minister to believe that he might still be able to change the President’s mind. But Churchill was entirely mistaken. While he wanted to exploit the unstable situation in the Soviet Union to initiate Big Three negotiations, Eisenhower was intent on destabilizing the Soviet Government even further with a new psychological warfare offensive. Part of this was the “Chance for


112. For example, Dulles’ deputy Bedell Smith explained, “[that] (...) he did not believe that the Soviets were ready to give up their zone at this time. Although it was entirely possible and even likely that the Russians would make another offer to reunite Germany before the EDC enters into force, such a bid would not be sincere and would be nothing but an attempt to prevent or delay the establishment of a European Army”. FRUS, 1952-54, Vol.7, 30 March 1953, pp.410-11.


114. PRO: FO 800/778, Makins, Washington, to FO, No.726, about a conversation with Bedell Smith, 6 April 1953.


“Peace” speech with which Eisenhower and his close adviser C.D. Jackson intended to counter the increasingly successful peace campaign waged by the Kremlin. Even anti-Communist hawk Foreign Secretary John Foster Dulles advised Eisenhower against the dangerous consequences of exploiting the fluid situation in Moscow, warning that the new leaders might overreact.118

On May 11, 1953 Churchill took the initiative. In a speech in the House of Commons, he revived his plan to arrange for a World War II-style summit between the United States, the Soviet Union and Britain.119 Churchill wished to enter negotiations to solve all outstanding East-West problems at a meeting unfettered by a formal agenda. In several secret conversations and memoranda Churchill subsequently expressed the notion that a reunited and neutral Germany and the sacrifice of the Federal Republic’s rearmament and integration with the West might prove a suitable price for a global détente. At one point he told his advisers confidentially “that he had not closed his mind to the possibility of a unified and neutralized Germany (...) as part of a settlement with the Russians”.120 Churchill envisaged the signing of a security pact between the Soviet Union and a reunited Germany, rather like the Locarno pact of 1925, which would be guaranteed by Great Britain.121

The dominant factor in Churchill’s consideration was the realization that only a global détente would allow Britain to catch up with the two superpowers in the economic and military field, maintain its Empire and Commonwealth and remain one of the great powers of the world. Churchill was aware that, if no détente with the Soviet Union was achieved and the armaments race and Cold War competition between the two blocs continued, Britain would lose out, and be forever dependent on the generosity of the United States. If détente could be realized, his country would be able to reduce its world-wide military commitments and concentrate on its economic and technological development, including the manufacturing of a British H-bomb and the necessary methods of delivery. A West German newspaper commented that after Britain had lost a quarter of her wealth in the war, Churchill’s “purpose now was to secure a long period of peace and recovery” for his country.122

However, Churchill’s notion that London could bring about a global détente with Britain as the guarantor of peace and security between the Soviet Union and a united but neutral Germany, much exaggerated Britain’s importance and its military capabilities in the post-war world. The Prime Minister’s own Foreign Office,

119. See note 117.
120. PRO: FO 371/103 660/C 1016/32 (19/5/53), minute Dixon to Strang and Roberts about his conversation with Churchill on 16 May 1953.
including Foreign Secretary Eden, the majority of the cabinet, as well as the American administration and Chancellor Adenauer were therefore very much opposed to Churchill’s ideas. At a time when the EDC treaty was about to be ratified, Churchill’s ideas were endangering the whole western concept of how to tackle the German question. If a summit seemed to be in the pipeline, French, German and other parliamentarians could be expected to wait and see whether or not German unification on a neutral basis materialized as this would make the rearmament of the Federal Republic unnecessary. Furthermore, there was considerable concern that his plans in their superficial simplicity would find the support of western public opinion. Under these circumstances, it seemed ever more unlikely that the French parliament would consider giving up France’s military sovereignty by agreeing to merge French forces with German and other forces into a supranational European army. After all, the creation of the EDC represented an almost revolutionary re-structuring of the national defence policies of its member states. The European nations were asked to give up a considerable part of their sovereignty—a sacrifice London and Washington strictly declined to consider. The American diplomat Leon W. Fuller concluded in early 1953:

“An important aspect of EDC which Americans, perhaps, fail to perceive with sufficient clarity, is that it is basically a permanent, organic reform of a revolutionary nature but proposed as an emergency device to meet an urgent and critically dangerous situation. It is obvious, for one thing, that we are pressing Europeans to do something that it is inconceivable we would do ourselves. The British stand aloof for much the same reason—as for us, merger of national sovereignty respecting defense in a supra-national federation is unthinkable.”

Churchill’s speech expedited top secret efforts to work out alternatives to the EDC as well as plans regarding demilitarized zones in Central Europe—just in case it would prove impossible to persuade the French to ratify the EDC treaty.

123. Under the influence of his senior Foreign Office advisers, Eden had changed his mind. Despite his own attempts at détente in 1951-52, a year later he came out in opposition to Churchill’s policy. As ‘his apparent’ Eden had become convinced that the retirement of the increasingly difficult if not senile Prime Minister would only be postponed by Churchill’s policy of initiating a global détente. See for example the numerous diary entries for the years from 1953 by COLVILLE, Fringes of Power; SHUCKBURGH, Descent to Suez; MORAN, Churchill.


British experts, both in the Foreign Office and in the military, viewed the EDC with great scepticism. They – like the Labour government in 1950 – became much more interested in the integration of the Federal Republic into NATO. This seemed to be the militarily best and least complicated way to achieve German rearmament.127 This explains why Churchill’s trusted friend Field Marshal Montgomery and the Chiefs of Staff, above all the Air Force Chief of Staff Sir John Slessor, who had however retired in January 1953, encouraged the Prime Minister to go ahead with his plans.128 In all likelihood this was connected with their deep-seated suspicion of schemes advocating a united Europe and their unanimous rejection of the EDC. Like Churchill they regarded an army fighting for an unidentified lofty European ideal and consisting of nationalities of six or more European nations as militarily inefficient and lacking in motivation.129 During a cabinet meeting in December 1952, Eden stated, that West Germany’s membership of NATO, “might well be preferable militarily”. Churchill also explained, that “he would not be unduly disturbed if the present plans for a European Defence Community were not carried into effect.”130 He was in favour of a coalition army like NATO and regarded the idea of a supranational European army as unworkable; he called it a “sludgy amalgam”.131 In May 1953 the Prime Minister declared that France was not really that important for the western alliance. If Paris refused to ratify the EDC treaty, West Germany would simply become a member of NATO.132 However, due to continued French opposition to West Germany’s membership of NATO and despite their own doubts about the EDC, until the scheme’s ultimate failure in August 1954, Churchill and Eden continued advocating the EDC solution in public as the only realistic possibility to obtain German rearmament.133 Still, despite various step-by-step agreements to associate Britain with the EDC, London steadfastly refused to join the Community as a full member.134

127. See PRO: FO 371/105 989/M 2813/3, FO memorandum, “U.K. Relationship with European supranational institutions and particularly the EDC” (16 Feb. 1953); see also CHARLTON, Price of Victory, pp.124 ff.
129. See CHARLTON, Price of Victory, pp.124 ff.
131. CHARLTON, Price of Victory, p.124.
132. PRO: FO 800/821, SU/53/33, memorandum Strang about a conversation with Churchill on 4 May 1953.
134. See J.W. YOUNG, “German Rearmament and the European Defence Community”, in YOUNG (ed.), Foreign Policy, pp.81-108; also the list of British association engagements in HEISER, British Policy, pp.65-66.
Therefore, the ratification prospects of the EDC were rather gloomy. Between December 1952 and January 1953 this led even Adenauer to express his hope in a conversation with British High Commissioner Kirkpatrick and his acting American counterpart Reber, that London and Washington “would publicly support Germany’s membership of NATO and the United Nations”. Kirkpatrick believed that the time had not yet come for a public declaration of a change of policy: “this is a dangerous suggestion at the moment.” However, again in early March 1953, the Chancellor’s line of thinking was made clear. In view of the bad ratification prospects in Paris, his confidant Blankenhorn secretly conveyed to him that Adenauer believed that “for the first time one would have to consider the possibility of a national German army as an alternative”. In mid-March Adenauer even asked Blankenhorn to submit highly secret plans to the American government. The Chancellor suggested to give up the linkage between the EDC treaty and the contractual agreement, to begin with the training of German troops and the re-enforcement of the German border police. Adenauer basically proposed that the treaties of May 1952 should enter into force immediately once ratification by the West German parliament had been secured. German rearmament and sovereignty, then, would not have to await ratification of the EDC by the other member states. Once again he also contemplated West German membership of NATO as this seemed to be the only realistic alternative to the EDC. The Chancellor was aware that the realization of German rearmament without Bonn’s membership in a western defence pact was impossible.

However, Adenauer’s suggestions were heavily criticized, in particular by American Secretary of State John Foster Dulles who insisted on West Germany adhering to the EDC. After all, one of the (many) reasons why Churchill’s attempt to enter into summit talks with the Soviet Union was firmly condemned by the Eisenhower administration consisted in its belief that such a development would make the ratification of the EDC and decisive progress towards a united Europe much more difficult. Despite the development of contingency plans, on the whole Washington and Bonn continued to regard the EDC as the only realistic possibility for achieving German rearmament and integration with the West. Eisenhower, for example, warned that any alternatives to the EDC were “too alarming to contem-

135. PRO: FO 371/103 918/CW 1016/1, minute Roberts to Strang, 2 Jan. 1953. The quoted sentence was crossed out with red ink by Eden.
137. PRO: FO 371/103 925/CW 1013/17, letter from M. Thomas to D. Malcolm about his conversation with Blankenhorn, 3 March 1953. See also CW 1013/20, letter from Johnston to W.D. Allen, 14 March 1953; and for Adenauer’s thoughts see FO 371/103 664/C 1071/32, minute Roberts to Strang, 4 June 1953.
plate” as the American people were always ready to turn towards “complete isolationism.” 139

During the second half of June 1953 Churchill arrived at the conclusion that either the EDC or some other solution to German rearmament and western integration had to be realized before the West would permit him to convene a summit conference with the Soviet Union. Even if such an event would then not be able to bring about German unification, Churchill believed that a summit meeting could contribute to instigating a global détente. It would therefore still be a worthwhile enterprise to pursue. As the Prime Minister had never been in favour of the EDC and did not believe that the French parliament would ever ratify the treaty, he pushed increasingly hard to obtain West German membership of NATO as soon as possible. For example in a memorandum dated July 9, 1953, Churchill suggested that it might be a good idea to confront the French with an ultimatum. Britain and the United States should ask the French parliament to ratify the EDC by the end of October 1953. 140 If they did not do so, a new NATO treaty would have to be concluded possibly without French participation. This strategy was soon referred to as the policy of the “empty chair”. According to Churchill this new NATO pact would have the advantage of not giving any of the member states a veto about the inclusion of the Federal Republic. 141 The Prime Minister had of course in mind that once West Germany had become a member he would be able to immediately continue with his summit diplomacy. On July 6, 1953 he stated:

“With either EDC or a reformed NATO (with or without France’s formal adhesion) we should be in a far better position to talk to Russia than if the present indefinite delay continued. (...) Let us therefore, as our first aim, persuade the French to ratify EDC in October. This could and should be coupled with a declaration of willingness for a four-Power Conference before the end of the year.” 142

Although eventually the NATO alternative to the EDC was realized in 1954/55, this came much too late to be of any help to Churchill’s summit policy. The opposition to his plans from Washington, Bonn and from within his own Foreign Office had not abated. Moreover, the elderly Prime Minister had already suffered a severe stroke in June 1953. 143 In collusion, Adenauer and Dulles used this opportunity to undermine Churchill’s policy. At a western Foreign Ministers’ Conference in Washington in July 1953, Dulles, with the help of Blankenhorn, and a letter submitted by the Chancellor, persuaded his British and French colleagues to invite the Soviet Union to a conference. It seemed necessary to show German public opinion that the West was prepared to discuss the German question with the USSR. 144 Ade-

141. See Dockrill, Britain’s Policy, pp.131, 140, 149.
nauer was scared, however, that a summit meeting before the general election in the Federal Republic to be held in September would only weaken the appeal of his pro-EDC position, and strengthen the attraction of the opposition SPD’s clamouring for neutrality and reunification. Moreover, Adenauer objected to any Big Three or four-power conference on Germany in principle. He feared that the great powers would decide Germany’s fate behind his back, and might even renge on the Federal Republic’s integration with the West. Therefore, Dulles did not suggest a heads of government meeting as Churchill wished, but a conference of foreign ministers, which would exclude the participation of the British Prime Minister. Moreover, Dulles and Bidault, the French Foreign Minister, were agreed that the conference should end in failure as usual, for which Soviet intransigence should be blamed.

Although Lord Salisbury, who was standing in for the convalescent Eden who was recuperating, showed some hesitation over this strategy, he did not support Churchill’s vision and in the end weakly agreed with his colleagues. There could be no compromise solution on the lines of something like a neutral and reunified Germany. Moscow eventually accepted the invitation, and suggested a four-power Foreign Ministers’ Conference in Berlin in January and February 1954.

Before this conference was convened, Churchill, who had made a comparatively quick recovery from his stroke, began resurrecting his summit diplomacy. He succeeded in persuading Eisenhower and the French Prime Minister Pinay to attend a western top-level conference in Bermuda. The Prime Minister hoped that he would be able to convince the President to agree to a three-power (without the French) heads of governments’ conference with the Soviet Union. However, in

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For the whole rather complicated episode see in detail LARRES, Politik der Illusionen, pp.185 ff.


146. For Adenauer’s so-called “Potsdam complex” see H.-P. SCHWARZ, Adenauer. Der Aufstieg, 1876-1952, Stuttgart 1986, pp.827 ff.


148. Ibid.


the course of the conference in early December, and much to Eden’s and the British Foreign Office’s relief, Eisenhower remained steadfast. The President preferred the foreign ministers’ conference as arranged by Dulles and Adenauer in the course of the Washington meeting in July. A deeply disappointed and embittered Churchill returned to London. He had also finally realized that the American decision to let the projected conference with Moscow end in failure could not be prevented.151

Indeed, apart from an agreement to convene a conference on Indochina and Korea in the summer, the Berlin Conference of January and February 1954 achieved no tangible results. Both sides seemed to be content with the European status quo.152 Western politicians now intensified their efforts to get the EDC treaty ratified by the French Parliament which despite American pressure still showed no inclination of voting on the Treaty.153 In the following months, particularly in Britain but also in the United States and in the Federal Republic, alternative schemes were once again secretly worked out in case the EDC should fail.154


Integrating Europe or Ending the Cold War?

Although Churchill had realized after the conferences at Bermuda and Berlin that the US was not prepared to alter its position on the German question, he did not want to give up his plans for a summit conference with Malenkov and Eisenhower.\(^{155}\) In July 1954 Churchill and Eden travelled to Washington. Eisenhower had indicated his desire to talk to him and to his Foreign Minister in Washington to improve the increasingly tense Anglo-American relations at the Geneva conference on Indochina.\(^{156}\) Churchill, however, primarily intended to use the opportunity to persuade Eisenhower of the benefits of a top-level meeting with Malenkov. Yet, he did not suggest German reunification as the main topic of conversation with the Soviet leaders anymore, but the much less contentious issues of the threat of the H-bomb and the Austrian question.\(^{157}\) Since the Bermuda Conference, Churchill, whose health was rapidly deteriorating, had given up his plans for altering the entire western cold war concept. He had resigned himself to the fact that he was unable to change the status quo of a divided Europe.\(^{158}\) Churchill was increasingly occupied with merely attempting to mellow down the international atmosphere, and to decrease the probability of the outbreak of war and the destruction of all civilization by such a conflict.\(^{159}\) Above all, he was now much less concerned with the issues involved, than with establishing his reputation as a statesman who had not only succeeded in wartime, but also instigated a process of détente and disarmament by means of a summit conference. Moreover, he now clearly worked for a summit conference in order to postpone his impending retirement and to make a final dramatic impact on world affairs.\(^{160}\)

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160. Already at the end of January 1954, J.K. Penfield, Counsellor at the US Embassy in London, told the State Department: “Churchill does, however, still apparently have a very strong feeling that when he steps down it must be after one last dramatic gesture on the world stage. (...) it may be assumed that Churchill will not remain as Prime Minister in another Government, but it is virtually impossible to predict when and how such an extraordinary individualist of such unique talents will retire”. NA: 741.13/1-2854, No.2589, 28 Jan. 1954.
Under the impression that Eisenhower had not been as hostile to his summit ideas as before, Churchill, on his return to London from Washington, sent a telegram to Molotov inquiring whether Moscow would accept such an invitation and whether the British Prime Minister should first come to Moscow for an informal visit. Eden only agreed to the telegram because Churchill had promised to retire immediately after such a meeting had taken place. However, the British Cabinet had not been consulted. Back in London, Churchill was confronted with a very serious cabinet crisis, as most members were opposed to his initiative and the possibility that the ailing Prime minister might conduct bilateral negotiations in Moscow without American participation. Lord Salisbury and two other members of the Cabinet threatened to resign. Churchill also considered that option. In the end, the crisis was resolved by an entirely unforeseen (and, for the British cabinet, very fortunate) Soviet invitation to a thirty-two nation conference on European security. In the West this was not regarded as a genuine offer of negotiation by Moscow. It was, of course, impossible that the British Prime Minister would travel to Moscow while the West was contemplating how to react to this move, which seemed to open a new propaganda war between East and West. Churchill wrote to Molotov that he was unable to visit Moscow at present.

It is still unclear why the Kremlin did not accept Churchill’s proposal. After all, the Soviet leaders must have known of the displeasure about Churchill’s ideas in the western capitals. Perhaps Moscow simply did not trust Churchill and his ‘cold warrior’ reputation. The Soviet leaders appear genuinely to have thought that the


Prime Minister’s summit diplomacy constituted a western trap. At least, a statement by the Soviet diplomat Rodionov supports this interpretation. In a conversation with British diplomat Frank Roberts in mid-August 1954 Rodionov admitted that Moscow had to bear some of the responsibility for the failure of Churchill’s summity. He indicated:

“that the Russian leaders were by no means sure what the Prime Minister really wanted to do at such a meeting and, with their naturally suspicious outlook, were reluctant to commit themselves to something the outcome of which they could not quite foresee.”

In the following months Churchill attempted several times to continue his work for a summit conference. However, partly due to skillful manipulation by Foreign Office officials the opportunity did not arise. Above all, the final refusal of the French Parliament to ratify the EDC treaty in August 1954 led to a crisis in the western capitals which made all summit diplomacy impossible. An alternative solution for West German rearmament and integration with the West had to be found. Eventually, at two conferences in London and Paris in September and October 1954, Eden succeeded in realizing the so-called NATO/WEU solution which Churchill supported as well. This was basically the solution both the Attlee and Churchill administrations as well as the Foreign Office had always hoped to achieve. In May 1955 the Federal Republic became a member of NATO and at the same time obtained its semi-sovereignty. Its integration with the West had been realized. Churchill’s constant advertisement of the NATO solution between 1952 and 1954 may well have contributed to the fact that in the end such a solution was seen as the only reasonable alternative to the EDC. Eden’s successful crisis diplomacy was above all the result of the careful search for alternatives by the British experts throughout 1953 and 1954. The simultaneous inclusion of West Germany into the reformed Western European Union (WEU) to control the amount of armaments and troops the Federal Republic possessed and Britain’s agreement not to


168. In March-April 1955, for example, the officials prevented a visit by Eisenhower to London which would have given Churchill an opportunity to postpone his retirement once again. He would undoubtedly have attempted to persuade the President once again of the necessity to convene a summit conference. See Bodleian Library, Oxford: Woolton Papers, 3, diary 1942-1960, p.150, 15 March 1955; PRO: FO 800/763; PREM 11/893; CAB 128/28, C.C.(55)23rd conclusions, 14 March 1955; GILBERT, Never Despair, pp.1102-11; SELDON, Indian Summer, pp.52-53; COLVILLE, Fringes of Power, pp.705-06.

169. For the nine power London conference (28 Sep. – 3 Oct. 1954), the most important meeting to work out an alternative solution to the EDC to realize the western integration of the Federal Republic, see PRO: FO 371/125 146 (Sep.- Oct.1954); FO 371/109 773-76 (Oct.1954). For secondary literature see notes 81 and 133 above; also H. EHLERT et al. (eds.), Die NATO-Option, Munich 1993; GERSDORFF, Adenauers Außenpolitik, pp.249 ff.
withdraw its two divisions stationed in Germany without the consent of the WEU members, for example, had been worked out a long time before the events of August 1954. Diplomat Frank Roberts wrote in his memoirs about the London Conference: “Although this has never yet been mentioned, it had always been a part of the British plan that we would commit ourselves to certain force levels on the Continent (...)”.  

Conclusion

When West Germany became a member of NATO Churchill had already retired on 5 April, 1955, without having been able to convene a summit conference. After the downfall of Malenkov in February 1955 and because of his increasingly failing health, Churchill had given up. He was no longer able to confront the opposition to his plans from Eden and the Foreign Office, Eisenhower and Adenauer, which was still as strong as ever. 

Despite Churchill’s vague plans for a united Europe during the war and his ambiguous calls for European unity as leader of the opposition, his last years as Prime Minister clearly demonstrate that at least in a narrow federalist sense he was not a committed pro-European. Churchill was never in favour of creating a supranational Europe – and certainly not one which involved British participation. When he referred to a united Europe it almost always excluded Britain. Moreover, his last years as Prime Minister clearly demonstrated that Churchill was more than ready to sacrifice any progress in European integration in order to obtain a Big Three summit conference. After all, it was his prime ambition to enable postwar Britain to remain one of the world’s leading powers. As early as 1946 Churchill had come to the conclusion that this could best be achieved by working for a settlement with the Soviet Union to end the Cold War. In this way, Churchill was representative of the majority of the British population and the country’s political elite in that he was utterly convinced that a speedy end to the Cold War would ensure a more peaceful and a more stable world which would allow Britain to catch up with the two superpowers in the economic sphere thereby enabling it to remain a great power itself.

This explains why Churchill believed that a neutral unified Germany was preferable to a divided Germany and the Federal Republic’s western integration.


He was convinced that the latter scenario would ensure the continuation of the Cold War. Particularly in the post-Stalin era the creation of an united and neutral Germany seemed to him the only possibility of obtaining Moscow’s agreement to settle the Cold War amicably. The Prime Minister, together with most of his countrymen, did not believe that British participation in an ever stronger continental and integrated Europe would best serve Britain’s interests. It was even believed that such involvement would be counter-productive and have a damaging effect on Britain’s standing as a world power.

There is, of course, a good deal of truth in the often repeated statement that Britain missed the European bus between the late 1940s and the mid 1950s. However, it had not occurred to Churchill that there was a bus which needed to be caught. On the whole, it is therefore difficult to disagree with Roy Jenkins’s assessment that “it could hardly have been expected that a second Churchill government, inevitably existing in a glow of nostalgia for the first and greater one, would make the necessary break with the trappings of world power”. This would have to wait for another decade and longer.

Klaus Larres

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172. CHARLTON, Price of Victory, pp.124 ff.
Cold War Threats and America’s Commitment to the European Defense Community: One Corner of a Triangle

Ronald W. Pruessen

“A twice-told tale” can be tedious, Shakespeare wrote in King John, ill-suited to rousing interest in “the dull ear of a drowsy man.” How much worse the likely fate of yet another recounting of the oft-told European Defense Community saga? After more than four decades and countless discussions, is it time to pass by the EDC facts – or fiasco – in silence?

No. Historians can be a strange breed, after all, possessed of an almost infinite capacity for review and retelling. This is usually to our credit. Our scholarly discipline appropriately assumes that the passage of time actually requires reconsideration of familiar tales: new sources may become available, later experiences may affect the way we read the old ones, cooling passions may alter judgments and conclusions, etc. The EDC “story,” in this respect, deserves regular revisiting – even if a drowsy reader may be somewhat at risk.

Although specifically US policies regarding EDC have been considered many times, for example, our understanding of those policies might well benefit from further attention. This is not to say a full-scale, blow-by-blow narrative covering all relevant developments between 1950 and 1954 will be necessary or appropriate here. The long and notorious course of Washington policy-making – from initial confusion and improvisation to ultimately ham-handed threats of “agonizing reappraisal” – has been amply charted.1 What might be valuable instead is an analytical updating regarding some of the themes or fundamentals which permeate the tale’s month-to-month unfolding.

In particular, US perceptions and US motivations deserve ongoing consideration. What did American policy makers see in the world of the early 1950s which led them to support the creation of a supranational military organization by France, Germany, Italy, and the Benelux countries? What goals did they think would be achieved by a multinational army with an integrated command operating in tandem with a political superstructure that would serve as a de facto defense ministry for a major portion of Europe? It is true that scholarly analysis along these lines has long

1. The standard source for the EDC story as a whole remains E. FURSDON, The European Defense Community: A History, London 1980. Because any number of important archival materials were unavailable to Fursdon at the time he was writing, more recent studies may be valuable even if their focus is somewhat different. S. DOCKRILL, Britain’s Policy For West German Rearmament, 1950-1955; Cambridge 1991, provides numerous additional insights and much new evidence, for example. M. P. LEFFLER, A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War, Stanford, California 1992, provides both a first-rate survey of foreign policy making throughout the 1945-1953 period and much information about the shaping of US policies regarding the strengthening of NATO and the rearmament of West Germany. D. ACHESON, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department, New York 1969, also remains useful for its extensive attention to the American side of the EDC story.

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since developed a sophistication lacking in the earliest studies. Initial emphasis was almost exclusively focused on American preoccupations with the “international communist conspiracy.” The argument ran that Cold War anxieties generated a determination to expand the “containment” contributions of European allies, with a substantial extra boost to come via the tapping of West Germany’s military and economic resources. Ongoing research – particularly in US government records not originally accessible – gradually made it clear that the wellsprings of Washington policies were actually more complex than such emphasis on Cold War threats suggested. Of greatest importance, much evidence demonstrated bifurcated US and European concerns with both a Soviet and a German menace. If the policy makers of the late 1940s and early 1950s were fearful of immediate Kremlin machinations, that is, they also worried about the revival of an aggressive Reich. Life experiences for post-1945 leaders on both sides of the Atlantic made them familiar with two devils – and the virtue of a program like EDC was that it would utilize German strength for dealing with one while creating a formal structure within which the second would be controllable. To use the telling phrase that captures the combination of motives involved here, EDC was conceived as a tool of “dual containment.”

As valuable as this analytical progression has been to an understanding of EDC – and many other features of transatlantic relations in the earlier years of the Cold War, for that matter – some additional refinement may yet be in order. In particular, placing the details of EDC’s history into the context of US thinking regarding Europe as a whole helps to highlight another important source of Washington policies. In the end, it is not unreasonable to conclude that the concept of “dual containment” should be expanded to “triple containment” – indicating the way in which American desires to solve a variety of more broadly European problems frequently complemented concerns about Soviet or German ones. From a Washington perspective, the behavior of allies like Great Britain, France, Italy, Belgium, and the Netherlands was often problematic. Relationships were seen as enormously valuable, but complex and troubled – because of European “bad habits” like colonialism, excessive nationalism, or flirtations with neutralism.

One of the great virtues of EDC was the way in which it seemed likely to nudge many important European players – not just the Germans – in valuable directions: toward providing more meaningful assistance in dealing with a Soviet menace and toward solving much older continental problems that were not exclusively attributable to German misconduct. Some scholarly work on various aspects of transatlantic relations has dealt with the way ambivalent US feelings toward Europe generated broadly-conceived “reform” campaigns. It is now appropriate to note the way in which these played

What is the place of “Cold War” concerns in a broadened – or complexified – portrayal of US policies toward EDC? Should earlier emphasis on Kremlin schemes and “containment” priorities now be seen as an example of the way both policy makers and scholars are capable of spinning myths to help them deal with disorienting crises? Perhaps this is one of the cases William Fulbright had in mind when he described Cold Warriors as “medieval theologians,” possessed of “a philosophy that explained everything (…) in advance” and ready to dismiss anything that “did not fit (…) as a fraud or a lie or an illusion (…)”.

But as Fulbright also argued, the “perniciousness” of all-encompassing anti-communism was more a function of “distortion and simplification” than “patent falsehood.” It is impossible to ignore the substantial amount of evidence indicating the Cold War sources of US enthusiasm for EDC – even if it is now equally impossible to ignore the evidence pointing in other directions. In part, at least, EDC was clearly one component of a whole cluster of early 1950s efforts designed to strengthen Western Europe and the so-called “Free World” for what were seen as intensifying struggles with the Soviet Union.

To a significant degree, in fact, this lane in the road to EDC was discernible before the 1950s. Like any number of other specific projects, that is, EDC emerged directly out of seminal Cold War calculations and became a later manifestation of milestone initiatives like the Marshall Plan and NATO. Support for EDC can easily be linked, for example, to the Truman administration’s bedrock conviction that the health and safety of Europe were of profound significance to the United States. By 1947, at the latest, Washington policy-makers were prepared to mobilize massive resources for the solution of what they saw as grave transatlantic problems. “The recovery of Europe” from the devastation of World War II “has been far slower than had been expected,” Secretary of State George Marshall declared in April 1947: “Disintegrating forces are becoming evident. The patient is sinking while the doctors deliberate.”

“It is now obvious that we greatly underestimated the destruction to the European economy by the war,” reported Undersecretary of State Will Clayton after a visit to the continent the following month: “Without further prompt and substantial aid from the United States, economic, social and political disintegration will overwhelm Europe.” State Department officials sometimes emphasized the dire economic consequences for the United States of a European situation veering toward “revolution” – Clayton’s list cited “markets for our surplus production gone, unemployment, depression, a heavily unbalanced budget on the background of

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, alternatively, focused on strategic implications. An April 1947 study surveying troubled global horizons took as its premise that the Soviet Union had become a “new eastern menace” whose “ultimate aim is world conquest (...).” Under such circumstances, “the entire area of western Europe is in first place as an area of strategic importance to the United States (...).” It was difficult to imagine, for example, “how Canada or the United States could live safely if France and/or Great Britain were under Soviet domination either by reason of military conquest or for the reason that communists had taken over control of their governments.”

There was a second early Cold War calculation which also paved the way to eventual US interest in EDC: If a troubled and threatened Europe was of fundamental significance to the United States, then a troubled and threatened Germany was of fundamental significance to Europe. “Whoever deals with Germany deals with the central problem of Europe,” John Foster Dulles declared in early 1947, shortly before serving as one of George Marshall’s advisers at the Moscow session of the Council of Foreign Ministers. General agreement with this proposition led policy makers to the conclusion that harshly punitive treatment of the defeated enemy should give way to rehabilitation and reintegration. “Are we going to try to keep Germany a running boil with the pus exuding over the rest of Europe,” Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal asked in March 1947, “or are you going to try to bring it back into inner society?” “We can keep Germany in these economic chains,” agreed former president Herbert Hoover, “but it will also keep Europe in rags.”

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, as early as April 1947, added an emphasis on the military significance of German revival:

“Without German aid the remaining countries of western Europe could scarcely be expected to withstand the armies of our ideological opponents until the United States could mobilize (...) Further, the complete resurgence of German industry (...) is essential for the economic recovery of France – whose security is essential for the combined security of the United States, Canada, and Great Britain.”

An analysis emphasizing dramatic needs and perils generated dramatic policy initiatives, of course. Was a weakened Europe endangered by either direct Soviet expansionism or communist subversion? Then strengthen Europe with the Marshall Plan’s economic transfusions and the psychological reassurances of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Would German rehabilitation and security speed up the overall process of continental recovery? Then modify the harshness of initial occupation procedures, work toward the efficiency of integration among at least three of the occupation zones, and arrange for a meaty share of European Recovery

9. J. F. DULLES, “A New Year’s Resolve,” January 17, 1947 address, John Foster Dulles Papers, Princeton University. (The John Foster Dulles Papers will hereafter be identified as DP.)
Program monies to go to this former enemy as well as old allies. And underline the US commitment to both Western Europe and Western Germany by mounting sturdy resistance to the Soviet Union’s Berlin “blockade.”

The correlation of Cold War concerns and transatlantic policy innovation continued into the early 1950s – because the concerns would simply not subside. For all the exhilaration that came with being “Present at the Creation” of a postwar world in which the US exercised stunning global leadership – to use the typically self-aggrandizing title of Dean Acheson’s memoirs – anxieties abounded. The Marshall Plan and NATO notwithstanding, the decade’s end brought a sense that there was, as Acheson put it in March 1950, “a trend against us.” The US ambassador to Moscow simultaneously noted that “The Russians gave every evidence of feeling that the tide was running in their favor” and “were active everywhere.” Successful testing of an atomic bomb and the triumph of the Chinese Communist Party, in particular, seemed to generate “a mounting militancy” in the Kremlin – “a boldness that is essentially new – and borders on recklessness,” according to the State department’s Paul Nitze. 12

Nitze, of course, would play a key role at just this time in drafting the notorious NSC-68, a call to arms whose basic premise was the purported death threat issued by the international communist conspiracy. It was the outbreak of war in Korea that really mobilized US actions, however, very much including a shake-up in policies toward Europe. Even allowing for a measure of purposeful exaggeration, it seems clear that the troubled early course of the conflict in Korea jolted policy makers and average citizens alike. Meeting with a group of Congressmen, Secretary of State Acheson confessed to the fear that time “is running out on us”: the United States “was in the greatest danger in its history, more so even than the crucial days marked by the battle of Gettysburg and the debacle at Pearl Harbor.” Massive unexpected aggression in Korea suggested that reckless communists might go on the move anywhere. General Omar Bradley, for example, worried about an invasion across the 38th parallel being “a tactical or strategical diversion – tactical to cover a Chinese communist invasion of Formosa, strategical to cover a Soviet invasion of Western Europe.” 13

Concern about potential Kremlin forays was doubled by the sense that the strength required to throw them back was seriously underdeveloped. Even before the Korean explosion, NSC-68 had warned that while “the United States has a large potential military capability (...) actual capability (...) is declining relative to the USSR” 14 Nor had NATO made much headway in building European preparedness. Under such circumstances, how would Washington be able to deal with any crisis added on to the one raging in Korea? And wouldn’t the very fact of inadequate military strength-in-being actually create a vicious cycle in which it would become

13. FRUS, 1950, III, 200-201; Bradley quoted in Dockrill, Britain’s Policy For West German Rearmament, 1950-1955, 32.
harder and harder to develop the vast potential that did exist? Throughout 1950, for example, there was a great deal of US hand-wringing over the “neutralist” temptations of European allies. On July 14, Acheson told the Cabinet that “It is becoming apparent to the world that we do not have the capabilities to face the threat, and the feeling in Europe is changing from one of elation that the United States has come into the Korean crisis to petrified fright.” From London, a dismayed Ambassador Lewis Douglas observed that “the will to fight (...) lies largely dormant” on the continent – “not because the great majority of the French people and of the German people and of the Belgians and the Dutch prefer communism, but because they doubt that the Soviet hordes can be resisted.”

Early and mid-1950 anxieties led to specific policy conclusions – which in turn eventually led to EDC. Whatever the costs, Washington concluded, NSC-68’s blueprint for a dramatic buildup of “Free World” strength had to be vivified. Mobilization on a variety of fronts was to be rapidly undertaken, with a willingness to tolerate risks and waste: as Acheson put it, “Prompt action is worth more than perfect action.”

A layer upon layer effort was envisioned. First, significant expansion of the US’s own forces would be necessary. Truman would go to Congress in order to – again in Acheson’s words – “ask for money, and if it is a question of asking for too little or too much, he should ask for too much.”

Second, European allies should be pressed toward maximum military preparedness as well. Aside from the fact that this would valuably augment overall antimunist strength, it would also nudge Congress toward greater generosity by demonstrating the stalwart support lining up behind new US leadership.

Third, however, Washington would also take steps to make it easier for the Europeans to be more forthcoming in the first place. Aside from continuing or expanding the material aid already arranged under the Military Assistance Program, the Truman administration opened itself to reconsideration of a longterm placement of US divisions in Europe and to the appointment of an American supreme commander for NATO. As Ambassador Lewis Douglas phrased it, such steps would “spur (...) the will to fight” among continental allies – there would be a “heavier weight upon America for the defense of Europe” and it would become clear that the US was willing to “wear the toga” of both immediate and ultimate responsibility.

Fourth, yet another step would be required in order to make it easier for both Americans and European allies to take the preceding ones: some means of tapping West Germany’s potential military strength would be devised. Given the massive costs of massive rearmament, Germany seemed as necessary for movement as it had when continental economic recovery had been the objective. In spite of many qualms about giving any kind of military capacities to a hated enemy only five

17. FRUS, 1950, I, 344-345.
18. FRUS, 1950, III, 190-191.
years after its defeat, Cold War necessities helped to force US and allied hands. *Le Monde* commented on the ultimate necessity of recognizing that “the rearming of Germany is contained in the Atlantic Pact like the yolk in the egg” – while some Germans began to accept the argument that adequate European defense was “nur ein Torso ohne Deutschland.” In the end, as Acheson put it to Harry Truman in July 1950, the question became “not whether Germany should be brought into the general defensive plan but rather how (...).”\(^{19}\)

Fifth, and finally, both Americans and Europeans would also have to take steps to induce the West Germans to actually follow through on any abstract inclination to contribute to defense. On one level, this came to involve a complex choreography of military design – in which Germany’s nascent power could be kept substantively limited, but not too noticeably. On another level, difficult “contractual” negotiations would be required regarding the dimensions of political sovereignty.\(^{20}\)

II

As Acheson’s words to Truman suggest, Washington’s decision to tie the strengthening of NATO to West German rearmament was quite clear by the mid-summer of 1950. Within two months, the State Department and the Pentagon had settled broad details of what the military called the “one package” proposal – and the Secretary of State had personally presented it to NATO ministers at meetings in New York. But the EDC treaty was not signed until May 1952. Why did it take more than a year and a half to move from Point A to Point B here, especially given US emphasis on the Cold War crises that had helped generate a determination to move in this direction in the first place?

In design, diplomacy, and other realms, it is often said that “the devil is in the details.” It is certainly easy enough to imagine considerable potential for time-consuming negotiations concerning any multilateral defense and budget rearrangements. But in the case of EDC, it is now generally accepted, a significant additional layer of complexity was foreordained by the fact that at least two devils were lurking in the details. On one hand, that is, preceding anxiety concerning Soviet behavior intruded in transatlantic developments in a continuing way – primarily via Moscow’s attempt to use alternating threats and peace offerings as a means of stymieing German rearmament.\(^{21}\) On the other hand, however, it was precisely in the working out of rearmament specifics that the great potency of worries about Ger-

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21. ACHESON, *Present at the Creation*, incorporates regular commentary on Soviet efforts to influence the fate of EDC: see, for example, Chapters 47, 57, 61, 64, 67.
many also became obvious. Long, passionate, and frustrating negotiations were needed to produce EDC because more than Cold War concerns were at the heart of its gestation and birth.

Perhaps “ambivalence” is the key word to keep in mind in trying to understand the impact of anxieties concerning Germany on the negotiations that yielded EDC. Policy makers – both European and American – were powerfully conflicted when it came to recasting relationships with their former enemy. If they had been more emphatically positive in their approaches toward Germany, progress on a multilateral rearmament agreement would have come more rapidly – but if they had been more thoroughly negative, there would have been no progress at all.

Positive predisposition concerning military questions had indeed developed by mid-1950, although it is necessary to risk a seeming absurdity by specifying that they were of both a positive and negative variety. In one sense, for example, leaders on both sides of the Atlantic speculated about the way in which German military potential would be a hugely beneficial addition to the western arsenal – “the greatest shield that we could get,” as John Foster Dulles once put it. More often, perhaps, the emphasis was on the reverse side of the same coin: the way in which a loss of Germany to Soviet control would drastically damage the balance of power. As one North Atlantic Council report summarized it, “Germany’s formidable industrial and military potential makes her, in the Soviet view, the key to control of all Europe.” One way or another, however, there was wide-ranging recognition of Germany’s overall importance. It was the “key battleground in the Cold War,” John McCloy maintained, and required attention accordingly.

But high appraisals of Germany’s future value never came close to wiping out the profound suspicions generated by Germany’s past. A never-ending stream of evidence concerning European sensitivities in this respect flowed over American policy makers – powerfully reinforcing anxieties that were already homegrown as well. Varied nightmare visions haunted the entire Atlantic community. In some cases, the focus was on the dangers that would be spawned by the revival of an independent and aggressive Reich. “There are still 70,000,000 Germans possessed of great qualities of industriousness, discipline and ambition, painfully compressed in a strategic area,” John Foster Dulles regularly warned: why would anyone imagine that leadership could not be seized by the kind of “militant and vengeful persons who will surely again be found in Germany?” Who could have a hard time understanding continental concerns about German economic recovery as well, John McCloy often asked, citing the “old fears of domination of the Ruhr in Europe’s economy” which regularly surfaced “with great vehemence and force.”

22. April 17, 1953 and July 16, 1954 minutes, Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Historical Series).
Cold War Threats

could be immune to worries about unilateral German military power? Certainly neither Dean Acheson nor Harry Truman were, as revealed in a July 1950 conversation:

“It seemed to us [Acheson said of State Department opinion] that to create a German General Staff in the German Army and a German military supply center in the Ruhr would be the worst possible move, would not strengthen but would rather weaken Western Europe and would repeat errors which had been made a number of times in the past. The President said that he agreed with this view and gave illustrations of the mistakes which had been made along this line from Napoleon’s time on.”

At other moments, transatlantic nightmares sprang from fears of the results of potential German-Soviet relationships. A best-case scenario – but still an awful one – involved a future in which Germany would become what Acheson described as “a neutral bloc in the center of Europe,” trying “to play the East off against the West.”

Charles Bohlen described an alternative worst-case scenario as one in which there was “less of a repetition of an individual German attempt to rule Europe by force and more of a fear of a Soviet-German combination. The distrust of Germany is reflected in the belief that as soon as Germany recaptures her freedom of maneuver she will inevitably begin to play the West off against the East with the very real danger of coming to rest on the side of the Soviet Union.” John McCloy often articulated the same point and once used an image that captures well the qualms so common among American policy makers: East-West confrontation over Germany, he suggested, was a “struggle for the soul of Faust.”

At one early point in deliberations about German rearmament, Dean Acheson articulated the complexity of the issue in a message designed to reassure the anxious French: like Paris, he said, Washington wanted to move in a way which would prevent “Russian or German, or perhaps Russian-German domination” of Europe. How easy – or possible – would it be to devise a policy that could simultaneously achieve such distinct and even potentially contradictory objectives? Perhaps the surprising thing is not that it took so long to negotiate EDC as much as that total transatlantic paralysis did not result.

In fact, however, many policy makers in Europe and the United States quickly came to believe that it was possible to solve this particular conundrum – although very few would have imagined that it would take quite so long to do so. “Integration” designed to produce a supranational military organization – EDC – came to be seen as the means by which competing anxieties could be assuaged. This was a direct outgrowth of an interest in European integration of various kinds that had been gathering steam through the 1940s. The evolution of both the Marshall Plan

29. FRUS, 1949, IV, 412.
Ronald W. Pruessen

and NATO, for example, had demonstrated transatlantic inclinations in this direction. And in the period during which EDC itself was being designed and debated, other evidence of the overall thrust was visible as well – the Schuman Plan most notably.

As early as 1947, John Foster Dulles had been thinking of European integration as a mechanism for specifically preventing the renewal of a German menace. What was needed, he argued, were “economic forces operating upon Germans” which were “centrifugal and not centripetal,” “natural forces which will turn the inhabitants of Germany’s states toward their outer neighbors” in a positive and cooperative rather than an aggressive fashion. This would make it possible “to develop the industrial potential of western Germany in the interest of the economic life of western Europe, including Germany, and do so without making Germans the masters of Europe.” The great beauty of pursuing programs like the internationalization of the Ruhr, in this regard, was that the allies could go beyond hoping that they were creating “a Germany which (...) would never again want to make war;” they would have created a European structure within which Germany “could not again make war even if it wanted to.”

Other US policy makers regularly voiced similar views in the period leading up to EDC negotiations. John McCloy saw a “united Europe” as the kind of “imaginative and creative policy” that would “link Western Germany more firmly into the West and make the Germans believe their destiny lies this way.” It made sense to “ennmesh” the Germans in structures that would both tap their resources and control their behavior.

George Kennan made a similar case, both regularly and forcefully. A 1949 Policy Planning Staff paper on the “Question of European Union” argued that:

“We see no answer to German problem within sovereign national framework. Continuation of historical process within this framework will almost inevitably lead to repetition of post-Versailles sequence of developments (...) Only answer is some form of European union which would give young Germans wider horizon and remove introverted, explosive, neurotic quality of German political thought (...).”

In an early 1950 debate with Charles Bohlen, Kennan continued to insist that “without federation there is no adequate framework within which adequately to handle the German problem.”

It was this kind of overall thinking which was applied to the specific problem of German rearmament – and which eventually generated EDC. John McCloy put it in very broad terms when he said that a “fundamental principle” of the US approach to 1950-51 negotiations was that “whatever German contribution to defense is made may only take the form of a force which is an integral part of a larger interna-

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32. The Policy Planning Staff paper is quoted in SCHWABE, “The United States and European Integration: 1947-1957,” 133; the remarks to Bohlen are in FRUS, 1950, III, 620.
tional organization”: “There is no real solution of the German problem inside Germany alone. There is a solution inside the European-Atlantic-World Community.”33 Quite quickly, the practical focus came to be on the “European-Atlantic” possibilities. The State and Defense Departments’ “one package” proposal of September 1950, for example, zeroed in on NATO strengthening involving Germany – stressing that the creation of “an integrated force” was “the best means of obtaining the maximum contribution from European nations and to provide as well a framework in which German contribution of a significant nature could be realized.” (Italics added.)34 In a message to Robert Schuman written two months later, Acheson laid out his personal logic even more clearly:

“I do not need to remind you of the attitude which the Government of the United States has displayed on innumerable occasions and in many forms, toward European integration. We favor it. I favor it. If the European countries could work it out in a practical manner a sound basis would be laid on which military and economic strength could be built. A rallying point would be created around which a free and civilized Europe could muster its energies for a successful defense (...) against the attacks of Communist nihilism and Soviet imperialism. It would perhaps be the soundest basis on which this generation could reinsure the next against another dangerous German aberration.”35

III

Two devils in the details – and the resulting conviction that “dual containment” of both the Soviet Union and Germany was necessary: here was a situation complicated enough to explain slow movement on German rearmament and EDC. But there was a third devil in the details, as well, and its existence is part of the story of how slow progress became very slow – and how even this became a dubious guarantee of success. The United States and its European allies shared a commitment to “dual containment,” that is, but this was a lowest common denominator in an overall relationship that could be problematic and even volatile. While shared convictions ultimately made important headway possible, many serious disagreements left Washington constantly anxious over both pace and viability. At many points, “triple containment” seemed to be the order of the day: keeping vigilant watch on the Kremlin and Germany, while simultaneously using EDC and other mechanisms as a way of taming difficult European behavior.

The most obvious – though not the most important – evidence of the US’s concern regarding overall European conduct can be found in the constant expressions of frustration over progress on NATO strengthening and German rearmament. Although it was clear that allies appreciated the logic of using the latter to help

33. SCHWARTZ, America’s Germany: John J. McCloy and the Federal Republic of Germany, 228.
34. FRUS, 1950, III, 274.
35. FRUS, 1950, III, 497.
achieve the former, preferences regarding specific mechanisms and timing were of mind-boggling variety. The fall of 1950 alone, for example, saw Byzantine debates concerning Washington’s “one package” proposal, the “Pleven Plan,” and the “Spofford Proposals.” This inaugurated a pattern that held all through the next eighteen months. So complicated did negotiations become – and so densely packed the trade-offs required to assuage competing sensitivities – that the EDC treaty finally signed in May 1952 contained 132 articles and various protocols – in comparison to NATO’s 14 articles. Nor did the potency of competition over game-plans diminish after the signing of the treaty. France, of course – although it was not alone in this respect – regularly sought modifications of agreed-upon terms. Pierre Mendès-France’s final efforts along these lines resulted in the failure of the August 1954 Brussels conference and paved the way for the debacle of the French Assembly’s vote on August 30.

It was France, certainly, that most frequently spurred angry words in Washington. There was a “pathological Gallic fear” of Germany which often went beyond the bounds of good sense, it was said, leaving Paris “stubborn and vengeful.” From his base in Bonn, John McCloy could lose patience with references to the “delicacy” of French public opinion: “I think the time has come to tell these people,” he advised the secretary of state, that “US opinion is getting damned delicate itself.” Nor did David Bruce’s Paris posting automatically yield greater sympathy. The ambassador could grumble darkly about the way in which a “26 percent popular commie vote” was a “cancer in [the French] body politic,” for example, and would have understood the bitterness of department colleagues fed up with France’s use of “a species of blackmail” to garner US aid in exchange for EDC promises.

But virtually every other European player also sparked US anger during the long EDC struggle. “Our estimable, if stubborn Dutch friends” played the role of “villain” at some points, as Acheson put it, when their doubts about the pace and scope of continental integration caused delays. So could the United Kingdom, for that matter, and for similar reasons. Both the Labour and the Conservative governments in power during the years EDC was being considered were disinclined to make the kind of continental commitments which Washington thought suitable for soothing allies afraid of being left alone with Germany. Churchill sometimes made matters particularly difficult by criticizing the specific EDC mechanism that was finally devised: he developed a fondness for saying that a European army should be like a strongly bound clutch of firelogs, not “a bucket of wood pulp.”

36. This interesting indication of the special complexity of the EDC treaty is commented on in DOCKRILL, Britain’s Policy For West German Rearmament, 1950-1955, 105.
38. Acheson’s use of the word “villain” can be found in FRUS, 1952-1954, V, 680-2. Another example of concern regarding the Benelux countries is on 597.
Some European players could be criticized for a number of the other frustrating behaviors associated with France, as well. Italy was seen as regularly interested in bartering its support for EDC, with respect to Trieste developments among other things. And the Germans were viewed as guilty of this and more. For all of Dwight Eisenhower’s ultimate interest in securing the right kind of German rearmament, for example, he sometimes grew angry at the “blackmail” tendencies of an Adenauer government bent more on speeding up a return to sovereignty and status. John McCloy, for his part, could also express dismay in this respect. The Germans could be “almost hysterical” when they thought “discrimination” against them was in the air, for instance, and this certainly slowed overall progress. They just did not seem to adequately “understand that other countries still distrusted them and at times feel towards them a resistance not far short of revulsion.”

But American concerns with European behavior went far beyond the specific difficulties connected with building EDC. The angry words that sometimes flew in this connection were essentially only momentary sparks – notable, but primarily because of the way they reveal the deeper, long-burning fires of American anxieties regarding Europe. It was these deeper fires which helped fuel US policy in the early 1950s, augmenting the power simultaneously engendered by concerns about the Soviet Union and Germany.

The fires had started burning long before the 1950s, of course, and the full span of American anxieties about Europe is at the center of an old and largely familiar tale. Full exposition would require attention to centuries of transatlantic history, back to 17th and 18th century qualms about “mother” countries from which at least some colonists had sought escape. For the purposes of this discussion, brief attention to some facets of the story’s 19th and 20th century evolution will suffice – because it is here that greatest relevance to EDC can be found.

What emerged over time, most notably, was the kind of ambivalence already noted above, in connection with post-1945 attitudes toward Germany. Americans consistently valued their transatlantic economic and cultural ties, that is, but also found constantly troublesome problems in many elements of European behavior. Militarism and imperialism, in particular, clashed with the values to which most Americans paid at least some lip service. After 1914, the perils and costs of these European tendencies came to be seen as horrendously high – for countries on both sides of the Atlantic. And after 1939, the reform of Europe – in the interest of global peace and prosperity – became a top priority for American policy makers.

One of the remedial techniques considered during World War II was more and more regularly emphasized in its aftermath: integration. Faith in integration as a

means of making it safe to tap the resources of a reviving Germany, that is – also discussed above – had a reach that went beyond the defeated enemy and had origins of a far more generic nature. If Europeans – not just Germans – could move toward cooperative rather than competitive relationships, it was argued, the vicious cycle of war and peace might at last be broken. If they could begin to break down traditional walls of trade and currency restrictions, for example, functional collaboration would rationalize the economic environment – and generalized prosperity would reduce the likelihood of new internecine clashes.

The Marshall Plan was a crucial early product of such thinking, a means of vivifying Washington’s interest in the need for a new kind of European house. The Plan’s cooperatively drafted blueprint spurred optimistic thoughts of a new era in transatlantic relations. But by the end of 1949, it seemed clear that the pace was not being maintained in the way desired by US policy makers. Britain, France, and others were seen as dragging their feet on the kind of ongoing economic reforms originally envisioned, for example. Early discussions of taking further steps toward the rehabilitation and reintegration of Germany produced little cooperation, as well. In a pessimistic conversation with colleagues Charles Bohlen and Paul Nitze, George Kennan revealingly argued that “Europe is a patient whom we have been treating and who we can now say will not die but who, during the convalescent period, is showing decided tendencies to drift back into its former bad habits of disunity.” (Italics added.)

Halting this drift became a major Washington objective, beginning well before the outbreak of conflict in Korea and emphatically continuing long after its conclusion. Working with like-minded Europeans, US policy makers more and more enthusiastically pushed an integrationist agenda. Spring 1950’s Schuman Plan became the most dramatic early effort, prompting heartfelt Washington support. Its successful execution, John McCloy argued, would serve as “a sort of test of whether the European countries are yet prepared to work together in creating a progressive European community which will advance the interests of all and overcome the cleavages of the conflicts of the past.” This was exactly the kind of logic soon attached to EDC. Building a new supranational institution within which to achieve German rearmament would fortuitously accomplish a number of goals in one fell swoop. The tools of “dual containment” would be strengthened, to be sure, but progress toward the construction of a new European house would also be advanced – and Europeans would be better able to enjoy the peace and prosperity threatened by the Soviets, the Germans, and themselves. It would be possible, as Dean Acheson put it, “to reverse incipient divisive nationalist trends on the continent” and forestall what George Ball called “the insidious exhumation of old, dark rivalries, fears, and complexes.”

42. FRUS, 1950, III, 620.
44. Acheson in FRUS, 1949, IV, 471; Ball quoted in SCHWARTZ, America’s Germany: John J. McCloy and the Federal Republic of Germany, 96.
The story of EDC’s convoluted origins very much belongs to the Truman administration, as the treaty’s May 1952 signing obviously suggests. But the battle to get it ratified took place primarily on Eisenhower’s watch, symbolized by the fact that final coffin nails were only hammered down in August 1954. This is a part of the saga that deserves at least brief attention here as well — for two reasons. First, because US motives and US perspectives were continually revealed by the maneuvers which filled the frustrating months between the treaty’s ceremonial baptism and its painful death. Second, because the striking consistency of policy which ties the Republicans to the Democrats in this case suggests the fundamental power of those motives and the permeability of those perspectives.

Coming to power in January 1953, Dwight D. Eisenhower and John Foster Dulles were in total agreement with the Truman administration’s staunch EDC advocacy. This may not be surprising in view of the close connections which both men had had with the retiring Democrats — e.g., Eisenhower’s role as NATO Supreme Commander and Dulles’s frequent work at George Marshall’s and Dean Acheson’s State Department — but electoral fortunes sometimes cut old ties and induce policy amnesia. This never came close to happening in the case of EDC because the new administration’s primary foreign policy shapers felt exactly the same concerns and impulses as the old. All three of the forces which had initially produced American enthusiasm for NATO strengthening and German rearmament in the Truman years continued to fuel it.

There is certainly no doubt about the ongoing significance of a Cold War thrust. If anything, Eisenhower and Dulles became known for adding new jolts of anti-Kremlin zeal to US foreign policy. Nor was this image simply a product of the secretary of state’s notorious penchant for to-the-brink denunciations of “godless communism.” The president himself seemed to be a true crusading believer as well. In his last public address as president of Columbia University, he girded himself for new battles by reminding his listeners that the struggle against the Soviet Union which he would now be directing was “a war of light against darkness, freedom against slavery, Godliness against atheism.” Such a view was a steady companion. Eisenhower was extremely skeptical of the talk of change in Moscow policies after Stalin’s death, for instance. As he told British and French leaders in December 1953, at the Bermuda conference, “it was clear there had been no change since Lenin.” He believed that the same Soviet slattern was walking the street — and that “despite bath, perfume or lace, it was still the same old girl (...)” He was also convinced that it remained necessary to “pull the old girl off the main street and put her on a back alley.”

Western Europe and Germany were certainly on this main street and both Eisenhower and Dulles were anxious to use EDC as a means of keeping the Soviets out of the neighborhood. One core ingredient of the new president’s policies was his
conviction that atomic bombs and long-range bombers had ended the days in which
the oceans had served as great protective barriers for the United States. As he once
lectured Congressional leaders:

“Today those barriers no longer exist and Germany and Japan have become the two
great anchors in the defense of freedom, the two great prizes that the Communist
world is seeking to attain (...) we must keep on our side the great industrial potential
of Japan and Western Europe. We must keep them from falling into Communist
hands.”

Dulles would have agreed wholeheartedly. He had been personally responsible
for negotiating the Japanese Peace Treaty in 1950-51 and had been intensely con-
cerned about transatlantic relations since the days of Woodrow Wilson. In 1953
and 1954, he regularly underlined EDC’s value for safeguarding crucial European
interests against Cold War dangers. “The big prize the Communists were after was,
above all, Germany,” he told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Failure to
ratify EDC – failure to “consolidate the position in Europe” – would create danger-
ous Kremlin opportunities. The Russians would be able to offer the Germans “so
much (...) East Germany, restoration of the Polish boundary, trade” – and then “the
first thing you know, Germany is going to be stolen right from under our noses.”
French obstreperousness was staggeringly dangerous as a result: “The trouble is,”
Dulles argued, “when France drifts, Germany goes over the abyss.”

But Eisenhower and Dulles were more than Cold Warriors. As expanding archi-
val sources have generated more scholarly work on the 1950s, a consistent analyti-
cal theme has been the presence of complexity beyond the ken of the two leaders’
contemporaries. The struggle for EDC certainly substantiates such a perspective.

Both the President’s and the Secretary of State’s commitment to “dual contain-
ment” had been demonstrated even before 1953, for example. In Dulles’s case, par-
ticularly, the advocacy of both using and controlling Germany had remained a
steady ingredient in his policy advice after its first appearance in 1947. EDC
became one component of a valuable cluster of mechanisms for generating the
“centrifugal forces” he wanted to have acting on Germany – forces needed to coun-
teract the “centripetal” ones that had kept it isolated and dangerous in the past. As
he put it during the tense weeks just preceding the fateful French vote of August
1954, “It would be an incalculable disaster if there was a failure” of the policy
designed “to ally Germany with the West and to prevent the revival of German milita-
rism.”

Eisenhower was in full agreement. He had been so, in fact, since the summer of
1951, when his own advice along “dual containment” lines had helped persuade
Truman and Acheson to rally behind the plans that ultimately produced EDC. His

46. R. FERRELL, ed., The Diary of James C. Hagerty: Eisenhower in Mid-Course, 1954-1955, Bloom-
ington, Indiana 1983, 140.
47. PRUESSEN, John Foster Dulles: The Road to Power, Chapters 3, 5-7, 12-13, 16-17.
48. July 16 and July 22, 1954 transcripts, Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
(Historical Series).
administration’s policies never wavered in this respect. NSC 160, “US Position With Respect to Germany” – adopted midway through his first year as president – identified EDC as a “vital” necessity because of the way it would “harmonize three aims: (1) the securing of a German contribution to European defense; (2) the provision of acceptable safeguards against revival of German militarism; and (3) the cementing of Germany firmly to Europe and the West.” This was often Eisenhower’s personal message as well. During the Bermuda discussions with Winston Churchill and Georges Bidault, in December 1953, he strongly urged completion of the drawn-out EDC drama. The supranational military structure would have enormous value as “a federation” from which the Germans “could not break loose. They must never be in a position where they could blackmail the other powers and say ‘meet my demands or else.’” He was convinced that Adenauer’s government was totally devoid of the “evil forces” that had generated Hitler, but why take chances?50

Eisenhower and Dulles saw EDC as a tool of “triple containment” as well – a safe means of reintegrating a valuable Germany that was also a mechanism for taming what were seen as the dangerous proclivities of Europeans in general. Dulles had a near-lifetime of interest here. He had begun urging the virtues of functional economic cooperation as early as the 1920s and had become an explicit advocate of wide-ranging continental integration during World War II. In agreement with his old friend Jean Monnet, he argued that “European federalism” could prevent reconstruction of the “world’s worst firetrap.”51 By the time he became secretary of state, Dulles had become so well known for his interest in European integration that one old department hand could quip about devotion to a “sole-cure patent remedy.”52 Eisenhower was a later convert, but he quickly came up to Dulles’s speed. European integration became what the president himself called his “pet” concern and he took many opportunities to argue its merits. One early example was his eloquent and widely-noted speech to the English Speaking Union in July 1951:

“Europe cannot attain the towering material status possible to its people’s skills and spirit so long as it is divided by patchwork territorial fences. But with unity achieved, Europe could build adequate security and, at the same time, continue the march of human betterment that has characterized Western civilization.”53

Both Eisenhower and Dulles channeled their overall enthusiasm for European integration into EDC. There were few individual subjects which prompted more regular comments from them between 1952 and 1954 – and fewer still which were capable of producing the same level of intense anxiety or passionate determination. Eisenhower could energetically press his case with Konrad Adenauer, for example, by describing EDC as “the first step toward [the] process of European federation. Hopes and expectations have been built up which should not be blasted by procras-

51. PRUESSEN, John Foster Dulles: The Road to Power, Chapters 5, 12-13.
53. AMBROSE, Eisenhower, Volume II: The President, 507-509; the July 1951 is quoted in Dock-Rill, Britain’s Policy For West German Rearmament, 1950-1955, 70.
Dulles, for his part, quickly began to apply pressure on London and Paris. During Washington meetings with the British and French foreign ministers in July 1953, he could hardly have been more emphatic regarding the need to rapidly ratify EDC:

“... showed that Western Europe would tear itself to pieces unless the Franco-German problem were resolved. He said the results of the European wars had been a decline in the power and influence of Western civilization. At present it almost looked as if this were our last chance which would be followed by a return to the Dark Ages if we failed. The Secretary concluded, saying it was impossible to exaggerate the importance which we attach to European integration, and the tragic effects which would result if it appeared the movement were dead.”

The most famous example of Dulles’s pressure for EDC, of course, was his “agonizing reappraisal” speech of December 14, 1953. What is often lacking in commentary on the notorious phrasing of this statement, however, is awareness of the way in which the broader case being made was a vintage example of “triple containment” logic. EDC’s value, Dulles told the North Atlantic Council, was its potential for ending the “traditional strife” that had plagued Europe. Why might the United States have to undertake “an agonizing reappraisal” of its transatlantic relations?

“The answer is that the nations which have long led the West have so repeatedly fought each other that they have sapped their own vitality and diminished their authority and their prestige in the world. If the West cannot now build a safer home for its civilization, then its statesmanship will be judged bankrupt and men everywhere will look elsewhere for leadership (...) If (...) the European Defense Community should not become effective, if France and Germany remain apart so that they will again be potential enemies then there would indeed be grave doubt as to whether Continental Europe could be made a place of safety.”

It should also be added that Dulles explicitly distinguished between his Cold War concerns and the other forces pushing him toward such faith in EDC’s value. “Even if the Soviet threat were totally to disappear,” he revealingly argued, “would we be blind to the danger that the West may destroy itself? Surely there is an urgent, positive duty on all of us to seek to end that danger which comes from within.”

Conclusion

The passing of time and the expansion of historical research makes it desirable to complexify the old and seemingly familiar story of US enthusiasm for EDC – to broaden analysis from narrow emphasis on Cold War anxieties to more widerang-

ing concerns regarding the future of Germany, Europe, and the Atlantic community. If there is logic in identifying the distinct components of American perspectives and motives, however – to talk about “dual” and “triple” containment – it is also ultimately necessary to remain sensitive to the way the components came together in the early 1950s. US policy makers hoped that EDC would help produce a future in which ancient enemies would be “woven together in a European fabric of mutual understanding and common endeavor (...).”57 Washington’s powerful impulses in this direction were themselves like the product of a careful intermeshing of separate yarns: attention to the complexities of the warp and woof should not distract from appreciation for the cloth as a whole.

EDC’s potential ability to simultaneously satisfy a variety of concerns, in fact, was precisely one of the key reasons for the special level of US enthusiasm it generated. Something that could achieve one significant goal was bound to be appreciated; something that could achieve two – or even three – could be fought for passionately. In the heat of some moments, to be sure, like December 1953 and August 1954, American policy makers could exaggerate EDC’s unique qualities. They could temporarily lose sight of the way their own diplomacy or the efforts of others might be perfectly capable of accomplishing worthwhile objectives through other means. But historians would do well to note the relative significance of the passion as compared to the sometimes distorted judgments. Eisenhower and Dulles, for example, quickly came around to supporting Western European Union as a substitute for EDC. They also quickly lent their support to the negotiations that produced the Common Market. It was their deep passion for European integration that made it easy for them to do this – and if the story of EDC helps to highlight the complex nature of that passion, then it continues to offer valuable insights into a crucial period in the history of transatlantic relations.

Ronald W. Pruessen

The Role of the Soviet-Union as a Factor in the French Debates on the European Defence Community

Pierre Guillon

Since Raymond Aron and Daniel Lerner published their classic work on that subject immediately after the event, much light has been shed on the great debate stimulated by the European Defence Community (EDC) – a debate that encompassed French political and governmental circles and the military leadership. We owe this wealth of information to numerous works that used parliamentary debates, recollections by the main actors and witnesses, the archives of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defence.

It is the object of this article to throw into relief the “Soviet factor” in those debates: to show how the perception of the Soviet danger developed, how possible reactions on the part of the USSR were taken into consideration and how Soviet diplomatic initiatives were viewed.

For public and political opinion in France, the German danger and the Soviet danger formed a dialectical relationship: there was the belief that French security was threatened both by a revival of the power of Germany and by the aggressiveness of Soviet policy. Whenever the Soviet danger seemed to grow, fear of Germany diminished; whenever, on the other hand, the Soviet danger seemed to decrease, the fear of Germany again assumed the priority. A certain periodization then seems to be called for: in 1950/51, under the impact of the Korean War and the ensuing intensification of the Cold War, the danger the Soviet Union was blamed for having created for Western Europe drove many Frenchmen to accept West Germany’s rearmament. Since 1953, with Stalin’s death and the Korean armistice, the relaxation of international tension left the impression that the German rearmament, after all, was not opportune.

So the fear of the Soviet threat dominated the negotiations which, since the autumn of 1950, were conducted between the Western powers with the purpose of determining the conditions for German rearmament – negotiations which led to the signing of the EDC treaty on the 27th of May 1952.

In fact, the Soviet danger provoked contradictory responses. To the Prime Minister, René Pleven, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Robert Schuman, this threat proved the urgent need for setting up a European army and this position was adopted by the cabinet. But several of their colleagues made the point that they should proceed with caution and should not close the door on any discussions with the Soviet Union. At the conference held in Brussels from December 18 to December 22, 1950, Robert Schuman nevertheless announced that France accepted German rearmament within the framework of a European Defence Community. At the same time, however, he made it clear that the EDC should not bar all negotiations with the USSR on the subject of Germany, if the chance for them should come up.  

In order not to offend the USSR too much, the advocates of the EDC were always anxious to reaffirm the point that the Yalta and Potsdam decisions with regard to the German problem as a whole and with regard to Berlin in particular were still in force and were in no way affected by the inclusion of West Germany into the EDC.

Within the cabinet, Schuman used two arguments in favour of the EDC. On the one hand, he pointed out, a sufficiently strong force was needed in the heart of Europe; the USSR would not accept a direct rearmament of Germany, but it would accept more easily German contingents within a European army. This was also the point of view of Hervé Alphand, French representative in NATO who chaired the conference of the Six charged to work out the draft treaty for the EDC; the EDC, he believed, would appear less provocative to Soviet eyes than would West German national armed forces.

On the other hand, it seemed necessary to prevent the USSR from inveigling West Germany into a separate deal on reunification. The EDC, which would integrate the Federal Republic closely into Western Europe, would ensure these overall French objectives.

Confronted with the Soviet danger, the military leaders were as anxious as René Pleven and Robert Schuman to have West Germany participate in the defence of Western Europe. But they dismissed the EDC solution: this device, they feared, risked delaying the strengthening of Western defence and would impair its effectiveness. What was needed instead was a considerable and speedy German contribution, because time was running out. In addition, because the European army would integrate all the armed forces in Western Europe, the largest possible German contribution was considered indispensable; and because Germany would enjoy full equality, it was inevitable that West Germany would come to dominate

3. BARIETY, op.cit.
5. Long report by Hervé Alphand, 14 August 1951, quoted by POIDEVIN, op.cit.
7. Mémorandum des chefs d’état-major au ministre de la Défense, 6-2-1951, quoted by VIAL, op.cit. p. 53. This argumentation was taken up by the Comité des chefs d’état-major in a memorandum of 15 November 1951; GUILLEN, op.cit., p. 11.
the EDC, not least because the French were entangled in financial difficulties as well as in the Indo-China war. Of course, French military leaders considered this unacceptable.\footnote{GUILLEN op.cit., p. 16.}

This feeling of extreme urgency was blurred, once the military situation in Korea stabilized; in March 1951, the Chief of Staff of the French army believed that there was no basis to fear an imminent conflict in Europe.\footnote{AURIOL, op.cit., 1952, p. 282.} The military leaders thus accepted the so called “risk” of an EDC as designed by the government. Even if the EDC did not allow for a real increase of western defences against the USSR, it would still make it possible to consolidate French leadership on the continent vis-à-vis the Anglo-Americans. This was the reason why the military gave their conditional assent to the EDC during the spring and summer of 1951.

But during the winter of 1951 and the spring of 1952, the EDC again seemed unacceptable to the military leaders because it proved necessary simultaneously to increase the war effort in Indochina to the detriment of the French contribution to the defence of Europe. Once again they feared that EDC would be dominated by the Germans. On the other hand, the disequilibrium of military forces in Europe between East and West was widening — a fact that made a German contribution necessary more quickly than could be achieved through the EDC. General Juin underlined this before the National Defence Committee, on April 24, 1952, and demanded that German divisions be raised as soon as possible — German divisions that would be at the disposition of NATO.\footnote{Ibidem, meeting of 20 December 1950.}

While the military leaders took exception to the EDC, because they considered it as ineffective vis-à-vis the Soviet threat, the opponents of the EDC in the political realm feared above all Soviet reactions, and kept pleading for negotiations among the Big Four. In November 1950, the foreign affairs committee of the French National Assembly was startled by a motion that demanded a meeting of the four Foreign Ministers to discuss German demilitarization.\footnote{Ibidem, meeting of 8 November 1950.} During the following months the committee insisted that Robert Schuman should be present himself to explain the problem of German rearmament and Soviet reactions to it. Interrogated by Maurice Schumann, the minister had to pledge that if an agreement among the Big Four on Germany took shape, it would be necessary to “review the whole situation”,\footnote{Ibidem, meeting of 2 February 1951.} and in February 1951 left wing members of the committee demanded that German rearmament be postponed altogether while the invitation to a conference of the Big Four was pending.\footnote{Ibidem, meeting of 2 February 1951.}

These attacks on the EDC were renewed in August

\begin{footnotes}
8. Note de Général Stehlin 6-11-1951, memorandum of the chefs d’état-major 15 November 1951; GUILLEN op.cit., p. 16.
11. Motion Biscarlet, finally rejected by 25 votes against 12 and 2 abstentions; Archives de l’Assemblée nationale, Commission des Affaires étrangères, meeting of 8 November 1950.
\end{footnotes}
When the National Assembly debated the EDC project in February 1952, many members expressed the wish that at least an attempt should be made to achieve an understanding with the USSR before the EDC was signed, as this signature would aggravate the tension with the USSR and threaten to trigger a military conflict. Others stressed that this step would be inappropriate, because the USSR had just initiated a gesture of peace by accepting another meeting of the Disarmament Commission of the United Nations – a gesture that could indicate an important contribution to détente. Others, finally, considered the EDC as too inefficient to be able to put up a resistance to pressure and threats on the part of the Soviet Union; at the very least, the United States and Great Britain should offer a guarantee that a threat against one member state of the EDC would be considered as a menace to their own security. As some members of the MRP and SFIO demanded the fulfilment of this condition, Robert Schuman had to take account of it. At the end of April 1952, he obtained such an Anglo-American declaration – an achievement that allowed him to meet this condition. At long last, at the end of the parliamentary debate of February 1952, the project of the EDC was carried by a majority of only 40 votes. In addition to communist and Gaullist deputies who voted no, 20 socialists, some radicals and MRP members cast a negative vote because they demanded that, as a precondition of signing the EDC treaty, a last attempt to secure an understanding with the Soviet Union should be made.

Those parliamentarians who opposed the EDC because they feared Soviet reactions and thought that détente between East and West would become impossible, were able to count on a powerful supporter: the President of the Republic, Vincent Auriol, who was dead set against the EDC. In a long letter written to Prime Minister Pleven in August 1951 Auriol stressed that accepting the EDC would lead to certain war. Once rearmed, Germany would try to involve the West in its reunification and the reconquest of its lost territories; at any event, the Soviet Union would avail itself of this opportunity to “accelerate the course of events”. Signing the EDC treaty, Auriol argued, would also be grist to the mill of Soviet propaganda relayed in France by the communist party and would increase the latter’s popularity among the French voters; in fact, Soviet propaganda that accused the Western powers of preparing a war and which launched offers of peace, of conversations among the Big Four, of a reduction of armaments was bearing fruit in France, where the impression was growing that the United States and its Allies were bent solely on war. Auriol, therefore, suggested that France and its allies propose discussions on peace, the control of armaments and a limitation of national forces in talks with the USSR. In his view it was necessary to mobilize public opinion and not to remain on the defensive to the brunt of attacks by Soviet propaganda.

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In general, Vincent Auriol was in favour of seeking to solve the German problem in conjunction with the Soviets and, for that reason, of giving up German rearmament, and thus the EDC. He came back to this point in cabinet discussions, as soon as it looked as if the negotiations for the EDC treaty were near to conclusion. Because of the reawakening of nationalism and irredentism in West Germany, he feared, that the German units within the EDC could provoke incidents likely to end up in a conflagration with the East, and kept pleading for conversations with the USSR to settle the German problem.

The Quai d’Orsay did not share the President’s views. Nevertheless, Auriol was able to rely on numerous reports which were coming in from the French ambassador in Berne, Hoppenot, who gave the assurance that the Soviet Union, in exchange for the abandonment of the EDC, was prepared to evacuate the GDR (German Democratic Republic) and to favour the reunification of a neutralized Germany; if this formula failed, the Soviet diplomats in Berne confirmed, this would mean war.

Of course, the notes the Soviets sent in 1952 on Germany represented a godsend for the opponents of EDC advocating a dialogue with Moscow. These notes impressed both public and parliamentary opinion, and strengthened the feeling that, before starting to rearm Germany, the West should try to negotiate with the USSR.

This confirmed Vincent Auriol’s standpoint: it would have been necessary, as he repeatedly had claimed, to take initiatives instead of letting the situation deteriorate and allowing the Soviets to start a huge peace offensive; if one simply said yes to their notes, he remarked, the Soviets would have a diplomatic advantage; saying no would enhance the communist propaganda; it was therefore necessary to make counterproposals. In a cabinet meeting held on May 23, 1952, Auriol recognized that it was impossible to postpone the signing of the EDC treaty that was scheduled to take place on the 27th; still, he asked the government to drag its heels in initiating the procedure of ratification while France waited to get a clearer picture of Soviet reactions to the signing of the treaty.

The President tried to mobilize those SFIO deputies who were suspicious of, if not hostile to German rearmament and to EDC. He asked Ramadier to encourage the view among them that the door for negotiations with the USSR should not be

17. Note by Vincent Auriol to René Pleven, 27 August 1951; AURIOL, op.cit., 1951, p. 647-648. In a communication sent to Parodi, Auriol had already demanded that one should express “hautement notre volonté de paix”, and had denounced the softness of the Quai d’Orsay in responding to Soviet propaganda; ibidem, p. 227.
20. SOUTOU, “La France et les notes soviétiques”, op.cit., p. 263. Hoppenot seems to have been “manipulated” by a high Swiss official of Russian origin, who acted as an advocate for Soviet views.
closed: “We must achieve that the whole affair of the EDC is suspended until the Russian negotiation is settled.”

In the cabinet meeting of May 29, Robert Schuman pointed out that the Soviet reactions to the signing of the EDC did not seem to become as negative as he had feared, and yet, he had to concede that France had no reason to rush the ratification of the treaty. Indeed, the government was exposed to political pressure; the debate on the EDC in the Council of the Republic opened on June 12 confirmed that a considerable number of members insisted that all possibilities of coming to an understanding with the USSR should be explored, and refused to ratify the EDC treaty before a last conference of the Big Four was held.

As to the Quai d’Orsay, its position was unclear. At a high level meeting on March 14, 1952, under the direction of Parodi, the secretary general of the Foreign ministry, the idea of a unified Germany, that would be neutralized but rearmed, a proposal contained in the Soviet note of March 10, was rejected. A German army that was not enframed and restrained in a European context was thought to be extremely dangerous to French security. Although everyone believed that the Soviet note was designed to defeat the EDC, there was no consensus as to how to respond to it. Parodi and Margerie thought that the USSR was ready to buy the abandonment of Germany’s rearment at the price of a unified Germany that would be free in its diplomatic moves – something very dangerous. It was, therefore, necessary to speed up the process of signing and ratifying the EDC before embarking on negotiations with Moscow. On the other hand Laloy, Seydoux, and Sauvagnargues felt that one could not have the treaty ratified before having explored the medium of negotiations: The topic of unification plus neutralization was quite attractive and had a substantial echo in both French and German public opinion. It seemed therefore necessary to enter into negotiations and carry them on in such a way as to create the appearance of a Soviet responsibility for their failure.

Confronted with these two opposing views, Robert Schuman picked up both of them in the belief that it was necessary to sign the treaty as well as to negotiate with the Soviet Union. Being aware of the state of public opinion in France and Germany, he proposed creating at least the impression of taking the Soviet notes seriously and of not closing the door to negotiations. While preparing the Western answer to another Soviet note (of May 25), he succeeded in having the principle of a Big Four Conference on German unification accepted by the United States. If one responded to the Soviet notes by a blunt refusal simply rejecting them (simple \textit{fin de non recevoir}) one would provoke a feeling of deep disappointment among all those West Germans, who strove for reunification – a disappointment that the Soviet Union would be sure to exploit to its own advantage. All that was necessary, Schuman concluded, was to ensure that possible negotiations would not compromise chances for West Germany’s integration into the Western camp.

\begin{itemize}
\item 23. Talk with Paul Ramadier 26 May 1952; \textit{ibidem}, p. 360-361.
\item 24. \textit{Ibidem}, p. 368.
\item 25. SOUTOU, “La France et les notes soviétiques”, op.cit., p. 268.
\item 26. \textit{Ibidem}, p.266-269.
\end{itemize}
At the cabinet meetings of 19 and 23 March 1952, Robert Schuman argued thus: One should not be negative, but one should confront the Soviet note with a “constructive policy”, one should ask questions about free elections and the prerequisites for the establishment of a government for a unified Germany, in order to “see clearly” and to get to know the Soviets’ real intentions. Vincent Auriol raised the stakes: France could not tolerate dilatory formulas; instead what was needed was a precise plan that would prevent German-Russian rapprochement on the one hand, as well as any chance for Germany to reconquer its eastern territories on the other.27

On March 28, 1952, in a conversation with Pleven, now minister of defence, the President acknowledged that no time should be lost in organizing the European army, in order to put an end to the efforts by Germany to blackmail the West; but one should do so without forgetting that the French would have to come to an agreement with the Russians, unless one wanted the Germans to do this first. In his opinion the Quai d’Orsay lacked subtlety and finesse, because after all there was a real chance to come to an understanding with the Russians.28

Auriol returned to that question after the receipt of the second Russian note of April 9, 1952: In order to avoid the danger that Germany will either arrive at an understanding with the USSR or drag the Western powers into a war against the East, it will be necessary to offer to Moscow the abandonment of the EDC, free elections under Four Power control, the neutralization and the demilitarization of Germany with only a few international contingents stationed along the Western and Eastern borders under UN control.29 What was important was not to lose contact with the Russians and not to seek to “cut corners”.30

Following the third Soviet note of May 25, which was more polemical than the earlier two and which rejected the Western proposals, Auriol urged U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson not to harden the American position; the allied reply should not be purely negative, because, “the Russians fear Germany as much as we do”; for that reason, it was wise not to close the door to any conversation; one could construct the EDC in a way that one would arrive at “a sort of internationalization of security in Germany”. Schuman made the same point vis-à-vis Dean Acheson as well.31

Nonetheless, the French government did sign the EDC treaty on May 27, 1952. But it did not begin ratification procedures, because it knew perfectly well that it could not muster a majority in Parliament for it. German rearmament now appeared all the more inopportune, as discussions were being held in the UN disarmament commission. Jules Moch, who represented France, told his Soviet opposite number, Malik, that signing a treaty did not automatically mean ratifying it: The future of the EDC treaty depended on the future of East-West relations; in any case, he assured him that ratification would not occur that year, if at all.32

The change of government of January 1953 did not mean a change of attitude. George Bidault, who replaced Schuman in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, had not committed himself to the EDC. His view was that one could find a modus vivendi with the USSR which would have to be based not on a unified and neutralized Germany, which would be as dangerous to the East as it would be to the West, but on upholding the division of Germany in a way that the two camps would integrate their respective Germany, while ensuring that this integration would not do damage to the other camp.33

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After the death of Stalin in March 1953, the French government wondered whether Soviet foreign policy would not change direction. In a speech delivered before the British House of Commons on May 11, 1953, Churchill relaunched his project for a Big Four conference on Germany. One month later, the disturbances in East Germany revived speculations about a possible German unification. What were the consequences that one could draw from these events as far as the EDC was concerned? Bidault received conflicting advice and concluded that it was “urgently necessary to wait”.34 As for President Vincent Auriol, he instructed the French ambassador in Moscow, Louis Joxe, to tell Molotov that he would try to “arrange all these matters”; he planned to go to Russia in order to try to bring their views on European security and the German problem more closely together.35

The signing of the armistice in Korea in July 1953 further reinforced the argument of the opponents of the EDC: As a détente was taking shape, it seemed hardly advisable to rearm Germany and thus to impair the relations with the USSR. In other words: ratifying the EDC treaty was held to compromise any chances for disarmament and the maintenance of peace.36

Joseph Laniel, the new Prime Minister after the June 1953 reshuffle, and Bidault, who kept the portfolio of Foreign Affairs, were both subject to American pressures to ratify the treaty and tried to put the Americans off. It was impossible, they explained, to submit the treaty to Parliament before convening a conference of the Big Four, a step which in principle had been decided on. The number of those members of parliament who defended this point of view was also increasing. The determined opposition from the extremes of right and left in parliament and the divisions within the governmental majority therefore continued to block the process of ratification.37 In November, at a press conference, de Gaulle also gave his blessing to EDC’s opponents by depicting Russia as an ally if there was a German

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32. Conversation of Auriol with Jules Moch, 9 July 1952; ibidem, p. 481.
33. SOUTOU, “La France et les notes soviétiques”, op.cit., who uses the archives of the Quai d’Orsay and the Bidault papers, deposited at the Archives nationales.
34. BARIETY, op.cit.
36. POIDEVIN, op.cit.
threat and by advocating both “discrete conversations” and an “active diplomacy”.38

In July 1953, the Washington conference of the three major Western powers then debated the advisability of proposing to the USSR a Big Four conference on Germany. The British stated that they would not accept negotiations with the USSR unless the EDC was ratified by France. Finally yielding to Bidault’s pleadings they then revised their position and on July 15; the Western powers extended an invitation to the USSR. Bidault made sure that this invitation did not contain passages which could serve as an excuse for Soviets to decline.39

In the Quai d’Orsay, officials were quite sceptical. It seemed to them that the suppression of the uprisings in the GDR showed that the USSR did not really intend to go ahead with free elections for a unified Germany, even in exchange for the scrapping of the EDC. At the conference they anticipated Bidault would demand free elections, the USSR would refuse and the division of Germany would continue – a situation which was well in line with France’s interests.40

And yet, in its notes of August 4 and 15, 1953, the USSR accepted a Big Four conference, to discuss a provisional German government, free elections, and the working out of a peace treaty. In his speech before the Supreme Soviet of August 8, Malenkov emphasized the necessity of bringing the Cold War to an end. Addressing France, he called it France’s major interest to give up the EDC. To Bidault it appeared indispensable to stick to the proposal of a Big Four conference in order “to corner the USSR”41 (“au pied du mur”). Similarly, Auriol used his leverage in favour of holding a conference. The Gaullists, through their spokesman Gaston Palewski, encouraged him. For, since the death of Stalin, Palewski argued, it had become possible to negotiate with the Russians, whereas the United States made no acceptable proposals to them.42

President Auriol meanwhile prevailed on Ambassador Joxe to continue his démarches with Molotov, in order to find a solution to the German problem, in spite of the annoyance of the Quai d’Orsay which considered that this initiative might create divisions among the Western allies. According to Auriol, Joxe could propose to the Russians a European army including German units part of which would be stationed along the frontier of the Rhine, while the other part would be stationed along the neutralized Oder-Neisse border. In the heart of Germany there would be a total demilitarization. In his attempts to approach the Russians, Joxe would have to tell them: “Germany should not be a weapon in the hands of the one or the other.”43

42. Conversation by Auriol with Palewski, 6 October 1953; *ibidem*, p. 448.
43. Note of 16 October 1953 on a talk Auriol-Joxe; *ibidem*, p. 467-468.
In cabinet, Bidault considered that the Soviet notes of June 4 and November 26 did not contain anything new; evidently Russia once more stood up against both the plan of militarizing West Germany and the pressures exerted on France to ratify the EDC treaty; and yet, as Moscow accepted the convening of a conference on Germany of the Big Four, it was still necessary to avoid slamming the door to the continuation of talks.\footnote{Council of Ministers, 4 November and 2 December 1953; \textit{ibidem}, p. 497 et 536.}

Furthermore, the government had to take account of the feelings in Parliament. In the foreign policy debate at the National Assembly, from November 17 to November 27, a socialist motion insisted on convening a conference as quickly as possible and on French initiatives for disarmament being taken, as a prerequisite to the approval of the EDC. This motion polled 234 votes (as against 313 nays and 74 abstentions). The vote of confidence demanded by the government was itself affected by another Soviet note published on November 26, i.e. on the eve of the vote, and announcing Soviet acceptance of the proposal for a Big Four conference on Germany. The vote was just barely carried, with 275 votes in favour, 244 against and 103 abstentions, with some opponents of the EDC voting in favour because they calculated that the Big Four conference, which the USSR had just accepted, would render the ratification of the EDC unnecessary.\footnote{Journal officiel, Débats parlementaires, Sessions from 17 to 27 November 1953.}

At the four power conference of the foreign ministers that opened in Berlin on January 1,1954, Bidault turned down the idea of unifying and neutralizing Germany. Molotov, for his part, avoided any clear position on German reunification and seemed content to stay with the status quo. Bidault asked him twice whether sacrificing the EDC would lead to a modification of the Soviet stance. He got only evasive answers, a fact which nonetheless was taken as a gesture of détente.\footnote{L'Année politique, 1954, p. 327.}

The Quai d’Orsay felt its views had been sound: The USSR did not intend to abandon its hold on East Germany; it preferred to keep Germany divided, even at the price of a certain rearmament of the Federal Republic.\footnote{Circular Telegramme of the Quai d’Orsay 24.2.1954, quoted by SOUTOU, “La France et les notes soviétiques”, op.cit., p. 272.} Bidault shared this view: The USSR and France had the same common interest in the mutual recognition of the status quo: “The division of Germany for an indefinite period is foreseeable”.\footnote{Note by Bidault of 25 January 1954, quoted by SOUTOU, \textit{ibidem}. See also WEISENFELD, op.cit., p.67-68.}

In the last analysis, the security of France rested upon the division of Germany and the integration of the two Germanys into the opposing blocks. West Germany’s military integration into the Western system would guarantee French security both against the USSR and against Germany itself. But for Bidault and the majority of the high officials of the Quai d’Orsay this integration should be brought about not within the EDC, but within NATO, because close ties with the United
States against the USSR were considered more important than European integration.49

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Pierre Mendès France has been accused, especially by Dulles and Adenauer, of having scuttled the EDC in order to arrive at an understanding with the USSR on the neutralization of Germany and disarmament. In fact, when he became Prime Minister in June 1954, the fate of the EDC was already practically sealed: In parliament a mixed majority refused to discuss any further German rearmament before a new attempt for negotiations with the USSR had been made. The general opinion at the Quai d’Orsay and among the responsible military officers was that German rearmament would be more effective within the framework of NATO than within the EDC in order to counterbalance Soviet power.

Mendès France thus found himself subjected to strong pressure from Jules Moch, who continued to represent France at the UN disarmament commission and who was due to report on the EDC before the National Assembly on August 28. He demanded to propose to the USSR, in exchange for giving up EDC, an agreement providing for a progressive and internationally controlled disarmament.50 He was the spokesman of numerous members of parliament who wished to avoid a rupture with the USSR that would result from any ratification of the EDC.

Georges Boris and Simon Nora, influential advisers of the Prime Minister, also argued for the abandonment of the EDC, because they claimed that the USSR had no aggressive designs and only feared a German-American collusion directed against itself. The government had to be aware of the Soviet state of mind and to avoid increasing Western armaments, in order to ease tension between East and West.51

Some officials of the Quai d’Orsay also wanted a cautious renewal of the threads of negotiation with the USSR on Germany; but for some of them like the head of the European desk, Francois Seydoux, this implied putting off any kind of German rearmament. For others, it seemed necessary to settle that question – i.e. the adoption of the EDC or of any other formula for German rearmament -, to prevent the USSR from encouraging German nationalism and to maintain the unity of the West;52 and in case of a failure of EDC, the West should not leave the Federal Republic alone face to face with the Soviet Union, but should integrate it into the Western system in another way – always insisting on Western continued adherence

49. SOUTOU, “France and the German Rearmament”, op.cit., p.507.
51. Archives Mendès France, Dossier Accords de Paris; ibidem.
to the reserved rights of the four allies in questions concerning Berlin and Germany as a whole.53

Because of these pressures, Mendès France started to explore avenues for an agreement with the Soviet Union. On July 21, at the Geneva Conference, he gave Molotov to understand that significant progress on the road to disarmament would have an impact on the French decision on the EDC. Molotov avoided an answer by replying that only if France rejected the EDC, it would be possible to start a discussion.

Still, on July 24 the Soviet government proposed a Big Four conference. Mendès-France shared the view of the Quai d’Orsay: The USSR just wanted to gain time and to influence the decision of the National Assembly about the EDC; however given the mood of many parliamentarians, it would be necessary during the debate on the EDC, to affirm that the government had not discarded the option of a Big Four conference.54 As Mendès France explained to Dulles, the resultant tactic would be to make use of the Soviet proposal of a conference for public and parliamentary consumption, but at the same time to assure, in one way or another, West Germany’s participation in the Western defence system.55

Mendès France no longer committed his government to the EDC before Parliament and thus avoided to risk a vote of no-confidence, as he was now convinced that, with the possibility of a Big Four conference, the National Assembly was less likely than ever to ratify the EDC treaty. On this subject one could not speak of a manoeuvre for torpedoing on purpose the EDC and drawing more closely to the USSR; and yet, “PMF” excluded the idea of neutralizing Germany and appeared hostile to any settlement that would leave Germany “isolated in the heart of Europe”.56 At the same time, he did not close the door to a dialogue with the Soviet Union, in order to arrive at a system of European security, because his entourage pressed for it as urgently as parliamentary opinion.57

Mendès France has also been accused of having proposed a global deal to the USSR, that is the abandonment of the EDC in exchange for Soviet support in order to reach an honourable end to the war in Indochina. In fact, this idea was in the air well before the Mendès France government had been formed. Vincent Auriol referred to it in May 1953 in a talk with Joxe, ambassador in Moscow, and asked him to inform Molotov of it.58 People at the Quai d’Orsay also discussed the idea, but dismissed it at once.59 During the debates held in the Council of the Republic and in Parliament in October/November 1953 certain deputies also suggested sacrificing EDC in exchange for Soviet support over the Indochinese

54. DDF 1954, numbers 16 and 49.
question. In a speech before Parliament Bidault categorically rejected this idea. In fact, at the Foreign Ministers’ conference held in Berlin he also refused to consider such a bargain, in spite of René Massigli’s advice to the contrary, and declared on January 25, that the two problems should be dealt with separately.

Some members of Parliament reproached him for that, and on February 24, in the commission of foreign affairs of the National Assembly the Gaullist spokesman expressed his regret that Bidault did not link the two problems, because peace in Indo-China could not be achieved unless the EDC was abandoned.

But the question of a global deal did resurface after the formation of the Mendès France government. Washington as well as Bonn suspected that the Prime Minister offered this deal in his talks with Molotov at the Geneva conference. In reality, Mendès France and Dulles expressly agreed that the questions of the EDC and of Indochina should not be mixed up. For his part, Molotov stated at Geneva that he wanted to talk about Europe only after the Indochina question was settled. Following the Soviet proposal of a Big Four conference (made on July 24) to deal with disarmament and security questions Mendès France repeated that “there had been no global deal in Geneva”.

No archival evidence exists to cast doubt on this statement.

In conclusion, one should state that the Soviet factor as a force in the background of the French debate on the EDC should not be underestimated. The adherents of a European army considered it to be an instrument capable of making German rearmament and the integration of the Federal Republic into the Western system acceptable, – a step the Soviet threat had made necessary. At the Quai d’Orsay and among military authorities there was the contrary belief, that is to say that the EDC would delay West Germany’s participation in the defence of Europe, and that the European army would be less effective vis-à-vis the Soviet Union than German units directly attached to NATO. In political and parliamentary quarters, a strong current developed both against any German rearmament and the EDC. This was based on fears about Soviet reactions, or on the wish not to compromise the hopes invested on a resumption of an East-West dialogue on disarmament and European security.

Under these conditions, successive French prime ministers took care not to start the process of ratifying the EDC treaty. To charge Mendès France of having been the grave-digger of the EDC is thus an unfair accusation.

Pierre Guillen

60. Journal officiel, Débats parlementaires, sessions of 17 and 27 November 1953.
The Soviet Union and European Integration from Stalin to Gorbachev

Vladislav Zubok

The Soviet rejection of the idea of European economic integration after World War II had been as important for the future of the continent, as the end of the American tradition of “isolationism” and the decision of the Truman Administration to create an all-European assistance programme in 1947.1 The clash between Soviet and American priorities split Europe into two “camps” and caused a protracted period of polarization in Europe. Yet, that polarization, in its turn, became a catalyst of powerful integrationist forces on both sides of the Cold War divide, in particular in Western Europe. In a sense, the Cold War polarization was the “midwife” of the European Community. At the same time, in the later stages, all-European integration became a most popular symbol for the peoples in Eastern Europe, who felt increasingly isolated and unhappy in their Soviet-style “bloc”. Finally, since the end of the 1980s the Gorbachev leadership, reversing the old policy pattern, also began to associate itself with that symbol.

The Kremlin leadership under Joseph Stalin saw European integration as a potential threat to Soviet security interests. Stalin and his successors looked on international relations through the prism of the Marxist-Leninist “theory of imperialism”. This theory amended the traditional realpolitik postulating the inevitability of global wars as a result of the struggle among capitalist states for power, territories, resources and markets. After the end of World War II, Stalin and the Kremlin leadership, euphoric due to the great victory, sought consolidation of their own considerable acquisitions through more or less amicable agreement with the great Western powers, the United States and Great Britain. But even then the Kremlin’s views of the world provided no room for European integration.

Ivan Maisky, a former ambassador in London, and Maxim Maximovitch Litvinov, one of the most sophisticated men among the Soviet foreign policy experts, emphasized in January 1944 that “it is not in the interests of the USSR, at least in the first period after the war, to foster the creation of various kinds of federations – a Danubian, Balkan, Central-European, Scandinavian, etc.” The consensus was that the USSR should remain an unchallenged land power in Europe, without even a shadow of countervailing power represented by another state or a group of smaller states.2 Maxim Litvinov, former Commissar of Foreign Affairs and now a head of the state commission on peace treaties, considered it essential to avoid the

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1. This article is based, in part, on the paper “Soviet attitudes towards European Neutrals during the Cold War” prepared for Arbeitskreis Europäische Integration, Institut für Zeitgeschichte der Universität Innsbruck, April 7-8, Innsbruck, Austria.
emergence of an Anglo-American alliance against the USSR, through disengagement between Moscow and London.  

These ideological and “realist” biases against European integration were supported by memories of old and recent history, when a united Europe was a synonym for a crusade to the East (from Napoleon to Hitler) and when West European powers attempted to create a “cordon sanitaire” on the borders with the USSR. This historical bias later proved to be useful for Stalin, when he began to set the Soviet strategy for the Cold War with the United States.

At first, in accordance with the “theory of imperialism” the Stalin leadership hoped that “inevitable Anglo-American contradictions” would keep the capitalist world split for a long time after the war.  

In November 1945 Maisky, in two memoranda, written at Molotov’s special request, concluded that the United States, for purely economic reasons, would treat with suspicion “various projects of a Western bloc” uniting Great Britain, France, the Netherlands, Belgium, Spain and Portugal.  

There was an alternative view advocated by Evgeny Varga, a top economic adviser of the Kremlin and director of the Institute of World Economy and World Politics. Varga cautiously argued that the militarization of capitalist economies during World War II and the new role of the state would allow capitalism to be more manageable and integrated than ever before. Stalin, however inclined to a more dogmatic interpretation of world capitalism. In a speech delivered in February 1946 in the Bolshoi Theater, he mentioned that, in principle, there could be a peaceful division of raw material resources and trade markets “among the countries in accordance with their economic weight – by adopting a coordinated and peaceful decision.” But, he added, “this cannot be achieved under the current capitalist conditions of development of the world economy.”

On the practical side, the desperate needs of the Soviet economy for American technology and loans made Stalin pay lip service to the Bretton-Woods process; for a while he even considered possible USSR membership of the World Bank. Yet, the immediate interests of the Soviet economy soon came into a predictable clash with US preferences in Europe, particularly in Germany. While Soviet officials pumped out reparations, the prosperous Americans could afford to move to a post-war agenda, envisaging the economic revival of Germany as an alternative to havoc and Bolshevization of the Western part of Europe. Stalin and Molotov had quickly

3. Litvinov to Stalin, Molotov, etc, 15 November 1944, “O perspektivakh i vozmozhnoi baze sovetsko-britanskogo sotrudnichestva,” [On the perspectives and a possible base for the Soviet-British cooperation], AVP RF, fond 06 (Molotov’s secretariat), opis 6, delo 143, pp.54-55.
begun to suspect that the United States and Great Britain wanted to add the industrial power of the Ruhr to a future anti-Soviet politico-military bloc. The proclamation of the Marshall Plan in June 1947 seemed to vindicate their mutual apprehensions. There was a flicker of hope in the Kremlin that it could be just another “lend-lease”: Molotov and Stalin read Varga’s analysis of the Marshall Plan as primarily being a scheme to forestall the imminent economic crisis by creating a European market for American goods. Yet, upon reflection, Stalin decided that the security risk of participating in the Marshall Plan was greater than any possible economic gains. American financial and economic superiority over the rest of the world and the USSR was too great, and, in Stalin’s eyes, had already subjugated Britain and France to US interests. The spreading of an American assistance program over the rest of Europe, Stalin reasoned, could allow the United States to impose its will on other states, including the ones inside the Soviet sphere of influence. Stalin decided to thwart the American move, in the absence of economic and financial assets, by political and propaganda means, through the mobilization of West European communism and by an accelerated consolidation of Eastern European States into a bloc of Soviet satellites. Covert resistance to the plans for European integration in Soviet diplomacy gave way to strident denunciation of “the Truman-Marshall Plan of enthrallment of Europe.”

Much of Soviet behavior in 1947-49, accelerated rather than prevented the integration of Western Europe under the aegis of the United States. The outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950 catapulted the transformation of Western Europe into a coherent political, military and economic alliance. Since the fall of 1951 the integration of West Germany into NATO and the plans for economic integration of French and German industries, politically unthinkable just a few years earlier, quickly took shape. Stalin seemed incapable of seeing how his activities in Berlin and Korea stimulated Western integration and aggravated the problems of Soviet security. For him it was a prophecy fulfilled, a validation of his approach to world affairs. Stalin and people around him viewed integration processes very narrowly, through the prism of preparations for a future global military clash with a coalition of capitalist countries. This clash, as Stalin hoped, might end in a final collapse of the capitalist world. The alliance with communist China in February 1950 was for Stalin a sufficient counterbalance to the integrated power of the United States and its capitalist allies. It is also plausible that he regarded the Korean War, started by his puppet Kim Il Sung in June 1950, not as a grave miscalculation, but as a useful diversion of American resources from the main European theater of confrontation, a useful testing ground for Soviet military art. In October 1950 Stalin wrote to his

new communist ally Mao Zedong that “if war is inevitable let it happen now,” before the United States managed to restore and rearm Germany and Japan. “Other European capitalist states do not possess any serious military power,” Stalin wrote, “save Germany, which cannot provide assistance to the United States now.” At the last stage of his life Stalin attempted to throw a monkey wrench into this by announcing in March 1952 his proposals for a “united democratic Germany.” The Russian archives which are accessible do not allow us to provide a conclusive answer to the question as to whether Stalin’s note reflected a serious policy or was just a device to torpedo the EDC as a way towards European integration. In a strategic sense, as can be inferred from the archival evidence, Stalin did not believe that Germany would be divided for long, and thus preferred to hold a scenario for Germany’s unification ready at hand. At the same time, Stalin’s strategy was consistently opposed to Germany’s integration with Western Europe. But by that time the image of the USSR was already so tarnished in Western Europe both by the Korean War and the mounting repression in Eastern Europe that the Americans could easily ignore Stalin’s proposal as a propagandist trick.

Only two years later after Stalin’s death, following a period of bitter power struggle, the Soviet leadership developed a new diplomacy, adjusted to the fact of a politically united Western Europe. In the course of the power struggle the new Soviet elite criticized the foreign policy of Stalin and Molotov on the grounds that “it integrated the capitalist world, because it was too transparent for them, it armed them against our socialist camp.” “Today’s foreign policy,” one critic claimed, “is flexible and manoeuverable, it splits [the capitalist countries].” Although Stalin’s successors continued to equal capitalist integration with an external threat, they no longer feared an imminent European war (nuclear armaments helped the most in this regard). They sought to thwart this process by denying the West a convenient image of the communist enemy: putting a smile on the face of the Soviet regime, legitimizing the Eastern bloc by the creation of the Warsaw Treaty Organization, the reduction of troops, etc. Khrushchev even began to nourish schemes of splitting NATO, and perhaps, rolling back the progress made by the Americans in the years of the Korean War. Khrushchev did not hide his belief that, when “all would see our peaceful nature, then it would be hard for [the West] to preserve NATO (...).” In a

fever of propagandistic improvisation, the Kremlin applied for Soviet membership of NATO, knowing they would be rejected and thus proving the anti-Soviet character of the alliance.

The new foreign policy created room for the evolution of Soviet Weltanschauung into a less polarized and confrontational direction. The diminishing fear of a big European war helped the new Soviet leadership to adopt, at the 20th CPSU congress in February 1956, an innovative concept of “peaceful coexistence” with capitalism as a permanent Soviet international strategy. According to Andrei Alexandrov-Agentov, a Soviet expert on Europe and later assistant to Foreign minister Andrei Gromyko, the essence of the new strategy, developed by Khrushchev and his colleagues, consisted of “three main elements: to prop up to the maximum and tie to the Soviet Union the countries of the People’s Democracy of Eastern and Central Europe; to create, wherever possible, a neutral “buffer” between the two opposing military-political blocs; and to gradually establish economic and other more or less normal forms of peaceful cooperation with the countries of NATO.”

These elements were direct precursors of Gorbachev’s “new thinking” of the mid-1980’s.

The Soviet leaders continued to see the USSR as a leader and “bulwark” of the world revolutionary process that, they believed, was bound to lead to the victory of communism. Nevertheless, the new emphasis on “peaceful coexistence” made them look for models of “socialist integration” that could anchor the countries of Eastern Europe to the Soviet economy and eventually replace Stalin’s imperial domination over the satellites by a commonwealth on a more or less voluntary basis. The reorientation of the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) towards mutually more beneficial trade arrangements between the Soviets and the satellites reflected the impossibility of continuing Stalin’s crude exploitation of East European countries and the total subservience of their economies to Soviet military-industrial needs. With the willingness to tolerate a greater level of economic and even political autonomy in the countries of the Soviet bloc came the need for new modes of relationship – with an appearance of mutual profitability and a proper legal facade. In reality, what emerged was a model of economic interdependence imposed on reluctant East European allies by Moscow and generously financed from vast Soviet economic and natural resources.

The uprisings in Poland and Hungary in 1956 made the need to “pamper” Eastern Europe even more urgent. During 1957 the Presidium (Politburo) even split on the issue of hidden Soviet subsidies and loans to Eastern European economies. Khrushchev and Anastas Mikoyan argued that the Soviets had to do it anyway, to gain time, since otherwise the workers in those countries would rebel, and the USSR would lose its strategic positions in their center of Europe. This was perhaps the first time the Soviets had to face squarely the emerging burden of their European empire. The only way they could maintain their autarky and control along

with the continuation of growth of Eastern European economies, was through creation of a world “socialist market”.  

Khrushchev was apparently too optimistic about the future of “socialist” integration and grossly underestimated the factors that would hold Western European countries together and in the alliance with the United States. He also overrated the significance of traditional cultural and political separatism among NATO members (France, the Benelux, Denmark, Norway). Regarding the future of European integration, the Kremlin for a long time discounted new economic forces, binding particularly West Germany and France, and also smaller European states, and working in the direction of a unified European market. The tenets of Soviet ideology, particularly Lenin’s works, held all attempts towards a “United States of Europe” to be Utopian. According to Georgi Kornienko, later First Deputy of the Foreign Minister of the USSR and in the 1950’s a senior analyst of the Committee of Information and the Informational Department of the CPSU Central Committee, the prevailing mood in the halls of power was that the days of American dominance in Western Europe were numbered, and so were the days of NATO. Focusing on the ideological prophecies of capitalist contradictions, Soviet authorities did not understand, according to Kornienko, the potential significance of the efforts of people like Jean Monnet and Ludwig Erhard, directed at economic, financial and cultural integration well beyond the exigencies of the Cold War.

In the standard Soviet estimates for the second half of the 1950s, the plans for a “united Europe” figured as a bad idea: perhaps a ploy to retain American domination or a West German scheme to ruin promising rapprochement between the USSR, France and Great Britain on the basis of common fears of German expansionism and militarism. The fears of German expansionism became more pronounced by the end of the 1950s, as the West German economy entered into the period of “miracle”. Moscow began to look everywhere for signs of rising pretensions of West Germany to reclaim the place of a central European power. Even the idea of Charles de Gaulle about “the Europe from Atlantic to the Urals”, that he shared with Khrushchev in 1960, put the Soviet leader on alert – reminding them of the imperial ideas of Adolf Hitler!

Khrushchev’s plans “to end” the Cold War by the neutralization of smaller West European states and the fragmentation of NATO began to fade in the 1960’s, when Moscow began to face the consequences of the growing economic unity of Western Europe. The European economic growth, boosted by the symbiosis of West German and French economies, represented a powerful magnet to Eastern European countries. Ironically, it was Khrushchev’s aggressive assertion of the “neutrality”

15. Interview with the author, Moscow, Spring 1990.
i.e. the isolation of West Berlin from Western Europe and NATO in 1958-1961 that revealed for the first time the Soviet inability to compete with the growing Western market economy for the souls of the Europeans. Later Khrushchev recalled that “unfortunately, at a certain stage, ideological issues [i.e. the outcome of the peaceful competition between capitalism and communism] are decided by the stomach, that is, by seeing who can provide the most for people’s daily needs. Therefore, the attraction of one or the other system is literally decided by shops windows, by the price of goods, and by wages. In these areas, of course, we had no chance of competing with the West, especially in West Berlin.”

In August 1961 Khrushchev and East German leader Walter Ulbricht had to close the border in Berlin to put an end to the gigantic drain of people to the West. However, it took much longer for the Soviet leaders to realize that the historic tide had turned, and the “inevitability of the triumph of socialism” of the Soviet type had been replaced by the inevitability of capitalist integration and the rise of world consumerism. Most of the Kremlin leaders, particularly Khrushchev, believed that it was just a question of uneven starting conditions for “socialist” countries, in particular since they were those who had suffered the most during World War II. The Soviets under Khrushchev and, after his ousting, under Brezhnev, began to compete with Western consumerism by patching together, piecemeal, the consumerism of a “socialist” kind. Inside the USSR it was very truncated and confined to the elite and the dwellers of main cities. The leaders of most East European countries went much further in this direction by taking vast Western loans and moving to a market-oriented economy (see “Kadarization” of Hungary, Poland under Edward Gierek). The Soviets never gave their consent to this, but had no will to thwart this movement either. As a veteran of the International Department of the Central Committee of CPSU recalls, “at first people at the helm [in Moscow] were angry, particularly with regard to the economic experiments of the Hungarians. But eventually they gave up: after all, one could not invade this country a second time. The people are too hot-tempered there. Let them have their own way.”

The problem of Soviet subsidies for both selective internal and East European “consumerism” continued to aggravate. The Kremlin leadership attempted to solve it by increasing the traction of raw materials and through underpaid labor. But this solution became problematic, while huge Soviet resources were sucked into the continuing arms race with the United States. The structural impossibility of producing both “guns and butter” (Soviet agriculture suffered from the ruin of the Stalinist years) led to the gradual turn of the Brezhnev leadership to the idea of “imported consumerism” and of state-controlled reintegration with the world economy.

Officially, this process was straitjacketed from the beginning to fit the existing foreign policy strategy. The ideologues used the references to Lenin’s ideas of con-

structing communism through the emulation of capitalist know-how. Politicians and diplomats expected that the increase of trade would encourage capitalists to advocate to their respective governments the end of the Cold War. The political message behind the state-controlled trade was obvious in the 1960s – 1970s: since 1963 when the Soviet Union had begun to buy grain from the United States, the Kremlin began also to cultivate and promote special economic and trade ties, particularly with those European countries who could be potentially “closer” to the USSR politically: with France and European neutrals – particularly Finland, and to a certain extent Austria and Yugoslavia, and (what they regarded as “neutral”) West Berlin. The partial reintegration helped Soviet diplomacy to achieve some minor goals, but its strategic consequence was very negative for the integrity of the Soviet regime. The new emphasis on foreign imports was undermining the autarkic ethos in East European and Soviet economies, and at the same time was preparing a revolution of expectations in Eastern European countries and inside Soviet elites who began to dream of Western goods and living standards. Molotov, in retirement, severely criticized the new policy which, in his eyes, amounted to substituting the cause of class struggle for consumerist pro-Western orientations. And essentially this was what happened, particularly among the younger generation.

The Helsinki process for securing all-European peace was another case where the Soviet leadership attempted to engage in a partial and state-controlled process of reintegration with the West. Again the official goals were to further “the end of the Cold War,” but the Breshnev leadership also sought apparently to acquire international legitimacy and to become a member of the European club. The emphasis on legitimacy grew as the traditional security concerns faded. Strategic parity with the United States and the series of US-Soviet agreements in 1971-1974, particularly on strategic armaments and on the status of West Berlin, made the Soviet leaders more relaxed and confident in the future of the USSR. At one point, when the Kremlin learned that Soviet diplomats agreed to include the “third basket” on human rights into the text of the Helsinki agreement, hard-liners were horrified. Yet, according to Anatoly Dobrynin, the Soviet ambassador in Washington, Gromyko persuaded Brezhnev to sign the document as a package. The first argument was that the Politburo could interpret the Helsinki “rights” as it liked inside the USSR. The second was that the document would codify the post-war borders in Europe, and, in its historic significance, would be another “congress of Vienna”. Brezhnev agreed with this, and the Soviet regime undertook, against its will, commitments based on Western democratic values and an all-European framework. This led to a short-term boost for the Soviet “dissident” movement, but also to a much more significant de-legitimization of domestic repression and to the spreading of Western ideas in the Soviet cultural and even political establishment. Just a decade after Helsinki, Mikhail Gorbachev embraced Western values as “all-human values” and placed them above the cause of class struggle.

However, even during the 1970s the attitude of the Kremlin toward the idea of European integration ranged from suspicious to downright hostile. One can cite several factors to explain this. The first factor was the “zero-sum game” mentality of the Soviet leadership. The Soviet official worldview remained essentially based on the idea of a global polarization. With the emergence of the new centers of power (the People’s Republic of China, European Community, Japan) the Soviets did not abandon this idea, since they regarded all those centers as either part of the Pax Americana or as potential American ally.

A second factor was the fear of losing Eastern Europe that put a severe constraint on how far the Soviet leaders could advance in their state-controlled process of re-integration with the West. The tragic end of the “Prague spring” with the Soviet invasion of August 1968 and the subsequent proclamation of the “Brezhnev doctrine” revealed again the fact that the Soviet Union had been as much a hostage to its geopolitical fears, as the peoples of Eastern Europe were hostages to the Soviet empire. Even when the Kremlin prudently preferred to cultivate special political, economic and cultural relations with the European Community, it had to fend off the “subversive” effects that its policies and even its mere existence had on Eastern European countries. For instance, in 1980-1981, the Brezhnev leadership intensified its rapprochement with Western Europe after the harsh US reaction to the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan, but at the same time it desperately tried to prevent Poland’s defection from the socialist camp. It pushed the GDR toward rapprochement with the FRG, yet, when the Honecker regime finally embarked on this course, Moscow became worried that the “friends” would walk into a trap.

A third factor was the growing incompatibility of the state-controlled, non-market Soviet economy with the increasingly interdependent global capitalist economy. It should be emphasized again, that the cautious state-controlled attempts at developing economic relations with Western economies had always been limited by the xenophobic fears of “capitalist penetration.” During the Cold War, the West had practiced various mechanisms of a technological blockade of the USSR (the COCOM, etc.) and had taken economic sanctions against it. Yet, the most important factor was not Soviet psychology or external barriers, but the autarkic structure of the Soviet economy that had been sanctified by official ideology and since Stalin had become part and parcel of the monopolistic structure of power. The communist party and its leadership simply could not dismantle the former without losing the latter – a fact that had become absolutely clear during the reformist attempts of Gorbachev. Any participation in real European integration, therefore, would have meant a collapse of the economy in the USSR.

A fourth factor was that the intellectual ability of the Soviet political establishment to come to terms with integrationist developments had been severely hampered since the late 1940s by ideological and police repression. Only since the late 1960s, academic institutions and experts resumed the discussion of the changes of the world’s capitalist economy, which had been begun by Varga and his Institute during the 1940s. The Institute of World Economy and International Relations, the Institute of the World Socialist System, the Institute of the US and Canada Studies, among others, began to discuss and bring to the leadership’s attention the changes
in European life since the Treaty of Rome. Even earlier a group of relatively young communist theoreticians had written and discussed the issues of European integration in the journal “The Issues of Peace and Socialism” and had promoted them in their various official capacities in the central party and state hierarchy. One of them, Georgi Shakhnazarov, an expert of the International Department of the Central Committee CPSU, became an eminent political scientist-advocate of the new world order of interdependence. Nevertheless, the deep conservatism and anti-intellectualism of the Brezhnev leadership kept it immune to academic debates and innovative writings. Only after Brezhnev’s death, in the brief interregnum of Yuri Andropov, those new voices began to be heard in the political spheres.

The Gorbachev leadership that replaced the septuagenarian generation in the Kremlin, was oriented to fundamental domestic reforms of the USSR and viewed the Cold War tensions and arms race as a costly burden, a legacy of the past. Soon Gorbachev and his new foreign minister Eduard Shevardnadze launched a campaign to improve relations with the West as a preparatory step to domestic transformation. The new leadership discarded the “two camps” language of Stalin and Andrei Zhdanov, as well as the “Brezhnev doctrine.” Since late 1986 Gorbachev and his liberal-minded advisers on foreign policy had begun to look at Western Europe as a possible locomotive of another “détente”, particularly because, in the view of the Kremlin, Western European countries had already played this role at the end of the 1960’s. In late March 1987, after having met with Margaret Thatcher, Gorbachev said in his inner circle that “we have a poor knowledge of Europe” and stressed that the USSR “needed” Europe both for domestic perestroika and foreign policy.

“We cannot live without such a partner as Western Europe (...). The Helsinki process gives us new opportunities, and we should reach a new stage [of it]. An important task is to utilize the scientific-technical potential of Western Europe, all the more since our friends from COMECON have already gotten stuck there (...). One should see Europe as it is. Take this reality, the integrationist processes. What is there to our advantage, what is not?”

As in many other areas, the new views of the reformist Soviet leadership on European integration were non-systematic, rather eclectic and improvisational. Initially, it expected to end the Cold War by dissolving the opposing blocs, the Warsaw Treaty and NATO, into an all-European structure of the “Europe from Atlantic to the Urals”, a “Common European Home”, as a result of a convergence between the Western European and the Eastern bloc. These schemes, taken at their own value, were more slogans than realistic policies, a curious combination of Soviet (almost Khrushchevian) historic optimism and newly-liberated political imagination. However, these schemes reflected a new vision of world interdependence and unity, as opposed to the Stalinist philosophy of class hatred and polarization. Gorbachev himself gravitated in his ideological vagaries towards various revisionist schools of communist creed who represented the “historic compromise” of classes

21 A. Chernyaev, Shest let s Gorbachevim. Po dnevnikovim zapiziam [Six Years with Gorbachev. The notes from the diary], Moscow 1993, p.140.
in the name of stability and unity. Later the Soviet leader found much in common with other schools of European unity, particularly “social Christianity” and the Roman Church. “Paradoxically,” Gorbachev’s adviser mused later, “the search for a new relationship with the West, the process of disarmament, designed as a means to ensure external conditions’ for perestroika, began to turn into its engine (...).” In order to achieve success in the new foreign policy, one had to crack down on the myths and dogmas of confrontational ideology and ‘theory.’”22 However, the lack of a profound economic strategy in Gorbachev’s policies, the persistent illusions about the “socialist economy” in the USSR, led to the failure of the Soviet leader, even in 1989-1990, to realize that the whole Soviet regime and economy, as it existed, had no chance of becoming part of the “Common European Home”.

Defining the role of the West at the end of the Cold War, former US ambassador in Moscow Jack Matlock points at two factors – the firmness and strength of the Western policies (on the scenario “written in Washington”) and the example of Western prosperity and freedom.23 I would emphasize the emergence of a new, non-threatening and prosperous Western Europe, as a crucial external factor that influenced Gorbachev’s statesmanship, as its domestic reforms and foreign policy entered the period of revolutionary changes in 1989-1990. Deepening integrative processes in Western Europe, with the increasingly active involvement of smaller and neutral states, as well as the traditional “outsider,” Great Britain, became for Gorbachev and his advisers a crucial factor in their decision not to resist the collapse of communist regimes in Eastern Europe – the event that changed overnight the continent’s geopolitics and left the USSR without European allies. Gorbachev and his advisers (and a considerable segment of Soviet public opinion) reacted to the breakdown of the Soviet security system with moderation and tolerance, and eventually accepted this as a movement towards a united Europe, where the USSR would eventually gain a proper place. In the end, the new perception of Western Europe as a non-threatening, peace oriented community, allowed Gorbachev to outgrow his memories of World War II and discard the traditional germanophobia in favor of a flexible and pragmatic diplomacy.

The most serious test of the “new thinking” was the German reunification process after the collapse of the Berlin wall. Historic memories and psychological factors could have easily turned the USSR into a “spoiler” of this process, especially since the established German experts in the government were the ones who were the most suspicious and alarmist with regard to Germany and the Germans.24 These experts, under the weight of their professional expertise and responsibility, tended to defend the geopolitical status quo, and mistrust the “fairy bird” of the USSR’s embrace with Western Europe. After all, West Germany’s integration into NATO, they argued, happened on the anti-Soviet platform, and nobody could guarantee

24. MATLOCK, op.cit., p.387 (on the possibility to “spoil” the process); Shakhnazarov, op.cit., p.120 (on the German experts).
that a future Europe would turn to Moscow its peaceful economic face (EU, EC, EEC, etc.), rather than the militarized face of NATO. The Soviet Ambassador to Bonn, Yuli Kvitzinsky, expressed these fears in 1988: “More and more European states may begin to be sucked into the EEC and via the EEC into NATO – that is, there may be the construction of an all-European branch of NATO and no development into the direction of equal and constructive cooperation of the two systems on an all-European basis.”

Gorbachev, no doubt, shared some of these feelings. When Chancellor Helmut Kohl announced his program (“ten points”) without consulting with the USSR or any of his Western allies, Gorbachev was outraged. On December 5, 1989 the Soviet leader sternly lectured West German foreign minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, that the West German leader wanted to put the cart before the horse: German reunification, according to the Soviet strategy, was to be the eventual result of a long period of an “all-European process,” of the “construction of a new Europe.”

Gorbachev’s personal role in this Soviet reaction can hardly be exaggerated. His foreign policy adviser hypothesizes that his “personal”, first-hand knowledge of new European realities and his frequent meetings with West European leaders “made it easier for Gorbachev to take his historic decision (...) to agree with the reunification of Germany.” It has been noted by many that, by the end of his term, Gorbachev had developed a circle of friends among Western leaders, while losing friends among his colleagues in his home-country. According to Shakhnazarov, this was caused in part by the fact that

“Gorbachev is one of the first, if not the first, Russian leaders thinking in Western terms. Therefore he found without difficulty a common language with Thatcher and Bush, Kohl and Mitterrand. For the same reason our [Russian] Eurasian national mentality denied him unqualified sympathy, when he turned from General Secretary into President.”

While it is striking to note how the role of political will could have made such a difference in reorienting the USSR towards the idea of integration with the West in late 1980’s, this development has also had its drawbacks: Gorbachev’s “new thinking” was shared and understood only by the educated minority of Soviet society and a small layer of an enlightened elite in the political sphere. True, within a few years of “perestroika” the group of reformers and their supporters in the movements of the democratic intelligentsia has shaken fundamentally the state system of autarkic isolationism and xenophobia. But the crucial question is whether or not the Gorbachev “era” and the collapse of the empire made the end of Russian bureaucratic, social and intellectual isolationism irreversible. Paradoxically, the disintegration of the Union structures led to the downfall of the most ardent supporters of an all-European process – the Gorbachev administration was ousted from power.

27. CHERNYAEV, op.cit., p.141.
28. On Gorbachev’s being closer to Western leaders than his advisers, MATLOCK, op.cit., p.661; quotation from Shakhnazarov, op.cit., p.345.
and replaced by other people, mostly from lower and provincial groups of the former party and state apparatus. Many of those people, while professing a new creed of anti-communism, have been far less liberally-inclined, enlightened and knowledgeable of the world outside than the Gorbachev leadership. Behind the professed anti-communism and the slogans of “free market”, many of the new ruling elite preserved a traditional psychology, dating back to the years of Stalin and even the empire of the tsars.

Another development, besides the decline of the “enlightened” Soviet elite, contributed to the backlash of a pre-integrationist mentality in the post-Soviet Russia: the attempts to define national interests in the traumatic circumstances of geopolitical and economic catastrophe, human misery and wounded pride. Even the most enlightened of the post-Gorbachev elite, pursuing diplomacy and writing for liberal publications, proclaimed the “all-human” and “all-European” elements of the “new thinking” as naive, fuzzy and impractical for defining the interests of new Russia. The future of Russia’s security in the West, as some of them argue, would inevitably be defined by the distribution of influence, economic and political, among the great powers, primarily between Russia and Germany. The mentality of the Russian “statists” (derzhavniki) reminds one of Stalin’s “correlation of forces”, with economic and financial factors taking the place of the number of divisions. Arguments of German officials that Germany is more interested in extending multi-lateral institutions to provide prosperity and security for the entire continent and that Germany is no longer the former isolated nation-state, increasingly fall on deaf and disbelieving ears in Moscow.29 In the mainstream political thinking in Moscow, currently incorporated by the opposition to Yeltsin, Russia is increasingly portrayed as a “special civilization” separate from European (Western) civilization.30

The backlash, after the political and ideological rush of the Gorbachev leadership to a united Europe, was not unexpected. But it highlights the depth of the psychological problems that the years of the Cold War bequeathed to the USSR’s successors.

In conclusion, the Soviet attitude towards European integration changed dramatically throughout the decades of the Cold War. The emergence of the prosperous European Community was an important factor in this change, but the crucial, primary cause of it was the degradation of the Stalinist revolutionary-imperial philosophy and the rising need of profound domestic reforms, which, as the Soviet leadership came to realize, could not be carried out in isolation from Western Europe. One of the least known and least understood dimensions of Soviet foreign policy since the “détente” was the attempt to find ways in order to achieve a gradualist re-integration of the Soviet economy with the West, while pursuing the traditional security agenda — consolidation of Eastern Europe and splitting Western Europe by all means. The Soviet regime, however, was structurally incompatible with the market-oriented and free Western Europe. When re-integration became a

primary goal of the Gorbachev reformers in the late 1980s, they failed to realize this incompatibility themselves, which contributed to their false optimism at the start of perestroika and to the willingness to accept geostrategic defeat in Central Europe.

The European geopolitical revolution of 1989-90 was the logical conclusion of the process started by the Marshall Plan in 1947. Yet, Gorbachev’s reaction to it was diametrically opposite to the reaction of Joseph Stalin. While the first Soviet General Secretary harshly rejected the perspective of a united Europe, seeing it more as a threat than a potential opportunity for economic and political partnership, the last General Secretary sacrificed immediate security assets in the name of a long-term prospect of his country’s partnership with a new united Europe. Many of Gorbachev’s countrymen have had second thoughts today as to whether or not that choice was a prudent one. Some politicians feel humiliated by Russia’s marginalization in European affairs and by NATO’s overeagerness to oblige Eastern European countries (and possibly Ukraine, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia) in their desire to obtain security guarantees against an unpredictable big neighbor to the East. It will take some time for the dust to settle and for the Russians to realize their new position vis-à-vis Europe in the light of contemporary history. This history clearly shows that the decision of Stalin’s leadership to oppose the forces of European integration was a tragic and costly mistake that the Russians cannot afford to repeat.

Vladislav Zubok

Ce livre ambitieux cherche à donner une interprétation globale de la politique de la IVe République. Partant de l’hypothèse que la nécessité de la reconstruction a exercé une influence déterminante sur la politique étrangère, il s’efforce d’établir des liens entre la volonté de modernisation de l’économie, l’aide Marshall (et l’aide américaine en général), la politique allemande et la politique d’intégration européenne menées par la France.


Les deuxième et troisième parties constituent chacune, en elles-mêmes, une véritable thèse. La deuxième, «le plan Marshall et la modernisation de la France» (pp. 229 à 610) constitue une étude minutieuse illustrée par de nombreux tableaux qui fournissent des informations chiffrées précises. Elle énumère les apports américains à l’économie française en analysant les programmes d’importation, parfois trimestre par trimestre. Les livraisons ne vont pas sans négociations continues ni sans accrochages entre Paris et Washington. La France qui doit importer des surplus américains (tabac, pommes ...) n’obtient pas toujours les équipements souhaités (moteurs d’avions, équipements pétroliers ...). Les dirigeants français doivent batailler dur aussi pour disposer librement de la contrepartie de l’aide qui leur est acquise à 95%. Les Américains souhaitent la voir utilisée pour assainir les finances mais ils laissent les Français en investir une large part dans les dépenses de modernisation. Parmi les principaux bénéficiaires: l’EDF, la SNCF, les charbonnages, la sidérurgie, l’agriculture et, en 1950-1951, les logements sociaux. Au total, environ un tiers des investissements de modernisation sont fournis par l’aide américaine qui apparaît ainsi comme un atout pour la France. Certes, elle ne peut empêcher une immixtion continue dans ses affaires, mais elle accepte cette dépendance comme une condition nécessaire à son redressement et elle s’efforce de préserver une marge de manœuvre que Gérard Bossuat évoque souvent avec nuances, par exemple au sujet de la propagande en faveur du plan Marshall qui n’est pas absente de l’Hexagone mais limitée à des proportions jugées supportables par l’opinion.

Dieses Dokument wurde erstellt mit FrameMaker 4.0.4.
La troisième partie (pp. 613-794) est consacrée aux tentatives de coopération économique entre Européens, dans les années 1948-1952. Si l’OECE ne parvient pas à mettre sur pied un programme européen commun de redressement ni même des plans nationaux coordonnés, faute d’une convergence d’intérêts entre Français et Britanniques, elle réussit à favoriser les échanges intraeuropéens grâce à des accords de paiement. L’ouvrage montre que bien avant la constitution de l’UEP (Union européenne des paiements), mieux connue, des accords bilatéraux (les droits de tirage financés par les Américains dits «aide indirecte») ou multilatéraux (possibilité de transférer une partie des droits de tirage d’un pays de l’OECE vers les autres) s’efforcent de remédier au dollar gap. Une question sous-tend toute cette partie: dans quelle mesure les Américains cherchent-ils à influencer cette coopération? De toute évidence, ils ne parviennent pas à convaincre les Britanniques d’accepter une intégration plus poussée au sein de l’OECE. Le veulent-ils vraiment alors que subsistent des solidarités «anglo-saxonnes» qui se manifestent lors de la crise de la livre. Un peu plus tard lorsque les Six créent avec la CECA une organisation plus conforme aux vœux des Américains, l’immixtion de Washington paraît discrète.


Tous ces problèmes évoqués ici très rapidement sont en fait disséqués à la loupe dans ce livre très riche en informations, souvent de première main, puisées dans des fonds d’archives français, privés et publics, ou fournies par des interviews de très nombreuses personnalités. Le pari est tenu qui consiste à montrer la cohérence entre modernisation, politique allemande et intégration européenne dans les années 1947-1952. Ce triple projet s’inscrit dans une relation de dépendance vis-à-vis des États-Unis, plus ou moins évidente et plus ou moins bien acceptée selon les moments. Mais la logique qui lie ces différentes politiques n’est pas nécessaire au point de susciter un consensus. L’un des intérêts de ce livre réside aussi dans la présentation des débats franco-français qui agitent la classe dirigeante.

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Historians of international relations and of political movements, as well as other scholars interested in the gradual development of European integration, are likely to consider this volume as particularly useful. Italian, French, Belgian, British, German and Swiss authors’ substantial contributions to the international meeting organized in Pavia in 1989 by the “Fondazione Europea Luciano Bolis” are collected here. Chronologically, the subject is very clearly defined: beginning with the end of the second world war and choosing as arrival point the failure of the European Defence Community (EDC) project, an evident period of the integration process is scrutinized. The proceedings of a second meeting held in Genova in 1992, which dealt with the subsequent decade, will be published in a forthcoming book of the series.

The first essay, written by the editor Sergio Pistone, focuses on the “Movimento Federalesta Europeo”, whose action is studied in its Italian and international implications, merging thus the two main leitmots of the book: the broad study of national environments – developed
in the first section of the volume by Jean-Pierre Gouzy for France, by Wilfried Loth for Germany, by John Pinder for the United Kingdom and by Michel Dumoulin for Belgium – and the analysis of individual movements. In this second respect, Hick deals with the “European Movement” and Rognoni Vercelli with the “European Union of Federalists” (EUF); a short contribution by Martin Posselt on the Montreux Congress of the EUF in 1947 is also included. Edmondo Paolini studies the “Council of European Municipalities” and Martin Posselt the “European Parliamentary” Union. Philippe Chenaux analyses the “Nouvelles Equipes Internationales”, Wilfried Loth the “Mouvement Socialiste pour les Etats-Unis d’Europe”, Michel Dumoulin the “European League for Economic Cooperation” and finally Billion the action of the world federalist movements. Four more essays complete the volume, emphasizing stages of particular importance and mutual influence between the activity of the federalist groups and the decisions taken by national Governments as to the development of functional integration: Antonio Varsori examines the Hague Congress of Europe (May 1948) and Umberto Morelli the campaign for the federal union of Europe Pact (1949-1951); Daniela Preda studies Alcide De Gasperi’s and Altiero Spinelli’s action concerning the projects of the EDC and of the European Political Community; Lucio Levi, finally, introduces a comparison between the texts worked out by the Study Committee for the European Constitution and the ad hoc Assembly.

All the essays lay special stress on the organization, reciprocal contacts and different strategies of groups which, from 1945 on, tried to turn some theoretical interpretations, that had emerged during the war and through the Resistance experience, into effective political pressure on the leading élites. The most important concepts at stake were obviously, above all, the crisis and historical decline of the nation-State and the need of a European political union in order to provide chances of recovery for the continent ruined by two world wars, with a view to saving it from the forced choice between the Soviet Union and the United States. Facts are reconstructed in detail in the book and, generally, unpublished sources are made use of. Up to now, our knowledge of the period has been broadened more by studies on the concrete stages of functional integration than by comparative and systematic research on the contributions made by federalist and pro-European movements: in this context, this volume represents a valuable addition. The period thus analyzed is particularly interesting, of course, as it includes the whole spectrum of the great post-war illusion: from the hopes of a European “third force” to the Hague Congress, from the creation of the first Community institutions to the EDC project and to its failure in 1954. European choices were then influenced on one side by the British fear that a federated Continent might damage the special relationship between London and Washington. On the other side, there was the French worry that, without Britain, it might not be possible to build an efficacious counterbalance to the dangerous revival of German power. The American support of the EDC project, moreover, was not only considered as useful in the face of the Soviet danger, but also inspired by the idealistic and pro-federalist impulse of several members of the Administration.

In the interpretative respect, not all the authors share similar points of view: some stress the importance of the action of the movements and deduce from it their fundamental influence on the integration process. Some, on the contrary, do not hide reservations so far as the effectiveness of that action and the actual scale of this influence on governmental decisions are concerned. The different theses, anyway, are always well documented and will certainly stimulate the debate on the first decades of Europe-making efforts.

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At first glance, this book might suggest pessimistic thoughts about the future of the European Union: *quousque tandem* will economic particularism and national interest block the way towards the utopia of a federal continent? Will this too prove to be – as Bagnato titles her work – a European illusion like the project of a customs union that French an Italian statesman drafted in 1947-48? At that time, of course, nothing was further from their minds than political utopia. Paris aimed at leadership in Europe and needed a brilliant junior partner, Rome wanted to be considered a normal and valuable interlocutor in the international arena. Hence the reciprocal interest in a project which was still imbued with old ideas, as traditional political matter lay behind an innovative economic curtain. So, not incidentally, the Monnet Plan gave it a fatal blow in 1950 just changing the political horizon by economic means. But, by analogy, should one suppose that the political substance which backs the European Union today, though its economic integration, is still too imbued with national interests partly related to residuals of power politics or aspirations? In other words, might the process of European political integration still be blocked?

Bagnato’s book could be paradigmatic, under this respect, since one of its most important achievements is the demonstration – through a rigorous analysis of facts and behind-the-scenes-aims of the different actors involved – that the customs union was not an economic plan that failed for economic motives but a political project which failed for political reasons. This point is soon highlighted in the first chapter, where the author shows how heavily instrumental the project was since the very moment of its conception, on both sides. France wanted to build a ninety-million-people Latin bloc that might be intermediate between West and East – needless to specify where the main pole was supposed to be. Rome meant to use the friendship with France *interalia* as a message directed to Washington, showing that Italy was worthy of US aid and also able to help herself (p. 36). The two partners planned to use each other for objects which were not necessarily coincident. Nevertheless, in December 1947 – when the first important report on the project was drafted by a mixed Commission – optimism reigned. But if Umberto Grazzi, Director of economic affairs at the Italian Foreign Ministry, had no doubts about the political implications and perspectives of the plan, the French still preferred the idea that the customs union should be gradually extended to more countries (Benelux, West Germany, Austria, Switzerland, Spain, Portugal, and even Great Britain) rather than rapidly transformed in depth just with Italy (pp. 43-44).

In the second chapter, covering the first three months of 1948, Bagnato describes the diplomatic negotiations which led to the signing of the protocol, on 20 March. She explains all the difficulties that, being already then on the way, were bound to contribute to the eventual failure of the project, the doubts of the Italian Foreign Minister Carlo Sforza, the perplexities of Pietro Quaroni, then Italian ambassador in Paris, the American sympathetic position towards the project, the importance of the Turin journey of the French Foreign Minister Georges Bidault being so close in time to the April crucial elections in Italy. The path of single events is traced with vivid awareness of their connections with the international arena and the domestic situations, just like in the third chapter, which analyses the diplomatic, cultural, and economic implications of the project up to the signature of the customs union treaty, on 26 March 1949. The author stresses the importance of the Cannes meeting in December 1948, even if describing it as a moment of reciprocal incertitude and consciousness of impasse, and points out that complaints and worries began to be expressed especially in France, during that period, by the press and mostly, of course, by the industrial sectors which could sense then menace of Italian competition.

The fourth chapter is devoted to hesitations and polemics which dominated the period till March 1950. Here Bagnato underlines more and more the political core of the project,
reminding that Rome was then interested in French favour as far as two major points were at stake – the colonial question and the Italian participation in the Atlantic Pact. The French ambassador in Rome, Jacques Fouques Duparc, wrote in June 1949 that the protocol had become the "corner-stone" of French-Italian relations, not only economically but tout court. Which was true. But the gradual deepening of complaints against and worries about the plan was also true. As Quaroni wrote to Sforza in July 1949, the customs union had been since the beginning a political move, and just since the beginning its economic implications had been rather fragile (p. 184 ff.). Moreover, other cards should also be considered within the Italian game. For instance, the relations with the German and American interlocutors might either work as in se aims, especially with Washington of course, or means of pressure on France in order to reinforce bilateral connections.

In 1950, Italian and French perspectives were radically changed by the Monnet Plan. It was clear for Rome that the Paris-Bonn axis jeopardised her international action. The scenery had enormously evolved since 1947. Huge international organisms had been created – the OECD, the Council of Europe, the Atlantic Pact – and French-Italian contacts within them were bound to gain more political importance than bilateral projects.

Previously political objects would gradually fade during the following years, pressed by growing economic oppositions. To tell the truth, there was still some room for bilateral advantages, as Bagnato brilliantly points out (p. 221). In fact, Paris needed Rome in the difficult confrontation with Bonn and should symmetrically avoid an excessive strengthening of German-Italian relations, which would make Bonn’s position potentially predominant. Once again, the customs union might prove a good instrument. It was not enough, of course, as was already clear at the Santa Margherita Conference in February 1951, and more and more evident during the period till 1955 (described in the figuratively-titled chapter “a slow euthanasia”), when Italy’s Europeanism could not but consider bilateral union as a project of the past and French interests focused on the entente with Bonn.

Bagnato, now at her second book, effectively uses her sources (French, Italian, and American archives, a wide range of published documents, more than a hundred books and essays, thirty periodicals) in order to build a very pleasantly-readable text where all variables – mainly political aims, economic necessities, and public opinion dynamics – are correctly considered in their interrelations. This demonstrates once more how interesting and scientifically useful the study of a failure may prove, provided a scholar is professionally so well-prepared as to investigate properly the consequences a project has anyway produced on the international background, also in terms of “learnt lessons”, future realisations, and successes. A vivid style, acutely-outlined characters (in particular Quaroni and Sforza), and a subtle analysis of the press are among the merits of a book which confirms the author’s strong methodological background and ability of exploring interesting “black holes” in the windings of international history.

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This major thousand page biography of the icon of integration by a Le Figaro littéraire critic reads like an official history. The author makes no real attempt to view his subject in historical perspective. The story is told as if it could tell itself. Organized episodically into thirty one chapters, the book lacks structure, as do, generally, the chapters themselves. Roussel often introduces whole documents – letters, position papers, even oral histories – into the
text and makes little effort to help the reader distinguish between what is essential and what is not. Yet the very amorphousness of the book is a source of strength and an aid to discovering the man behind the myth.

Roussel’s Monnet is the figure familiar to readers of the Memoirs – the practical visionary of few but powerful ideas centering on the need for a United States of Europe; the activist without office but endowed with immense powers of persuasion; the autodidact unbound by pedagogic and academic convention; the New Man, forward-looking, internationalist, and, at least partly, Americanized, in short, l’Inspirateur. The author, an eager disciple, finds little to criticize or even discuss concerning Monnet’s innumerable campaigns, projects, proposals, interventions, and other diverse activities. Their merits are mostly taken for granted and failure or shortcoming ascribed, sometimes tacitly, to a persistence of less advanced outlooks.

This book is far from being an exercise in hagiography, however, and in particular lacks the aphoristic slickness that lends a prophetic quality to the figure presented in the ghost-written, indeed team-written, autobiography. In drawing extensively from Monnet’s personal letters, the so-called notes rose (which he apparently is the only researcher yet to have consulted), Roussel has allowed the man, for the first time posthumously, to speak on his own behalf. The Inspirer is by no means always eloquent, logical, or technically expert. The letters cited by Roussel nevertheless impress one with Monnet’s sheer doggedness. Students of the man have long been struck by the intense loyalty he commanded from his devoted band of followers. Roussel reveals the effort that went into winning over the skeptical, or only partially converted, like Kissinger, Couve de Murville, and Beuve-Méry. It is now clearer how among policy-makers, Monnet gained the respect of the many as well as the devotion of the few.

The last four chapters of the book add much to our understanding of Monnet. He can no longer be written off after the mid-1960’s a meddlesome senior statesman even though obvious indicators point to that conclusion. His greatest contribution, the ECSC, belonged to the past. His main interventions in the 1950’s and early 1960’s – EDC, Euratom, and MLF – failed. With the collapse of Kennedy’s Grand Design his political power-base in Washington eroded. The Kiesinger and Brandt cabinets were less interested in Westintegration than Ostpolitik. De Gaulle, the arch-enemy, was in power, had blocked the British bid to enter Europe, eliminated supranationalism, indeed all but immobilized the EC.

This book provides a convincing mass of evidence that in these years of inaction and frustration Monnet deserves unique credit for having kept alive the European idea. Roussel shows that in making converts like Helmut Schmidt and Harold Wilson on the one hand and post-De Gaulle gaullists like Georges Pompidou and Valéry Giscard d’Estaing on the other, “Europeanism” became the shared property of all but the communist parties. Thus the basis was laid for subsequent annual meetings of heads of state at the European Council as well as special relationship between Giscard and Schmidt and Kohl. The author further suggests that the specialized studies carried out under the aegis of the Action Committee for the United States of Europe accomplished much of the spadework for the Werner Plan for economic and monetary union. His evidence lends credence to the conclusion that Monnet’s tireless advocacy did succeed, as always hoped, in changing mentalities. It was only just that The Inspirer lived long enough to experience the incorporation of the integration idea into Europe’s political culture.

Roussel’s approach to portraiture is incomplete, however. Monnet was more than political-operative and visionary. He was, or at least was thought to be, an institution builder – a man who could provide workable solutions. What is remarkable, in light of his immense achievement in transforming Europe, is how many of them failed. The book has little to say on this point, or in general about anything on the operational level. We learn very little about how Monnet ran the French Plan. Roussel takes the ECSC’s success for granted even though
many studies, included one singled out for exceptional praise in the text – Henri Rieben’s *Des ententes de maîtres de forges au Plan Schuman* – demonstrate that the old steel cartels, whose directors objected strenuously to Monnet’s *dirigisme*, provided its operating mechanisms. The author treats EDC as a self-evident good, in the face of overwhelming evidence to the contrary, shows none of the skepticism for Euratom evident in François Duchêne’s *Monnet*, and is respectful of the *Multilateral Force* proposal for a Euro-navy, which even most members of Monnet’s inner circle ridiculed. How, in spite of such failures, *The Inspirer* retained the power to inspire is something that must be explained.

If what Monnet learned from the school of life gave him the edge, it would behoove a future biographer, just for starters, to examine closely those of Monnet’s early professional experiences that touch upon developments that would subsequently give characteristic shape to the history of the twentieth century. Few young men of his generation were in so many places and did so many of those things that were on the cutting edge of Europe’s future – variously spending time on three continents and filling roles as *Kriegsmanager*, international civil servant and banker, turnaround expert, takeover artist, and workout specialist. Without this background Monnet would never have become a powerful voice from behind the scenes in wartime Washington and because of it he disposed of the managerial expertise that enabled him to stay a step ahead of his followers, made him indispensable at times even to his enemies, and enabled him to mold rather than respond to change itself.

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Personne ne peut ignorer désormais le livre de François Duchêne sur Jean Monnet. François Duchêne, un proche de Jean Monnet, nous offre une remarquable mise en perspective de la vie et de l’œuvre de Monnet, bien documentée et présentée avec rigueur. Malheureusement la production historiographique française récente n’est pas exploitée, mais ce livre n’est ni superficiel ni apologétique. C’est un livre de réflexion.


Dans l’affaire des achats d’avions américains en 1938, l’auteur attribue clairement à l’action de Jean Monnet, de Paul Reynaud et d’Edouard Daladier, l’expansion extraordinaire de l’industrie de guerre américaine. Malheureusement, seulement une centaine d’avions américains était disponible le 10 mai 1940! Le projet d’union franco-britannique du 16 juin 1940 est un projet de circonstance, face au nazisme, plus qu’un acte en faveur de l’unité fédérale européenne. Monnet fit son possible pour faire partir en Afrique du Nord les membres du gouvernement français disposés à poursuivre le combat. Ces épisodes dramatiques révèlent le rôle historique de cet inconnu, un rôle sous-estimé. Pourquoi de Gaulle n’a-t-il pu entraî-
ner Monnet avec lui? Duchêne croit que Monnet n’a pas eu confiance en de Gaulle qu’il trouvait ambitieux, voire dangereux.

Monnet a-t-il été l’auteur du Victory programme américain du 6 janvier 1942? Monnet y a contribué selon des modalités encore mal éclaircies. Il gagna, en tant que co-responsable du British Supply Council, la confiance des Américains.


Le plan de modernisation est-il la conséquence de la soif de dollars comme Duchêne le dit? L’explication est insatisfaisante car les historiens français ont montré les liens entre reconstruction, planification et mouvement long des mentalités. La Commission du Bilan national dont Monnet et Uri étaient si fiers est née d’une idée d’Edward Bernstein, économiste américain du FMI. Mais l’auteur, limité aux sources anglo-saxonnnes, oublie les responsabilités prises par Paul Ramadier, chef du gouvernement. La volonté de lutter contre l’inflation n’est pas uniquement d’inspiration américaine. René Mayer en janvier 1948 s’est attaqué au mal en remettant de l’ordre dans la monnaie française. L’auteur surestime les pressions américaines sur le gouvernement Queuille à l’automne 1948. De même, la critique de la IVe République tourne à l’obsession (p. 173 et 178); il convient de reconnaître que la IVe République a été capable de poursuivre des buts à long terme. Elle a permis à Monnet de conduire la modernisation du pays, d’ouvrir l’économie sur l’extérieur et de bâtir des institutions européennes, en dépit des erreurs dramatiques, d’ordre institutionnel et colonial, du régime. Le Plan, d’après Duchêne, aurait contribué à faire émerger la notion d’expansion dans les esprits. Ne peut-on pas penser, à contrario, que le Plan a été imaginé parce que ces dispositions d’esprit existaient au sein de la Résistance? La lecture de l’ouvrage de François Duchêne renforce l’idée que la position française en faveur d’une Organisation européenne de coopération économique (OECE), forte et permanente, venait de Monnet. Mais il faut ajouter qu’elle était partagée par la classe politique française, à condition que cette organisation soit conduite par la France et la Grande-Bretagne. Monnet ne réussit pas. L’OECE fut une organisation intergouvernementale.

Monnet, si pragmatique, avait-il déjà l’idée du plan Schuman dès 1941? Nous en doutes. Le projet d’août 1943 est très loin de celui du 9 mai 1950. La vérité, qui est la grande-ur de Monnet, est qu’il avait décidé, contre de Gaulle ou Morgenthau, de traiter l’Allemagne à égalité avec les autres nations. L’absence de Monnet au Congrès de la Haye de mai 1948 est soulignée. Duchêne n’en donne pas une raison claire. Mais pourquoi y aurait-il été? Monnet n’était pas alors un fervent partisan de la fédération ou de la confédération européenne. L’auteur nous incite justement à mettre en rapport le succès du plan Schuman et la position délicate de la France sur le problème allemand. Le projet de Monnet de Haute Autorité est lié à la recherche de la paix en Europe plus qu’à la construction
de l’unité européenne. Mais pourquoi Schuman a-t-il pu convaincre si aisément le conseil des ministres d’accepter des délégations de souveraineté? La surprise a joué, l’urgence, le facteur personnel aussi. Cette république offrait décidément des opportunités d’action. Duchêne montre que les Etats-Unis ont été constamment présents dans les négociations du traité de la CECA. Il y eut un véritable front franco-américain pour décartelliser la Ruhr. Mais alors, pourquoi Monnet a-t-il accepté de nouvelles fusions dans la Ruhr (p. 249)? Monnet a accepté la CED alors qu’il n’y croyait pas (p. 231). Certes! l’idée d’une défense européenne était dans l’air au Conseil de Europe. La guerre de Corée a été un facteur déclenchant.


This monograph deals with the most severe test to which America’s policy vis-à-vis Western Europe so far has been submitted – a policy that traditionally aimed both at integrating Europe and, simultaneously, at strengthening the ties of the transatlantic alliance. This test coincided with one of the most critical phases in the process of European integration as such, which began with the coming into effect of the Treaty of Rome and ended with de Gaulle’s famous first veto on Great Britain’s application for membership of the EEC. It is one of the book’s conclusions that the French President’s “non” amounted to a resounding defeat for America’s European policy as well. Would this frustration have been avoided if America had learned its lessons from the defeat of the EDC in 1954? Based on a careful study of the available documentary and archival evidence, the author’s answer is that American policy makers indeed learned from that experience, as far as tactics were concerned, but that they did not perceive any real alternative to the basic policy line they had so far pursued – a policy of creating a situation of strength by unifying non-communist Europe and then by anchoring it firmly to the Atlantic alliance, in other words of implementing what President Kennedy called his “Grand Design”. As the author proves, a recurring motivation behind this policy was the concern about the future of Germany, the fear that any other policy might lead to the danger of “losing” Germany to the Soviet Union. If the United States wanted to implement its policy, it had to avoid giving the impression of imposing its will on the Europeans; that is to say it had to stay away from the middle of the stage, but it had nonetheless still to speak, as David Bruce put it (p. 309), from the prompters box.

From this position and not the least with the German problem in view, the United States conducted what the author considers a primarily politically motivated diplomacy which consisted of supporting the creation of the Common Market and discouraging British efforts to set up EFTA as a rival organization. Thus Macmillan’s request for Britain’s admission to the Common Market could justly be regarded as a preliminary victory for America’s European policy.

The most telling portion of this penetrating study covers the road that led from that victory to de Gaulle’s veto and to the gradual abandonment by America of Kennedy’s Grand Design. The author makes the point that it was the interdependence of economic, security related and political considerations that was responsible for its ultimate failure. Above all, as she shows, it was the problem of nuclear armaments and the accompanying striving for great power prestige. The United States defended its exclusive world power status, Great Britain tried hard to maintain it, Gaullist France scrambled for it; as soon as the opportunity arose, West Germany was suspected of reaching out for it, once Adenauer had stepped down. The author recounts at length how the Eisenhower and the Kennedy administrations attempted to contain their allies’ ambitions – Eisenhower somewhat ambivalently, Kennedy with more resolution by trying hard to cut short nuclear armaments proliferation and, above all, by preventing the Federal Republic from becoming a nuclear power. Kennedy’s problem was that, in the name of a transatlantic partnership, he also wanted to maintain a semblance of equal-
ity among the major European powers and between them and the United States. The way out of this dilemma seemed to be European integration in the economic and political field, and Atlantic integration at the military and nuclear level. To Eisenhower Euratom plus NATO seemed to offer a solution, to Kennedy the MLF (Multilateral – nuclear – Force). The problem was that neither Great Britain nor Gaullist France shared Kennedy's predilection; it was an ironic consensus that both powers disliked supranational structures and aimed at an exclusively national control of atomic weapons for themselves. To de Gaulle the United States appeared to stand in the way of his nuclear ambitions. If Great Britain became a member of the EEC, he feared, it would identify with American interests. The Nassau meeting between Kennedy and Macmillan (December 1962), which led to the American offer of Polaris missiles to Great Britain – a major blunder, as Kennedy himself admitted from hindsight – confirmed de Gaulle's apprehensions. Much to the American policy makers' surprise, the author argues, the Nassau agreement prompted de Gaulle to veto British membership of the EEC.

In unravelling this "saga" and analyzing the evolution of America's strategy and European countermoves, the author demonstrates that the American diplomacy largely failed to perceive the linkage de Gaulle had established between the economic and the strategic dimensions of Europe's integration. Ultimately, Kennedy's Grand Design was a shambles, although he refused to admit it. Alternatives had not been considered. His successors resigned themselves to a more pragmatic approach.

The author is unable to see heroes or villains among the protagonists of this dispute. She is content to uncover various degrees of inconsistency, pettiness and self-delusion in each one of them. If there were “heroes” following a more long range perspective, the author finds them among diplomats and policy makers of the second rank, especially in the European network with Jean Monnet and his entourage made by “Europeanists” of the State Department like David Bruce or George Ball. It is to them that she ascribes the high degree of consistency which the basically pro-integrationist orientation of America’s European policy preserved over the Eisenhower and Kennedy years. The strength of this group was that it could act behind the scenes and make use of personal connections to smoothen negotiations; but this strength, the author concludes, was also its weakness, as it lacked a popular mandate or public support to fall back on when confronted with a determined adversary like de Gaulle – a problem well known until the present day.

This book is well written. It would have been even more readable if the author sometimes had relegated lengthily paraphrased documents from the text into the footnotes. In addition, both specialist and general reader would have appreciated some more general conclusions of her account. But these minor flaws should not detract from the scholarly merits of this book, which bears witness of much intensive research.

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For a long time the academic debate about British policy towards Europe after the Second World War was dominated by the thesis of British exceptionalism in which Britain is assumed to have deviated from an allegedly normal West European development. According to this view, Britain was, unlike its European partners, semi-detached from the efforts at economic and political integration on the continent and only very reluctantly integrated into the European institutions initially formed without it. While successive British governments
could and should have led the continental Europeans, so the argument runs, they failed to provide leadership and eventually missed several European “busses”, primarily in connection with the Schuman Plan in 1950 and the Messina initiative in 1955. Yet the British Sonderweg thesis is the result of a fixation with the so-called inner Six, the founding members of the European Economic Community (EEC), and of an almost complete lack of a comparative perspective that might take into account the European policies of other peripheral West European countries. Not unlike its German counterpart, the British Sonderweg debate has always revealed more about the domestic political struggle for Britain’s identity than about the history of British policy towards European integration.

The simpler versions of the Sonderweg thesis are now slowly being replaced by a more thorough analysis of the motives and domestic and external influences driving British policy, as well as a more realistic assessment of the options open to British policy-makers at the time. With his publications John W. Young has in the past contributed significantly to a more historical analysis of British European policy, arguing, for example, that British participation in the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in the early 1950s was never a serious option for Labour or the Conservatives. In his new book he gives a concise overview of British policy towards European integration since 1945 and arrives at a more balanced judgement of British failures and successes in Europe – the latter including, more recently, the internal market programme, the first attempts at a reform of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and the enlargement of the European Union.

Even though the book covers the entire post-war period, based on his previous research, Young is naturally stronger on the period 1945-55 and again on the Wilson governments of 1964-70. He is also much better on Britain’s diplomatic relations than economic and domestic political forces, particularly party politics, which has arguably played a decisive role in shaping British attitudes towards European integration. Young’s concentration on high diplomacy, reflected in his one-sided reliance on Prime Minister, Cabinet and Foreign Office correspondence, is regrettable. It is also typical of the still dominant traditionalist approach to international relations history in Britain which in the past has absorbed few of the intellectual impulses from research in the United States or France, as, for example, the significance of long-established mentalities and pre-conceptions of the international environment for the policy-making process.

While Young critically examines certain elements of the Sonderweg thesis, such as the bus analogy, he sticks to others, such as the supposed aversion of British policy-makers in the early post-war period to any form of supranational integration, or the seemingly all-important contribution of Britain’s destiny as an island (but what about Eire?), ending up with the usual cumulative explanation of British semi-detachment. The book unfortunately contains some weaknesses which are not untypical of such overviews in English, especially those which are quickly written. It is regrettable, for example, that Young sometimes refers to other authors’ arguments without giving any bibliographical details. All the same, the book provides a good overview of British European policy since 1945, though perhaps its capitulation of facts is stronger than the sometimes muddled and ambivalent interpretation of them.

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In his book, based on a Ph.D. thesis, Lord sets out to analyse British entry to the European Community (EC) under the Heath government in the conceptual framework of cognitive theory of decision, an international relations theory which emphasises the importance for foreign policy behaviour of historical analogies, stereotypes and misperceptions rather than rational choice. Lord suggests that this theoretical approach might help to explain what he maintains is the failure of British decision-makers to appreciate that EC entry implied a decision about the future framework for policy-making and their consequent inability to optimise British influence within the Community (p.179).

It is unfortunate that Lord does not care to substantiate the assumption that subsequent British governments have been unable to realise their policy goals in the European Union (EU) efficiently. His failure to do so may be the result of a lack of a comparative perspective which is typical of much of the existing literature in English on Britain and European integration which is preoccupied with explaining a British *Sonderweg* in Europe after World War II. In some policy areas British governments have in fact been quite successful in shaping Community policy. Arguably, the internal market programme of the 1980s or, more recently, the British ability to manipulate EU policy on Bosnia at the expense of the weakest side in the war, the Bosnian Muslims, are cases in point.

But even if the underlying assumption of this book is correct, Lord fails to establish a clear link between misperceptions and policy failure. The main problem here is that for lack of access to government records the analysis is based on House of Commons debates, newspaper articles and some interviews. One essential feature of British European policy has, however, traditionally been policy-makers’ double speak: what they claimed in public as part of the party-political game, which Lord rightly identifies as important, too, for understanding British policy, tells us very little about their actual intentions. For example, historical analysis of the free trade area negotiations in the 1950s and of the first British EEC application shows that the argument about parliamentary sovereignty, which played such an important role in the House of Commons debates, was completely irrelevant to the executive decision-making on British European policy.

It is nonetheless worthwhile to examine the underlying expectations and perceptions of national governing elites in relation to what economic or political benefits EC membership might yield. Lord shows convincingly that by the early 1970s the expectation that EC membership would automatically result in higher growth rates and provide an efficient cure for Britain’s economic malaise was the more significant misperception by comparison with the belief, already held by Macmillan when he applied in 1961, that once inside the EC, Britain would automatically assume a leadership role and thus enhance its international influence and status.

The book confirms that international relations theory can be helpful for historical research on European integration. Unfortunately, it is also a good example of the methodological limits of international relations theory. The concrete analysis of the case study is only very loosely connected to the theoretical exposition in the introduction, and theory jargon is much too often thrown into the analysis at random. The belief in a certain theory, it seems, sometimes obscures more than it helps to explain.

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This volume is the latest in a series of official histories of the Bank of England, following on from Sir John Clapham’s two volumes covering 1694-1914 (first published 1944) and R.S. Sayers’ two volumes plus a volume of documents covering 1891-1944 (first published 1976). The current volume differs from its predecessors in several ways. First of all, rather than cover two centuries or even half a century, it does not even make two decades. On the other hand, it does come in one volume – and since that volume sells for £75, this is just as well. Secondly, the earlier volumes were written by distinguished economic historians who had a command of the world beyond that of the Bank; in contradistinction, John Fforde is a former Executive Director of the Bank and not a trained historian. There is a gain in the sense of a banker conveying the culture and approaches of his Bank and delineating the art of the possible, but there is a loss in that he clearly does not have the light-handed command of Sayers of the general economic context, domestic and international. One outcome is that thirdly, this is internalist history with a vengeance. Finally, publications of this sort should really have references more forthcoming than those supplied by Fforde. When Sayers wrote, the Bank was not nearly as welcoming to outside scholars as it now is; indeed, its archives were not as well listed and organised. It was not, therefore, surprising that he eschewed references, but both the Bank and the expectations of scholars have since changed.

Violating strict chronology, the book begins with what should have been the single most important change in the nature of the Bank since its establishment in 1694: its nationalisation, and therefore its transformation from a private to a public institution, by the Labour Government in 1946. Actual change, however, was evolutionary rather than revolutionary. We then reverse back to 1944 and 1945 and look at the Bank’s involvement in Bretton Woods and the American Loan of 1945, both unhappy experiences for the Bank, as, with Britain under ferocious American pressure, the Bank fought against principles and conditions which it thought likely to be profoundly damaging to future British interests. The following chapter delineates one immediate result: the sterling convertibility crisis of July-August 1947. For Fforde, Britain’s claim to be a monetary Great Power disappeared through the window along with her reserves.

There then follows two long chapters tracing themes. The first looks at external monetary problems from 1947 to the Korean War, with a substantial portion of the chapter being devoted to European payments problems and the European Payments Union (EPU), while the second concentrates on domestic monetary policy 1945-51, such as it was: Fforde makes clear that it was not very effective. This is followed by a transition chapter looking at both domestic policy and approaches to convertibility 1951-52: here the main themes are the reordering of monetary policy (the Conservative Government which came into power in 1951 proposed to treat Bank Rate as a flexible instrument of monetary policy, rather than fixed, as had Labour); the proposal to float the pound (Robot); and the beginnings of the Collective Approach (capitalised by the Bank) to convertibility. The following chapter looks at the rise and fall of the Collective Approach 1952-55, paying close attention to the inability of the Bank and the Treasury to agree on how to deal with the fact that Britain’s interests appeared to demand convertibility while the country was unable to satisfy the conditions laid down in the Collective Approach. In the end the Bank failed to convince the Treasury to take what it believed were necessary measures, resigning itself to warning the Government that it would all end in tears.

After a short chapter on the Bank and the Suez Affair of 1956, there follows two thematic chapters on external and domestic policy. The first, on the march to convertibility 1957-58, details a fascinating exercise in European financial diplomacy. The second, on domestic
monetary policy 1952-58, is a sombre tale, of conflict between the Bank and the Treasury on how to control credit and of manoeuvres by the Bank to forestall greater Government control over the Bank as well as over the commercial banks. The Bank gave ground tactically and thereby lost some independence; it is not entirely clear that the resulting policies were in the long-term interest of the country. But this part of the story ends abruptly, and the book closes with a summary chapter of the Bank’s relations with the City of London, for whom it claimed to speak to the Government.

For those interested in British and European post-war history, and not just monetary history, this book is vital: one-sided it may be, but the sense the reader gets of deep immersion in the arguments within the Bank, and then in the detailed negotiations with external powers such as the Treasury, is invaluable. It is also a very good source for the British side of European developments, whether it be integration and the EPU, or relations with, in particular, the French and German banks in the march to convertibility. Internationally, there are substantial sections on relations with the Commonwealth and with Argentina over the sterling balances and with the United States over financial policy during the entire period – not to mention during the Suez Crisis.

But in the end, it is those who care about financial policy and the history of central banks and their relations with their governments who will find this book interesting in itself. Fforde allows himself – and has been allowed by the publisher – the luxury of extensive consideration of various viewpoints when looking at how policies were developed. I do not know of any other history of this type where this is shown so clearly, with names attached to proposals and conflicts allowed to emerge into the daylight. At the end of the nearly nine hundred pages you feel that you know Cobbold and Bolton, Mynors and Siepmann, O’Brien and Peppiatt; you also begin to suspect that some of them, at least, were not up to the task. Given, however, the nature of the economic problems facing Britain during this period, both internal and external; given the decline in the independent powers of the Bank; and given the lack of strong Governmental leadership in what were often seen as technical issues, coping rather than conquering is probably the most that the Bank can reasonably be expected to have done.

Kathleen Bark
University College London


With the Danish No in the Maastricht referendum in 1992 in fresh memory a study on the consequences of EC membership for this small member state invites some intriguing questions. Is EC membership particularly difficult for highly developed welfare states? How does EC issues interact with domestic politics? Is there a potential Anglo-Nordic bloc in the EC? A study of the Danish experience in the EC might throw light on such questions of general European interest.

The present volume from the series *European Community Membership Evaluated* offers 27 contributions over a wide range of themes from foreign relations, over political institutions to cultural and economic policies. Following the pattern of the series the contributions are organised thematically in order to answer a common set of questions: What are the effects of the EC on domestic policies and domestic politics in Denmark? What are the gains and losses ensuing from Denmark’s EC membership? The questions are answered in depth in a wide variety of issue areas. But the price for this richness in detail and thematic scope is the lack of a common explanatory framework. This problem is exacerbated by the lack of an
introduction binding the contributions together and introducing the central themes of the collection.

Broader explanations of Danish EC relations are provided in some of the opening contributions. Yet, after reading these stimulating articles one is left with a feeling that the “Danish riddle” remains unanswered. A reason for this might be the national focus implicit in the quest to draw a balance sheet for Denmark’s EC relations. The emphasis on the national perspective distracts attention away from one of the strongest and most interesting features of Denmark’s relationship to the EC: the interaction between EC affairs and domestic politics and the function of EC issues as a battleground for domestic disputes over welfare issues, environmental protection and labour relations. Danish EC relations are not only about national interests and a struggle for influence between Denmark and the Community; it is also about sectoral interests within Denmark and a struggle for power and influence between the Danes themselves.

Another result of the national perspective of explanation is a tendency to focus on Denmark’s special traits. Yes, Denmark is special (all countries in fact are), but which special features are of particular importance and where does Denmark’s EC relations resemble those of other countries? A comparative approach might more consistently have positioned the Danish EC experience in relation to that of other European countries. The contributions on policies and issue areas are of high quality and constitute the backbone of the book. Readers wanting to know about e.g. the role of the Danish parliament in EC affairs, about environmental policy or labour relations are well advised to consult this volume. It should be noted, though, that being published in 1992 during the Maastricht ratification process the book is limited in its coverage to the pre-Maastricht EC. A brief postscript added by the editor discusses the Maastricht Treaty and the outcome of the Danish referendum in 1992. But readers looking for information on Danish EU relations such as the Edinburgh Agreement, the 1993 referendum and Denmark’s exceptions from the Maastricht Treaty must look elsewhere.

Johnny Laursen
University of Aalborg, Denmark

Richard T. GRIFFITHS (ed.). – Socialist Parties and the Question of Europe in the 1950s. Leiden/New York/Köln, E.J.Brill, 1993, 280 p. ISBN 90-04-09734-1. 75,00 US$. “European utopia or capitalist trap?": this fundamental question forms the title of Griffiths’ introductory chapter and as such is essentially the underlying theme of this stimulating and accessible collection of articles. The different national contexts of post-war Europe provoke a self-evident multitude of divisions between European Socialist Parties in their attitudes to the political reality of European integration. The common dilemma that each Party needs to resolve, however, is how to reconcile ideology and the implications of supranationality, or, moreover, are Socialism and the European idea at all reconcilable? A second question follows naturally from the first, which Griffiths succinctly indicates in his opening pages: is there, in fact, a single socialist response?

With these lines of enquiry in mind, Griffiths and his colleagues set themselves an ambitious two-fold task: firstly to analyse the intra-party debate within the chosen European states; secondly to highlight the inter-party differences and similarities in their approach to the European adventure.

There is growing literature on Socialist Parties and the European question and this collection of articles by leading academics is certainly a most welcome addition. The approaches and styles are varied and some chapters are naturally more accessible than others. For some
of the countries concerned, the Socialist Parties’ attitude to the beginnings of European integration is already extensively researched and documented. For others, previous research is limited and access to primary sources has often proved difficult. This is the case, for example, for both the Austrian and Spanish Parties.

Following on from the editor’s introductory contribution, there are sixteen further chapters which can be roughly divided into four sections. The first examines Party attitudes in five of the original six countries to accept the supranational structure of the European Coal and Steel Community (hereafter ECSC), (Luxembourg is the exception). The second groups together the British Labour Party and the three Scandinavian parties who all reject supranational solutions during the fifties. A third section looks at what Griffiths calls “special cases”: the Spanish Socialists in exile and the Austrian party who have no freedom in the definition of foreign policy. Finally, Christian Pineau, Mario Zagari and Marinus van de Goes van Naters make appealing guest appearances in the form of eyewitness testimonies. These interviews bestow a sense of warmth and inject liveliness into the text, serving to remind the reader that history and politics are human undertakings. The interview with Pineau is particularly stimulating, shedding considerable light onto the role and opinions of Jean Monnet.

Unfortunately, it is of course not possible to comment here on each individual contribution. Only the salient themes can be identified. A whole series of economic, political and military considerations influence the stances taken by Socialist Parties on the European developments of the 1950s. In addition, the concept of European integration can mean entirely separate things for different factions of the Parties, often leading to acrimonious or even divisive internal battles. The relative importance of the European question is furthermore often conditioned by whether the Party in question finds itself forming a majority government, in coalition with other political forces or in opposition. Although the six continental parties finally opt for supranational organisation, this does not mean that there is common ideological vision. An inextricable knot of factors and interplay of forces dictate and influence these choices, as the chapters dedicated to these parties clearly demonstrate. Indeed it is the Parties that adhere to intergovernmental solutions who seem to have fewer difficulties in defending and uniting behind their political choices. A common theme to all the countries studied is the predominance of domestic considerations and the interpretation of the structures needed to further national policy goals – rather than a religious belief in Europe for its own sake – which influence ideological and policy stances.

The result is clearly a complex and illuminating story. Indeed, one of the pleasures of the book is the capacity of the contributors to express obviously intricate issues succinctly, making it accessible to the specialist and non-specialist alike. However, the strength of its breadth and depth of coverage, is perhaps also the book’s central weakness for the balance between the whole and sum of its parts is not always apparent. The demanding reader does sometimes feel frustrated by an impression that the individual chapters fail to make the transition from comparative description to comparative analysis. Despite Griffiths’ thorough introductory examination of the internal dynamics of the International Socialist and his careful identification of the key facets to the problems, this contribution does in retrospect seem to be more of an afterthought than a strong desire to set an analytical framework. In this respect, it would have been satisfying to sense each chapter dovetailing towards an integrated whole. Moreover, it is a shame that Griffiths does not return with a concluding chapter to make the digestion of the rich contributions more enjoyable. Despite these perceived analytical weaknesses, neither the undoubted quality of the individual chapters, nor the relevance of the issues raised, nor the reader’s satisfaction are in any sense diminished or disturbed.

The relevance of the historical context of the 1950’s for today’s environment can not be ignored. The book clearly raises issues that are familiar to seasoned observers of contempo-
rary European affairs. Within the Socialist ranks, the main lines of division have an uncanny habit of continuing to shape left-wing political life, thwarting efforts to speak with a single voice: Economic and Monetary Union, German reunification, the Common Agricultural Policy, harmonisation of social legislation and most essentially the choice between supranational or intergovernmental solutions. This collection makes it overriding clear that intrinsically bound up in the intra- and inter-party divergences over European integration is the search for the fundamental identity of socialism. This is as true in the nineties as it was in the fifties.

Rachel Wilson
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The thirty-one chapters in this collection, which originated in a Florence Conference in 1989, provide a rich repository of information and interpretation. A brief notice can address only a handful of the issues raised.

The question mark in the title has provoked some debate among the contributors themselves. Ennio Di Nolfo and Robert O’Neill, for instance, both query it on the convincing grounds that whatever the future may hold, an era has come to an end. The reason that the editor, Antonio Varsori, and Dilys M. Hill of the Mountbatten Centre of the University of Southampton, in whose series the volume appears, adduce for the question mark, i.e. that “it conveys that feeling of uncertainty about the future which characterises our everyday life”, would seem to suggest that they should also regard the mid 1950s, when they insist that certainty superseded uncertainty in international affairs, as the real end of an era. The issue may seem pedantic, but it does point to a lacuna in even so ambitious a volume, the absence of any systematic attempt to apply consistent criteria to the problem of periodisation. Some of the rather erratic chronologies of the sectoral and chapter headings suggest a rich variety of subjective concepts of periodisation among the contributors. There is nothing wrong in itself with this, but it would have been instructive to have the issue debated systematically.

It is striking how appraisals of the recent past are influenced by assumptions about the future. Vojtech Mastny sounds at times almost nostalgic for the “good” Cold War. It is indeed possible that the years since 1989 will come to seem, and perhaps sooner rather than later, a major missed opportunity, if Russia in particular, but perhaps some other Eastern European states also, fail to achieve democratic stability. The arguments of John Keep, Charles Maier, and Robert O’Neill in support of a generous Western approach have not found much favour among policy makers. These may yet come to be condemned for myopia, and would probably deserve the condemnation even if circumstances work out better than can reasonably be feared. Nor does there seem to have been much response to O’Neill’s challenging proposal for the establishment of an alliance for development in Europe, and for a reconceptualisation of the appropriate education for young policy makers in Central and Eastern Europe.

Several contributors assume that military power is no longer crucial, and must increasingly yield pride of place to political and especially economic power. This seems to me to be as doubtful as it is plausible. What is perhaps surprising is that the volume pays so little attention to cultural influences, especially American cultural influence on Europe, which became so pervasive during the Cold War era, for better or for worse. May be it would have happened anyway, but the Cold War surely greatly accelerated it. The lacuna is all the more striking given the impressive chapters by Vera Zamagni, Leopoldo Nuti, Pierre Melandri,
Charles Maier, Lawrence Kaplan, and Marinella Neri Gualdesi on the economic, military and political aspects of American influence in Europe.

Perhaps the most eloquent tribute to American cultural influence lies in the decision to publish the proceedings in English, although it would have been easier to do so in Italian. The manner in which the sometime major cultural languages of Continental Europe are being gradually marginalised in international discourse is itself likely to remain one of the more enduring consequences of the Cold War era.

J.J.LEE, University College Cork


This is the first scientific research of events and developments resulting in the German unification in 1990. Based on profound historical research and striving for extensive perspectives it offers a wealth of information about the second German unification process, the outline of which will be lasting in the long run. As a long-standing American correspondent in West Germany, familiar with the development of East-West-relations, Elisabeth Pond did not only critically analyse the varied source material of the actors of German unification, but she also had more than 100 conversations with well-known politicians, senior officials and leading experts. In this way she could partly compensate the deficiency of internal sources. At the same time she recorded several impressions and facts, which probably have not been documented in writing.

From Pond’s point of view, the demonstrations in Dresden, Leipzig and Berlin at the beginning of October 1989 finally made the breakthrough of the revolution: the demonstrators became more and more self-confident and conscious of their new power; the SED-leaders on the other hand did not have the courage of using force, as they realized that the Soviet Union would not support them any longer. Gorbachevs Perestroika and the critical acceleration of reforms in Hungary and Poland confused them completely. Pond describes the total vacuum of leadership in East-Berlin, resulting from this confusion and explains (with it) the paralyzing of the whole system of repression as well as the enormous power of the popular movement. From the 9th of October the movement could push through what it wanted: at first the overthrow of the SED-regime and then the membership of the Federal Republic.

According to Pond’s analysis, Chancellor Helmut Kohl and Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher as well as President Bush and his administration took over the function of channeling the movement. Kohl was first of all interested in maintaining his position as a leading politician of the Federal Republic and in preventing unconsidered actions which might jeopardize the process of a peaceful change. He accelerated the process of change actively under the pressure of the East German migrants and the growing expectation of the GDR-population, who no longer trusted their own politicians. After his visit in Moscow on February 11, 1990, which gave him the impression of a limited opportunity, the German unity became a short-term target.

Bush’s part was less obvious, but nevertheless important. Pond is able to prove that Bush and Baker had decided even in November 1989 to promote the German unification – in order to make sure that it would not result in an early disintegration of NATO. At his summit with Gorbachev in Malta on December 2 and 3 1989, Bush left the Soviet president in no doubt about his interest in German unification, but he assured him that he wanted to avoid isolation of the Soviet Union as the Germans unified. Both, pressure and promises finally
caused Gorbachev to accept the Federal Republic to stay in the Western alliance. At the beginning of June 1990, Shevardnadze assured Baker of Soviet acceptance of German membership in NATO, pending the working out of conditions such as the future size of the German army. After that Gorbachev’s success on the 28th Party Congress on July 12 and 13 only had to be waited for, before the Soviet leader could present the answer to Federal chancellor Kohl.

Many passages in the book show clearly that German unification is also an important chapter in the history of European integration. Genscher’s striving for an island of stability in Europe and Mitterrand’s fear about a possible German drift to the East made sure that at the end of the 80s, a European framework was ready to receive German unification. That made it easier for the Bush-administration to decide for a promotion of German unification. After Kohl dropped his previous resistance to France’s pet European Monetary Union and central European bank, Mitterrand also was reconciled with unloved German unity. Thus German unification was acting as a catalyst for European integration, the Maastricht treaties were a result of recent German unity.

From Pond’s point of view, apart from the Soviet Union France also belonged to the losers of the process. For her the new Europe necessarily is under German leadership. This may be an exaggeration, as this opinion underestimates Germany’s dependence on an integrated Europe. Nevertheless, it does not alter the correctness of her results that the American actual strength in Europe will be welcome also in future as a balance between the different European powers. And it is certainly true that the Germans as “partners in leadership” now take a special responsibility.

As far as the security-political scene of the 1980s is concerned, Pond is sometimes inhibited by American prejudices. Moreover, some passages are superseded by new detailed research. This concerns for example the decision to open the wall on November 9, 1989, which in the meantime turned out to be a half-revolutionary act. But these comments do not detract from the convincing general view. Pond’s book is well written and excellently documented. It represents a fascinating reading material for all who witnessed the process of German unification and give thought to its significance.

Wilfried Loth
Universität Essen


While Switzerland as a whole remains aloof from the progress of European integration, a number of Swiss intellectuals like Denis de Rougemont or Jean-Rudolf von Salis have played an important role in achieving a cultural definition of Europe. In this context, the influence of Gonzague de Reynold (1880-1970), a member of the French-speaking aristocracy of Fribourg and a belligerent as well as controversial right-wing intellectual, on the conservative European ideology of ‘Abendland’ from the time between the wars till well beyond the year 1945 should not be underestimated.

All through his life, Reynold had his biggest audience amongst that university educated bourgeoisie of ‘Carolingian’ Europe which was governed by a pessimistic view of contemporary culture, by antiliberalism and catholicism. His vague nostalgia for a catholic ‘Reich’, a reactionary utopia based on the Holy Roman Empire, harks back to the empire of the Franks under Charlemagne and to the universal monarchy of the Hohenstaufen emperors. Their amalgamation of the Latin and the Germanic cultures appears as the culmination point
of the European history. This nostalgia is transferred to the authoritarian systems of the 30s. Mussolini’s Italy, Hitler’s Third Reich up to the massacre in June 1934, Franco’s Spain, Pétain’s French regime at Vichy appear in Reynold’s eyes as part of a ‘revolutionary’ progress in the original sense of the word: of a historical roll-back which does not mean a return to the past but to the future, as he would express it. Reynold’s contemporary hero was Salazar, the Portuguese dictator, whose Christian corporatism appealed to him far more than the idea of the state as realised by Fascism. Accordingly, his sympathies were with the Austrian antiliberal Ignaz Seipel and with certain Helvetian tendencies in what became known as ‘frontism’ in the Switzerland of the 30s. He once said in ironical self-depreciation that he preferred to be called a ‘reactionary’ rather than a ‘conservative’. The term ‘reactionary’, as he understood it, was of course a synonym for ‘revolutionary’ (or rather, ‘counter-revolutionary’).

The Swiss historian Aram Mattioli (Basel/Lucerna) is a specialist for the history of the authoritarian Right and of contemporary catholicism and one of the few historians to attempt an analysis of the phenomenon of European right-wing intellectualism. His excellently written and exhaustive biography of Gonzague de Reynold is the first scholarly study to be published about this subject. Mattioli uses a vast and impressive range of published as well as unpublished sources, not least the material available from Reynold’s own papers which – as an exception to the rule – are fully accessible and seem to have remained completely ‘unpurged’. On this basis, he describes the important steps in the development of this Helvetian nationalist and right-wing catholic, of the antidemocratic, antiliberal and antisocialist, the ideologist of authoritarian change in Switzerland, the partisan for a Christian state and the ideologist of ‘Abendland’ during the Cold War.

Reynold, after renouncing his political ambitions in 1941, turned to writing what became his most important work, the seven volumes of “La Formation de l'Europe” which are an arsenal of occidental anticommunism, of bipolar East-West-thinking and of biting comments on contemporary reality. Reynold’s achievement in writing this work lies in his insisting on a historical definition of Europe. Its weakness is his insistence on the cultural superiority of Europe which makes him turn the past into a utopian future. The Holy Roman Empire remains for this enemy of supranational institutions the example of a federal organisation of states, of polycephalous Christian unity.

Champions of conservative political thought as different in their views as Denis de Rougemont, Otto von Habsburg and André Siegfried paid tribute to Gonzague de Reynold as a “great European”. Robert Schuman confessed in 1955 that the spiritual encounter with Reynold’s work had been decisive for his European engagement. Thus, it is no surprise that Gonzague de Reynold is remembered as a connoisseur of European cultural history and as one of the most renowned essayists in the Romanic world. In the context of European integration, he represents a catholic, restorative tendency the historical importance of which can hardly be overestimated. The mentality of the Old Regime survives in this attempt to salvage what is left of ancient privilege and class subordination by countering modernization with conservative as well as revolutionary ideas of renewal. Such ideas were consistent with contemporary attitudes of the 20s through to the 60s; in the academically educated bourgeoisie of Portugal, Spain and Latin America, of France, Switzerland, Austria, Belgium, and the Netherlands they found a fertile ground in which to take roots up to the present day.

Today, these ideas appear antiquated, but they still remain powerful political tools. Mattioli’s biography of one of their principal authors is a key for understanding the political and historical relevance of European attitudes taken up by right-wing intellectuals in this century, a field of study which had so far been explored only at its outer rims. Readers should not be deterred by the fact that large portions of this eminently readable book treat of historical events which shaped Swiss rather than European history. All these events reflect a change which affects the continent as a whole. In many instances, Mattioli’s point of view as a
Swiss historian, unaffected by the delusion of greatness, which sometimes slumbers in German and French historians’ minds, helps to make visible the European context of events which are usually treated under the heading of binational relations, not least those between Germany and France.

Guido Müller
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"Die Rolle Dritter in den deutsch-französischen Beziehungen
Les Tiers dans les relations franco-allemandes".

Drittes Kolloquium des „Deutsch-Französischen Komitees für die
Erforschung der deutschen und französischen Geschichte des 19. und 20. Jahrhunderts"
in Paray-le-Monial vom 5. bis 8. Oktober 1994


deutsch-französische Verhältnisse nach 1945 stark in Abhängigkeit vom komplizierten Wechseleinspiel der Großmächte USA, UdSSR und Großbritannien.


In Hinblick auf die transnationalen Faktoren betonte Louis Dupeux (Strasbourg) bei seinem deutsch-französischen Vergleich für die Zeit von 1919 bis 1939 die nationalistischen Faktoren im Partei-Kommunismus beider Länder, der bald die ideologische Ausrichtung auf das internationale Proletariat verließ. Vor dem Hintergrund der nationalen Krisen 1923, 1929/30 und 1938/39 in Deutschland und 1933/34 in Frankreich verschärfte sich jeweils die nationalistische Linie der kommunistischen Parteien. Das gilt sogar für die KPD im Exil (Ulbricht). Annie Lacroix-Riz (Toulouse) sah im Vatikan vor allem unter dem Nuntius Pacelli, dem späteren Pius XII., die Strategie, nach den beiden Weltkriegen jeweils Deutschland gegen Frankreich zu unterstützen und dabei in besonderem Maße auf den „amerikanischen Trumpf“ zurückzugreifen. Dagegen rückte François G. Dreyfus (Paris) die wichtige Rolle konfessioneller Bindungen für die Entwicklung der deutsch-französischen Kulturbeziehungen hervor. War für die winzige protestantische Minorität in Frankreich (1914: 1,3%), die allerdings unter den hohen Funktionären rund 20 Prozent ausmachte, zwischen 1850 und 1933 Deutschland besonders im Bildungs- und Sozialwesen immer ein Modell, so blieb die nationalprotestantische, deutsche Evangelische Kirche vor allem nach 1918 auch gegenüber der kleinen kalvinistischen Gemeinde in Frankreich ignorant. Die Ökumene spielte vor 1933 für die deutsch-französische Aussöhnung noch eine zu geringe Rolle. Dagegen besaßen Barth und Gogarten im protestantischen Frankreich eine starke Ausstrahlung.


Das nordamerikanische Zivilisationsmodell in Form amerikanischer Managementpraktiken (Heidrun Homburg, Bielefeld) und als sozio-kulturelle Herausforderung im Deutschland und Frankreich der Zwischenkriegszeit (Hans-Manfred Bock, Kassel) provozierte ähnliche und abweichende Reaktionen bei den Wirtschaftseliten (eher positiv) und führenden Intellektuellen (eher negativ) in beiden Ländern. Die Gemeinsamkeiten und Unterschiede in der Rezeption amerikanischer Modelle verdienen in Hinblick auf das Verhältnis von nationalen und europäischen Identitäten in Deutschland und Frankreich stärkere Beachtung.
Schemenhaft scheinen dahinter Europakonzeptionen auf, ob stärker radikaldemokratisch oder eher holistisch orientiert. Damit wurde der Faktor Europa als Dritter in den deutsch-französischen Beziehungen auch auf wirtschaftlichem und kulturellem Feld in die Debatte eingeführt, ohne daß ihm eine eigene Sektion gewidmet war.

Die Konfliktfelder auswärtiger Kulturpolitik Frankreichs und Deutschlands im Rahmen der internationalen Organisationen „Institut International de Coopération intellectuelle“ im Völkerbund und der Nachfolgeorganisation UNESCO zeichnete Werner Scholz (Leipzig/Tübingen) nach. In der Komplexität solcher internationalen Institutionen zwischen Nationalinteressen und transnationalem politischen Handeln wurde damit zum Abschluß der Tagung ein wichtiges Forschungsfeld deutlich, das für die deutsch-französischen Beziehungen in diesem Jahrhundert bei weitem noch nicht ausgelotet ist.

Die Publikation der Akten des Kolloquiums wird von Klaus-Jürgen Müller (Hamburg) vorbereitet.

Das Thema des kommenden Kolloquiums des „Deutsch-Französischen Historikerkomitees“ sind die „Nachkriegsgesellschaften in Deutschland und Frankreich im 20. Jahrhundert“. Es findet vom 15. bis 17. September 1996 in Otzenhausen (Saar) statt. Die Organisation haben Herr Prof. Dr. R. Hudemann (Universität des Saarlandes), Frau PD Dr. B. Bouvier (Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Bonn) und Herr Prof. Dr. L. Dupeux (Université de Strasbourg III) übernommen.

*Guido Müller*
*Rheinisch-Westfälische Technische Hochschule Aachen*
Integrating Europe or Ending the Cold War?
Churchill's post-war foreign policy

Despite Churchill's plans for a united post-war Europe, as vaguely formulated during the war, and his ambiguous calls for European unity in the immediate post-1945 period, his last years as Prime Minister (1951-55) clearly demonstrate that Churchill did not believe in a united Europe. His aim was not European integration but the revival of the "special relationship" with the United States and, above all, Britain's survival as a world power. By means of an informal "Big Three" summit conference he hoped to end the Cold War (including the division of Germany). He wished to facilitate a general East-West détente which would enable post-war Britain to recover economically and remain one of the world's leading powers. Churchill was thinking in terms of equality with the superpowers. He was not willing to regard Britain as being on a par with the continental European powers – thus he never thought of Britain as part of united supranational Europe.

Ronald W. Pruessen
Cold War Threats and America's Commitment to the European Defense Community:
One Corner of a Triangle

This article argues that there were at least three important sources for strong US efforts on behalf of EDC: "Cold War" concerns which aimed to strengthen European muscle vis à vis the USSR; "dual containment" logic which saw a multilateral institution as a means of keeping control of a rearming Federal Republic of Germany; and traditional pre-Cold War views which produced a desire to use "integration" to solve a variety of what Americans saw broadly "European" problems.
Cet article affirme que les États-Unis avaient au moins trois raisons importantes pour appuyer fermement la CED: le souci, lié à la Guerre Froide, de renforcer l’Europe de l’Ouest par rapport à l’URSS; la logique du “double endiguement” qui voyait dans une institution multilatérale un moyen de contrôler le réarmement de la République Fédérale d’Allemagne; et finalement une vue traditionnelle datant d’avant la Guerre Froide, qui comptait utiliser l’intégration européenne pour résoudre des problèmes considérés comme spécifiquement européens par les Américains.

Dieser Artikel befaßt sich mit der EVG als einem Aspekt der amerikanischen Europapolitik. Er hebt drei wichtige Gründe hervor, die das entschiedene Engagement der USA zugunsten der EVG erklären: zum einen den aus dem “Kalten Krieg” zu erklärenden Wunsch, die Stellung Europas gegenüber der UdSSR zu stärken; ferner die Logik der “doppelten Eindämmung”, die in einer multilateralen Organisation ein Mittel sah, mit dem die Wiederaufrüstung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland kontrolliert werden konnte; schließlich eine traditionelle Sichtweise, die auf die Zeit vor dem Kalten Krieg zurückgeht und in einer europäischen Integration die Möglichkeit zu erkennen glaubte, spezifisch europäische Probleme zu lösen.

Pierre Guillen
The Role of the Soviet-Union as a Factor in the French Debates on European Defence Community

The evolution of the perception of the Soviet threat, the consideration of USSR’s possible reactions, the effect of initiatives taken by Soviet diplomacy greatly influenced the debates on EDC in France. For the supporters of the European army, it represented the means of having German rearmament accepted that the Soviet threat had made necessary; they thought that the USSR would react less sharply than on the direct armament of the FRG. The responsible diplomatic services and the military chiefs on the contrary considered that EDC was only delaying efficient defence against the USSR. In political and parliamentarian circles, a strong current developed against EDC, by fear of Soviet reactions and in order not to compromise the chances of resuming the East-West dialogue. With the decreasing international tensions from 1953 onwards, implementing the EDC treaty was judged inopportune.

L’évolution de la perception de la menace soviétique, la prise en compte des réactions probables de l’URSS, l’effet des initiatives de la diplomatie soviétique ont une influence importante sur les débats en France à propos de la CED. Pour les partisans de l’armée européenne, c’est le moyen de faire accepter le réarmement allemand, rendu nécessaire par la menace soviétique; ils pensent que l’URSS réagira moins vivement qu’à un armement direct de la RFA. Les responsables de la diplomatie et les chefs militaires estiment au contraire que c’est retarder une défense efficace de l’Europe contre l’URSS. Dans les milieux politiques et parlementaires, un fort courant se développe contre la CED, par crainte des réactions soviétiques et pour ne pas compromettre les chances de la reprise d’un dialogue Est-Ouest. Avec la diminution de la tension internationale à partir de 1953, beaucoup jugent inopportun de mettre en oeuvre le traité de la CED.

Die Debatten Frankreichs über die EVG wurden von mehreren Faktoren beeinflußt: der Entwicklung der Bedrohungsvorstellungen gegenüber der UdSSR, der Rücksichtnahme auf mögliche sowjetische Reaktionen auf die Bildung der EVG und der Wirkung von Initiativen der sowjetischen Diplomatie. Für die Befürworter der EVG war diese das Mittel, um eine deutsche Aufrüstung akzeptabel zu machen, die durch die sowjetische Gefahr notwendig geworden war. Sie hofften, die UdSSR würde auf eine europäische Armee weniger scharf reagieren als auf eine nationale Aufrüstung der Deutschen. Die verantwortlichen diplomatischen und militärischen Stellen glaubten dagegen, daß die EVG den Aufbau einer wirkungsvollen Verteidigung gegenüber der UdSSR nur verzögern würde. In politischen und parlamentarischen Kreisen kam eine starke Strömung gegen die EVG auf, weil man dort sowjetische Reaktionen fürchtete und die Chancen für die Wiederaufnahme eines Ost-West-Dia loges nicht beeinträchtigt sehen wollte. Mit der Abnahme internationaler Spannungen seit 1953 wurde dort die Anwendung des EVG-Vertrages für immer weniger opportun gehalten.
Vladislas Zubok
The Soviet Union and European Integration from Stalin to Gorbachev

The author concludes, on the basis of Russian archival evidence, that there were three major phases in the evolution of Soviet attitudes towards the idea of a united Europe. Under Stalin it was regarded as a reactionary myth, masking a threat to Soviet security. From Khrushchev to early Gorbachev the Soviet leaders wavered between the realization that a united Western Europe was in Soviet interests, and fears to “lose” Eastern Europe. Only later Mikhail Gorbachev began to seek a place for the USSR in the process of European integration.


Unter Rückgriff auf neu zugängliche sowjetische Archivalien unterscheidet der Autor drei Phasen in der Entwicklung der sowjetischen Haltung zur Idee eines geeinten Europa: Unter Stalin – Phase 1 – galt die europäische Integration als ein Mythos reaktionärer Art, hinter der sich eine Gefahr für die sowjetische Sicherheit verbarg. In der Ära von Chruchtschow bis zu den Anfängen Gorbatschows schwankte die sowjetische Führung zwischen der Erkenntnis, daß ein vereintes Europa nur in sowjetischem Interesse liegen könne, und Befürchtungen, Osteuropa zu „verlieren“. Erst der spätere Gorbatschow begann, im Prozeß der europäischen Integration für die UdSSR einen Platz zu suchen.
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